Ten years ago, in December 1993, the last Soviet monetary reform- the circulation of denominations of the 1961 model in denominations of one, three, five and ten rubles was stopped.
Money exchange is a common thing for us. Over the past twenty years, we have changed banknotes and lost ourselves in zeros more than once, but the monetary reform of 1991-1993 produced an almost revolutionary effect - almost the entire population of the country became equally poor.
The government of the USSR in an attempt to reverse crisis situation was extremely inconsistent. We can recall the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1990) on the forthcoming revision of prices (that is, their increase), which N. Ryzhkov announced publicly. The response to this announcement was immediate. In a matter of days, demand for all goods rose sharply, and total shortages spread throughout the country. A flurry of criticism hit the Council of Ministers, and the government postponed price revisions.
Another example of government inconsistency was the introduction at the end of 1990 of a five percent tax on all sales to replenish state budget. But soon (under pressure from industry lobbies), the government decided to significantly narrow the range of taxed products, and the value of this tax came to naught. At the end of 1990, the former Minister of Finance in the government of N. Ryzhkov, V. Pavlov, who represented the interests of conservative economic and political circles and the military-industrial complex, became head of government. To stop the centrifugal tendencies, a course was taken to tighten economic measures. There was no longer any talk of privatization and liberalization. Soon V. Pavlov accused private banks of some foreign countries that they seek to destabilize the situation in the USSR. President Gorbachev gave permission to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB to intervene in economic activity enterprises (including joint ventures), which led to a sharp reduction in investment and trading activity foreign capital on the territory of the USSR.
On January 10, 1991, Valentin Pavlov officially announced that there would be no monetary reform. Because it will not help - we need comprehensive methods to improve the economy. Most of the population will even remember that the minister was ready to lose his arm in order to prove the justice of his words.
Late in the evening of January 22, after the closing of the savings banks, Valentin Pavlov announced in the Vremya program that the banknotes of 50 and 100 rubles of the 1961 issue were being replaced with new banknotes. The population was given three days to exchange banknotes. It was possible to change at the place of work. Who did not work - in the savings bank at the place of residence (at the same time, a special stamp was put in the passport).
In the first three days it was possible to exchange 350 rubles. Over the next six months, it was possible to gradually exchange up to 1.5 thousand rubles, citing the fact that this did not exceed the annual salary of an ordinary Soviet person.
On January 23, 1991, Pavlov withdrew 50 and 100 ruble notes from circulation. One of the reasons for this measure was as follows: the fact is that the ruble-forint-dollar and ruble-zloty-dollar transactions brought much more income than the ruble-dollar, because the exchange rate of forint and zloty in relation to ruble was artificially low. It is not known how many large ruble bills ended up abroad in this way; in any case, Pavlov called the figure of 100 billion rubles.
The exchange of large banknotes, which was carried out freely only in the amount of a monthly salary and was accompanied by the freezing of a significant part of deposits, hit ordinary citizens most painfully. In addition, on the eve of the exchange, many enterprises and institutions received money to pay wages almost exclusively in large denominations. Due to the lack of small denominations, savings banks did not exchange money for pensioners. There was a threat that not everyone would be able to exchange money during the three days that were allotted.
The government was forced to revise the terms for the exchange of large banknotes twice. After each postponement, the state's monetary gain from the exchange decreased. Immediately after the exchange, it amounted to about 10 billion rubles, in March - 8 billion rubles, and by April it had decreased to 4 billion rubles.
However, the exchange of money created certain opportunities for stabilization monetary circulation. However, this last chance for the ruble to recover was thwarted by further government steps.
Although the nominal money supply was minimal in April 1991, the failure to stabilize monetary circulation took place precisely in April, i.e., at the time of the price reform, supposedly designed to consolidate the results of the January exchange of banknotes.
As a result of this reform, state retail prices increased by about three times, the limit was reached purchasing power population and there was a decrease in cooperative and market prices. However, at the same time, the government went on to pay significant monetary compensation. Therefore printing press was started and never stopped.
The main reasons for the significant increase money issue in June-September, there was the beginning of the collapse of the USSR and the refusal of the former republics, and now sovereign states, to transfer funds to the union budget.
Under these conditions, President M. S. Gorbachev violated Union legislation, taking in July, bypassing the Supreme Council, from State Bank 93 billion rubles for the maintenance of the army and the state apparatus. As a result, inflation that began even before perestroika and accompanied every step of it due to the gigantic expansion money supply escalated into hyperinflation. The price reform did not change the state of affairs in consumer market. The increase in the deficit outpaced the rise in prices. The government was counting on the exact opposite effect. The Cabinet of Ministers believed that, taking into account the payment of government compensation, it would be able to reduce standard of living population by 40%, bringing it closer to the level of 1978-1979. In this case, in the opinion of our ministers, the population, in order to maintain their usual standard of living, will withdraw 2,000 rubles from their savings books. in year. This will absorb the increase in savings recent years and the economy will return to the inflation-free years of 1971-1973.
The reform that went down in history under the name "Pavlovskaya" hit the wallets of thousands of people who kept rubles both "under the mattress" and in Sberbank. Were "multiplied by zero" fortunes of ten to fifteen, and even hundreds of thousands, accumulated over decades. In one day, millions of Russians became beggars, having completely lost confidence in the state for several years.
Valentin Pavlov was the last and probably the most unpopular finance minister and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. First, because he carried out a confiscatory monetary reform. And secondly, he spent it at a time when the regime could already be safely scolded.
The last Soviet reform was a turning point in Russian economic history- began the era of confiscations. Price liberalization in 1992, voucher privatization, and August 1998 repeatedly deprived citizens of their savings.
Moreover, the reform assumed a frightening character also because of its unexpectedness.
Many remember the year in which the Pavlovian reform led to the final impoverishment of the Soviet people. It is customary to call her by the name of the first and, in fact, the last prime minister of the Soviet Union. Let us further consider what the Pavlovian reform of 1991 was: the causes, stages, and consequences of the transformations.
The situation in the country
The beginning of 1991 did not bode well for the collapsed. On the outskirts of the country, inter-ethnic clashes became more frequent, there was a global shortage in stores, people lined up in huge queues. Gorbachev's economic transformations did not lead to anything, perestroika did not take place. The government tried to switch from planned to market system management. However, institutionally, the state turned out to be not ready for this - the necessary people and bodies were absent in the country. The vast majority of the population could not provide themselves with a sufficient amount of food and industrial goods. People are used to empty shelves. The only positive development at that time was the stable payment of a modest salary. Of course, the country's leadership understood that if they began to delay wages, this would result in mass protests. And the government could not allow this. Meanwhile, people did not demand a large amount of material goods. The population of the USSR is accustomed to restrictions, shortages, isolation. Everyone lived from paycheck to paycheck, trying to provide their families with food first and housing second. According to prof. Volchik, the nature of the existing excess money supply was determined by the growing dysfunctions of the institutions of the planned economic regime. Inconsistent and chaotic transformations destroyed centralized system, however, they did not contribute to the formation of market regulatory mechanisms and institutions.
Why did the Pavlovian reform of 1991 start?
There was a lot of money in the country. However, in the current crisis conditions they constantly depreciated and turned into meaningless waste paper. The official reason was the fight against counterfeit banknotes "thrown in from abroad." In addition, the government decided to withdraw the unearned income of citizens. Such a statement of reasons was the most familiar to the Soviet ideology. Unofficially, it was clear to everyone that the key goal was the elimination of banknotes printed in the late 80s. to fulfill the social guarantees that had accumulated among the population and increased the shortage of consumer products.
Change Organizer
The author of the reform was Valentin Pavlov, a 53-year-old "supporter of the Minister of Finance. Since 1986, he led the USSR State Committee on Prices. Accordingly, he knew not the ideological, but the real state of affairs. Pavlov had long been looking for different ways to withdraw Money among the population, not provided with goods. Assuming a ministerial post in July 1989, he constantly pondered the idea of transformation. According to his plan, the reform included not only the withdrawal of excess money, but also to promote price increases, taking into account the cost of services and goods.
Transformation Options
The Pavlovskaya city assumed several concepts. Among them were those that were previously used in other countries. Quite paradoxical concepts were also developed. For example, one of the options was the introduction of "parallel money" following the example of the 1920s, but in non-cash circulation. Another concept involved simply the confiscation cancellation of old banknotes without exchange and an issuing mechanism. credit regulation. Such transformations were carried out in 1948 in the Federal Republic of Germany by Chancellor Adenauer. As a result, it was actually liquidated. There was another, compromise option, according to which the Pavlovian reform of 1991 could go. People didn’t have much money, the compensation of which was supposed to be within a strictly established amount. However, the management intended to carry out an exchange with a change in the scale of the national currency. This provided for the withdrawal of savings in excess of strictly a certain amount. The minister insisted on the speedy implementation of the reforms, so that the funds stored not in banks, but "in capsules", people would either not have time, or would not be able to hand over completely. The Ministry of Finance had no doubt that most of the population had nothing to save from meager salaries, and only "dishonest people" could keep stash in large banknotes.
Rationale for transformations
The Pavlovian reform of 1991 had to be approved by Gorbachev. To do this, it had to be substantiated. Pavlov used a well-known method. In the summer of 1990, he filed a secret note addressed to Gorbachev and Ryzhkov. In it, the minister explains the need to exchange only 50 and 100 ruble banknotes of 1961. by the fact that they are exported in large volumes abroad. Ryzhkov, being at that time the chairman of the Council of Ministers, requested confirmation from the customs authorities. From there they reported that, as a rule, ten-ruble banknotes cross the border, and not hundreds. A discussion began, as a result of which Ryzhkov was dismissed. Gorbachev, who was rapidly losing popularity among the masses, needed a person who would take responsibility for the steps ahead. Pavlov was perfect for this role. On January 14, 1991, his candidacy was approved for the post of prime minister.
Cabinet management
Pavlov began his activities as prime minister with misinformation. From a high rostrum, he assured that no preparations were being made for future reforms. He said that financial reforms are only a part of the whole complex of measures that are aimed at improving the economy. The isolated implementation of the reform of money without solving other problems is meaningless, since it will not lead to any results. In addition, the prime minister said that the transformation would cost the economy 5 billion rubles. And at the end of his speech, he pointed out that the banknote production capacities that existed at that time would make it possible to accumulate the required amount of new banknotes within three years.
Unrest among the people
Soviet citizens who have long been accustomed to the ideological attacks of the leadership, poorly understanding the essence of market economy, nevertheless felt some kind of catch on the part of the party. The first persons of the state have already ceased to enjoy any kind of trust. Information about the upcoming reform leaked through acquaintances, so some citizens managed to change their "hundreds" and "fifty kopecks" in advance. On the eve of the announcement of the exchange, part of the population managed to "exchange" cash at the cash desks of railway stations and metro, in shops, with taxi drivers. However, there were few such "lucky ones". Everyone suspected the reform, but no one knew when or how it would be carried out. The upcoming changes were discussed everywhere: in transport, in universities, on collective farms, in production, in the army. On the one hand, most of the population came to the conclusion that "there is nothing to save," and on the other hand, "they will be deceived anyway."
Pavlovian reform of money: the course of the "share"
On January 22, Gorbachev signs a decree, according to which 50 and 100-ruble banknotes of 1961 are withdrawn from circulation. and exchanged for smaller new bills. From that moment, the Pavlovian reform of 1991 began. The population turned out to have less money than expected. Cash exchange in the amount of up to 1 thousand rubles. was produced only three days - from 23 to 25 January (from Wednesday to Friday). At the same time, the withdrawal of money from accounts with Sberbank was limited to 500 rubles. The exchange was allowed until the end of March, but in special commissions. They considered every case due date separately. Along with this, the citizen had to tell where he got the amount of more than 1 thousand. The presidential decree was read out at 9 pm, when almost all organizations were no longer working. The most savvy citizens in a panic began to save their money. Someone urgently sent a transfer, someone bought several plane or train tickets for different flights in order to return them later. However, only a few managed to do all this.
exchange process
The Pavlovian reform created huge queues already on the morning of January 23. At the cash desks of Sberbank there were "delegates" of labor collectives who changed banknotes of entire teams. The management's calculation for working days was partially justified. Many citizens simply did not have time to get from production to cash desks. However, in some areas, the local administration went to meet the needs of the population. Exchange offices were opened in production, in post offices. Conflicts arose in the queues themselves, someone became ill. As a result, the Pavlovian monetary reform made it possible to withdraw from the population about 14 billion rubles. According to the plan of the organizers, of course, it was supposed to confiscate more than 51.5 billion out of 133 billion (about 39%). The Pavlovian reform, in addition, included the freezing of bank savings. These funds accrued 40% per annum. However, they could not be received until next year.
results
The Pavlovian reform drastically reduced national income. In comparison with 1990, it has decreased by 20%. At the same time, the budget deficit increased significantly. According to various estimates, in 1991 it amounted to 20-30% of GDP. When the Pavlovian reform was completed, its organizer made accusations against foreign banks, reproaching them for coordinated activities aimed at disorganizing the circulation of cash in the USSR. As part of the second phase of the transformation, without any prior announcement, the prices of consumer products jumped sharply in the country since April 2, despite having remained at a stable level for decades. All this led to an absolute loss of all confidence in the leadership of the party. The population considered themselves robbed twice.
Conclusion
As the results of public opinion show, the Pavlovian reform became one of the key reasons for the failure of the coup d'état. As you know, it was undertaken by conservatives from the government and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1991. It is noteworthy that reformer Valentin Pavlov was also present among the members of the GKChP. Subsequently, he said that at that time few people realized and believed that it was not an ideological issue that was being decided. At the end of January 1991, the population of the country said goodbye not only to the missing banknotes, but also to part of their past. People living in Vladikavkaz, who witnessed these events, still often recall how on January 26, a day after the general hype, a well-dressed man with a suitcase appeared at the State Bank building. He opened it and poured a pile of 50-ruble banknotes onto the snow and set them on fire. From the point of view of modernity, according to Volchik, this form of reform is absolutely unacceptable. However, if we assess the situation the way the previous leadership did, then there was simply no other way of financial transformation. Almost all reforms of the USSR were confiscatory in nature. And this "action" of the early 90s was no exception.
On January 22, 1991, the President of the USSR Gorbachev issued a decree according to which the old banknotes of the 1961 model with a face value of 50 and 100 rubles should be withdrawn from circulation. Money that had lost its power could be exchanged, but with significant restrictions. Only three days were allotted for this (from January 23 to 25). At the same time, only 1,000 rubles per person could be exchanged (the rest of the money could theoretically be exchanged only by contacting special commissions that operated until March 1991).
In addition, the restrictions affected the possibility of withdrawing money from savings books, where many Soviet citizens kept their savings. It was allowed to withdraw no more than 500 rubles per month.
The idea of carrying out this monetary reform belonged to Valentin Sergeevich Pavlov, who at that time held the post of Minister of Finance of the USSR. Six days before the signing of the scandalous decree, he was appointed to a new post - the Prime Minister of the USSR. That is why the reform was soon nicknamed Pavlovskaya.
One of the last nails in the coffin Soviet economy was the monetary reform of 1991, popularly called "Pavlovskaya" by the name of Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, who carried it out.
On January 14, 1991, Valentin Pavlov, formerly President of the All-Union Economic Society, was appointed to the post of Chairman of the Government of the USSR.
Previously holding the post of Minister of Finance of the USSR, Pavlov was already working on various options withdrawal of "surplus money".
By 1991, on the wave of cooperation, a small layer of businessmen with significant sums had already formed. In addition, in the conditions of a shortage of goods, when, in general, there was nothing special to spend money on, the population had a huge amount of money in its hands, which could not be merchandised.
In an interview for the Vremya program, commenting on the need for reform, Valentin Pavlov noted that, in his opinion, banknotes of 50 and 100 rubles are "the most important element shadow economy» because they serve money turnover in non-transparent areas of the economy.
At the same time, according to the estimates of the Chairman of the Government of the USSR, denominations of 50 and 100 rubles accounted for “more than a third” of the denominations that were in cash circulation.
It was assumed that the withdrawal of cash from circulation would reduce inflation, as well as hit the shadow economy.
The essence of the reform was as follows: January 22, 1991, in the evening on the Central Television of the USSR in the program "Time" it was announced that "in the interests of the vast majority of the country's population", banknotes with a face value of 50 r. and 100 r. 1961 issues will not be accepted "for all types of payments" after some 3 hours, i.e. from 0000 hours on January 23.
In order not to lose absolutely all the money available in such a denomination, the population was given a ghostly opportunity to exchange “fifty dollars” and “stolniki” of 1961 for banknotes of a smaller denomination of the same 1961 issue or the same denomination, but of the 1991 sample.
The time allotted for exchange transactions was extremely short and inconvenient (3 working weekdays, from Wednesday to Friday). Naturally, not everyone was able to exchange their savings. Thus, in the crush at the treasured windows of the savings banks, the population lost part of their funds set aside "for a rainy day."
In the matter of exchanging money, people went to all sorts of tricks, for example, they urgently exchanged money with taxi drivers who had not yet heard about the decree.
The decree was published on January 22 in the Vremya program, i.e. at 21 pm, however, the turnover of banknotes stopped only at 0 am on January 23 - thus, the most resourceful received 2-3 hours to carry out such frauds as Money transfers to himself, buying tickets at railway ticket offices, Aeroflot ticket offices, and the like.
In addition, the Pavlovian reform implied restrictions on withdrawing cash from accounts at the Savings Bank, where it was so elegantly recommended at one time to keep money for citizens of the USSR. Now each depositor could withdraw no more than 500 rubles from his account. per month.
The Pavlovian reform was designed to remove the excess money supply from circulation. As a result, 14 billion cash rubles were withdrawn from circulation, but another result of this reform was the final collapse of the population's confidence in the actions of the government.
In addition, there were complaints about the practical implementation of the monetary reform.
For example, in the release of the Vremya program on January 23, a story was shown that some savings banks did not exchange banknotes on the 23rd, citing the fact that “there were no orders.”
The panic caused by the urgent need to exchange banknotes led to a certain drop in labor discipline and, accordingly, labor productivity. It is understandable - people were quite reasonably worried about the future of the "hard earned" and things at work faded into the background.
The subsequent increase in the rate of emission of rubles in 1991 nullified the whole point of the reform. In his book The Death of an Empire, Yegor Gaidar gives the following data on money emission in 1991: April - 4.77 billion, May - 5.50 billion, June - 18.74 billion (Gaidar E.T. Gibel empires, M.: ROSSPEN, 2006, p.367)
And already in 2 months - on April 2, 1991, a decree on new state retail prices will be issued, which raised prices in stores by an average of 3 times.
Due to the subsequent emission, the Pavlovian reform did not lead to a decrease in the money supply, while it was during this reform that significant personal savings were essentially confiscated from the population of the USSR.
