TEBENKO Vyacheslav Alexandrovich, applicant, department of national history of Petrozavodsk state university, Steel Service LLC, Petrozavodsk, Russia [email protected]

ONCE AGAIN ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE KARELO-FINNISH SSR INTO THE KARELIAN ASSR IN 1956

In the presented work, one event of Soviet history that has not been studied so far is considered. - the transformation of the KFSSR into the KASSR and its inclusion in July 1956. into the RSFSR. The purpose of the article is to reveal and indicate the reasons and factors that resulted in the transformation and renaming of the union republic. Based on the purpose of the study, the author defined the main task as follows: to identify the specific motivation of the Soviet leadership in the transformation of the KFSSR into the KASSR based on the study of Soviet-Finnish relations, including at the level of relations between the leaders of the two states.

To reveal the stated topic of the work, various research methods were used, which made it possible to most fully reflect the author's point of view on the transformation and renaming of the state territory. Were used: inductive logical methods and synthesis method, special: comparative-historical, problem-chronological methods. In the course of the study, the author points to a number of events and coincidences that make it possible to establish a direct connection between the transformation of the KFSSS into the KASSR and the political and economic situation within Finland itself, its foreign policy and partly those processes that took place in the USSR in 1956.

Key words: Karelo-Finnish USSR, Finland, foreign policy, Kekkonen, Paasikivi.

TEBYENKO Vyacheslav Alexandrovich, Applicant for a Degree, Chair of the History of Russia, Petrozavodsk State University, JSC STALSERVICE, Petrozavodsk, Russia

ONE MORE APPROACH TO TRANSFORMING THE KARELIAN FINNISH SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC (KF SSR) TO THE KARELIAN AUTONOMOUS SSR IN 1956

The paper presented here has considered an event of the Soviet history insufficiently explored yet, the KFSSR having altered its status to KASSR with its integration in July 1956 with the RSFSR. The study" objective was bringing to light and specifying some reasons and factors having entailed an altering status to and renaming of the federal republic. Proceeding from the study" objective, the author identified the key task: uncovering a specific motivation the then Soviet leaders had been convinced with in altering the KFSSR status to KASSR, on the grounds of a review of the Soviet- Finland relations, including the level of relations established between the leaders of the States. In order to discover the declared issue the author has applied various research techniques that made it possible for the researcher to reflect fully his point of view on the altering status to and renaming of the state territory. The following techniques have been applied: logical ones, as an inductive one and a synthesis technique; and the specific one as the comparative-historical one, the case study" and the chronological techniques. While exploring the issue, the author pointed to the range of events and some matches that made it available to establish an immediate relation of the altering status of the KFSSS into KASSR to a political and economic situation in Finland and its foreign policy and partly to those developments that happened in the USSR in 1956.

Key words: Karelian -Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic, Finland, foreign policy, Kekkonen, Paasikivi.

There are many "white" spots in Soviet history, both individual facts and entire historical plots. Of course, they can be different in their significance, their study is based on a huge number of sources: documents, published and secret, printed publications, personal memories. In some cases, the study of these events, facts, is based on insignificant sources, for example, several official reports that only inform about the event. But this information content itself does not allow the historian to explain the event, its causes, and official data explain the fait accompli too simply or do not explain at all. At the same time, there are no other documents - secret, unpublished - just as there is no group of sources, even indirect ones, that allow comparing various information about a particular event. This, of course, poses certain professional tasks for historical knowledge and historians.

However, the event does not cease to exist in the historical past. The historian can either confine himself to "registering" it, or try to interpret it on the basis of indirect sources and logical constructions. But since the sources are indirect, logical constructions are based on logic, which does not necessarily obey the actions of people, both ordinary citizens and leaders of states. In this sense, the historian's desire to prove the true causes of a certain event, based on a logical chain, must be supported by already reliably known and generally recognized facts that will correspond to the general line of reasoning.

One of such events, which was of an official nature, but happened somehow swiftly and, in fact, was not explained, was the transformation of the Karelian-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic into the Karelian Autonomous Socialist Republic and its inclusion in the RSFSR in July 1956. Except that the Karelian-Finnish SSR was renamed "at the numerous requests of the working people" in connection

with a significant increase in the number of Russians, Belarusians and other nationalities, as well as in order to reduce spending on the state apparatus. No other official clarification followed. Certainly by the mid 1950s. The Karelian-Finnish SSR in terms of national composition was for the most part Russian-speaking. Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that this event happened too quickly and that in the history of the Soviet state behind the "numerous requests of the workers", as a rule, there was always an unspoken decision of the first persons in the leadership of the USSR, which had a very specific motivation. With regard to the Karelian-Finnish SSR, this is probably what happened: there are no documents that would directly or indirectly confirm this idea, or they are not available to researchers.

In our opinion, the answer to the question of renaming the Karelian-Finnish SSR into the Karelian ASSR should be sought primarily in Finland, or rather, in Soviet-Finnish relations, which can “interpret” the reasons for this renaming and the abolition of the allied KFSSR. In fairness, it must be said that it is this point of view that is generally accepted today. In a collective monograph by Karelian researchers, with reference to Finnish colleagues, the true reasons for the transformation of the KFSSR into the KASSR are associated with the unfulfilled hopes of foreign policy, for the sake of which the KFSSR was created. The change in status was an act of friendly policy of N.S. Khrushchev: it was supposed to demonstrate to Finland that the USSR had no aggressive intentions and put an end to questions about the revision of borders. Of course, we fully share this statement.

It seems to us that this version can be supplemented with certain arguments and try to argue them logically. In general, without denying either the "Soviet" or "Russian" version of the transformation of the KFSSR, we will try to indicate new reasons and, possibly, a new look at this. historical event. Of course, our assumptions will be hypothetical in nature, since there are no documents on the basis of which these assumptions can be confirmed.

To begin with, we need to take into account that the Karelian-Finnish SSR, then the Karelian SSR were created exclusively at the will of the leaders of the Soviet state and these decisions were made in a narrow circle. This thesis, probably, does not require proof, as well as the assertion that most of the political decisions on Karelia, which was a border region, were made in the context of foreign policy and relations with Finland. In the Soviet state, where ideology and propaganda were of tremendous importance both for the outside world and within the country, issues related to symbols, rhetoric, and names have always acquired special significance - this is undeniable.

Now it is important to highlight three points in line with which our further reasoning will go. First: the history of the KFSSR is inextricably linked with the history of relations between the USSR and Finland, including the internal political situation in the latter. Second: in the post-war years, the Soviet state needed a pro-Soviet, even if "bourgeois", Finland, which is not a member of NATO and remains neutral. Relations between the USSR and Finland, and at the level of the first persons of both states, by the mid-50s. have become not just good, but in the full sense of trust and friendship (here it is enough to recall the "entertaining" facts of the meetings of Khrushchev N.S. and Kekkonen U.K.) The third point: the attitude of Finland towards the USSR, the KFSSR, which was not formed by momentary propaganda , but it has developed in the public historical consciousness and, therefore, has acquired a symbolic meaning; here, of course, we must turn to Finnish historians, since we are looking for the answer to the question posed in Finland.

First of all, let's turn to the issue of the emergence of the KFSSR and the events that are associated with it: how they were imprinted in historical memory, in ideology, national consciousness and politics. It will be about the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1949. “On November 30, the Red Army launched an offensive against Finland. On December 1, the creation of the People's Government of the Democratic Republic of Finland was announced, with O.V. Kuusinen. The next day, the USSR signed an agreement with Kuusinen on friendship and assistance, on the basis of which “territorial issues that complicate relations between the USSR and Finland were finally resolved. The Soviet Union ceded the territory of 70 thousand square meters. km. in Eastern Finland and "satisfied the centuries-old hope of the Finnish people for the reunification of the Karelian people with them." The news of the creation of the Terijoki government caused indignation and the strengthening of the national unity of Finland,” says Finnish historian Viljo Rasila.

The Terijoki government was created, as V. Rasila writes, immediately after the failure of the Finnish-Soviet negotiations. Joseph Stalin entrusted this to the communist emigrant Arvo Tuolinen, who was in Stockholm, but he refused the assignment, considering it a deception of the Finnish people. The formation of such a "people's" government is a kind of coup attempt in Finland. "Puppet" government in Terijoki under

Kuusinen's chairmanship became a subject of ridicule even in the eyes of the Finnish workers. Of course, all this Soviet adventure in relation to Finland made the Soviet Union an aggressor in the eyes of the vast majority of Finns, for which they had to pay with blood. Naturally, the attitude towards the whole farce associated with the Terijoki government, the FDR, the People's Army, Kuusinen and the USSR in general, was hostile.

After a short war, on March 13, 1940, the Finnish government signed a peace treaty in Moscow. According to the Finnish historian, "both in the USSR and in Finland, this treaty was perceived as a temporary solution." The famous researcher of the "winter" war Baryshnikov V.N. writes that the peace treaty caused a feeling of deep depression in Finland, especially among the 400,000 migrants who left their native lands. On the day the peace treaty came into force, the state flags were flown at half mast in Finland. On March 31, 1940, the VI session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 1st convocation) took place in Moscow, at which a law was adopted on the transfer of most of the territories transferred from Finland to the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The KASR included most of the Vyborg province (territories on the Karelian Isthmus and in the Northern Ladoga region), as well as the territory of Salla-Kuusamo (parts of the communities of Salla and Kuusamo).

Of course, the KFSSR did not meet the requirements of a union republic: there were not more than a million inhabitants, the titular nations did not make up more than half of the population, the only thing was the external border with Finland. Nevertheless, the KFSSR was formed. Timo Vihavainen in his work with a very symbolic title “Stalin and the Finns” writes: “The Karelian-Finnish SSR was a national revival - it was a consequence of the Winter War, the desire to emphasize the “Finnishness” of the republic in every possible way, the return of the Finnish language, the resettlement of Finns from other parts of the USSR. Behind all this, it was most likely that Finland was going to be annexed to the USSR sooner or later. One can fully agree with Vihavainen's opinion that the Soviet press tried to present the annexation of new territories as evidence of the existence of a new Finnish republic with a new-old leader Kuusinen at the head, to whom Vihavainen has a sharply negative attitude.

Vihavainen cites a very important quote from Kuusinen's speech on the occasion of the creation of the KFSSR: “... the Finnish nationalist press is constantly slandering that Finns and the Finnish language are being oppressed in Soviet Karelia. But now even the new name of our republic speaks for itself and is able to break their lies.” According to the historian, this once again should have shown the Finns the achievement of the victory of the Soviet Union. In addition, the creation of another “Soviet Finland” was a reserve for the future, as H. Meinander writes, both in Helsinki and Moscow were well aware that the “Finnish” issue had not been resolved, but only postponed for the time being. Well-known historians of the Soviet-Finnish war Verigin S.G. agree with the conclusions of Finnish colleagues. and Kilin Yu.M..

It is quite fair to say that the KFSSR, the Soviet Union, Stalin became for the Finns not only symbols of defeat, national tragedy, but also fear, fear of an inevitable big war with a formidable enemy, occupation. The KFSSR in Finnish self-consciousness symbolized the threat of creating a united, “correct” Finland. It remains only to add that the attitude of the Finns to the results of the Winter War, to the KFSSR and personally to Kuusinen was so negative that almost twenty years later, at the end of the 50s, when foreign policy relations between the USSR and Finland reached a qualitatively new level, Finnish the leadership, however, spoke out against the arrival of the already elderly Kuusinen (b. 1881) in Finland, for political and ideological reasons.

It's been a little more than a year since the signing of the peace treaty, when in June 1941 Finnish and Soviet citizens again became enemies. Now there is no need to talk about the events of the Great Patriotic War, but Finland managed to get out of the war on time, without becoming the scene of fierce battles, unlike the countries of Western and Eastern Europe.

As regards relations between the USSR and Finland in post-war period, two trends can be identified. First, as Korobochkin writes, Finland was to remain in the zone of influence of the USSR; the Soviet-Finnish treaty of 1948, the entry of Norway and Denmark into NATO, and Sweden's decision to remain neutral determined the main contours of the "northern balance" for decades to come. The second was the very flexible interaction between the leadership of the USSR and Finland, which manifested itself in many areas, including ideological, political, and economic. If the Soviet leadership, be it Stalin or Khrushchev, expected from the Finns foreign policy support for the Soviet course and guarantees of neutrality, then the "pro-Soviet" leaders of Finland had to be supported also domestically. Here we are talking that, unlike the USSR and the countries of the Eastern bloc, power was not monopolized in “bourgeois” Finland. Due to political traditions, general

Elections, political parties, and movements were of decisive importance. The Soviet leaders Stalin and Khrushchev indirectly participated in the political struggle for power in Finland on the side of Paasikivi, Kekkonen and various political forces from the communists to the so-called bourgeois parties. These are the very special relations that we pointed out at the beginning as the basis for further reasoning.

Such, frankly, friendly relations between the leadership of the two countries began after the signing of the treaty of friendship and mutual assistance in 1948. The actual signing of this treaty is a turning point, so it would be right to cite several provisions of the treaty. In particular, the first article of the treaty proclaimed that if Finland or the Soviet Union through the territory of Finland become the object of military aggression by Germany or any other state, Finland must fight to repel the aggression and, by agreement, the Soviet Union will provide her with the necessary assistance. Also, the agreement confirmed the obligation of the two countries not to participate in coalitions and not to enter into any alliances directed against the other of the contracting parties. In addition, the provisions of the peace treaty between the USSR and Finland on the transfer of the military territory of the Porkkala-Udd coast to the USSR for 50 years remained unchanged. Gulf of Finland a little west of Helsinki to create a naval base. This military base on the peninsula was only 30 kilometers from Helsinki.

The USSR was satisfied with the 1948 treaty. In the official Soviet historiography, the conclusion of the treaty was seen not only as a consolidation of friendship between Finland and the Soviet Union. Prerequisites were created for further deepening and expanding cooperation, transition to more active relations, the international position of Finland was strengthened, a new stage in foreign policy Finland, which by the mid-50s. became known as the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. The essence of this policy was expressed by the Finnish President himself: “Peace and harmony, as well as good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union, based on complete trust, are the first principle that should be guided in our state activity". One can only add to the official assessment that the USSR had a neutral state on the other side of the long border, which in the context of international politics (the creation of NATO) was a serious success of the strategic order, which established a certain “balance” in the North of Europe in the confrontation between the two blocs. This is the one from key points on which our inferences are based.

Of course, not everyone in Finland was satisfied with the results of the 1948 treaty. The Finnish Parliament was not unanimous in its desire to ratify this treaty. As an example, we will cite one of the most diplomatic statements. The leader of the Social Democrats in parliament, Alno Lumme, in his speech expressed the general attitude of the majority of deputies towards the agreement: “I am convinced that the majority of the people of Finland would be satisfied if we did not conclude such an agreement, because, despite everything, there are certain fears among the people that the treaty can be interpreted internationally and politically as Finland joining a certain group of states, and in turn this circumstance may have consequences for Finland, which, on the one hand, will slow down the economic revival of the country and, on the other hand, involve it in international conflicts." The Social Democrats opposed the military articles of the treaty, but were ready to vote for ratification in order to show what sacrifices all factions can make and demonstrate peacefulness and a sincere desire for good neighborly relations with the USSR.

Paasikivi himself, immediately after signing the treaty of friendship with the USSR, in his speech on the radio on April 9, 1948, substantiated in sufficient detail or even justified the need for concessions by the USSR, in particular, the transfer of the territory of Porkkala as a military base and any ways and means of transit between this military base and territory of the Soviet Union, but in fact, the loss of neutrality by Finland. Among other things, Paasikivi frankly urged the press to be more careful in feuilletons and statements on this subject, as if justifying himself for an agreement with the USSR. Of course, without the participation of Paasikivi, this agreement could have been in a different format or not at all. Now the USSR had to support the pro-Soviet political forces in Finland, otherwise, if there were no supporters of the agreement with the Soviet Union in power, Finland's foreign policy could quickly turn in the opposite direction. This did not fit into the plans of the Soviet leadership.

Under these conditions, in the spring of 1948, an election campaign for the Finnish parliament began. Here it is necessary to note one small detail at first glance: at the end of May 1948, three communist members of the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a request to reduce reparations. Shortly before the parliamentary elections on June 3, 1948, Soviet

the government by a special decision reduced the unpaid part of the reparations to Finland by 50% from July 1, 1948 - this amounted to a significant amount: 75 million US dollars. A very serious relief for the Finnish economy, as well as a kind of signal to the Finns: "vote for the communists and pro-Soviet forces." However, on July 2, 1948, in the elections, despite the indirect support of the USSR, which cut the rest of the reparations by half, the DSNF (Democratic Union of the People of Finland) * was defeated and after that it no longer began to have the same serious influence on the political life of the country. A new government was formed: Karl-August Fagerholm became prime minister. The very coming to power of the Social Democrats evoked sharp rejection in Moscow. The Fagerholm government began to eliminate the extreme left from key positions in the state apparatus, pardoned state criminals convicted of war crimes. The Soviet Union, according to Androsova, did not immediately, but resorted to trade and economic pressure against the government of Fagerholm, who resigned in March 1950, following the re-election of President Paasikivi.

After the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, the USSR tries not to lose the initiative and actively influences the internal political situation in Finland. By coincidence, in our opinion - not at all accidental, each foreign policy step of the USSR coincides with some important political and economic events in the life of the Finns, and this happens somehow synchronously. That is, we are again linking the foreign policy of the USSR with the political situation in Finland. According to the Finnish historian Meinander, the real struggle for power in domestic politics since the 50s. was fought between the two largest parties: the Social Democrats and the Agrarian Union. These two camps relied on support from abroad. While the Finnish Social Democrats received support from the fraternal parties of the Social Democrats of Scandinavia and Western Europe, the leader of the agrarians U.K. Kekkonen successfully convinced Moscow that he was the best guarantor of real allegiance to Finland. The Soviet historian V.V. also writes about this very political struggle with the use of external forces. Pokhlebkin, with the only difference that he has no indication of direct support for Kekkonen by the Soviet Union, although it is clear that Kekkonen personifies "progressive" forces.

It was Kekkonen who became prime minister in the spring of 1950. It was no coincidence that important Soviet-Finnish negotiations resumed. Three months later, on June 9, 1950, Kekkonen arrived in Moscow, on June 13 Stalin received him, and in the evening of the same day a trade agreement was signed on the supply of goods for the period 1951-1955. From that moment, Kekkonen's role as the sole guarantor of Soviet-Finnish relations was actually legalized. Here we will allow us to cite some facts and figures: ships, power and transport equipment were supposed to be supplied from Finland to the USSR, model houses. Everything was scheduled by year: in 1951, the Finnish side supplied goods for at least 232 million rubles, in 1952 - for at least 257 million rubles, in 1953 - at least 287 million rubles, 1954 - not less than 312 million rubles, in 1955 - not less than 322 million rubles. In turn, the USSR imported raw materials and goods to Finland in 1951 - no less than 152 million rubles, in 1952 - no less than 172 million rubles, in 1953 - no less than 197 million rubles, in 1954 - not less than 212 million rubles, in 1955 - not less than 222 million rubles. . The agreement is very significant for the Finnish economy, for Finnish entrepreneurs and Finnish workers. In Finland, not just ships were built, but icebreakers for the USSR: “Captain Belousov”, “Captain Voronin”, “Captain Melekhov”. In the autumn of 1951, the trade agreement was extended to consumer goods - this

* (DSNF - 8ioshep kap8ap demokraattinen Shio), a mass political organization in Finland, founded on October 29, 1944 by the Communist Party of Finland (CPF) and left-wing Social Democrats. In the field of foreign policy, he actively advocates the strengthening of friendship and the development of all-round cooperation with the Soviet Union. In 1948, representatives of the DSNF took part in the development and signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and Finland. In the internal political life of the DSNF, it plays the role of a broad association of democratic forces, primarily the working class and the working peasantry, who are in favor of democracy, against the power of big capital. Along with individual members, the DSNF includes as collective members: the Communist Party of Finland, the Finnish Women's Democratic Union, and the Academic Socialist Society. The DSNF has about 150,000 members (1970). Representatives of the DSNF were part of the Finnish government in 1944-1948 and in 1966-1971. In the parliamentary elections of 1972, the DSNF received 37 seats in parliament (out of 200).

significantly reduced unemployment, provided social stability, all that is so necessary for society. According to Kekkonen, who spoke in the periodical press under the pseudonym Veljenpoika, the trade agreement for the Finns was a gift from heaven, it was a clear hint to every Finn that the USSR was becoming the main partner of Finland, buying such goods that would give jobs to thousands of Finns for several years to come. It only remains to add that for Kekkonen it was a great start as prime minister.

Here it must be emphasized that during this period the USSR needed such a person as Kekkonen, a follower of Paasikivi, since it was obvious that Paasikivi, who was already over 80, would not go to the presidential elections in 1956. The fact is that in Finland, according to the prevailing political tradition, the president, after being elected, occupied a supra-party position. His status is to be an arbiter in relations between parties, between parliament and government. And most importantly, foreign policy was the prerogative of the president. What kind of president the Soviet Union needed - the answer, of course, is obvious. Now this man served as prime minister. But in democratic Finland, being prime minister did not automatically mean becoming president. Power had to be won in the pre-election political struggle. The USSR could help a politician who claimed the presidency of Finland to come and stay in power exclusively democratic and by peaceful means, and not through armed intervention, unlike Hungary or North Korea.

Thus, the USSR had to support Kekkonen, strengthening his authority and stable position in domestic political life. Coincidentally, 1953 becomes a crisis year for the world and Finnish economy. As Soviet historians write, Finland began negotiations on loans with the United States and international bank reconstruction and development. International structures dragged out these negotiations in every possible way, planning to use the difficulties of the Finns in order to complicate the position of the “pro-Soviet” prime minister. In Finland, 1953, a whole campaign is unfolding against Kekkonen, and, in the end, he was removed from the post of prime minister. Of course, the Soviet Union was also ready to provide loans, and there were certain agreements in this regard. As Marti Häikio writes, Kekkonen threatened that the Soviet Union would refuse credits to Finland if he did not become prime minister again. In Paasikivi's opinion, posing the question in this way was "politically dangerous, since the question of government was linked to economic problems."

However, negotiations continued. Khrushchev is already in power in the USSR. Kekkonen negotiates with the Soviet Union as foreign minister. However, bilateral relations are not getting worse, and between Khrushchev and Kekkonen, who did not recognize other ways of communicating with Moscow, except for personal diplomacy, not just good, but friendly relations were established. As a result, already on February 6, 1954, an agreement was signed with the USSR on providing a loan to Finland for a period of 10 years in gold or foreign currency for 40 million rubles, at 2.5% per year. We draw the reader's attention to the date February 6, 1954. It is probably no coincidence that this agreement was signed on the eve of the elections to the Finnish parliament, March 7-8, 1954, in which the Agrarian Union, Kekkonen's party, took second place and received 24% of the votes .

The success of Kekkonen's party in the elections also did not go unnoticed. In the summer of 1954, an agreement was again signed between the USSR and Finland on the supply of goods for 1956-1960, in which Finland again acted as an exporter of ships, industrial and transport equipment, and the USSR - as an importer of grain, sugar, oil products, cars, rolled metal . The Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was responsible for the success of negotiations with the USSR, was, of course, W.K. Kekkonen.

In general, the friendly relations between the two countries and the mutual support of the pro-Soviet leaders Paasikivi and Kekkonen were obvious. Let us take, for example, a simple historiographical fact: no literature hostile to the "bourgeois" system of Finland was published in the USSR. The general strike of the Finns in 1956 remained almost unnoticed by Soviet journalism and the press. If such a mass action had taken place in England, it would be easy to imagine the headlines of the leading Soviet newspapers. In the USSR, the speeches and articles of the two presidents of Finland were published and prepared in the form of solid collections, and then they were also republished. For comparison: the leader of the Finnish communists, Ville Lesi, was only awarded the publication of the publication of the “reporting” brochure “The Significance of the October Revolution for the Independence of Finland and the Development of the Liberation Struggle of the Working Class”, published on the anniversary of the revolution. In fairness, it must be said that the first book of Paasi-kivi was published only in 1958, but back in 1955, Paasikivi, in an interview with the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyhter, stated that what happened (about the events of the October Revolution) was

for Finland, a great happiness, it is unlikely that the country could expect anything good from the return of the Romanovs.

Let's go back to 1955. The USSR was ready to continue to support Paasikivi and Kekkonen with very serious measures, and this, of course, cannot but be associated with the preparations for the presidential elections. At the very beginning of 1955, on January 24, an agreement was signed with the Soviet Union to provide Finland with another loan for 40 million rubles in gold or other currency for a period of 10 years and 3% per annum. We will not deny that such a loan for small Finland was a significant help. Moreover, the Prime Minister of Finland, responsible for domestic policy, economic stability, shortly before that, in October 1954, was Kekkonen, who was supposed to replace Paasikivi as president during the successful outcome of the election campaign.

In the autumn of 1955, a significant event took place in the history of Finland. An agreement was concluded between the Soviet and Finnish sides, according to which the USSR ahead of schedule refused to lease Porkkala Udd and withdraw its troops from these territories. It seems to us that this strong step was aimed at supporting the future President of Finland, U.K. Kekkonen, who together with Paasikivi participated in the negotiations in Moscow. In Finland, this was seen as a major non-political achievement. Suffice it to quote from the speech of the Finnish President on September 22, 1955: “In recent days, the good news has spread throughout our country: the Soviet Union has renounced lease and other rights to the territory of Por-kkala, which is returned to Finland. Now this painful matter for us has received a favorable resolution thanks to the sympathetic attitude of the Soviet Union towards us. Marshal Mannerheim was deeply saddened by the provision of a base at Porkkala. When he was president, he returned to this issue. Mannerheim said that because of the Porkkala base, the capital should have been moved from Helsinki to Turku. Already later W.K. Kekkonen said that the conclusion of the agreement on the return of Porkkala in the autumn of 1955 should be considered the crowning achievement of our foreign policy. Obviously, the heroes of this event were Paasikivi and Kekkonen. Of course, inside the country, certain structures had to convey this idea to the voters. There is one more point that needs to be said a few words. In May 1955, the Department of Internal Affairs was created, which, in the event of a military conflict, was supposed to confront the NATO countries. Surely there were many among the Finns who wondered if Finland would become one of the satellite states of the USSR, especially since all the necessary prerequisites for this were there. In this sense, the transfer of Porkkala-Udd, in addition to the above assessments, can be regarded as a kind of hint to the Finnish economic and political elite: “despite the full support of U.K. Kekkon, the USSR does not plan to involve Finland in military cooperation. Is such an option possible? Quite, if we take into account that a significant part of the Finnish society had a very specific idea about the military conflicts of the world powers.

One way or another, it is important to say that the USSR is again taking a serious foreign policy step, moreover, directly related to the mood of most of the Finnish society on the eve of the presidential elections, where the main struggle will be between Kekkonen and the leader of the Social Democrats Fagerholm, on whom Western countries are betting .

In February 1956, presidential elections were to be held in Finland. Under the conditions of the election campaign, according to Finnish historians, the return of Porkkala-Udd, membership in the UN and a hint that "Urho Kaleva's playing on the kantele" will charm the Soviet government and it will agree to return "beautiful Karelia" to Finland (such was the text under one of cartoons in the newspaper "Maakansa", an organ of the Agrarian Union) - all this was skillfully presented to the public as the merit of Kekkonen. Of course, foreign policy victories, achievements in the economy were used to increase the rating in the pre-election struggle, which was not at all illusory. Kekkonen won the presidency by two votes more than the "pro-Western" Fagerholm. For the USSR, this victory was simply necessary. Assuming that Fagerholm would have been president, Finland's reorientation to the West and NATO membership were predictable. The Soviet side, of course, helped Kekkonen in every possible way to achieve success in domestic and foreign policy, gain authority among voters, prepare for the elections and take the presidency.

It should be recalled that the 1956 elections were held in a crisis. Kekkonen was about to take office when the biggest strike in Finnish history began. Naturally, this has the most direct relation to the election results. As the Soviet historian Pokhlebkin writes, the main goal of the reaction from the second half of the 50s. was to interfere with the implementation of Kekkonen's foreign policy and prevent his re-election for a second term. We will not deny the fact that these goals of internal political struggle could be connected with mass strikes.

At that time, significant events were also taking place in the USSR itself: the famous 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev’s report, the “break” with Stalin, rehabilitation, the recognition of mistakes, crimes against entire peoples. Decrees followed to remove restrictions for Poles, Kalmyks, Karachais, Chechens, and others, and a year later, some of the national autonomies were already restored. Coincidentally, in July 1956 the Karelian-Finnish USSR was transformed into the Karelian Autonomous SSR. Returning to the reasons for this transformation and renaming, it should be said that several factors came together in this event.

The first factor is foreign policy: it can be argued that this was another concession to the Finns in line with loan agreements, trade agreements, Porkkala-Udd broadcasts, which, as we have tried to show, usually took place on the eve of the election campaign for parliament and for the presidency and during periods of social instability that threatened the position of pro-Soviet leaders. The USSR no longer sought to change "bourgeois" Finland, there was no need for the KFSSR. The abolition of the KFSSR should have once again emphasized the peacefulness of the Soviet state, which we spoke about at the very beginning of our work, sharing the point of view generally accepted today. Of course, this “gift” brought political dividends to U.K. To Kekkonen, it is not at all excluded that Kekkonen himself, given his relationship with Khrushchev, could hint or simply ask about it. *

How this dialogue between the two leaders took place and whether this dialogue took place at all - we are unlikely to ever know. But, as you know, Khrushchev's friend Kekkonen found himself in a difficult situation. Immediately after the presidential elections, mass protests paralyzed the entire country for two weeks. It was clear that Kekkonen's victory was by no means a guarantee of the country's political and economic stability. The events of March 1956 shocked Finland, the crisis situation for the Finnish society became obvious. Kekkonen's presidency got off to a bad start, and he needed support more than ever.

Already in April 1956, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the KFSSR Prokkonen P.S. at the 3rd session of the Supreme Council of the KFSSR makes a report on the transformation of the KFSSR into the KASSR and joining the RSFSR. Another coincidence? Maybe. However, it cannot be denied that the actions of the USSR follow in sync with crisis situation in Finland and the frankly difficult situation of Kekkonen. What could be such a transformation in the eyes of Finnish society?

Perhaps, firstly, this reflected a demonstration of certain intentions for some further concessions by the USSR in favor of Finland, or it was some kind of guarantee of security and inviolability of borders from the eastern neighbor. Secondly, the abolition of the KFSSR is also the “destruction” of the symbol of national humiliation, the defeat of Finland, the threat of war and, importantly, the exclusion of territories. What was paramount here is hard to say, but all of the above was relevant for Finnish society in the 50s. This is true already for the reason that the events of the two wars at that time were not a historical legacy of the distant past, but existed in the real memory of most of the Finnish people. Naturally, all this was supposed to divert the attention of the Finns from internal problems and have a positive effect on the authority of Kekkonen, who managed, if not to return East Karelia, then, according to at least, "erase" is a constant reminder of the war with political map and put an end to military conflicts with the Russians.

Turning to the domestic political factor, it must be said that the Karelian-Finnish SSR was far from Karelian and certainly not Finnish in its national composition, and the Soviet leadership really carried out reforms to reduce the state and administrative apparatus (suffice it to recall the creation of economic councils in 1957). It was quite logical

* Involuntarily, another thought comes to mind: it is possible that N.S. Khrushchev, a temperamental man and not averse to broad gestures, could promise Kekkonen in a private conversation, given their friendly relations, part of Karelia in the event of his victory in the presidential election. After February 1956, it was no longer up to Kekkonen or Nikita Sergeevich changed his mind, which is also possible. In general, Khrushchev had to somehow delicately get out of the situation. This assumption is already more suitable for a political detective. However, after Kekkonen’s victory, for some reason, relations between the USSR and Finland enter a period of “freeze”, as historians write, which continues until 1958. Moreover, no clear reasons for these “freezes” are given. Economic difficulties, political struggle in Finland, pressure from the West, social democrats? Yes, but all this was long before Kekkonen’s victory and did not interfere with the development of bilateral relations at all, even under the less “Soviet” Paasikivi.

rename the Karelian-Finnish SSR into the Karelian ASSR, and at the same time give the republic with a population of less than a million people the status of an autonomous one, along with other relatively small in terms of population national formations within the RSFSR, which fully fit into the proclaimed principles of socialist legality and the fight against distortions in national policy .

For the Soviet leadership, which changed the maps of the two union republics two years ago in honor of the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia, renaming the small Karelian-Finnish SSR into the Karelian ASSR in conditions of a complete monopoly on power was a simple matter. Thus, the renaming of the KFSSR is, in our opinion, one of a number of foreign policy decisions, economic, political, military, ideological, the purpose of which is to influence the internal political situation in Finland in favor of the pro-Soviet leaders Paasikivi and Kekkonen, which quite organically coincided with the tasks internal policy of the USSR.

2. Tsygankov A. Harmony of the age-old meaning [Electron. resource]. Access mode: http://politika-karelia.ru/?p=1949

3. History of Karelia from ancient times to the present day / ed. ed. N. A. Korableva. Petrozavodsk, 2001.

4. Rasila V. History of Finland. Petrozavodsk, 2006.

5. Rasila V. Decree. op.

6. Meinander H. History of Finland. Lines, structures, turning points. M., 2008.

7. Baryshnikov V.N. Finland's entry into World War II 1940-1941. SPb., 2003.

8. Verigin S.G. Karelia in the years of military trials. The political situation of Soviet Karelia during the Second World War 1939-1945. Petrozavodsk, 2009.

9. Vihavainen T. Stalin and the Finns. SPb., 2000.

10. Vihavainen T. Decree. op.

11. See Vihavainen T. Stalin and the Finns. SPb., 2000.

Meinander H. History of Finland. Lines, structures, turning points. M., 2008. P. 160; Rasila V. History of Finland. Petrozavodsk, 2006, p. 190

12. Verigin S.G. Karelia in the years of military trials. The political situation of Soviet Karelia during the Second World War 1939-1945. Petrozavodsk, 2009.; Kilin Yu.M. Karelia in the policy of the Soviet state in 1920-1941. Petrozavodsk, 1999. S. 216-217

13. Korobochkin M.L. USSR policy towards Finland and Norway 1947-1953 // Northern Europe. Problems of history. M., 1999.

14. Karvonen T. Soviet Union and Finland: cooperation, good neighborliness. M., 1977.

15. Pokhlebkin V. V. USSR-Finland. 260 years of relationship. M., 1975.

16. Komissarov Yu. "Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line": history, modernity, prospects. M., 1985. P. 40. See also Ingulskaya L.A. In the struggle for the democratization of Finland (1944-1948). M., 1972.

17. Paasikivi Yu.K. Article and speech by Juho Kusti Pasikiivi. M., 1958.

18. Karvonen T. Decree. op.

19. Ibid.

20. Pokhlebkin V.V. Decree. op.

21. Korobochkin M.L. Decree. op.

22. Androsova T.V. Finland in the plans of the USSR in the late 1940s-mid-1950s. Political and economic aspect // Domestic history. 1996. No. 6.

23. Meinander H. Decree. op.

24. Pokhlebkin V.V. Urho Kaleva Kekkonen. M., 1985.

25. Androsova T.V. Decree. op.

26. Agreement between the USSR and the Republic of Finland on the supply of goods for the period 1951 -1955. dated June 13, 1950 // Soviet-Finnish-relations 1948-1983. M., 1983.

27. Pokhlebkin V.V. Decree. op.

28. Berteniev T., Komisarov Yu. Thirty years of good neighborliness (on the history of Soviet-Finnish relations). M., 1976.

29. http://www.vbrg.ru/articles/istorija_vyborga/istoricheskie_lichnosti_nashego_goroda/per_evind_svinkhuvud/

30. Agreement on the provision of a loan by the USSR to the Republic of Finland dated February 6, 1954 // Soviet-Finnish relations 1948-1983. M., 1983.

31. Yusila O., Khentilya S., Nevakivi Y. Decree. op.

32. Agreement between the USSR and Finland on the supply of goods for the period 1956-1960. dated July 17, 1954 // Soviet-Finnish relations 1948-1983. M., 1983.

33. Lesi V. Significance of the October Socialist Revolution for the independence of Finland and the development of the liberation struggle of the working class. M., 1957.

34. Pasikiivi Yu.K. Decree. op.

35. Agreement on the provision of a loan by the Soviet Union to the Republic of Finland dated January 24, 1955 // Soviet-Finnish relations 1948-1983. Treaty of 1948 on friendship, interaction. Documents and materials. M., 1983.

36. Paasikivi Yu.K. Decree. op. P. 281. Turku is located 157 km west of Helsinki

37. Kekkonen U.K. Finland and the Soviet Union. Speeches, articles, interviews 1952-1975 M., 1975.

38. Yusila O., Khentilya S., Nevakivi Yu. Decree. op.

39. Pokhlebkin V.V. Urho Kaleva Kekkonen. M., 1985.

40. Prokkonen, P. S. Speech of Deputy Prokkonen P. S. // Third session of the Supreme Soviet of the Karelian-Finnish SSR: stenogr. report. [B. m.], 1953.

1. History of Karelia from ancient times to the present day / ed. ed. N. A. Korableva. Petrozavodsk: Periodicals, 2001.

2. Rasila V. History of Finland. Petrozavodsk: Petrozavodsk State University Publishing House, 2006.

3. Meinander H. History of Finland. Lines, structures, turning points. M.: All world, 2008.

4. Baryshnikov V.N. Finland's entry into World War II 1940-1941. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press, 2003.

5. Verigin S.G. Karelia in the years of military trials. The political situation of Soviet Karelia during the Second World War 1939-1945. Petrozavodsk, 2009.

6. Meinander H. History of Finland. Lines, structures, turning points. M.: All world, 2008.

7. Kilin Yu.M. Karelia in the policy of the Soviet state in 1920-1941. Petrozavodsk, 1999.

8. Karvonen T. Soviet Union and Finland: cooperation, good neighborliness. Moscow: Progress, 1977.

9. Pokhlebkin V. V. USSR-Finland. 260 years of relationship. M. .: International relationships, 1975.

10. Komissarov Y. "Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line": history, modernity, prospects. Moscow: Nauka, 1985.

11. Ingulskaya L.A. In the struggle for the democratization of Finland (1944-1948). M., 1972.

12. Paasikivi Yu.K. Article and speech by Juho Kusti Pasikiivi. Moscow: Publishing House of Foreign Literature, 1958.

13. Pokhlebkin V.V. Urho Kaleva Kekkonen. Moscow: International relations, 1985.

14. Lesi V. Significance of the October Socialist Revolution for the independence of Finland and the development of the liberation struggle of the working class. M., 1957.

15. Kekkonen U.K. Finland and the Soviet Union. Speeches, articles, interviews 1952-1975 Moscow: Progress, 1975.

ARTICLES IN MAGAZINES, COLLECTIONS, NEWSPAPERS

1. Korobochkin M.L. USSR policy towards Finland and Norway 1947-1953 // Northern Europe. Problems of history. M., 1999.

2. Vihavainen T. Stalin and the Finns // Neva. SPb., 2000.

3. Androsova T.V. Finland in the plans of the USSR in the late 1940s-mid-1950s. Political and economic aspect // Domestic history. 1996. No. 6. S. 47-65

4. Agreement between the USSR and the Republic of Finland on the supply of goods for the period 1951-1955. dated June 13, 1950 // Soviet-Finnish-relations 1948-1983. M., 1983.

5. Berteniev T., Komisarov Yu. Thirty years of good neighborliness (on the history of Soviet-Finnish relations). M., 1976.

6. Agreement on the provision of a loan by the USSR to the Republic of Finland dated February 6, 1954 // Soviet-Finnish relations 1948-1983. M., 1983.

7. Agreement on the provision of a loan by the Soviet Union to the Republic of Finland dated January 24, 1955 // Soviet-Finnish relations 1948-1983. Treaty of 1948 on friendship, interaction. Documents and materials. M., 1983.

8. Prokkonen, P. S. Speech of Deputy Prokkonen P. S. // Third session of the Supreme Soviet of the Karelian-Finnish SSR: stenograph. report. [B. M.], 1953. S. 67-73.

INTERNET SOURCE

Tsygankov A. Harmony of the age-old meaning [Electron. resource]. Access mode: http://politika-karelia.ru/?p=1949

The Center for Political and Social Research of the Republic of Karelia is a non-governmental organization. The Center was established in 1994. One of the priorities of his activity is the study of the problems of the formation of civil society in the territory of Karelia.

The Center for Political and Social Research of the Republic of Karelia is a non-governmental organization. The Center was established in 1994. One of the priorities of his activity is the study of the problems of the formation of civil society in the territory of Karelia. This task is implemented both within the framework of their own programs and through the participation of the Political Science Center in the international research project "Civil Society" (Finland, Russia, England, Estonia, Sweden).

Under the auspices of the Political Science Center, a special issue “Civil Society. Political Science Review” (1995-1999). By financial reasons the publication did not last long and was transformed into a monthly review of the same name by the republican newspaper Karelia (72 issues were published).

The Political Science Center published 4 editions of the Civil Society newspaper in English (the results of federal and republican election campaigns for government bodies).

From 1996 to 1999, the project "10 Politicians of Karelia" was carried out, within the framework of which the political elite of Karelia was studied. In 1999 the brochure “10 Politicians of Karelia. Year 1998".

The Political Science Center carries out monitoring, conducts public opinion polls, and consults. Over the years of work, a large archive of documents and materials has been collected, research has been carried out on the topics: "Political opposition in Karelia" (1995-1996), "The entrepreneurial elite of Karelia" (1997), The political landscape of Karelia (1999-2000)

The political science center carried out a number of research orders from the Legislative Assembly of Karelia, the Central Election Commission of Karelia, IMA-Press (Moscow), and foreign scientific centers.

The head of the center is Anatoly Tsygankov, candidate of historical sciences.

Information and analytical electronic review POLITIKA-KARELIA.RU is the first and this moment the only online publication specializing in the study of the political environment of the Republic of Karelia. The purpose of the web resource is to form in Karelia independent of the authorities and political organizations information resource participating in the construction of civil society. The site covers the activities of the regional leadership, leading politicians, parties and groups of influence, studies and supports civil initiatives of the inhabitants of Karelia, explores the processes of cooperation between the regions of the North-West of Russia and the neighboring states of the European North.

Political scientist Anatoly Tsygankov believes that, despite the rumors about the resignation of the head of Karelia Artur Parfenchikov, he will finalize it before the end of his term. “It seems to me that over time, Parfenchikov became more confident, calm. It seems to me that these are signs that he understands that he will have to work for the entire term, ”Tsygankov said and noted that almost all media governors who worked in Karelia were regularly“ dismissed ”.

The head of Karelia, Artur Parfenchikov, is once again being “sent” to the resignation by the media. Earlier, information appeared that Parfenchikov had allegedly already written a letter of resignation. It is worth saying that rumors about the possible resignation of the head of Karelia appear regularly. At the same time, local observers note that recently Parfenchikov's move to Moscow has been talked about more and more often.

The main thing

• Olympic champion Zhurova supported the proposal of the Chelyabinsk Governor Texler to develop the Zemsky Coach program

  The governor of the Chelyabinsk region, Alexei Teksler, proposed developing the Zemsky Trainer program, similar to the Zemsky Doctor and Zemsky Teacher programs. “I believe that it is critically important that there are trainers, organizers of physical culture in rural areas,” Texler said. State Duma deputy Svetlana Zhurova considers the proposal of the head of the region relevant. Sergei Kashnikov, a member of the RF Civic Chamber, notes that Texler's proposal is in line with the tasks of the Demography and Healthcare national projects.

  Governor Vladimirov: the main goal of meetings with the ONF is to better understand what worries people

  The Governor of Stavropol, Vladimir Vladimirov, met with activists of the regional headquarters of the ONF for the third time this year. He supported their initiative to create a new system for evaluating municipal leaders. Vladimirov also stressed that the main goal of such dialogues is to better understand what worries people and adjust the work of the authorities to best solution their problems. For the governor of the ONF, this is a very good tool for solving really important tasks, political consultant Alyona August supported Vladimirov’s cooperation with the front-line soldiers. The co-chairman of the regional headquarters of the ONF, Viktor Nadein, told the Club of Regions that the support of the head of the region allows public figures to quickly and efficiently achieve solutions to various issues that concern citizens. During a visit to one of the schools Rostov region Governor Vasily Golubev invited schoolchildren to participate in a video flash mob dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War. To do this, you need to record a video story about the participation of their relatives in the war. Elena Tsunaeva, chairperson of the commission for youth affairs, volunteerism development and patriotic education of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, believes that such an informal approach will allow schoolchildren to form the memory that the older generation carries, who had the opportunity to personally communicate with veterans.

  RANEPA expert Ivankina supported the decision of Governor Furgal to relocate residents from emergency houses to new apartments

  In the Khabarovsk Territory, it is necessary to build new housing for the resettlement of citizens from emergency houses, said Governor Sergei Furgal. He rejected proposals to buy apartments for them on secondary market. According to him, nothing but rising prices, which in Khabarovsk already amount to 88 thousand rubles. per sq. meter, it will not work. Elena Ivankina, director of the RANEPA Institute of Industry Management, agrees with this position. She noted that even if the apartments themselves on the secondary market can be in good condition, then everything else, including the condition of entrances, elevators and entrance groups, as a rule, leaves much to be desired and does not allow providing people in such houses with a good quality of life. The construction of new housing in many respects is more economically profitable than buying a "secondary", and under certain conditions, this allows you to reduce prices for regional market, says Yulia Ryshkina, project manager of the analytical center "Indicators of the real estate market IRN.RU".

A precedent for new methods of work of the regional authorities with municipalities may appear in Petrozavodsk, where the upcoming elections to the State Duma of 2016 have created a new window for maneuver for the independent mayor of the city Galina Shirshina in the conflict with the Governor of Karelia Alexander Khudilainen. The fight between the governor and the head of the regional capital is a common plot of the Russian municipal policy, ending in 90 percent of cases with the resignation or landing of the mayor. In 2008-2009, according to statistics, every three days in Russia they imprisoned a mayor, but now the intensity of passions has subsided. And the mayor of Petrozavodsk, who until recently was on the verge of dismissal, can generally keep her post.

Judging by the actions of Shirshina, she intends to fight for the position. On November 1, a rally is planned in Petrozavodsk in support of the deputy mayor, Yevgenia Sukhorukova, who is accused of abuse of power. At the same time, the collection of signatures for the resignation of Alexander Khudilainen began in Petrozavodsk, which shakes the electoral situation on the eve of the Duma elections. All these are elements of Shirshina's political counteroffensive. The disgraced self-nominated woman is still in her chair and even gained support in the person of the Yabloko party, which announced its readiness to nominate her as a candidate for the State Duma. At the same time, the federal center today needs calmness from the region and good results in the elections to the State Duma. "Lenta.ru" tried to figure out why in this situation the governor stopped the brought sword.

Anatomy of Conflict

The fight between non-partisan Shirshina, backed by Yabloko, and the government of the republic began just a few months after Shirshina won the election of the mayor of Petrozavodsk in September 2013 from the United Russia party Nikolai Levin with a crushing score of 41 percent to 29. In early 2015, the governor's team went on the offensive : Oleg Fokin, the speaker of the Petrozavodsk Duma (Petrosoviet), who was objectionable to the regional authorities, resigned, at that time still United Russia. His place was taken by Khudilainen's henchman Gennady Bondarchuk.

Photo: Alexander Miridonov / Kommersant

It is not difficult to dismiss an objectionable mayor: according to the law, he must once a year report to the City Duma on the work done, and deputies evaluate the achievements of the mayor. After the second negative assessment, the mayor says goodbye to the post. The problem is that Khudilainen did not control the Petrosoviet. The first attempt to put "failed" Shirshina for the annual report on the work before the Council of Deputies was made back in 2014, but failed due to Fokin's opposition.

In June 2015, it was already much easier for the regionals to influence city parliamentarians. On June 3, 2015, Shirshina's report still received a "deuce". At the beginning of 2016, she could easily be fired for the second “failure”. Obviously, in preparation for this, on June 18, the Parliament of Karelia and on August 5, the Petrozavodsk Council made a decision: to cancel direct elections of the mayor in Petrozavodsk, to introduce the position of a city manager for hire. Regional experts agreed that the mayor had only two or three months left to "live".

Scythe on a stone

An expert in the field of regional political processes in Russia and the CIS countries, Alexander Kynev believes that "Shirshina's resignation has not yet been implemented because there is a rather consolidated discontent in the region with the policy of the head of the region and his team, which will only intensify in this case." “Petrozavodsk is a city traditionally oppositional, with a developed civil society, and the head is popular and relies on the real support of the residents,” the Lente.ru expert explains.

Anatoly Tsygankov, head of the Center for Political and Social Studies of the Republic of Karelia, tells Lente.ru that the Yabloko woman probably had an influential patron: “In August, everything was ready for resignation, but it was as if another command had arrived. There are no direct facts about who exactly supports Shirshina. But a number of rumors and speculation point to Rashid Nurgaliyev, who is now Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council. Already a very former minister made frequent visits to Petrozavodsk, which he calls his "beloved city." Alexander Stepanov, deputy of the Karelian Legislative Assembly, says the same thing: “Apparently, Moscow did not give the go-ahead, and part of the republican team, interested in relaxing the conflict, prevailed.”

Another question arises. Why can't the parties come to a common denominator in any way and continue the confrontation for more than two years, which has not brought results? Kynev believes that in the team of Khudilainen, who came from the neighboring Leningrad region, there are people who do not understand the peculiarities of the region and are trying to "break everyone through the knee, which, of course, causes resistance from the environment." But Stepanov suggests that Khudilainen took into account the experience of the previous governor Andrei Nelidov, who tried to negotiate, gently crush the local elites, and as a result ended badly: he could not stay in his chair for two years, and is now completely under investigation.

Boyar government

There is another version. According to Tsygankov, the confrontation between the “apple” and the “bear” is just a political screen behind which is hidden the struggle between the governor appointed by the federal center and the local oligarchy. “There is no confrontation between Hudilainen and Shirshina. For a simple reason - she is not an independent figure, but a member of Popov's team, where she plays the third, if not the fifth role.

At the time of Khudilainen's arrival, there were three main business groups in the republic, explains Tsygankov. The Katanandov group, formed during the leadership of the region by Sergei Katanandov in the 2000s. After his departure, the group survived, although it lost most of its influence. The Alikhanov group, formed around Davletkhan Alkhanov, an entrepreneur and politician who held top regional posts in the late 2000s and early 1910s and concentrated informal power in Petrozavodsk. Now Alikhanov is in custody on charges of illegal border crossing and large-scale fraud. And the third in a row, but not in terms of influence - Popov's group. Vasily Popov - director of the Olonets Dairy Plant, since 1998 - deputy of the Karelian legislature, since 2007 - deputy and chairman of the Petrosoviet, member of the Yabloko party.

It is to him that Shirshina owes her victory in the elections. Initially, the social liberals nominated Emilia Slabunova as mayor, who was able to consolidate opposition votes and become the favorite in the election race. However, it was withdrawn on a formal occasion - incorrectly completed financial documents. Then the "Yabloko" sent financial and organizational resources to support the "second number", which turned out to be non-party Galina Shirshina.

Formally, Popov finished political activity April 2, 2009, when, by confession Supreme Court Karelia was found guilty of extorting 100 thousand dollars from businessman Mazurovsky, received a fine and a suspended sentence. However, this did not prevent him from holding the post of speaker for several weeks and transferring it to Oleg Fokin. Which, by the way, faced a similar fate in 2015 - detention under the article "fraud".

Also in March 2015, the deputy of the City Council Yabloko resident Olga Zaletskaya and the director trading network"Lentorg" Alexander Kornilov. This network belongs to Popov; he himself, while in Finland, decides not to return to Russia. His wife, Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly Anastasia Kovalchuk, "Yabloko", also being a defendant in the criminal case, was released on bail. Popov himself is not at all embarrassed by the rich network of family ties at all levels of the republic's government, talking about them in an interview with Svoboda.org from Joensuu. So, Svetlana Chechil, his cousin, for a long time ruled the Prionezhsky district, surrounding Petrozavodsk. It was from under her wing that Evgenia Sukhorukova rushed to the deputies for economics to Shirshina, so that two months later she would be charged with abuse of power.

“All these conflicts are not generated by Hudilainen himself. The oligarchic fiefdom is an inheritance given to him by previous governors. But at the same time, he received carte blanche from Moscow to restore order and strengthen power in the region, ”Tsygankov sums up the story. Khudilainen's “Varyazhstvo” in this case was an attempt to put a person “above the fray” in the region, who was not strongly connected with local oligarchic circles.

“Shirshina herself is a dependent leader. But it must be admitted: two and a half years to stay in office in such a situation is an achievement. She has political potential, and, perhaps, the Kremlin decided to cut off the support team from her by hitting Popov’s team, and then she will be able to negotiate with the governor, ”Stepanov suggests.

By the way, by the will of fate, Shirshina, who got into the kings, managed to enlist the support of the Yabloko people at the federal level. As Sergei Mitrokhin, the chairman of the Yabloko party, admitted to Lente.ru, despite Shirshina's non-partisanship, he has long considered her a supporter. And it fully admits the possibility of putting her first number on the party list to the State Duma. In this case, the governor runs the risk of getting a powerful opposition campaign in his region with a popular mayor at the head. It is certainly possible to curtail the confrontation, but then, obviously, Shirshina will have to endure as mayor of the regional capital.

Choices from two evils

What is the fate of Hudilainen himself in the conditions of this conflict? “On the one hand, the level of support for him among the active voters is low. On the other hand, it does not cause obvious negative, residents are satisfied with what they have. Signatures for his resignation, of course, are not being collected by the public, but by Popov's structures, who from Finland is trying to influence the situation. And it’s not the people who work, but apple bills,” Stepanov confidently declares. Tsygankov, on the other hand, recalls that it was Khudilainen who was able to attract 137 billion rubles of investments to the region and bring in big business, which revived the economy.

On the other hand, the Kremlin did not send the head of the republic to early elections, as it did, for example, with the governor of the neighboring Leningrad region Alexander Drozdenko. This means that the federal center is skeptical about the prospects for successful legitimization of Khudilainen. And this is understandable, because in Karelia in 2011 the United Russia got one of the worst results in the country - 32 percent. Therefore, it is now critically important for Hudilainen to demonstrate good rating"United Russia" in the elections in State Duma, in parallel with which the elections of the Legislative Assembly of the region will be held. And this creates an intractable problem for him, political scientist Dmitry Oreshkin explains to Lente.ru.

“The most important enterprises, production and service centers are always concentrated in the capital of the region. And its elite is always interested in using the money for their own needs. The governor, managing throughout the region, is interested in "smearing" the funds. Its sources are either capital money or federal subsidies. The conflict between the governor and the head of the capital city is a traditional story, there is a systemic basis for this. Different bosses decide differently: someone kicks the mayor out, someone deprives him of his powers or replaces him with a city manager,” he explains.

However, such methods only work with a sleeping city with a low voter turnout. With an increase in turnout and a deterioration in the situation in the city, one can easily get the situation of Novosibirsk (the mayor is a communist Lokot) or the Irkutsk region (the governor is a communist Levchenko). With an apple mayor, this risk is also not small. Therefore, from the point of view of political technologies, the mayor of Petrozavodsk should have been destroyed in advance, Oreshkin believes: “If it was not possible in the two and a half previous years, then doing it on time for the year of elections to the State Duma is too big a risk.”

Thus, the governor finds himself between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand, the removal of both the State Duma and the Legislative Assembly a year before the elections by Shirshina automatically creates in Petrozavodsk a strong single-mandate representative with the image of a martyr, around whose figure opposition forces can consolidate and seriously drop the ratings of the ruling party at all election levels. On the other hand, the “apple mayor” will not let EP get a good result in the region anyway. Which, again, will shake the already traditionally weak position of United Russia in the city, and this will most likely become critical for Khudilainen's career. The way out could be a point compromise with Shirshina, who was left without the support of the clans that nominated her for mayor and is forced to maneuver in the political sea on her own. This will be a precedent for the coordination of interests.