It implies a certain historically established form of organization of human joint life activity, which arises as a consequence of the need to satisfy the needs of society. Institutions are aimed at implementing various communicative functions and are characterized by their ability to determine people’s behavior with the help of established
rules (public opinion), taboos (prohibitions) and so on. Actually, this term in various contexts can have four main meanings:
- a group of people personifying an institution;
- an organization designed to perform specific functions;
- some through which meaning is given to relationships in society;
- set of institutions;
- groups of people concentrated in one area of life.
The structure of social institutions contains the following elements:
Modern sociologists, as a rule, identify four main specific spheres of social life. It is in them that relationships and institutions are formed.
Economic social institutions: examples and essence
Public social institutions: examples and essence
This refers directly to relationships within society between different age, gender, national and other types
groups. This also includes categories associated with social regulations and taboos. For example, family, upbringing, friendship, social movements, etc.
Political social institutions: examples and essence
Actually, this is all that covers the corresponding sphere of life. That is, relations in the state system - civil society. The institutions represented here are the legal and judicial systems, government and parliament, civil rights and political parties, the military and legal institutions.
Spiritual social institutions: examples and essence
This is the domain of culture and intangible science, education, religion, art and so on.
Introduction. 3
1. 4
2. Institutions of the Soviet economy. 9
16
Conclusion. 24
Literature: 25
Introduction.
The economic actions of an individual take place not in an isolated space, but in a certain society. And therefore it is of great importance how society will react to them. Thus, transactions that are acceptable and profitable in one place may not necessarily be viable even under similar conditions in another. An example of this is the restrictions imposed on human economic behavior by various religious cults.
In order to avoid the coordination of many external factors that influence success and the very possibility of making a particular decision, within the framework of economic and social orders, schemes or algorithms of behavior are developed that are the most effective under given conditions. These schemes and algorithms, or matrices of individual behavior, are nothing more than institutions.
The purpose of this work is to consider internal and external Soviet and modern economic institutions.
Define the concept of “institution”;
Find out which institutions are called external and which are called internal;
Consider Soviet economic institutions;
Consider modern economic institutions;
Draw conclusions based on the material being studied.
During the research, the works of domestic and foreign authors on economics, institutional economics, encyclopedic publications, as well as data posted on the Internet were used.
1. External and internal institutions of the economy.
First, you need to define what an institution is, in particular, an economic institution. Institute is a set of roles and statuses designed to satisfy a specific need.
Definitions of institutions can also be found in works of political philosophy and social psychology. For example, the category of institution is one of the central ones in John Rawls’s work “A Theory of Justice.” In economic theory, the concept of institution was first included in analysis by Thorstein Veblen.
Institutions are a common way of thinking as regards the particular relations between society and the individual and the particular functions they perform; and the system of social life, which is composed of the totality of those acting at a certain time or at any moment in the development of any society, can, from the psychological side, be characterized in general terms as the prevailing spiritual position or the widespread idea of \u200b\u200bthe way of life in society.
Institutions are dominant and highly standardized social habits.
Institutions are the rules, the mechanisms that enforce them, and the norms of behavior that structure repeated interactions between people.
We can also say that institutions are formalized rules and informal norms that structure interactions between people within economic systems ().
Institutions regulate access to the legal use of rare and valuable resources, and also determine the principles of this access. They determine what these or those interests are and how they should be realized, taking into account the fact that the very rarity of these resources, which makes accessing them difficult, forms the basis for rivalry and even conflicts in the struggle for their possession. Institutions regulate (structure and consolidate as socially recognized practices) such a struggle between various interests. They define the rules of the game, as well as the goals that can be achieved in that game, but not the moves that players must make during the game, remaining within the institutionally defined space of opportunities, choices and incentives. Institutions determine the ways in which resource-scarce conflict can be mitigated and resolved.
The functioning of institutions is determined by the type of their activity, cultural traditions and many other factors, among which efficiency is far from being the determining parameter. Changes more often occur to them because the values that determine their existence change, or they themselves become incompatible with other values and institutions, but not for reasons of efficiency.
In the economic literature, two types of institutions are distinguished:
External - establishing basic rules in the economic system that ultimately determine its character (for example, the institution of property);
Internal – which make transactions between entities possible, reduce the degree of uncertainty and risk and reduce transaction costs (enterprises, types of contracts, means of payment and credit, means of storage).
Therefore, the study of institutions, as well as other complex economic phenomena, must begin with their classification. Let us take a closer look at the typology of institutions depending on their functional role in the economy. This classification includes two types of institutions:
System (or external)
Local organizational (internal).
Systemic institutions are those that determine the type of economic order, that is, the dominant type of economic system. These institutions establish the basic rules of economic activity, therefore they include not only purely economic rules and norms, but also political and ethical ones, without which the effective functioning of the entire economic system is impossible. An example of systemic institutions are institutions that specify and protect property rights, determine the procedure for making and changing economic decisions, norms of economic ethics, etc. ()
Local-organizational are institutions that structure interactions associated with concluding transactions both on the open market and within organizational structures. Institutions such as, for example, stock and commodity exchanges, banks, firms, not only make transactions between various economic entities possible, but also reduce the degree of uncertainty and risk, and help reduce transaction costs. The functioning of such institutions is associated with the activities of related organizations, which creates a dichotomy.
The division of institutions into systemic and local organizational allows us to deepen the analysis of institutional equilibrium. The institutional “markets” of the above two types of institutions are formed and function separately. This does not mean that the formation of systemic institutions does not influence the functioning and selection of local organizational institutions and vice versa. Their interaction can be compared by analogy with the goods of higher and lower orders in K. Menger. Consequently, systemic institutions are goods of a higher order, and local organizational ones are of a lower order.
It seems very important, especially for an economy in transition, to distinguish between external institutions as fundamental prerequisites for a market economy and internal institutions created by corporations in the course of their development. External institutions form a set of fundamental norms and rules on the basis of which the implementation of a market economy is possible. These are institutions that guarantee and protect property rights, ensure responsibility, freedom and obligatory fulfillment of contracts, form the basis of a market economy, while at the same time being derivative elements of a general legal democratic and free state order.
Within this given framework, numerous direct market (internal) institutions arise that make connections and transactions between subjects possible, reduce the degree of uncertainty and risk, that is, they represent forms of economic adaptation to external institutions. Their formation proceeded from the bottom up and continued for a long time, being tested for strength, efficiency and compliance with the interests of economic entities. The functioning of internal institutions is constantly carried out under double control: legal - from the state - and economic - from the market.()
All of these institutions are united by common features:
1) they are characteristic of the division of labor system;
2) they operate on the basis of the principle of contractual relations.
So, by systemic institutions we mean institutions that determine the type of economic order. An example of systemic institutions are institutions that determine the procedure for making and changing economic decisions, norms of economic ethics, etc.
Local organizational institutions are those that structure interactions associated with concluding transactions both on the open market and within organizational structures. This category includes institutions such as, for example, commodity exchanges, credit, financial, investment and other institutions.
2. Institutes of the Soviet economy.
It is known that the Soviet economic system lacked those mechanisms and institutions that are the main subject of study of Western economic science: competitive (albeit imperfect) markets, currency exchanges, many financial instruments, etc. Russian economists were left to develop separate blocks of economic theory, and they did this despite ideological pressure. Let us consider several specific institutions of the Soviet economy and the problems associated with them.
These institutions set the framework for the Soviet economy, and the country would feel its consequences for another 20-25 years. Up to 80% of the fixed assets used by today's enterprises were created under Soviet rule. During the same period, it grew to 70% of workers who are working now, and to 50% of workers who will be working in 10 years. Their economic, legal, and technological culture were formed under the conditions of a Soviet-style economy. So, let's consider such institutions as: the party, the State Planning Committee and
company.
In the literature, the Soviet people, members of the CPSU, and the Politburo were positioned as owners in the Soviet-type economy. Most likely this is not the case. It is enough to remember how elections to party bodies were held to abandon the idea that the Soviet people were the owners. The political structure that existed in the USSR opened the way to the top of the bureaucratic pyramid only to people who were party members. This was an option from 17 million party members. The Politburo could include 17 people, i.e. one person in a million. But at least they didn’t choose from non-party members; only party members had a chance to enter. On the other hand, it is impossible to reduce everything to the Politburo, because members of the Politburo could be re-elected if they lost the support of regional committee secretaries, members of the Central Committee, or clearly did not fulfill the tasks assigned to them, etc. Thus, it was a totalitarian self-sustaining system, and since it was self-selecting, interest was always concentrated at the top. There are a number of serious works on this subject. Svetozar Pejović, the leading institutionalist who wrote about the Soviet economy in the 1970s and 1980s, considers the Politburo to be the supreme owner because its members bore some liabilities for their decisions. However, the fact that the Politburo was the final decision-making authority does not mean that its members were the real owners.
Members of the Politburo did not exist as real owners - they were very significantly limited in their decisions and could not go beyond fairly strict consumption standards. The limited opportunities for satisfying personal interest and material consumption for themselves and their families that Politburo members had clearly demonstrate that they were not owners. They were the top executives, and they were as squeezed as the party bureaucrats subordinate to them, if not more so. The owner is free in relation to the subject of his property, and the members of the Politburo were as unfree as possible. Collective responsibility is a very accurate description of the system that existed in our country.
The hypothesis was widely discussed (and it is closest to the truth) that the nomenklatura was the collective owner in the USSR. This point of view was held, for example, by M. Voslensky and M. Djilas. The nomenklatura included all leaders included in the administrative and party subordination systems (i.e., about 1 million people). Party organizations nominated and approved their candidacies. All personnel movements were carried out from the corresponding department or the Central Committee, or regional committees, or district committees of the CPSU. By controlling personnel appointments, the party thus controlled the very replenishment of the “new class”.
The Soviet-style economy is often compared to the “Asian” mode of production, which was also characterized by a pyramid of officials (though there was a tsar at the top, but in many states he after some time became a ritual victim).
It can be assumed that the Soviet system is a unique system in which there was no supreme owner who had free choice in relation to objects of public property.
There is a fundamental, from the point of view of economic theory, position: a complete unconditional private owner is always and everywhere needed; If the interests of the private owner are not protected, then with any distribution of property the system will be economically ineffective.
The classics of Marxism believed that commodity relations in society are harmful because they stimulate selfishness, and viewed them from a purely technological point of view, believing that it was possible to collect all resources and all information in the center, systematically calculate and optimally distribute.
The idea of a “single factory” dominated our political economy. In the 1990s major mathematicians who worked at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute (among whom was, for example), created the theory of optimal functioning of the socialist economy - SOFE - which assumed the possibility of optimizing all flows at the level of the national economy, which they saw as a “single factory”. Naturally, this was only a theoretical model; it was not applicable in practice. In reality, three types of transaction costs prevent society from functioning as a single factory - measurement costs; costs of acquiring and transmitting information; agency costs. But still, public property, which acts as the property of a socialist state, had to find in itself some mechanisms for implementation, and state planning became such a mechanism.
The State Planning Committee was the center where all information about the production capabilities of all enterprises was collected, and where forecasts were made, i.e., several resource allocation strategies were calculated in order to satisfy certain needs. Thus, a unique experiment was carried out in the USSR for 70 years. In fact, it began from the times of war communism, although the State Planning Committee itself, as an institution that collects information and gives commands to the localities, arose about five years later, in the early 1920s. This experiment had limitations because there was no market in which resources were valued.
All that the State Planning Committee could do and honestly did, because many brilliant specialists worked there, was to collect information and plan the distribution of resources in the amount of 2000 items. In the State Planning Committee itself, about 2,000 responsible employees were involved in this. In addition, the State Planning Committee gave tasks to approximately 50 line ministries, which detailed them. The range of products controlled directly by the ministries amounted to 38,000 items. 2000+38000=40000 product items in physical terms, described with a certain standard - this is the maximum that the Soviet system was capable of at the apogee of its information and computing capabilities. The system of material balances for more than 2000 items - a huge table that showed in dynamics which industry what went where - was a huge achievement of Soviet economic science. The heir to this scientific school is the Institute of National Economic Forecasting. However, despite this amazing planning system, it should also be noted that it has a very significant negative side.
With 40 thousand planned (passed through 50 thousand officials) product range, its actual product range in the 1970s was was by no means 40 thousand, but somewhere around 1-1.5 million. That is, the State Planning Committee captured and aggregated only 4% of the real product range, even if it amounted to 1 million items. This coarsening of assessments, teams, and strategies led primarily to our lag in the system of technological approvals for products.
It is the limited computing ability that explains the presence of 2 thousand in the State Planning Committee and 40 thousand in total across the country of product names.
So, the planning system had its shortcomings and risks. The enterprise planning system itself often failed. The enterprise received both a production plan and suppliers, and the suppliers of the enterprise were strictly determined; there were no alternatives. And if the supplier of a given enterprise disrupted deliveries, what then? That is, the system of natural planning, natural indication of production plans and suppliers for each enterprise was extremely fragile, which constantly led to some breakdown - to the failure of plans.
The enterprise was a separate part of public property. The creation of a separate enterprise, in contrast to the idea of a “single factory,” is a huge step towards reality, which was partially made under, and the enterprise received basic rights under. Thus, we can distinguish two stages in the existence of Soviet enterprises. At first it was a Stalinist-type enterprise, for which all indicators were strictly planned and which did not have the right to sell its funds at all. And then this Kosygin-type enterprise, which was able to form material incentive funds, independently set a labor plan, produce above-plan products and sell them on the free market (prices remained fixed, but the supplier was not specified). But in any case, both an enterprise of the Stalinist type and an enterprise of the Kosygin type represent a certain isolated part of public property.
The enterprise was managed by a director who acted as the main agent of the government. The company received from above:
1. Nomenclature, or rather, product range.
2. Financial plan.
3. Suppliers and consumers with fixed prices for products.
4. Capital Resources.
The enterprise was controlled along three lines:
State Planning Committee and the Ministry - according to the range of products; The Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, the industry bank - on the implementation of planned ratios, planned profitability; party structures.
So, compared to a conventional enterprise, the Soviet enterprise had three features:
Did not pay for fixed assets, receiving them for nothing;
Hired workers on the labor market, but the wage fund and specific rates were fixed:
Suppliers, consumers, supply prices and sales prices were indicated. At that time, in terms of innovative potential, our enterprises were in no way inferior to Western ones. They often did not have the funds to build on their success, but R&D and initial innovation into the current production process were at a very high level. As already mentioned, foreign enterprises have two types of costs - transformation (or production) and transaction, while Russian enterprises, in contrast, have three types of costs - transformation (or production), transaction and social. Many factories operate a kindergarten, houses, a tram line that runs throughout the city to the factory, and much more.
3. Institutions of modern economics.
From a theoretical point of view, it can be easily shown that the quality of the “institutional and legal structure” as well as the definition of “property rights” influence economic development as a whole. Consequently, institutions determine the “rules of the economic game” in society. Since investment is necessary for economic development, and investment is facilitated by credit development, protecting the interests of creditors as part of the “institutional structure” has an important impact on the functioning of the domestic financial market and, therefore, on growth prospects. It is necessary to separate external and internal institutions. According to the definition, external institutions are those whose independence is sanctioned by the state, and the independence of internal institutions is sanctioned by society().
Weak external institutions reduce the economic efficiency (albeit in different ways) of both federal and unitary systems. In a unitary economic system, weak institutions can lead to unclear definitions of the boundaries between public and private powers and activities. In Russia, the main problem with fiscal federalism is that external institutions are weak, while “internal” or socially sanctioned institutions operate more effectively, even within the public sector. The unfavorable situation in Russia is caused by the phenomenon that especially the vertical structures within the public sector are effectively an imposed system of fiscal federalism, which is characterized by pressure from the center in case of disobedience.
In Russia, the institutional weakness of the public sector is expressed not only in the opacity of the tax system and mechanisms for the division of powers between different levels of government, but also in the fact that lower-level authorities often do not act in the interests of the center and there are no mechanisms for resolving conflicts in such cases. In fact, Russia's economic problems are related to the poor quality of the “institutional and legal structures” proposed by the center, in addition to the problem of pressure from the center. Incentives operating within the “informal” economy are often based on low taxes and, accordingly, result in lower costs of doing business. Incentives for authorities to act on the basis of “unofficial” principles may arise from a lack of decision-making mechanisms.
Moreover, the influence of the “unofficial economy” on the budgetary sphere is manifested in the following ways: firstly, unofficial transactions of different levels of government from the budget expenditure side are caused mainly by non-payment or delay in payment of wages and payments for supplies. Secondly, on the revenue side, barter and so-called “surrogates” when paying taxes, as well as regional tax incentives, as well as tax arrears are a symptom of this phenomenon. These tax breaks and debt allowances, widespread throughout Russia, can be seen as indirect subsidies to those firms not mentioned in the budget. Third, regional governments may accept tax breaks even on federal taxes due to both pressure from the center and a lack of transparency. One of the most important features of the Russian economy is that some government bodies are closely linked to these informal and partially hidden transactions that are not reflected in the budget.()
However, the functioning of the existing budget system largely depends on the coordination and harmonization of the activities of different levels of government: in Russia, the problems of pressure from the center are reflected in polarly different budget situations at the federal and regional levels. It is significant that the consolidated budget deficit is almost entirely concentrated at the federal level, while the budgets of the federal subjects as a whole have been balanced over time ().
For the Russian economy, the problem of the “Soviet legacy” is of fundamental importance. Indeed, since then the technological basis of the country has undergone any significant changes, but rather for the worse - the lost elements of the production system turned out to be significantly more than those that appeared again. With investments in domestic industry steadily declining (the scale of investment activity in the late 90s was approximately five times lower than at the beginning of the decade), obviously, we can only talk about attempts to maintain some elements of the old technological system, but not about its qualitative renewal. The constitutive properties of the Soviet economy are well known: moral and physical obsolescence, structural inconsistency of the system of production capacities with the modern needs of the country, insolvency of management systems.
At the same time, the environment in which the decrepit production apparatus operates has changed fundamentally. The planned economy with its unique, but still relatively stable system of reproduction is a thing of the past, and the “Iron Curtain”, previously impenetrable to foreign producers, has disappeared. In a historically short period of time, domestic industry found itself in a market environment alien to it.
The idea that the adaptation of subjects of a complex social system to a new reality occurs in an optimal way has not been proven theoretically, and, moreover, has not been confirmed by practice. Adaptation is underway, but its forms can take on a very bizarre character. This is exactly the situation that is observed in the domestic industry, the basis of which is still formed by enterprises that lag behind their Western competitors in terms of technical equipment by thirty years, and in terms of management level - by almost fifty years. It is clear that products produced under such conditions, with rare exceptions, are not at all competitive with foreign analogues either in quality or in price.
It would seem that in an open market economy such enterprises cannot exist and are forced to either transform into Western-style companies or leave the market. Russian practice does not refute this position, but enriches it in the sense that this process can be extended in time for an indefinitely long period.
Such a scenario at the beginning of the process called perestroika was quite difficult to foresee in detail, but with hindsight it is easily explained: the “critical mass” of inefficient production in the domestic industry turned out to be sufficient for the newly emerging Russian economic institutions not so much to correspond to classical ideas about the market, how many “served” the interests of the inefficient producer.
A similar development of events is possible in any country with a transition economy, but in Russia it manifested itself most clearly. This is largely due to, to use a term popular in many sectors of Russian society, the “exceptionalism” of Russia. Exceptionality, first of all, from the point of view of the availability of the richest natural resources, the export of which for many decades has made it possible to significantly mitigate the consequences of many domestic poorly understood economic decisions. It is the export of resources with low added value that objectively makes it possible to carry out reforms with a slowness worthy of better use. Instead of serving as a kind of buffer softening the shock of radical socio-economic transformations during the formation of a new institutional and technological environment, export earnings go to maintain (in fact, preserve) outdated social institutions.
The second factor slowing down the transition to a full-fledged market economy is the greatness of Russia, or more precisely, its manifestation that it is almost impossible for a great country to impose new values from the outside. She must come to these values herself, and this happens the faster the harsher the internal and external conditions of existence. The absence of serious external threats and the ability to satisfy a significant part of basic needs through imports are obviously not the strongest incentives for implementing fundamental and, undoubtedly, painful changes for Russian society in its economic behavior.
Protecting the interests of an inefficient manufacturer cannot be viewed as an unambiguously negative phenomenon. In Russia, where such producers constitute, in legal terms, a “qualified majority,” failure to take their interests into account would inevitably lead to a social explosion, the consequences of which would obviously be tragic. Therefore, the problem is not that these interests are protected, but that the protection of these interests itself has long assumed a self-sufficient character. Self-sufficient in the sense that Russian economic institutions are actually (despite the regularly repeated “correct” goals like a spell) focused on the reproduction of an inefficient producer.
Typically, efficient and inefficient producers do not get along well with each other. The first one quickly displaces the second one, but in Russian conditions, and this is their main specificity, the desire to support an inefficient producer naturally, although not very noticeably for Russian society, resulted in a struggle with an efficient producer.
Thus, Russian economic institutions actually perform the function of protecting against the emergence of an efficient producer. In the financial and economic sphere, this is expressed in the fact that, under the guise of collecting taxes, all financial resources that he cannot hide from the tax inspectorate are withdrawn from an efficient producer if possible; in the legal sense, that any activity is regulated so strictly that there is no longer any need to talk about any freedom of entrepreneurial activity; in the socio-political sense, it is that without merging with the bureaucracy at all levels, no serious business can even be started.
If the infringement of the interests of an efficient producer were limited to excessive activity in the tax sphere, this could still be explained by the common desire in many societies to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs in order to get everything at once, and only then be surprised to discover that the golden eggs are in the goose itself no, that they appear only insofar as they are a product of her life activity. However, as already noted, the main function of Russian economic institutions is not just supporting an inefficient producer, but creating conditions for its sustainable reproduction. In addition, those few efficient industries that still exist in an environment hostile to them still cannot support the rest of Russia. That is why the system that prevents the emergence of an efficient producer is much more developed and is not limited to purely fiscal instruments.
The desire for sustainable reproduction of a obviously unviable system, which (and few doubt this) will die out over time anyway, cannot be explained by one or even several reasons. Let us dwell only on a few, without which it is impossible to understand this phenomenon.
A market economy presupposes a model of behavior that is fundamentally different from the one that was developed and instilled in Russian citizens (and not only them) during the years of the administrative-command system. Market thinking, which involves relying primarily on one’s own strengths, personal responsibility for the consequences of decisions made, accompanied by an appropriate level of remuneration (with a plus or minus sign depending on the “quality” of the decision made), is poorly perceived by people brought up on ideas in which sometimes even reminiscent of market ones, only with the opposite sign.()
It is known that the proportion of people who are able to effectively engage in entrepreneurial activity is approximately the same for different societies and rarely exceeds 5%. In this sense, Russian society differs from others only in that in our country only a small part of the remaining 95% perceive the market as a natural form of life. The reasons for this situation can be listed in dozens, but, most importantly, they all lead to one consequence: the majority of Russian citizens are afraid of the market and do not see their place in it.()
It would be strange if the state, representing the interests of the conservative majority of the population, supported the creation of a living arrangement in which this majority sees a threat to its own existence. Hence the long-term conflict between the state and business. A conflict in which the winner has long been known, since business knows what it wants, and the state is fighting not only and (increasingly lately) not so much against business, but is torn apart by internal contradictions as more and more of the population accepts market values . Actually, this is the tragedy of modern Russia: when trying to stop the advance of the market, instability is created in society (partly unconsciously, and to a large extent consciously), which, better than any formal prohibitions, limits investment in the domestic economy. And if there is no investment, then there are no new jobs. Who, under these conditions, will “vote” for a full-fledged market, which will inevitably make huge hidden unemployment obvious, but, it seems, will not create new jobs.
The Russian economy is no longer planned, but it is no longer a market economy. She's really transitional. Moreover, the pace of its transformation depends on the speed of evolution of economic institutions. The current system of institutions already allows individual business structures not only to exist, but also to a certain extent to develop, but it is still far from creating the conditions for the development of society as a whole on market principles. Indeed, to the extent that a business is closed from the state, it is also closed from external investors. Cases of successful development using one’s own financial resources are well known, but strong economies are created not only and not so much by individual successful entrepreneurs, but by the synergistic effect of their interaction within the framework of an institutional environment stimulating development. By preventing the influx of capital into growth areas, Russian economic institutions set a “bar” that limits the pace of development of the national economy and does not allow capital to enter truly promising areas of activity. In fact, limited only by their own financial resources, Russian entrepreneurs cannot quickly increase production to capture new markets that are constantly emerging, but do not remain unoccupied for long. Moreover, they cannot squeeze out their foreign competitors who have access to financial resources sufficient to implement almost any development program.
It is obvious that the existing economic institutions do not correspond to national interests. However, the problem is that Russian society needs time to realize that being in a state of “I won’t sit in a cart or walk on foot” is not only ineffective, but also simply dangerous.
The future of the Russian economy is decisively determined by the pace and nature of the transformation of Russian economic institutions, primarily at the federal level. This does not mean at all that regional programs for stabilization, and, in the future, local economic growth, are unproductive. Indeed, federal policy, to one degree or another, is a reflection of processes occurring precisely at the regional level. The use of the limited, but still considerable potential that regional authorities have will help create the prerequisites for starting the investment process at the all-Russian level. Only highly professional local management and the emergence of new leaders capable of effectively organizing the reproduction process can create any significant resource for the start of economic recovery. At the same time, it is necessary to be aware that individual regional development programs, no matter how deeply they are developed, in principle cannot eliminate systemic risks, the sources of which lie outside the responsibility of the regions.
The current situation cannot persist indefinitely. Russian society, if not of its own free will, then under the threat of its continued existence as a society, will be forced to reform its basic institutions and nominate new leaders.
Conclusion.
So, in the course of the study, we found out that institutions are formalized rules and informal norms that structure interactions between people within economic systems. Systemic, or external, are institutions that determine the type of economic order, that is, the dominant type of economic system. These institutions establish the basic rules of economic activity, therefore they include not only purely economic rules and norms, but also political and ethical ones, without which the effective functioning of the entire economic system is impossible.
Local organizational institutions are those that structure interactions associated with concluding transactions both on the open market and within organizational structures.
We examined the main institutions of the Soviet economy and found out that for the Russian economy the problem of the “Soviet legacy” is of fundamental importance. Indeed, since then the technological basis of the country has undergone any significant changes, but rather for the worse - the lost elements of the production system turned out to be significantly more than those that appeared again.
Today, both domestic and foreign experts, regardless of belonging to a particular economic school, see the main reason for the current situation in the fact that despite the presence of all the attributes of a market economy in the Russian economy, their institutional direction is far from complete. Market institutions operate in a regime that does not meet modern requirements for the organization of the national economy. Therefore, the Russian economic system can be defined as institutionally imperfect and therefore requiring continued reform.
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Alekseev, the policy of the Russian government is a captive and generator of an “institutional trap” // Transformation of economic institutions in post-Soviet Russia. Moscow, 2000 S. 92
A lot depends on the desire and will of people in a market economy. However, the thesis “let people do whatever they want” is now categorically unacceptable. Economic theory. Macroeconomics. Transitional economy: textbook. manual: 2 hours / Gerasimov B.I., Kosov N.S., Drobysheva V.V. and others. Tambov. 2009 P. 190 Freedom means: firstly, equal economic opportunities for everyone, i.e. the right for everyone to begin economic activity in accordance with their capabilities and interests and to carry it out freely within the framework of the law: secondly, it serves as a condition for the existence of competition and the effective distribution of resources.
Economic freedom does not at all imply the absence of legal, social and other restrictions on economic activity. Volitional relations are fixed in the structure of rights and, through a system of incentives, determine the norm of human behavior in society. Thus, the legislative basis of society is an important prerequisite for the formation of a market economy and at the same time a consequence of its development.
In economic life, as in all other spheres of human activity, it is necessary to observe certain generally accepted rules so that the mass of various actions of economic entities does not lead to economic chaos, but turns into a logical set of economic processes that ensure the development of the economy as a whole. Gerasimov B.I., Kosov N.S., Drobysheva V.V. Decree. Op. P. 203 These rules arise and change in the process of historical development, are established by generally accepted practice or administratively - by the state.
All economic entities in a market economy - the state, enterprises, citizens engaged in business, etc. act according to certain rules indicating what can and cannot be done, how to build relationships between economic entities. Such rules are called economic institutions.
Often the concept of “institution” includes economic organizations and institutions, for example, such as the government, parliament, central bank, ministries, services, commissions, etc. To some extent, this is quite justified, since all laws, orders, decrees, instructions, regulations, orders, etc. come from these departments and are then communicated to economic agents.
At the same time, the concept of “institution” is broader. Institutions are the rules by which economic entities interact with each other and carry out economic activities. Institutions are, for example, the right of private property, the procedure for opening and registering a new enterprise, the procedure for obtaining a state license to develop a deposit, etc.
Institutions can be formalized or informal. Formalized institutions are all written rules related to economic activity: the Constitution, the Civil Code, the Tax Code, other economic laws, decrees, regulations and orders of government authorities. The system of formalized institutions in its content is close to the concept of “framework conditions for economic activity” of economic entities.
Unformalized institutions (rules) include traditions, sociocultural stereotypes, rules and procedures that are not sanctioned by the state, but, nevertheless, practiced by economic entities in their activities.
When there is a lack of legal norms or the inability of the state to enforce laws, informal institutions play a very important role in regulating the behavior of economic agents.
The role of institutions in economic life is extremely great. Institutions reduce uncertainty by structuring everyday life. They organize relationships between people. Institutions define and limit the set of alternatives in economic behavior that each person has. They include all forms of restrictions created by people in order to give a certain order to human relationships. Institutions influence the economic process by influencing the costs of exchange and production. Tarushkin A.B. Institutional economics: textbook. Kemerovo. 2011. P. 131 Along with the technology used, they determine transaction and transformation (production) costs, which together constitute the total production costs.
Economic institutions are often called “rules of the game,” and given from the outside. Business entities cannot change economic rules and procedures at their own discretion. For example, they do not have the right to change the procedure for closing a company in the event of bankruptcy. Changing the “rules of the game” in favor of business entities is usually done by organizations specially created for this purpose.
Thus, written and unwritten laws, rules and norms of economic activity - institutions structure the economic environment, set the external framework of economic life, bring a certain certainty and predictability to economic processes by limiting the freedom and arbitrariness of economic agents.
There are many economic institutions. However, the most important of them is the contract - an institution of transaction, which is a bilateral or multilateral agreement that stipulates the rights and obligations of its participants aimed at establishing, changing or terminating rights and obligations. The agreement regulates the behavior of counterparties according to certain characteristics known to them, in accordance with the logic of the types of activities in which they are engaged.
Another type of economic institution is property rights, which regulate the behavior of people in society in relation to certain economic goods.
Symmetrical to the right of property is the right of man. This right regulates a person's behavior towards other people. In their content, both institutions are so close that they actually form part of one whole - the rules of individual behavior in society. Gerasimov B.I., Kosov N.S., Drobysheva V.V. Decree. Op. P. 214
In highly developed countries, the institutional environment, formed as a result of centuries-old socio-economic evolution, is extremely complex, which can be considered as its advantage. In such an environment, institutions interact well, and legislation regulates in detail the entire range of socio-economic relations. There is a huge variety of economic organizations with very narrow specialization. Under these conditions, an economic entity functions in the economic environment easily and freely, which greatly facilitates its economic activities.
Over time, with changing conditions and situations, economic institutions tend to change. However, the decision on institutional transformation must be made by the relevant government body, and it does not always do this willingly and effectively. The thing is that new state laws, programs to regulate and stabilize the economy, fundamental decisions on spending and taxes, measures to prevent inflation or a decline in production are adopted by bodies of representative and executive power. But both elected and appointed officials are motivated solely by their own self-interest. All persons running the state have their own goals, strive to benefit from the economic process and maximize their own well-being. Therefore, the decisions they make are often questionable and ineffective from an economic point of view, since they take into account private interests.
In addition, changes in institutions are associated in most cases with a redistribution of the rights of individual groups or the authority itself that makes the decision on institutional change. Sometimes an ineffective institution may, over time, in the process of changing the behavior of the economic system, cease to function at all. For example, people may simply stop following an outdated law.
It is very important to carry out systematic work to change the institutional environment. In this case, the state must play a special role. It is obliged to establish and protect conditions of economic activity that are binding on other market entities. The influence of the state on the formation of the institutional environment is expressed, first of all, in lawmaking and control over compliance with laws.
As mentioned earlier, one of the most important economic institutions is the right of property, namely, as scientists and economists today consider private property itself. Let's look at it in more detail.
Property as an economic category was formed at the dawn of the formation of human society. Labor and its division between individuals and tribes had a significant influence on the origin and development of forms of property. Ageev A.I. Entrepreneurship: problems of property and culture. M., 1999. P. 48 Possession of the means of labor has become one of the determining conditions of life, the production of the necessary means of subsistence. At the same time, productive labor made it possible to obtain an economic product to a greater extent than was necessary to provide for the simplest living needs of that period. The accumulation of property arises, its form in the form of wealth arises. The emergence of rich and poor, the desire to expand their possessions gives rise to wars for the possession of territories, wealth, property; property begins to change hands. An increasing population needs more and more land and natural resources involved in production. As a result, everything available to a person is immediately isolated, captured, appropriated, divided, i.e. becomes property.
The emergence of states contributed to the emergence of state ownership. Thus, a variety of forms of ownership developed in the form of personal, family, clan, and state.
Subsequently, property acquires an increasingly perfect form; in the course of history it is modified, transformed, some forms have already disappeared from the face of the Earth (feudal property). Today, humanity considers this institution in different aspects: moral, legal, economic. It is necessary to distinguish between economic and legal categories of property. As an economic category, property expresses relations of appropriation and alienation between people. Economic theory // Ed. G.P. Zhuravleva, V.M. Yuryeva. Tambov., 2000. P. 317 As a legal category, property is a subjective interpretation of objectively established relations of appropriation, a social need to consolidate what has already developed in practice. In this paper we will consider the economic content of property.
The economic content of property is revealed through its functional characteristics: ownership, management, control. The main thing in the functional characteristics of property is control over the production and financial activities of the subject of ownership.
In modern economic theory, a whole direction of economic analysis called neo-institutionalism has developed. One of the most famous theories in this area is the economic theory of property rights. Course in Economic Theory // Ed. M.N. Chepurina, E.A. Kiseleva. Kirov, 2000. P. 46
The origins of the theory of property rights were the American economists R. Coase, Nobel Prize laureate in 1991, professor emeritus at the University of Chicago, and A. Alchian, professor at the University of Los Angeles. The uniqueness of economic analysis, according to their theory, is as follows:
Firstly, in their research they do not operate with the familiar concept of “property”, but use the term “property rights”. It is not the resource itself that is property, but the “bundle” or share of rights to use the resource that constitutes property.
The complete “bundle of rights” of property consists of the following 11 elements that characterize the content of the property “rules of the game” when using benefits:
From Roman law:
ownership;
right of use, i.e. personal use of the item;
the right to exercise management, i.e. decisions about how and by whom an item can be used.
right to income, i.e. for benefits arising from previous personal use of a thing or from allowing other persons to use it;
the right to the “capital value” of a thing, implying the right to alienate, consume, change or destroy the thing.
From the 1st half of the 20th century:
the right to security, i.e. immunity from expropriation;
the right to transfer things by inheritance or will;
8) perpetuity.
From the 2nd half of the 20th century:
9) prohibition of harmful use, i.e. the duty to refrain from using a thing in a manner harmful to others;
liability in the form of penalties, i.e. the possibility of withdrawing an item to pay a debt;
residual nature, i.e. the expectation of a “natural” return of the powers transferred to someone after the expiration of the transfer period or in the event of loss of the last power for any other reason. Zhuravleva G.P., Yuryev V.M. Decree. op. P. 321
In Russian law, a triad of powers of the owner has historically developed: possession, use, disposal.
A specific form of modern distribution of owner rights is a trust agreement. Trust (eng. trust) - an agreement on the right of economic management, i.e. an agreement to transfer the right to manage one’s property to another entity. Moreover, the owner does not have the formal right to interfere in the actions of his trustee.
Property rights are understood as socially sanctioned (state laws, administrative orders, traditions, customs, etc.) behavioral relations between people that arise in connection with the existence of goods. These are legal orders that any person must comply with in his interactions with other people or incur costs due to non-compliance.
Private property rights mean that an individual person or entity has the entire “bundle” of eleven rights, or, as Paul Heine (1931-2000) noted, some of the “blades of grass” from this “bundle.” Property rights are the right to control the use of certain resources and the right to distribute the costs and benefits of doing so. It is property rights, or what people believe are the appropriate rules of the game, that determine exactly how the processes of supply and demand operate in society.
The second distinctive feature of the theory of property rights is that the phenomenon of property is derived from the problem of the relative rarity, or limitation, of resources: “Without any precondition of rarity, it is meaningless to talk about property.”
True, this approach is not a discovery of the above-mentioned authors; it was first substantiated back in 1871 by the Austrian economist Carl Menger (1840-1921) in the book “Foundations of Political Economy.” “Property,” wrote K. Menger, “its ultimate basis is the existence of goods, the quantity of which is less than the need for them. Therefore, the institution of property is the only possible institution for resolving problems, the disproportion between the need and the amount of goods available for disposal.” Chepurin M.N., Kiseleva E.A. Decree. Op. P. 52
This discrepancy leads to the fact that the central point of property relations becomes their exclusive nature. Property relations are a system of exclusions from access to material and intangible resources. The absence of exceptions to access to resources (i.e. free access to them) means that they are no one's. Such resources do not constitute an object of property. Economic and market relations do not arise between people regarding their use.
Clarity of property rights means changing the behavior of business entities so that they make the most effective decisions. After all, only the owner ultimately bears all the positive and negative results of his activities. Stankovskaya I.K., Strelets I.A. Economic theory for business schools. M., 2005.S. 67-68 Therefore, he is interested in taking them into account as completely as possible when making decisions. The more certain property rights are, the stronger the incentive for an economic entity to take into account the benefits or damage that its decisions bring to another person. During the exchange process, property rights are transferred to the economic agent for whom they represent the highest value. This ensures an efficient allocation of resources, since in the course of exchange they move from less productive to more productive uses, from persons who value them less to those who value them more. Ivashkovsky S.N. Microeconomics. M., 2001. P. 47
In conclusion, it can be noted that the transition to a market economy, carried out in a number of countries, causes inevitable institutional changes and the need to create new market institutions. Zhuravleva G.P., Yuryev V.M. Decree. Op. P. 307 Therefore, it is very important for the scientific community to consider economic institutions as an important criterion for explaining the origins and prerequisites of highly effective economic development.
to institute (English) - to establish, establish.
The concept of institution was borrowed by economists from the social sciences, in particular from sociology.
Institute is a set of roles and statuses designed to satisfy a specific need.
Definitions of institutions can also be found in works on political and social science. For example, the category of institution is one of the central ones in John Rawls’s work “A Theory of Justice.”
Under institutions I will understand a public system of rules that define office and position with associated rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules specify certain forms of action as permissible and others as prohibited, and they punish certain actions and protect others when violence occurs. As examples, or more general social practices, we can cite games, rituals, courts and parliaments, markets and property systems.
The concept of institution was first included in analysis by Thorstein Veblen.
Institutes- this is, in fact, a widespread way of thinking with regard to the individual relations between society and the individual and the individual functions they perform; and the system of social life, which is composed of the totality of those acting at a certain time or at any moment in the development of any society, can, from the psychological side, be characterized in general terms as the prevailing spiritual position or the widespread idea of \u200b\u200bthe way of life in society.
Veblen also understood institutions as:
- habitual ways of responding to stimuli;
- structure of the production or economic mechanism;
- the currently accepted system of social life.
Another founder of institutionalism, John Commons, defines institution as follows:
Institute- collective action to control, liberate and expand individual action.
Another classic of institutionalism, Wesley Mitchell, can find the following definition:
Institutes- dominant, and highly standardized, social habits.
Currently, within the framework of modern institutionalism, the most common interpretation of institutions is Douglas North’s:
Institutes are the rules, the mechanisms that ensure their implementation, and the norms of behavior that structure repeated interactions between people.
The economic actions of an individual take place not in an isolated space, but in a certain society. And therefore it is of great importance how society will react to them. Thus, transactions that are acceptable and profitable in one place may not necessarily be viable even under similar conditions in another. An example of this is the restrictions imposed on various religious cults.
In order to avoid the coordination of many external factors that influence success and the very possibility of making a particular decision, within the framework of economic and social orders, schemes or algorithms of behavior are developed that are the most effective under given conditions. These schemes and algorithms or matrices of individual behavior are nothing more than institutions.
“Institutions are the basis of economic behavior”
The founder of the institutional direction is considered to be Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929), author of “The Theory of the Leisure Class” (1899).
The main thesis of Veblen's work: “Institutions are the basis of economic behavior.” Veblen opposed the one-sided interpretation of the motives of behavior of the “economic man”, which had become widespread since the times of the classics (A. Smith).
Veblen considers it wrong that economic science does not consider human behavior and its patterns, but focuses on the instruments of the market mechanism, the monetary system.
Veblen has two main ideas. The economy is constantly developing and evolving. Economic changes occur under the influence of institutions, which are also constantly changing. But often institutional changes lag behind, and institutions slow down development. To debug institutions, Western countries needed 400-300 years. This is a very complex, contradictory process. Hence the conclusion: it is not the market mechanism itself that changes, but institutions, the institutional environment, customs, and laws; each country has its own specific institutions; Economists should study not ideal schemes, but real norms, traditions, structures.
Criticizing the classics, Veblen stated: a person should not be treated as a kind of mechanical ball or a calculating machine, a kind of “calculator of pleasures and burdens.” He is guided not only by the profit motive and not by strictly arithmetic calculations, weighing the magnitude of costs with the magnitude of benefits.
The behavior of an individual as a consumer and participant in production is very ambiguous. His economic interests represent a complex and contradictory system, so social conditions and psychological motives should be more fully taken into account.
Institutes— habitual ways of carrying out the process of social life. The basis of the accepted way of life is the system of views held by social groups. The formation of institutions is conservative. Previously established forms and rules do not meet the current situation and must be constantly changed.
Is it good or bad? What tasks do they perform? All these questions, as well as a number of others, will be discussed within the framework of this article.
general information
First, let's define the term "institution." It should be noted that it can be used in several meanings. Thus, if you say “economic social institution”, meaning an organization or institution, then this will be the correct use of the term. This is the name given to special research institutions that work within narrow specialties. An institution can also be understood as a set of statuses and roles, the purpose of which is to satisfy certain needs. This designation can be used for a public system of rules, for habitual ways of responding to specific stimuli, and for designating a structural component. As an example, we can cite the following phrase - “democratic institutions”. It is used quite often in modern journalism. Or, as an alternative, the institution of family or marriage (which many complain about being destroyed).
Interpretation
Essentially, institutions refer to popular ways of thinking. It can refer to relationships between individuals and entire communities. Let's take the economic institution - this is the belief that the greatest prosperity is possible under capitalism, and the need for equal opportunities, and so on.
Moreover, it often turns out that several spheres are quite strongly connected. Thus, equal opportunity mentioned earlier is an economic social institution. Although certain organizations engaged in specialized activities can also be created. An example is the Moscow Economic Institute. We will devote time to each of these interpretations.
Organizational plan
Various research institutes are created as separate organizations and institutions specializing in certain problems or tasks. They are a place where professionals concentrate in their field, who solve the issues posed to them. Very often, such institutes are approached to order research in a certain area or carry out complex scientific and technical work. In addition, these institutions provide (at a minimum) proper training to promising young people.
A common practice is for researchers to also work in a reputable company (even if only as a freelance specialist). As an example, we can consider economic institutions. The specialists working in them often also act as freelance advisers to senior administrative staff of commercial enterprises or even to government officials.
Let's look at an example. In conditions where top positions are most often occupied by people with a legal education (just remember the president and chairman of the government), economic institutions play an important role. They provide specialists who help choose the best solution for the country's development. Whether the recommendations will be followed is a separate question. After all, an economic institute is a kind of personnel forge, and not a control center, the decisions of which are not subject to discussion.
Of course, even professionals can make mistakes sometimes. But that’s why they are specialists, because their error rate is very low. Therefore, when a crisis rages, an economic institution is a useful tool in terms of restoring order.
Specific Features
When a certain organization is created, be it a military-political or financial-economic institution, it is always necessary to decide what tasks it will perform. They often act and influence the formation or development of a certain system of behavior.
Let's take democracy for example. What it is, in general, is clear to most people. But what about the implementation or solution of certain situations and aspects of social life? The institutes are working on possible options.
Institute as a public system of rules
Let's develop the example of the institution of democracy. Only now we will talk not about the activities of individual organizations, but about the public system of rules of behavior and interaction.
Let's take such a question as the turnover of power. What's the best way to organize this? Within the framework of the institute, a special mechanism is provided - elections. They follow certain rules. As an example, you cannot order false negative material about competitors. The main bet is that each person himself tells what he does, what experience he has, outlines his vision of the future, and voters are only asked to vote for the one they like.
And this only applies to one aspect. Something similar can be said about others: the division into three branches of power to complicate the emergence of a dictatorship, and the large weight of civil organizations and much more. Moreover, there are many institutions (public systems of rules) that describe most aspects of various spheres of life. If it's hard to believe, then let's go through a few of them. So, there are the institutions of family, school, law enforcement system, army, social activities, and so on.
Conclusion
As you can see, the concept of “institution” is multifaceted. The topic itself is quite interesting, and it would be advisable to learn it not from one (or even several) articles, but to become familiar with fundamental scientific works.
After all, if we consider research institutions, then an institute is an extremely important and at the same time very complex organizational structure. And it is generally quite difficult to describe the activity of rule systems, since they are significantly influenced by the past of each individual country and locality.
Therefore, it is quite difficult to generalize here. Even if we talk, for example, about democratic traditions, it is very difficult to create a complete picture. How can one not recall the two-party systems of the USA and Great Britain in comparison with the parliaments of France, Germany and other countries.
