She conquered the big oil of Western Siberia. Surgutneftegaz has become the guarantor of Russia's energy independence, remaining the most closed oil company in the country
Reference Information:
- Company name: OJSC Surgutneftegaz;
- Legal form of activity: Public corporation;
- Kind of activity: exploration, development and development of oil and oil and gas fields, production and sale of oil and gas, production and marketing of petroleum products and petrochemicals (57 in total);
- Revenue for 2016: 992.5 billion rubles;
- CEO: Vladimir Bogdanov;
- Beneficiaries: are not disclosed;
- Number of staff: 114.3 thousand people;
- The site of the company: https://www.surgutneftegas.ru/.
OJSC Surgutneftegaz is one of the largest Russian oil companies. Exploration and production of oil and gas, gas processing and supply of electric energy, oil refining and marketing of petroleum products, oil and gas chemistry, research and design activities have been developed in it. The enterprises belonging to the concern carry out a full range of works:
- scientific and design support of the entire scope of work;
- search and exploration of hydrocarbon raw materials;
- extraction and processing of oil and gas;
- production of electrical and thermal energy;
- production and marketing of petroleum products, related products and services;
- production of an extensive range of oil and gas chemical products.
The history of Surgutneftegaz has only a few years, but its achievements are quite convincing.
history of the company
The official countdown began in 1977. It was then, 40 years ago, that a multidisciplinary Production Association. But that was preceded by other events.
Important dates in the history of Surgutneftegaz
- March 1964 - the oilfield department "Surgutneft" is created. Development has begun big oil Western Siberia. Back to top next year the first 7 wells gave oil - 134 thousand tons.
- 1965 - the first echelon of oil entered the Kirishi refinery. Surgut was transformed from a workers' settlement into a city.
- 1968 - NPU "Surgutneft" reached the level of production of 1 million tons of oil per year.
And then there was the year 1977. The period of the 70s for the West Siberian fuel and energy complex became the "golden" age. More and more new deposits were put into development:
- Bystrinskoye;
- Lyantorskoye;
- Solkinskoye;
- Savuyskoye;
- Fedorovskoye (later unofficially called the "second Samotlor").
Oilfield facilities were automated one by one. Surgutskaya GRES started its work.
The company has concentrated its activities in the Russian regions from the Baltic to Far East. Its main resource base in Western Siberia is located in the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Regions, in the Tyumen and Novosibirsk regions.
And Surgut itself acquired the status, albeit unofficial, of the Siberian oil capital.
Application of knowledge-intensive high technology(environmentally and resource-saving), the implementation of innovative potential, full cost control allow the company not only to solve even the most complex production tasks, but to do it as efficiently as possible, while observing environmental standards and industrial safety rules.
Oil production
Surgutneft, the oldest enterprise in the structure of the company, was created more than half a century ago from scratch. Only the Ob connected him with the outside world. Not a single capital building, not a single paved road, and only all-terrain vehicles served for off-road travel.
Until 1967, seasonal oil production and field development was organized - for navigation, the extracted oil was sent by barges to the Omsk oil refinery along the river, and the wells were idle in winter. The Ust-Balyk-Omsk oil pipeline made it possible to organize year-round operation of the fields.
The share of this oilfield enterprise was to be a kind of testing ground, where the possibilities of performing geological developments in incredibly difficult climatic conditions were tested.
Oil refining
The Kirishi oil refinery became the All-Union shock construction site. Having started in 1961, already in 1966 he issued his first products. And six years later it entered the top five largest in the country. Its task was to provide fuel to the northwestern Russian regions.
And when the operation of the Yaroslavl-Kirishi oil pipeline began in 1969, oil from the fields of Western Siberia began to be processed for processing. Moreover, an opportunity has opened up for the export of oil products to Western Europe, which was facilitated by proximity to the Baltic ports.
By the end of 2013, the largest complex for deep oil refining in Europe was operating on the basis of the Kirishi Refinery.
Sales area
Novgorodnefteprodukt and Tvernefteprodukt, two marketing enterprises of the Surgutneftegaz company, are directly related to the Nobel brothers, who became the creators of the first Russian organizations trading in petroleum products.
During the years of industrialization of the country, such enterprises were rare, because the automotive industry in Russia had not yet received proper development, steam locomotives, as a rule, needed coal as fuel. And only ships, river and sea, began to use fuel oil, and the population needed kerosene. So, only by the end of the 1940s and 1950s there was a real need for large volumes of oil products, and, finally, oil product supply enterprises were developed.
Kaliningradnefteprodukt was created in 1946 on the basis of the facilities of firms that operated in East Prussia - Shell and Nitag. Until now, the gas station building and tanks made of Krupp steel have been preserved.
Each of the sales enterprises of Surgutneftegaz sells only high-quality oil products and occupies a leading position in its region in terms of service level.
Rice. 4. Filling station "Surgutneftegaz" in Veliky Novgorod
Access to financial markets
The company's shares were issued in October 1993. They were distributed like this:
- in state ownership - 45%;
- went on sale - 8%;
- the company redeemed for vouchers - 7%;
- put up for a mortgage auction - 40%.
The latter went to the winner - NPF Surgutneftegaz.
The company does not make any efforts to attract a strategic investor, rather, on the contrary. It seeks to keep large blocks of shares in its hands, and sells the rest to small investors from the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug.
The company coped with the task. By 1996, outside investors were unable to acquire enough shares to gain the right to influence the operation of Surgutneftegaz.
The year 1997 was marked by the entry into the world financial market, depositing American depositary receipts 1st level, each of which was equal to 50 ordinary shares JSC.
The crisis that broke out in 1998 did not affect the company itself. Only the exchange quotes of shares fell by a factor of 10, and this had nothing to do with the attitude towards Surgutneftegaz, the shares of any Russian company were questioned.
But he also showed how effective the policy was, which was declared by the management of the joint-stock company, when the calculation was made only on their own strength. The company survived without much loss and low prices on oil, and the depreciation of the ruble.
In June 2003, by the decision of the shareholders, the OJSC is transformed into Leasing Production LLC, 93% authorized capital which were the shares of OAO Surgutneftegaz. So the company eliminated the danger of a hostile takeover. In addition, the requirements for disclosure of information to open joint stock company minimum established by law.
Company today
Surgutneftegaz is known all over the world as a company with a reliable reputation, sustainable competitive advantages, developed international relations, high-tech business and high production culture. And, speaking of her, first of all they mention financial position which remains stable despite crises. Surgutneftegaz has sufficient funds to external factors did not affect the implementation financial support scheduled projects.
According to Forbes, at the end of 2016, the company ranks second in the TOP-10 largest private companies in Russia, second only to LUKoil.
"There is no point in changing your financial policy in pursuit of guessing where the ruble or the price of oil will go. We are focused on our tasks: ensuring production efficiency, reducing costs, introducing technologies.” V. Bogdanov in an interview with INTERFAX
The company does not create joint ventures, does not attract large foreign loans, preferring to rely on its own strength.
Forty years after its inception, the company is engaged in exploration, production and processing of oil and gas, power generation, development of petrochemicals and gas chemistry products, and marketing of its own products.
Sources: company website
The company's achievements in oil production have become possible thanks to three main areas of activity:
- commissioning of new deposits;
- non-decreasing activity of development drilling;
- use of technological solutions applicable in given specific conditions and features.
Source: OJSC “Surgutneftegas” annual report for 2016
Investment strategy
Investment policy Surgutneftegaz aims to provide stable growth in the field of production, exploration and processing. Their direction is rather strict. The company does not invest non-core assets.
Tab. 3. Investments of the company for 2012-1016, billion rubles
| in oil production | in oil refining | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
The ownership structure of the third largest oil company in Russia, Surgutneftegaz, is complex and non-transparent. In 2007, Vedomosti uncovered a network of 23 firms, non-profit partnerships and funds linked to Surgutneftegaz, either founded by it or run by its managers, including its CEO Vladimir Bogdanov. The total financial investments of these organizations at the end of 2005 reached almost 1 trillion rubles, and the cost of these investments changed in proportion to the capitalization of Surgutneftegaz (see sidebar). The experts concluded that these structures may own 72% of the shares of Surgutneftegaz. Now size financial investments reveal not all these structures; for those who do this, in 2012 it amounted to 568.717 billion rubles.
Until recently, the founders of most NPs were located within Russia. But about two years ago, the situation began to change: the founders of two non-profit partnerships, which allegedly have 9.26% of the shares of Surgutneftegaz on their balance sheets, NP Ruver and NP Nordik, are now associated with Cypriot companies. Namely, with seven firms: Ntarino Investments, Corouna Investments, Cebina Trading, Poleria Trading, Ourako Trading, Mazouna Holdings and Makola Holdings. They form a ring: the first firm owns 100% of the second, the second - the third, etc., and the last - the first (in the Russian ring that Vedomosti discovered in 2007, each of the firms owns each; see the diagram on page . 13).
The Cypriot ring appeared among the possible owners of Surgutneftegaz shares in this way. In March 2011, Makola received 4.76% in Toldo LLC, which owns 4.76% in Sillades LLC, the founder of NP Ruver, established in 2012.
Long-term investments of this partnership over the past year exceeded 46 billion rubles. At the same time, the Cypriot Cebina received 4.76% of Polyusinvest LLC, which owns 4.76% in SPES-Vega LLC, the founder of NP Nordik. His long-term investments exceeded 43 billion rubles last year.
New non-profit partnerships- the heirs of the old. NP Ruwer was formed as a result of the merger in 2011 of NP Banff and NP Ruwerpart, and NP Nordic was formed as a result of the merger of NP Diktenpart and Norquay. Except for these changes, the network of organizations and their Russian companies-founders, associated with Surgutneftegaz, continues to exist in almost the same form as in 2007.
Some NPs that may have shares in the company on their balance sheet indicated the telephone number of the Surgutneftegaz methodology department during registration. In other partnerships, such as NP Firenz and NP Ekkon, the directors are still employees of NPF Surgutneftegaz - the deputy director of the fund Alexei Nazarov and the head of the legal department Valery Efimov. Surgutneftegaz still does not disclose information about its owners. “The number of shareholders of OAO Surgutneftegaz is over 34,000. We do not know the owners of the shareholders of OAO Surgutneftegaz,” is all that a company representative told Vedomosti.
Why would a company need a Cypriot ring? “In the absence of detailed information, it is difficult to judge the content of the operations carried out through the Cyprus ring. It can be assumed that the systemic symmetrical distribution of stakes in several affiliated companies indicates the emergence of a new minority shareholder in Surgutneftegaz with a share of less than 1%, suggests Elena Starovoitova, general director of the audit firm Starovoitova and Partners. - The use of Cypriot companies in this case is a fairly common optimization scheme as financial flows and taxation."
There are no bans on cross-ownership in the European Union, but such a scheme is considered opaque, as it allows all power to be concentrated in the hands of managers and deprives shareholders of the opportunity to influence their decisions, says Grigory Chernyshov, partner at White & Case law firm. “A company that is traded on the stock exchange and takes care of its investment attractiveness, as a rule, does not use such schemes,” he adds.
The new minority shareholder could be an oil trader and an old acquaintance Russian President Gennady Timchenko. In mid-2012, he himself admitted to Vedomosti that he had shares in Surgutneftegaz: “a very small stake, a little more than zero,” bought “either for $10 million, or for $5 million.”
Timchenko's representative denies the participation of the oil trader in the Cypriot ring: “Gennady Timchenko owns a meager stake in Surgutneftegaz. According to our estimates, it is about 0.01%. Timchenko is not affiliated with any of the mentioned [Cyprus] companies.”
An employee of one law firms puts forward another version: “The ring of firms in Cyprus can presumably serve to divert cash. Or, if the cache is not allotted there, it could be a technical channel for distributing cash flows between companies associated with the ring.
The richest resident of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, CEO and co-owner of Surgutneftegaz, Russia's third largest oil company after Rosneft and Lukoil, Vladimir Bogdanov recently won a state award, the first of his life. The prize in the field of science was awarded to him for "the creation of rational systems for the development of oil, oil and gas and gas-oil fields in Western Siberia." It was presented personally by President Putin in a solemn ceremony in the Kremlin on June 12, 2017.
Few from Russian billionaires can boast of such a high assessment of his work. In the top ten of the Forbes list, no one has a state award, including the president of Lukoil Vagit Alekperov. Meanwhile, Bogdanov occupies a modest 49th place in the ranking with a fortune of $1.9 billion. He has been on all Forbes lists since 2004, and the estimate of his fortune has changed slightly, from $1.7 billion to $4.4 billion.
In life, the billionaire is modest, and he avoids publicity. He was last listed by Forbes in 2004. Then for many years the image of an ascetic living in Surgut in the usual apartment building and a budget vacationer in Karlovy Vary. Another Forbes question about whether anything has changed since then remained unanswered. The secretary at Bogdanov's office told Forbes that he was on vacation, email was disabled throughout the company "due to the threat of hacker attacks" and there was no operational communication with the head.
Bogdanov came to work at Surgutneftegaz in 1976, in 1984, at the age of 33, he became the general director of the enterprise, and in 1995 he organized a scheme to buy out a state stake in the amount of 40.16% of shares through a loans-for-shares auction. Since then, the structure of the company's share capital has changed several times, but who its real owners are still a secret with seven seals. In a 2016 report, Surgut states that "the company's shares are distributed among shareholders, none of whom is the ultimate controlling party and does not exercise significant influence." Bogdanov as to an individual today owns 0.37% of the ordinary shares of Surgutneftegaz.
Another secret of Surgut is the astronomical amount of funds that the company keeps on deposits in Russian banks predominantly in US dollars. By the end of 2016, this amount was 2.181 trillion rubles, or $36 billion. This is almost 20% of all deposits of Russian companies in all Russian banks. In Sberbank, Russian companies keep 2.637 trillion rubles on deposits, in VTB - 2.181 trillion rubles (exactly the amount Surgut has accumulated). In all other banks, this figure is much lower.
Why does Surgut need so much cash? “We have something to spend on: we are developing new provinces. This money is a safety net: no one knows what will happen to oil prices. We need them for the team to live in peace. If the situation of 1998 happens again, what will we do then?” - Bogdanov answered the questions of shareholders at the annual meeting in 2013. By that time, Surgut had already accumulated 1 trillion rubles, or $31 billion at the then exchange rate. The price of oil has more than halved, but the stash has remained intact. On the market, Surgutneftegaz, with its accumulated $36 billion, is worth only $20 billion.
outperformed ExxonMobil Corp. and Royal Dutch Shell Plc, becoming the world's only publicly traded oil company to deliver positive returns to investors following OPEC's November decision to defend its market share and the ensuing price collapse, Bloomberg reported. Over the past 15 months, the dividend yield on the company's papers amounted to 18.5%, the agency calculated, while the shares have fallen 14% since November. Thus, the income of shareholders amounted to a total of 6.4%, taking into account dividends reinvested in securities, the agency indicates. Exxon shares fell 9.4%, but dividend payments softened the fall to 5.4%. Shell losses were 31%, while the dividend yield was 5.6%, according to Bloomberg data. The rest of the majors are also in the red: since November 2014, Chevron shares have fallen in price by 29%, and the dividend yield was 3.75%, Total lost 16.7% of the quotes value, and the dividend income brought investors only 5.8%. Chinese PetroChina lost 47.6% of its share price, while the dividend yield was 2.4%.
Company reserve
Surgutneftegaz only once and unexpectedly for everyone bought in 2009 a 21.2% stake in the Hungarian company MOL, but sold the stake two years later. “I don’t need to buy anything. We have everything!<....>It is worse when there is no money. Then you don’t know where to run, where to borrow, at what percentage,” said Vladimir Bogdanov, CEO of the company, in 2012.
The reason for Surgutneftegaz's success is obvious: the company has huge dollar deposits (more than $30 billion - Vedomosti), says Sergey Vakhrameev, portfolio manager at GL Financial Group. In 2014, Surgutneftegaz earned RUB 846 billion on foreign exchange differences, while IFRS profit tripled to RUB 885 billion. As a result, Surgutneftegaz paid record dividends: 63.2 billion rubles. on preferred and 23 billion rubles. on ordinary shares, reminds Vakhrameev. Dividends per preference shares increased by 3.5 times, for ordinary shares - by 8%. Other Russian oil companies do not have such an airbag, as a result, they went into the red in terms of share returns, like the world majors. Lukoil, taking into account dividends, lost 27%, Rosneft - 35%, Gazprom - 44%, Vakhrameev calculated.
Surgutneftegaz is the leader in Russia both in terms of dividend yield and TSR (total shareholder return), says Aton analyst Alexander Kornilov. Dividend yield preferred shares of Surgutneftegaz since June 2014, when oil prices began to fall, amounted to 37.8%, and TSR - 96%, while for other Russian companies these figures are 4-14.3 and 1.1-53.9 % respectively, he points out.
Bloomberg reveals the owners of 22% of preferred shares of Surgutneftegaz (in total, preferred papers account for 18% of the capital). Among them are Grantham Mayo Van Otterloo & Co, JPMorgan Chase & Co, Blackrock Fund Advisors and others. “But the beneficiaries of the company are unknown, and as an investor I have a question: how long are shareholders willing to share such dividends with minority shareholders? In the event of a further fall in oil prices and the devaluation of the ruble, the risk of a revision of the dividend policy also grows, ”says Vakhrameev. In addition, the company has already found itself in a situation where dividends ($1.5 billion) exceeded the annual cash flow(about $1 billion in 2015), the expert points out. Before the oil price crash, the company was generating $2-3 billion a year, he estimates. But Surgutneftegaz will have no problems with the payment of dividends: the company can cut investments, withdraw money from deposits, increase debt, the expert lists. On the other hand, if oil prices start to rise, Surgutneftegaz will record a large loss on exchange rate differences, so it's time to sell the company's preferred shares now, advises Andrey Polishchuk, an analyst at Raiffeisenbank.
1. Instead of an epigraph
“The Tambov organized crime group as such no longer exists, it existed in the past… It appeared on the order of the FSB, was created for the purpose of enrichment. Russia was formed as a separate state, and therefore this organization appeared. That's all, there is nothing left of this organization. Only a very large sum money and legend...
One part of [money] is controlled by Coumarin, but here we are talking a maximum of 100 million. And the other part belongs to other people, officials, it really belongs to them ... Generals, people who work in the government.
From the protocol of interrogation of Mikhail Monastyrsky (Monya-Faberge), one of the founders of the Tambov organized criminal group. Spain, Madrid, March 9, 2007
2. Greetings from Surgut
In 2010, unexpectedly for everyone, this creature was appointed mayor of Moscow:
He was almost unknown to the general public in Moscow. Journalists rushed to find out his biography and why he was so honored to head the capital. It turned out that Sobyanin is an old acquaintance of Putin from the 1990s. When Putin visited Tyumen in the early 2000s during his first presidential term, local journalists were surprised to hear him fraternally greet the Tyumen governor Sobyanin: "Hi, Seryoga!" It felt like the boys had known each other for a long time.
But where did they meet? - Putin in the 90s was in St. Petersburg, then - in Moscow, in the Yeltsin administration, then the head of the FSB. And Sobyanin is the mayor of Kogalym, a deputy in the Khanty-Mansiysk district, a senator. Where could they intersect?
The Russian Newsweek managed to come closest to the solution. In the issue dated 10/20/2010, with reference to "former officials of the St. Petersburg mayor's office," a story was published about how the Tambov organized crime group in the 90s ran into an oil refinery in Kirishi (Leningrad region), which belonged to Surgutneftegaz. The director of the latter, Vladimir Bogdanov, sent his friend Sobyanin to investigate. He went and met Putin there. Those. in gang wars.
From an article in Newsweek:
“Former officials of the St. Petersburg mayor's office recall that at that time the Tambov criminal group, which controlled almost the entire St. And it was then that he allegedly met Putin, and he helped him solve the problems of the plant with crime. Sobyanin was generally a partner of Putin and his colleague Gennady Timchenko in the St. Petersburg oil business, says political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky: Putin and Timchenko ensured the operational management of the plant, Sobyanin was responsible for deliveries. Timchenko's structures began to sell Kirishi products abroad.
Serega came to the showdown, and there Putin. Sits, solves "issues with crime" (moreover, in Tambov). And they liked each other so much that they established a joint business and became friends.
The famous photo taken at Easter 2013, when Medvedev came with his wife and Putin with a friend.
Which gave rise to a lot of jokes about this:
But seriously, in the 1990s, Surgutneftegaz really waged a war in St. Petersburg against the Tambov organized criminal group. It lasted for many years, peaking in 1994-96, when Putin was vice-mayor. But the “former officials of the St. Petersburg mayor's office” clearly did not tell Newsweek everything.
The fact is that Surgutneftegaz lost this war outright. The bandits took away everything in the city from him, and the Kirishi Oil Refinery fell under the control of a friendly brigade of Chekists led by Timchenko. From whom Vova Putin saved the plant is not clear. From yourself or from your friends?
Putin's view here, of course, is creepy. A face swollen from Botox, either a bruise, or an incision under the jaw. With this only to dismantle to go. I don’t know if anyone else injects Botox in the Tambov organized criminal group, but Putin’s struggle for beauty is impressive. It's not easy, ask women.
After all, Botox injections under the skin cause extensive bruising at first:
What about walking in high heels?
Eight centimeters?
Returning to the story with the Kirishi refinery, Sobyanin traveled to St. Petersburg in the 90s, of course, not to save the plant from crime. And negotiate with her. Look for a compromise: Peter is yours, dear crime (Putin, Timchenko and Tambov), but the oil is ours. And judging by their subsequent friendship with Putin and the fact that Timchenko has been milking the plant so far (for more than 20 years), the negotiations were successful.
3. Tambov Fuel Company
During the division of the Soviet oil industry in 1993, Surgut got good assets in the North-West of Russia: a refinery in Kirishi (the only one in the region), a network of filling stations Nefto-Kombi (more than 100 gas stations in St. region), oil depot "Krasny oilman" (fuel oil and oils), "Lennefteprodukt" (a network of filling stations in the Leningrad region), etc.
In short, Surgut received a monopoly on the St. Petersburg fuel market.
Got it, but not for long.
Very quickly, the Tambov organized crime group laid eyes on all this wealth. Already by 1996, Surgut had lost de facto control over its daughters in St. Petersburg. They worked out the entire arsenal of raider seizures. A tax office and cops were sent to the Ruchi oil depot, and they left only when the director rented the base to bandits for a penny. Later, shares of the oil depot were also transferred to them.
In the Surgut subsidiary "Nefto-Kombi" ( largest network gas station in the city) "Surgutneftegaz" in 1996 was simply thrown out of the shareholders. We carried out an additional share sale and diluted its share to a small package. The meeting of shareholders, where such a decision was made, passed under the dictation of the bandits. In the morning before the meeting, a lawyer representing Surgut was met at the entrance by strong guys and recommended to behave correctly so as not to regret it later.
In all cases, the property of Surgut in St. Petersburg was squeezed out in favor of the Petersburg Fuel Company (PTK), which was jokingly called the Tambov Fuel Company. In honor of the organized criminal group of the same name, which ruled there. "Surgut" sued, of course, tried to challenge. But it's useless. It was a rehearsal of the Yukos case, only on a city scale.
Once, Surgutneftegaz had most of these gas stations ...
PTK was established by the mayor's office in September 1994 under the plausible pretext of a stable supply of fuel to the city. At the time of creation, no one had a controlling stake there. There were 21 founders with a share of 4.76% each. Major fuel consumers entered (city, Railway, shipping companies), oilmen, bandits too (but without a controlling stake).
Putin and his friend Vladimir Smirnov (chairman of the Ozero cooperative) received another 5% each. From the brethren for services. Putin issued his share to a friend and classmate Viktor Khmarin, Smirnov - to an offshore company from the Virgin Islands.
The composition of gangster shareholders, which took shape in the PTK in 1996, was not final. Later, in 1998-99. Kum took the shares of other authorities for himself, becoming the owner of a controlling stake. At the same time, Kum did not touch the shares of Putin and Smirnov, Smirnov's share even increased to 10%. Since 1998, Putin has become the director of the FSB in Moscow, such a shareholder was very useful for bandits.
Viktor Khmarin, to whom Putin's share in the PTK was registered, is one of the first Putin cellists known to science. Khmarin, a sambo and judo fighter, got into the law faculty of Leningrad State University on a sports quota in 1970, like Putin. He positions himself as a “lawyer”, but in fact he is the same “lawyer” as his friend Vova Putin: he spent all his studies in the gym.
Viktor Khmarin:
In the 2000s, the affairs of Viktor Khmarin, as usual, went uphill, for many years he was a supplier of pipes and all sorts of things for Gazprom. Then in 2007, he and Putin had a fight (Viktor Nikolaevich was not restrained in his language and several times got under the record). Well, and accordingly, instead of Khmarin, another judoka, Rotenberg, took the tenders. Disappointed by an old friend, so why not steal now or what?
4. Kum and Hem
Like Putin, Kum preferred not to register PTK shares in his own name, but to use a professional figurehead. It looked like this:
This is Andrei Podshivalov, Kuma's personal financier, who has been working for him since the early 1990s. It was on Podshivalova that Kum designed such pearls of his empire as the PTC and the 5-star Grand Hotel Europe on Nevsky (until 1991 - the Evropeyskaya Hotel).
Officially, Podshivalov is the owner of the St. Petersburg City Bank (Gorbank), which, in turn, has held a controlling stake in PTK since the beginning of the 2000s. Well, in fact, Gorbank is the bank of the Tambov organized criminal group, and Podshivalov is the cellist at Kum.
With such serious assets, Podshivalov officially became a billionaire in the 2000s and was included in the Forbes list. At the same time, he changed his surname to Golubev (after his wife). Encrypted type. Kum, by the way, also changed his last name in the late 90s, becoming Barsukov (by his mother). However, the change of surnames did not change the essence. Everyone understood perfectly well for whom Podshivalov-Golubev was holding billions and how Kumarin-Barsukov had made them.
But what is interesting is that in the 2000s, the shares of not only Kuma, but also Putin and Smirnov were transferred to Gorbank. Khmarin was left with a penny, 0.55%, which was, apparently, his personal share in the PTK, payment for work at face value.
The true meaning of the transfer of shares of Putin and Smirnov Kumarin financiers is still not known. Most likely, Putin and Smirnov simply sold their 15% to the gang, leaving the business with a profit. They entered the PTK for a penny in the 90s, on corrupt ties, and in the 2000s the company was already under a billion dollars.
In this regard, of course, Kumarin's repeated statements (both at large and later in the pre-trial detention center) that he never knew Putin make me smile. Still, since the 90s they had a common close friend (Smirnov). In addition, it turns out that Kum, the owner and vice-president of PTK, did not know with whom he had a share in this company and from whom his adjutant Podshivalov acquired shares? - Hard to believe.
Petersburg, 1999. Vladimir Smirnov and Vladimir Kumarin (both vice-presidents of the PTK at that time), followed by "Pozdnyak" (authority Georgy Pozdnyakov, killed in April 2000).
In the mid 2000s. Qom reached the peak of his power. He was called the "night governor" of St. Petersburg. But then he fell out of favor with the guys from the Kremlin. In August 2007 he was arrested. Three sentences on different episodes totaling more than 50 years. Someone clearly decided to put him in jail for life.
What is the reason for the fall? - Kum got out of control, "beguiled the coast." For some time now, he began to openly express disdain for the official governor of the city, Valentina Matvienko (Valya-Stakan). So, in 2005, Kumarin and his guys ran into Vali-Stakan's girlfriend Natalya Shpakova and took away her restaurant on Nevsky. They showed who is the boss in the city.
In addition, in 2006 Kum ran into the authority of Sergei Vasiliev, his colleague in the Tambov organized criminal group. By order of Kum Vasiliev, they tried to kill and take away from him the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal (PNT) worth 500 million dollars. And Vasiliev went under Timchenko. He drove oil products through the terminal. Vasiliev survived the assassination attempt, PNT remained with him, but the senior comrades tensed up: the redistribution of the port, which they had long divided in the 90s, was not part of their plans.
But that's not all. In addition to irrepressible greed, Kum began to say too much in an interview. In June 2007, he stated that "about a year and a half ago" he allegedly met with Litvinenko, they talked and he "seemed reasonable to me." But Litvinenko is an enemy of Putin, a collector of compromising information about his connections with the mafia.
As a result, Kuma was imprisoned, while Podshivalov was not touched. He still has a controlling stake in PTK. In the ranking of the richest people in St. Petersburg, which is compiled by the Delovoy Peterburg newspaper, in 2015 Podshivalov and the "family" took 10th place with 60 billion rubles. They even got ahead of Kovalchuk (Kosoy from the Ozero cooperative).
Under the word “family”, the journalists of “Business Petersburg” meant, of course, Podshivalov’s wife Olga Golubeva (they work together). But in fact, Podshivalov's family is a Tambov organized criminal group. This is THEIR 60 billion rubles.
5. “The team worked all together…”
The petrol market is gas stations. Gas stations cannot operate without an oil depot, where they take fuel. And the oil depot needs a refinery that produces this fuel. The bandits had such a refinery - in Kirishi.
The refinery in Kirishi is a huge enterprise that occupies an exceptionally advantageous position. Nearby - St. Petersburg, ports, Finland, the Baltic States.
Since the beginning of the 90s, the refinery has been under the control of Timchenko's brigade. They seized the factory with a stranglehold. This brigade was on friendly terms with the Tambov people, and, of course, also with Putin.
How did the brigade work? Since 1987, the export of the plant's products has been concentrated in the state company Kirishineftekhimexport, also known as Kinex (since 1994). It was driven by Timchenko and his three friends: Katkov, Malov and Adolf Smirnov. Timchenko, Katkov and Malov - former employees"Lenfintorg" (a division of the USSR Foreign Trade in Leningrad, Timchenko was a KGB undercover there). Adolf Smirnov - from Kirishi, deputy. factory director.
Andrey Malov (left) and Evgeny Katkov:
Kinex took the products at the plant and drove them abroad, to their partner in Finland. He resold further to the West. The partner was joint venture Urals Finland, created by the PGU KGB (the first main department of the KGB, now the SVR). Chekists worked there: Pannikov, Tarasov, Rovneiko and others.
Scheme of export of oil products from the Kirishi refinery in the first half of the 1990s.
The Urals firm was established in 1990 with the permission of General Shebarshin, then head of Soviet intelligence. It was planned to use it to cover up some KGB operations abroad. With the collapse of the USSR, it simply passed into the hands of its employees and served them for personal enrichment.
Andrei Pannikov, Chekist from PGU. In 1988 he was expelled from Sweden for espionage, since 1990 he has been a director at Urals. Made a big fortune in oil business.
In 1993, by decision of Moscow, the refinery in Kirishi was given to Surgutneftegaz. In 1994-95 Surgutneftegaz was privatized and became a private company. However, Kinex, its key foreign trade division, was privatized separately.
As a result of a series of frauds (including deliberate bankruptcy), in 1994 it was taken over by a brigade already familiar to us: Timchenko and his three companions (Katkov, Malov, Adolf Smirnov). In 1995, they also bought out JV Urals in Finland, which became known as IPP (International Petroleum Products). Now they have the entire chain of sales of petroleum products abroad.
Scheme of export of oil products from the Kirishi refinery in the second half of the 1990s.
In fact, Timchenko and the brigade in the 90s took over not only the export from Kirishi, but also domestic sales. Bandits from the PTK held a monopoly on the city's gasoline market, and Timchenko was their monopoly supplier.
This is the merchant Maxim Freidzon (Max Gunsmith), who in the 90s was engaged in the fuel business in St. Petersburg:
Freidzon and his partner Dmitry Skigin in the 90s worked under the roof of Vasiliev's authority. They kept an oil depot in Pulkovo, where planes were refueled. Vice Mayor Vova Putin helped them get in. Not free (for a 4% rollback, according to Freidzon).
Freidzon knew all the main players in the fuel market of St. Petersburg in the 90s, authorities, officials. In 2015, in an interview with Radio Liberty, he recalled:
“Timchenko needed sales for his Kinex organization…. There was a certain condition that all business participants complied with until recently, until Lukoil entered [this is already in the 2000s], that all oil products are taken only from Kirishi. From no one else - categorically impossible (...)
The team worked all together: Vasiliev, Kumarin, Traber, Skigin, Timchenko. There was a distribution of roles, the task was clear. In essence - to take all the supply in the North-West, to a greater extent, exports and the inner city, thereby ensuring sales for Timchenko as well. Timchenko also had a local sale - all of St. Petersburg was serviced on the Brooks ... "
Ruchii is the same tank farm with gasoline storage facilities that the bandits seized from Surgutneftegaz in 1996. The “team” that worked all together was the Tambov organized criminal group, security officers and officials.
6. Age of Gunvor
In the late 90s, with the rise of Putin in Moscow, the Timchenko brigade also began to reach new heights. In 1997, Timchenko and his IPP became shareholders of Bank Rossiya. Rossiya Bank is Putin's obshchak, the bank of the Ozero cooperative (future summer residents Kovalchuk, Yakunin and others entered it back in 1991).
Now the obshchak has been replenished with money from the Kirishi refinery, which went through IPP and Kineks. Timchenko and the team received about 20% of the bank's shares, and Andrey Katkov became chairman of the board of directors there in 1998. This scheme will then be repeated more than once in the 2000s. As soon as Putin's people put their paw on something, it is immediately dragged to the Rossiya bank. All flows in one place and under control.
The building on the square Rastrelli, 2 in St. Petersburg. Headquarters of Rossiya Bank. Someday it will be called the "Lake House" and a museum of Putin's mafia will be opened. In the meantime, billions from the oil trade pass here, everything stolen from Gazprom (Gazprombanks, Siburs, Sogaz) is transferred here, Roldugin's offshore companies in Panama were controlled from here.
Another interesting detail: until 1999. Kinex was a company that specialized in the sale of petroleum products. But in 1999 they also moved into crude oil. Naturally, also Surgut.
At first, in 1999-2002, Kineks was only one of the intermediaries selling Surgut oil, and not the largest. However, unlike others, he took oil from Surgut at prices well below the market. Anglo-American investor William Browder in the 2000s conducted an investigation into the activities of Kinex based on customs statistics.
It turned out that Kinex took oil in Surgut at a "discount" of $35 per ton (about $7 per barrel), and resold it abroad at normal prices. Given that a barrel in the early 2000s cost about $20, Kinex got oil 25% below the market. In such a simple way in 1999-2002. Putin's pumped out of "Surgut" about a billion dollars.
William Browder, head of the Hermitage Capital Management international investment fund.
Browder investigated Kinex's schemes, and also demanded that Surgutneftegaz reveal the owners of the controlling stake in this oil company (which have been classified since 2003). All this caused a stormy reaction in the Kremlin, which declared a real war on Browder.
In addition, in 2007, Browder's auditor, Sergei Magnitsky, uncovered a scheme in which certain officials stole $230 million from the Russian budget through the Moscow tax office. The money has gone overseas. The scheme was serial, this is only one episode.
The stolen money was then found in parts in various parts of the world. And in 2016, some of them were found in the offshores of cellist Roldugin. It turns out that Vladimir Vladimirovich does not disdain such a gesheft ...
But the conflict between Putin and Browder began with Surgut. And the scheme with Kinex - it was a classic of gangster capitalism of the 90s - is called "privatization of profits." It doesn't matter to whom the office is registered, the main thing is who milks it, sits on streams.
And the flows, meanwhile, grew. Soon it smelled of really big money (tens of billions). And then in 2002-2003. Putin and Timchenko led a revolution at Surgutneftegaz: they took the whole cow for themselves. Timchenko's old partners (Katkov, Malova and Co.) were thrown out of business. Why share with those who are no longer needed?
After that, the entire system for marketing oil products and crude oil of Surgut was rebuilt. The entire sale of Surgut was transferred to two monopoly intermediaries: Surgutex and Gunvor. The first village was for the sale of petroleum products, the second - for crude oil. The 15-year era of Kinex ended here. The era of Surgutex and Gunvor began.
Surgutex was established in St. Petersburg in 2002. By 2004, according to Forbes, its turnover had grown from zero to 360 billion rubles. per year (12 billion dollars at that rate). It's no joke - the entire sale of oil products "Surgutneftegaz" within the country and abroad.
Next came the turn of crude oil. The Gunvor company appeared in Geneva back in 1998, but until 2002, few people heard about it. But then the guys from "Gunvor" suddenly began to drive Russian oil abroad in space volumes - tens of millions of tons. In 2004, the turnover of Gunvor amounted to 5 billion dollars, in 2006 - already 40, in the 2010s it exceeded 80.
Gunvor received a monopoly on the export of oil from Surgutneftegaz, and after the capture of Yukos, it got into that too, taking about 40% of Rosneft's sales. And then they also bent TNK-BP (Friedman and Alfa-Bank) to work with Gunvor. In short, Vova Putin and friends got a taste.
In 2007, oil market analysts were astonished to discover that out of 250 million tons of oil exported from Russia, 80 million (almost a third) were exported by Gunvor. And this is not the limit, in the future, the turnover only grew. The money earned was invested all over the world. Gunvor has turned into an empire with offices on all continents, a tanker fleet, and its own terminals in Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk. The guys bought three refineries in Europe (Antwerp, Rotterdam and Ingolstadt) and an oil pipeline along the Panama Canal.
And the Gunvor guys are patriots of their country and help national sports: Gunvor is a sponsor of the hockey and football club Servette (Geneva).
Geneva, st. Rhone d. 80-84. Gunvor headquarters. From this building, the export of oil from Surgutneftegaz is controlled. In Surgut they pump, they saw here.
7. Secrets of the Surgut Thief
Who were the founders of Surgutex and Gunvor? - In Surgutex, Timchenko received 51%, and a certain Pyotr Kolbin received 49%. Timchenko presented him as his childhood friend, allegedly their fathers, officers of the Soviet army, served together in the GDR in the 1960s. Then Kolbin worked as a butcher in a store, and in the 2000s Timchenko decided to help a friend financially: he took a share in the oil business. Here is such a legend.
Crooks in Russia love to register one-day firms for alcoholics ... This is how Vova Putin registered his share in Surgutex (and not only) for his childhood friend Petya Kolbin from Ivangorod (Leningrad region). Kolbin is actually a childhood friend of Putin, they have known each other since they were 2 years old. His father is not an officer, but a school teacher (we'll talk about this a little later). Well, the "businessman" Kolbin is the same as the cellist Roldugin. Just a holder of other people's capital.
As for the Gunvor company, its founders have long been a secret to the general public. The situation was aggravated by the fact that there were several Gunvorov. One is in Switzerland (which, in fact, exported 80 million tons of oil from Russia each), but its founder was another "Gunvor" - from Cyprus. In addition, some of the operations (the most murky) passed through the Gunvor from the British Virgin Islands. In short, a whole gang of gunvors gathered there.
In 2007, it became known that the founders of Gunvor were three people - Timchenko, the Swede Thorbjorn Tornkvist and a certain third shareholder, whose name was not disclosed. The Swede Torknvist is a professional oil trader who worked with Chekists from Urals in the 90s, where he met Timchenko.
Torknvist (far left) with friends:
When Gunvor began to be promoted in 2002, Timchenko and Torknvist moved to Geneva, closer to the headquarters, settling in mansions opposite each other.
Timchenko and Torknvist did not disclose the third shareholder of Gunvor for a long time. In 2007, Torknvist told the media that the secret third shareholder, whose name he has no right to name, "has nothing to do with politics," but it was he who gave the money for the initial promotion of the company. type investor.
However, around 2009, the name of this person was nevertheless made public: Peter Kolbin. He invested his personal savings in the meat section of the grocery store into Gunvor (just kidding).
In 2014-15 Timchenko and Kolbin were sanctioned as proxies Putin. And in 2016, in an interview with the BBC, Deputy. U.S. Treasury Secretary Adam Shubin, said that according to the competent US authorities, Putin's personal money was invested in Gunvor and he is directly related to the promotion of this office.
Of course, in Gunvor itself they deny everything. If you take any interview with Tornqvist, there is the same legend everywhere: brilliant businessmen, a Swede and security officer butchers have gathered. And flooded. Although the reason for the success lies on the surface: someone ordered Surgutneftegaz to transfer its flows to them. He is the true author of their business.
How much money did Vova-Gunvor and friends raise from the export of Surgut oil? Given that Gunvor is the direct heir to Kinex, which back in 1999-2002. took away Surgut oil at prices a quarter below the market, then we are talking about a billion dollar fortune. In 2007, political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky, in an interview with the Welt newspaper, estimated Gunvor's profit for 2006 at 8 billion dollars (with a turnover of 40). This is for one year.
Officially, however, Gunvor never disclosed its profit for 2002-2010. Only revenue. After 2010, the head office (which is in Switzerland) began to show profit, but at the very least - 1-2% profitability. The rest goes offshore.
