Economic crises began almost 200 years ago, during the formation of industrial societies. Their constant companions - a decline in production, high inflation, the collapse of banking systems, unemployment - threaten us to this day.
1857-58 years
The financial and economic crisis of 1857-1858 can be full confidence called the first global crisis. Starting in the United States, it quickly spread to Europe, affecting the economies of all major European countries, but Great Britain, as the main industrial and commercial power, suffered the most.
Undoubtedly, the European crisis was exacerbated by the Crimean War, which ended in 1856, but economists still call the unprecedented growth of speculation the main factor that caused the crisis.
The objects of speculation were mostly stocks of railway companies and heavy industry enterprises, land, grain. The researchers note that the money of widows, orphans and priests even went into speculation.
The speculative boom was accompanied by an unprecedented accumulation money supply, an increase in lending and rising stock prices: but one day it all burst like a soap bubble.
In the 19th century, they did not yet have clear plans for overcoming economic crises. However, the influx of liquidity from England to the United States helped at the beginning to ease the effects of the crisis, and then completely overcome it.
1914
The outbreak of the First World War gave impetus to a new financial and economic crisis. Formally, the cause of the crisis was the total sale of securities of foreign issuers by the governments of Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States in order to finance military operations.
Unlike the crisis of 1857, it did not spread from the center to the periphery, but arose simultaneously in many countries. The collapse occurred in all markets at once, both commodity and money. It was only thanks to the intervention of the Central Banks that the economies of a number of countries were saved.
The crisis was especially deep in Germany. Captured a large part European market England and France closed access to German goods there, which was one of the reasons for the outbreak of war by Germany. By blocking all German ports, the British fleet contributed to the onset of famine in Germany in 1916.
In Germany, as in Russia, the crisis was aggravated by revolutions that abolished monarchical power and completely changed the political system. These countries overcame the consequences of social and economic decline the longest and most painfully.
"Great Depression" (1929-1933)
October 24, 1929 became "Black Thursday" on the New York Stock Exchange. A sharp decline in the value of shares (by 60-70%) led to the deepest and longest economic crisis in world history.
The "Great Depression" lasted about four years, although its echoes made themselves felt until the outbreak of World War II. The United States and Canada were the hardest hit by the crisis, but France, Germany and the United Kingdom were also hit hard.
It would seem that the crisis did not portend anything. After the First World War, the United States embarked on the path of a stable economic growth, millions of shareholders increased their capital, and consumer demand grew rapidly. Everything collapsed at once. In a week, the largest shareholders, according to the most conservative estimates, lost 15 billion dollars.
In the United States, factories were closed everywhere, banks collapsed, and about 14 million unemployed people found themselves on the streets, the crime rate increased sharply. Against the backdrop of the unpopularity of bankers, bank robbers in the United States were almost national heroes.
Industrial production during this period decreased by 46% in the USA, by 41% in Germany, by 32% in France, and by 24% in Great Britain. The level of industrial production during the years of crisis in these countries was actually thrown back to the beginning of the 20th century.
According to American economists Ohianian and Cole, researchers of the Great Depression, if the US economy abandoned the Roosevelt administration's measures to curb competition in the market, the country could overcome the consequences of the crisis 5 years earlier.
"Oil Crisis" 1973-75
The crisis of 1973 has every reason to be called an energy crisis. Its detonator was the Arab-Israeli war and the decision of the Arab member countries of OPEC to impose an oil embargo on states supporting Israel. Oil production dropped sharply, and during 1974 the price of "black gold" rose from $3 to $12 per barrel.
The oil crisis hit the United States the hardest. The country faced the problem of shortage of raw materials for the first time. This was also facilitated by the Western European partners of the United States, who, in order to please OPEC, stopped deliveries of oil products overseas.
In a special message to Congress, US President Richard Nixon called on fellow citizens to save as much as possible, in particular, if possible, do not use cars. Government agencies have been advised to save energy and reduce car fleets, while airlines have been ordered to reduce the number of flights.
The energy crisis has seriously affected the Japanese economy, which seemed to be invulnerable to global economic problems. In response to the crisis, the Japanese government is developing a number of countermeasures: increasing the import of coal and liquefied natural gas, and starting to accelerate the development of nuclear energy.
The crisis of 1973-75 had a positive effect on the economy of the Soviet Union, as it contributed to an increase in oil exports to the West.
"Russian Crisis" 1998
On August 17, 1998, the Russians first heard the terrible word default. This was the first case in world history when a state defaulted not on external, but on internal debt denominated in the national currency. According to some reports, the country's domestic debt was $200 billion.
This was the beginning of a severe financial and economic crisis in Russia, which launched the process of ruble devaluation. In just six months, the value of the dollar rose from 6 to 21 rubles. Real incomes and purchasing power of the population decreased several times. The total number of unemployed in the country reached 8.39 million people, which was about 11.5% of the economically active population of the Russian Federation.
Experts cite many factors as the cause of the crisis: the collapse of Asian financial markets, low purchase prices for raw materials (oil, gas, metals), the failed economic policy of the state, the emergence of financial pyramids.
According to the calculations of the Moscow Banking Union, the total losses of the Russian economy from the August crisis amounted to 96 billion dollars: of which the corporate sector lost 33 billion dollars, and the population lost 19 billion dollars. However, some experts consider these figures to be clearly underestimated. In a short time, Russia has become one of the largest debtors in the world.
Only by the end of 2002 did the government of the Russian Federation manage to overcome inflationary processes, and from the beginning of 2003 the ruble began to gradually strengthen, which was largely facilitated by rising oil prices and the influx of foreign capital.
Nefedov S.A.
The previous period in the history of mankind was marked by the formation of a new industrial society. If the former agrarian society was characterized by peasant, largely subsistence farms, now people lived in cities, produced manufactured goods and exchanged them for food and raw materials brought from distant countries. With the growth of industrial society, competition between firms and companies producing goods gradually increased; already in the first half of the 19th century, periodic crises of overproduction began to be observed. During the years of crises, many companies went bankrupt and were absorbed by more than big companies; thus, there was a process of concentration of production and capital. By the end of the 19th century, mergers and acquisitions resulted in huge industrial monopolies, trusts, and syndicates, made up of many smaller companies. At the same time there was a process of merger of industrial and banking capital; banks acquired shares in industrial companies, and trusts created their own banks, attracting funds from small investors.
The possibilities for the development of industrial production depend on the size of the market for foodstuffs and raw materials for which these goods are exchanged. On a global scale, this market remains limited, and by the end of the 19th century it was largely divided among the industrial powers. One form of market division was the creation of colonial empires, the other was agreements on "spheres of influence". England, took advantage of its primacy and created a huge colonial empire with a population of 390 million people, France seized territories with a population of 55 million people, Germany got lands with a population of 12 million. The markets of the powers and their colonies were protected from the penetration of foreign goods by customs duties, often exceeding half the value of the goods. The few countries that remained independent were divided into "spheres of influence" in which one or another power had commercial predominance.
England and France, having seized most of the markets, did not allow German goods to enter them and, thereby, hindered the further economic development of Germany. Meanwhile, Germany vastly outnumbered these countries industrially and militarily; thus the question arose of the redistribution of markets by military means. In 1914 the First World War began. Germany hoped to defeat its opponents in a couple of months, but these calculations did not take into account the role of the new weapon that appeared then - the machine gun. The machine gun gave the defending side a decisive advantage; the German offensive was stopped and a long "trench war" began. Meanwhile, the English fleet blockaded German ports and cut off food supplies. In 1916 a famine began in Germany; the military government introduced a surplus appraisal, all the grain produced was bought up by the state at nominal prices and issued to the population on cards, all enterprises worked according to state plans. A difficult situation also developed in Russia, the tsarist government paid for military expenses by printing money, as a result, the landlords refused to sell their grain for depreciated credit cards; the government, as in Germany, tried to introduce a surplus appraisal and cards - but it did not have enough strength, they began to hide bread, famine began in the cities and at the front - as a result, a revolution broke out. The main slogan of the revolution was the same as in 1905: "Land to the peasants!" The Bolsheviks confiscated the landlords' lands and distributed them to the peasants; as a result, a civil war broke out. During the war, surplus appropriation was introduced and industry was nationalized - as in Germany, these measures were dictated mainly by military necessity. After the end of the war, the surplus appraisal was canceled, many enterprises were returned to the old or transferred to new owners - this was called the "new economic policy" (NEP).
In general, the revolution of 1917 was a manifestation of the usual patterns of an agrarian society; it was caused by overpopulation and brought to power new kings who gave land to the peasants. It was a crisis that completed another demographic cycle. As usual, the crisis was accompanied by a demographic catastrophe - the population decreased from 170 to 147 million people.
By 1925, the post-war economic recovery was largely completed, and the Bolshevik government began to hatch plans for the industrialization of the country. As in the previous period, money for the purchase of equipment could only be obtained by exporting grain. In 1926-1928 the government tried to get this money by buying bread from the peasants and selling it in the West. However, the peasants refused to sell bread at low state prices. Under these conditions, the Bolsheviks took a course towards collectivization, the creation of collective farms, which would become a mechanism for seizing grain from the peasants. Simultaneously with the purpose of accumulation financial resources the private sector in industry was eliminated.
Hasty and forced collectivization led to the famine of 1932. The grain harvest fell to 70 million tons, the peasants did not want to give their livestock to collective farms - as a result, 10 out of 30 million cows were slaughtered. Position in agriculture recovered only by 1940, when the grain harvest exceeded the level of 1913. At the same time, yields remained low, but great progress was made in the introduction of new equipment, tractors and combines.
The withdrawal of grain from the countryside and the accumulation of all funds for the construction of new enterprises made it possible to industrialize the country. In the years 1928-1940, several thousand large enterprises; compared with 1913, industrial production increased 8.5 times. This growth was all the more striking because the industry of the West was in a state of crisis and stagnation. The Soviet Union became a powerful industrial power, in terms of production it caught up with Germany - although it was much inferior to the United States.
The First World War brought ruin to Europe, but fantastically enriched the United States. Hard-pressed, England and France were paying huge sums of money for war supplies, and the hugely profitable American entrepreneurs hurriedly expanded production. During the war years, US industrial production increased by 2.5 times, and exports by 3 times. In 1920, the United States produced 42 million tons of steel - 60% of world production. However, after the war, the crisis began, production fell by one third. American companies had to start fighting for foreign markets; in China, the US's main rival was Japan; in Latin America - England and Germany. A massive export of capital began, and the United States soon overtook England in terms of the amount of capital exported. In 1923, a new boom began, it was associated with the development of mass production of cars. Even before the war, Henry Ford set up assembly line production, and the car became affordable for farmers and workers. Between 1921 and 1928, US automobile production tripled, from 1.5 million to 4.8 million, accounting for three-quarters of world production. By 1929, however, the market was saturated and the "great crisis" set in. On October 24, 1929, a panic began on the stock exchange, the average share price fell by half, the shares of the leading automobile company General Motors fell 80 times. Production cuts and mass layoffs began; by 1932, production had halved, with half of the workers becoming unemployed. Millions of starving people roamed the roads from state to state in search of work, and food riots broke out in some places.
In the previous period, Americans were so accustomed to a prosperous life that only a tenth of them were in unions, there were neither unemployment benefits nor old-age pensions in the country. In the 1932 election, Democratic candidate Franklin Roosevelt proposed the introduction of a social security system and became president. To bring the country out of the crisis, Roosevelt proclaimed a "new course" in the economy. The reforms were based on the ideas of the famous English economist John Keynes, who argued that capitalism had ceased to be a self-governing system, and the government should move to state regulation of the economy. In 1933, the "National Act on the Restoration of Industry" was adopted, in accordance with which the state determined for each enterprise the volume of production, markets, prices and wages, and the length of the working day. A social security system was established and collective agreements were introduced. Public works and labor camps were organized for the unemployed. America began to gradually emerge from the crisis, and over time, measures to regulate the economy became less stringent. By 1939, the US economy had reached its pre-crisis level.
In Germany, as well as in Russia, the World War caused a national catastrophe and an acute social crisis. In the political sphere, the result of the crisis was the fall of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic with universal suffrage; an 8-hour working day and social guarantees were introduced. Germany was able to get out of the crisis only thanks to inflicted the main blow on Germany. By 1932, half of the population lost their jobs, the authorities were unable to pay benefits, and violent demonstrations of the starving took place in the cities.
In this situation, the National Socialist Party of Adolf Hitler won the election; Hitler promised to give everyone a job. After the Nazis came to power, the nationalization of the economy was carried out; the owners of the enterprises practically lost their ownership and turned into "fuhrer" managers. In their work, the "fuhrers" obeyed instructions from the center; they were given a small percentage of the profits. In the countryside, the surplus appraisal was restored, and all products were handed over to the state at fixed prices. Just as in the Soviet Union, all economic activity was regulated by state plans.
Hitler's main goal was a new war for the redistribution of food and raw materials markets. For this purpose, an increase military industry, industrial production was restored and by 1939 exceeded the pre-war level by 40%.
Revolutions in Russia and Germany big influence for the development of other European countries. Under the influence of the mass strikes of 1918-19, an 8-hour day and collective agreements were introduced in France, universal free primary education was introduced in England and women were granted suffrage. In 1923-24, socialist parties came to power for the first time in England and France. However, wage increases and social spending led to the flight of capital - in the future, this phenomenon becomes a characteristic consequence of the rule of the socialists. It slows down economic development and to the return of power to the bourgeois parties. In general, the development of England and France during the interwar period was slow; compared with 1913, production increased by only 20-30%. At the same time, dominance over vast markets softened the effects of the 1929 world crisis; in England and France there was no such unemployment as in the USA and Germany. Germany demanded from England and France access to the markets they controlled and the return of the colonies - the conflict that caused the first world war, in the end, broke out into a new war.
Much has gone forever from history with the volleys of the "salute of nations" that sounded on November 11, 1918 - too much for the historian's thoughts not to turn again and again to the events of the World Crisis.
It's not only and not so much in human sacrifices great war and not in huge material and financial losses. Although these losses were many times greater than the conservative estimates of pre-war theorists, calling them "incalculable" or "beyond the human imagination" is unjustified. In absolute terms, human losses were less than from the influenza epidemic of 1918–1919, and material losses were inferior to the consequences of the 1929 crisis. As for the relative figures, the First World War bears no comparison with the medieval plague epidemics. Nevertheless, it is the armed conflict of 1914 that is perceived by us (and was perceived by contemporaries) as a terrible, irreparable catastrophe that led to the psychological breakdown of the entire European civilization. In the minds of millions of people who were not even directly affected by the war, the course of history was divided into two independent streams - “before” and “after” the war. "Before the war" - a free pan-European legal and economic space (only politically backward countries - like tsarist Russia - humiliated their dignity with passport and visa regimes), continuous development of "ascending" science, technology, economics; gradual but steady expansion of personal freedoms. "After the war" - the collapse of Europe, the transformation of most of it into a conglomerate of small police states with a primitive nationalist ideology; a permanent economic crisis, aptly called by Marxists the “general crisis of capitalism”, a turn towards a system of total control over the individual (state, group or corporate).
In itself, this already marked the nature of the next war - World War II - and the post-war "cold peace".
This essay offers you an unconventional approach to the study of the events of military history. Exploring the events of the First World War, we will try to "unpack" their meaning. To do this, we will have to accept the inexorable logic of the development of an antagonistic intercivilizational conflict. The logic embodied in the clash of ideas, worldviews and strategic plans of the parties. Logic, manifested in the interaction of individuals - the arbiters of fate and the executors of the will of opposing egregors.
Most often, military-historical works are either memoirs or analytical reviews. Memoirs are characterized by the construction by the author of his own personal universe, which sometimes has very few points of contact with what we call reality. In this case, the work of the memoirist is the construction of a Reflection that is comfortable for the author.
Note that almost always "official stories" are memoirs and are written in the style:
"Yes! We won, although it was strong with the Unrighteous Power of Knowledge - That side ... ”(Ryan, Tolkienist Epic.)
Analytical history, on the other hand, tends to reject official versions or, according to at least, "check them for germination." This creates the illusion of objectivity for everyone, not excluding the authors. However, in my opinion, it is precisely this claim to objectivity that is the main shortcoming of "analysts".
“Memoirists at least realize how accidental the outcome of many combat episodes was. Constantly looking for an excuse for the mistakes they have made, they cannot get rid of the thought: “It could have been different. If I had then listened to the opinion of X ... If I had not turned east of Paris ... If I had gone to sea an hour earlier ... ”Analysts are so carried away by the desire to explain what happened as the only possible one that chances refuse (as well as subjective factors) in the right to exist and draw far-reaching conclusions from completely insufficient premises.
1. The structure of the conflict.
Usually the story about the political aspect of the history of the First World War begins with the annexation of Lorraine and Alsace by Germany. Being in a hopeless military situation, France was forced to sign a peace treaty, which even the Germans did not consider in the least fair. The annexation, objected to by Bismarck, who personifies the political leadership of the new empire, was demanded - and achieved - by the victors from the Prussian General Staff. Both sides had their reasons.
France - represented by the government, parliament and people - refused to recognize the seizure of Alsace and Lorraine.
This meant that from now on, under any government and under any circumstances, Paris would pursue a consistent anti-German policy, and the desire to return the lost territories would become in France a national super-idea, if not a national paranoia. This in itself, of course, made inevitable (in a more or less distant future) a new Franco-German war, but in no way predetermined its all-European character.
It should be noted that, having set as its indispensable goal the return of the eastern departments (and orienting propaganda accordingly), France did not show due statesmanship. Her politics became predictable. This meant that regardless of the authority of its army and the degree of economic prosperity, France ceased to be the subject of international politics and became its object. By judiciously exploiting the restrictions that the "great goal" of the return of Alsace placed on the foreign policy actions of the Third Republic, France became possible to manipulate. But in this case, French policy should be recognized as dependent and it is impossible to talk about German-French contradictions as a cause or even one of the causes of the First World War.
Looking carefully at the pre-war political map of Europe, we will see that it is impossible to explain the nature and origin of the World Crisis of 1914, starting from the geopolitical interests of the countries participating in the conflict. Germany plays the role of the attacking side in the World War, having no meaningful territorial claims at all.
(The ideologists of pan-Germanism spoke, of course, about the annexation of Belgium, Russian Poland and the Baltic states, but these conquests were never considered as a serious political goal, since the theory of “living space” did not yet exist, and from a geopolitical point of view, the space of the empire was already redundant. As for the demand for a redistribution of the colonies, it is doubtful that it was ever put forward at all.). France, acting under the banner of revenge and the return of lost territories, on the contrary, is on the defensive. Russia, which is destined by historical fate for the southern direction of expansion (the Straits and the Middle East), is planning operations against Berlin and Vienna. Perhaps only Turkey is trying (albeit unsuccessfully) to act in some way in accordance with its geopolitical goals.
Let's compare this situation with the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. In this conflict, the economic interests of the countries clashed in Korea and Manchuria. The Japanese islands blocked the Russian fleet's access to the Pacific Ocean. On the other hand, the geographical "overhang" of the Russian Empire over Japan held back Japanese expansion in any strategic direction. With a strong Russian Pacific Fleet, Japan could not advance either to the continent, or to the southern seas, or to the archipelagos of the islands of the central Pacific Ocean. The effect of the "strategic shadow" was demonstrated to Japan immediately after the conclusion of the victorious Shimonoseki treaty with China.
Before us is a typical geopolitical conflict, when neither side can achieve its foreign policy goals without suppressing the other. Such a conflict did not lead fatally to war: Japan could not decide on an extremely risky attack. In this case, it would remain a second-rate power.
The desire of the Japanese Empire for an active foreign policy (due to the logic of the struggle for sources of raw materials and markets) provoked the development of the conflict and its transition to a military stage. It should be noted that, despite the fierceness of the fighting at sea and on land, the war was considered by both sides as limited. Neither for Japan, nor even for Russia, dominance in Korea and the Pacific was a matter of survival. That is why Russia concluded a peace favorable to Japan, far from having exhausted its possibilities to continue hostilities. The war ended as soon as its cost exceeded the significance of the conflict in the eyes of Russia.
So, in the case of the Russo-Japanese war, the parties acted in accordance with their geopolitical interests. They resolved the conflict that arose in the form of a limited war.
In the First World War, the parties act, if not directly against their own interests (Germany, Austria-Hungary), then at least “perpendicularly” to them (Russia). The result of the resolution of the conflict that has arisen is a general war and the collapse of civilization. It is reasonable to assume that this conflict did not have a geopolitical nature at all.
Orthodox Marxism explaining the origin of the Great War economic reasons- First of all, the sharpest competitive struggle between Germany and Great Britain is probably closer to the truth than the geopolitical concept. In any case, the British-German economic rivalry did take place. The sharp increase in industrial production in Germany (with a relatively low cost of labor) seriously undermined the position of the "workshop of the world" in the markets and forced the British government to switch to a protectionist trade policy. Since preferential tariffs for the countries of the British Empire (the idea of Joseph Chamberlain) could not be passed through Parliament, protectionism led to a marked increase in the "transport resistance" of the empire. This could not but affect the state of the financial and credit world system with the center in London and indirectly - on the world trade system. Meanwhile, it was the position of the “world carrier” that ensured Britain's economic prosperity and political stability.
At the turn of the century, Germany moved on to the construction of a huge military and civilian fleet. With the support of the state, the largest German shipping companies (GAPAG and Norddeutschland Line) come out on top in the world in terms of the total tonnage of ships with a displacement of more than 5,000 tons. The vessels of these companies consistently win the most prestigious award in merchant shipping - the Blue Ribbon of the Atlantic. We are talking, therefore, about the very basis of the economic and political power of Great Britain - about the "ownership of the sea."
The economic content of the structural conflict that led to the First World War is obvious. Alas, it is in this case that the dynamics of economic indicators is only a reflection of deeper social processes. In the end, Great Britain paid a price for participation in the war, a price immeasurably higher than any real or imagined losses from German competition. During the four war years, the world's financial and credit flows, previously closed to the City of London, reoriented to Wall Street. The consequence was the rapid flow of British capital across the ocean. Great Britain started the war as a world creditor. By the end of it, she owed the United States over £8 billion. (For comparison - the total cost of Great Britain during the "dreadnought race" of 1907-1914 did not exceed 50 million pounds.)
Of course, the financial circles in Great Britain perfectly assessed the situation and opposed the country's entry into the war in 1914. ( Equally, German industrialists were categorical opponents of the war.) In other words, the legend of the "conspiracy of bankers against the world" does not stand up to criticism. In general, justifying an unlimited war on trade, financial or other business reasons is not too serious ...
“Things that are more important than peace and more terrible than war” are rarely due to mercantile reasons and are usually determined by the psychology of the masses, that is, within the framework of the views of C. Jung, they are of an archetypal nature. The fierceness with which the peoples fought indicates that it was not about money, not about relatively insignificant territorial gains, not about political prestige. This is how they protect their hearth, their way of life, their culture.
The colossal advances of civilization in the nineteenth century were, above all, the advances of Great Britain, the "workshop of the world." Throughout the English literature of the Victorian era, the imperturbable pride of the Englishman in his country is emphasized.
But "the one who has the advantage is obliged to attack under the threat of losing this advantage." And it is not easy to realize this obligation - again and again to risk ships, people, honor, the fate of the people - in order only to preserve dignity, pride, civilizational priority.
Germany for the second half of XIX century has turned from a conglomerate of third-rate states into a superpower. The speed of its economic development significantly exceeded the English pace. At the turn of the century, the Germans felt for the first time that they were a great nation with a great future.
Thus, the main question of the war is the question of civilizational priority - the right to leadership, in fact, the possession of the world. (Of course, here “possession” should be understood, not as an occupation, but rather in a spiritual sense. Once Satan showed Christ “all the kingdoms of the earth” and said: “Bow to me, and you will own them.” Speaking with the Son of God, The Prince of Darkness wasn't referring to the "lentil soup" of conquest either.)
The conflict was further exacerbated by the fact that the British and German empires belonged to different civilizations.
This statement looks quite unexpected, but it is confirmed by the entire course of the war. In the end, as A. Toynbee has shown, it is inter-civilizational conflicts that are characterized by maximum bitterness.
When it comes to the fate of that unique translator between the information space and Reality, which we call our civilization, no price seems excessive.
Exploring the semiotic culture of the Third Reich, Bergier and Ponel came to the conclusion about its magical character. Under the guise of a machine, rationalistic, Western civilization, there was a completely different - alien to us - structure. Intuitively sensing this, many authors associated German fascism with the Middle Ages. However, this is nothing more than a simplification, an attempt to find a suitable word for an object that does not and cannot have a name. Bergier's formula is just as simplistic: Nazism is magic plus tank divisions.
Determining the structure of the magical civilization of Nazi Germany is beyond the scope of this work. It is reasonable, however, to pose the question: could an advanced alien civilization have been created in the incomplete decade and a half of Nazi domination? Wouldn't it be more natural to assume that its formation began long before Hitler? After all, the Thule Society was created under the Kaiser...
The difficulty is that the German civilization in many ways is close to the classical Western one. (Therefore, it is always tempting to explain deviations as mistakes or crimes.) One might even say that these civilizations coincide statically. The difference is in dynamics. The German civilization initially contained a much larger share of Chaos than the European one. That is why it developed faster. Therefore, it was less stable, with clearly visible tendencies towards social suicide.
It is difficult to imagine the Germans, the personification of order, paragraph, law, as inhabitants of Chaos. However, let us pose the question: why exactly did the Germans, and precisely at the turn of the century, that is, at the pinnacle of their development, become the caricature incarnation of discipline?
Will there be a revolution in Germany?
No, because revolutions in Germany are forbidden by the Kaiser's order.
Do you know how to fly an airplane?
According to the first paragraph of the third section of the seventh Instruction, a German officer must be able to do everything.
Apparently, it was precisely such (ridiculous from the point of view of an external observer) attempts to “order Chaos” that maintained the connection of the state and the nation with an ordered Reality.
Let us note here that the intelligent and observant Blok calls the German genius "gloomy", that is, obscure, indefinable, and contrasts it with "sharp Gallic sense."
So, two civilizations, one of which became great, and the other wanted to become it, collided in a fight not for life, but for death. A fight in which the future picture of the world was at stake.
Due to the lack of the necessary conceptual apparatus (the formalisms of information theory, cybernetics, L. von Bertalanffy's systems theory, the theory of quasi-objects describing the structures of the mass unconscious), such an analysis could not, in principle, be carried out at the beginning of the century. This meant that the people of that time were doomed to misunderstanding the situation. In fact, even the most informed of them saw only the surface of the iceberg. In examining the events of the Great War, we must keep this in mind at all times.
2. Von Schlieffen and the German land war plan.
The conflicts of civilizations have been developing for decades. Countries entered the World Crisis of 1914 in different ways, but none of them had the right to call themselves unprepared.
The preparation of the state for war includes military planning, the creation and training of the army and navy, and the development of the economy. And, finally, the mobilization of the spiritual forces of the nation. These tasks, of course, must be solved jointly.
Since we have defined the First World War as an inter-civilizational conflict driven by Great Britain and the German Empire, we will consider the structure of this war primarily as the result of the interaction of German and English strategic plans.
The task facing Count Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff, was extremely difficult. After the conclusion of the Franco-Russian agreement of 1894, a war on two fronts turned from an eventual possibility into an inevitability. At the same time, the military capabilities of France were comparable to those of Germany, while Austria-Hungary was unable to fight Russia in a one-on-one fight. The use of the ground forces of the third ally - Italy - was difficult for geographical reasons.
The first drafts of a plan for a war on two fronts belonged to the even older (great) Moltke. Actually, Moltke, who built all his strategic planning on railway maps, described the fundamental principle of solving the problem: using the mobility provided by eleven through railway lines connecting the Western and Eastern theaters of military operations, defeat the enemy troops one by one.
This meant that Germany should strive for a fleeting military campaign, while the Allies would benefit from dragging it out. The preparation of the theater of military operations (theater of operations) is carried out by the parties in accordance with this principle.
France is fenced off from Germany by the line of fortresses Toul - Epinal - Belfort - Verdun. Russia adopts a wider railroad gauge as a defensive measure (which practically deprives the Germans of the possibility of using the Russian railroad network) and evacuates the western bank of the Vistula. Germany is improving the work of railways in every possible way and is investing money only in two fortresses - Konigsberg in the east and Metz in the west. At the same time, both of them are conceived as fortified camps interacting with active field troops.
Schlieffen's most important problem was the choice of the direction of the first strike. Protracted mobilization in Russia forced the German General Staff to make the defeat of France a top priority. This meant that the Germans were ready to take the risk of losing East Prussia and possibly all of Austria-Hungary.
Only a quick and complete victory over France could justify such a risk. The operational scheme of 1870, included in all textbooks of military art, did not suit Schlieffen because of its slowness. Schlieffen could only achieve his "ideal end result" by carrying out an encirclement operation.
Actually, now the “Schlieffen maneuver” is understood to mean almost any operation to encircle. This is a considerable "merit" of Schlieffen himself, who called his classic work "Cannes" and constantly referred to the experience of Hannibal.
“The battle of annihilation can still be fought according to the plan proposed more than two thousand years ago…”
Not having - due to the conditions of the terrain and the composition of the forces - the possibility of making a double detour, Schlieffen adopted an asymmetric operational scheme. The main blow was delivered by the right wing. This wing, deployed on 2/5 of the length of the Western Front, included 73% of all available German forces. Schlieffen created a colossal operational reinforcement. The active - Western - theater of operations received 7/8 troops, and 5/6 of them were sent to the active sector.
Schlieffen's plan is consistently logical:
1. War with France is inevitable.
2. Under the current political conditions, it can only be a war on two fronts.
3. With a given balance of forces, the only way to win such a war is to defeat the enemy troops in parts, taking advantage of the advantage provided by actions along internal lines of operations.
4. Due to the conditions and terrain, a quick victory over the Russian army is impossible. Therefore, the first blow must be struck in the West.
5. The French army must be defeated before the full deployment of the Russian forces. This can only be done as part of an environment operation.
6. Due to the lack of forces, the encirclement maneuver must be asymmetrical.
7. The French line of fortresses cannot be quickly broken through and therefore must be bypassed.
8. Such a detour can only be carried out through neutral territory - Belgium or Switzerland. According to the conditions of the area, the second option is unacceptable.
Schlieffen came to the conclusion that it was necessary to violate the neutrality of Belgium, guaranteed by all the great powers, including Germany itself and Great Britain.
So, the Schlieffen plan implied the entry into the war of Great Britain, the extremely negative position of the United States and other neutral countries. Six Belgian divisions and three fortress regions - Liege, Namur, Antwerp - were added to the armed forces of Germany's opponents (already superior to the German ones). "Surrendered" to the enemy East Prussia, Galicia, Alsace with Lorraine, the Rhineland. Perhaps no operation required such serious security and did not imply such a huge risk. And all this - just for the sake of winning the pace!
The fact is that with all other options, there was no chance of winning at all. Here, the gain in tempo could be transformed into something more real:
1. At the end of the deployment of the Right Wing, six Belgian divisions came under attack from 35-40 German and had to be written off from the account (together with the fortress areas). Germany was able to use the rich road network of Belgium and Flanders.
2. The march maneuver of the right wing led to the capture of the coast of Flanders and, later, the ports of the English Channel, which posed a threat to England.
3. Within ten to twelve days, the movement of the armies of the right wing was to be carried out in an operational "vacuum" - with the complete absence of enemy resistance. During this time, the outflanking wing, reinforced with reserves, managed to turn around on the line of the Franco-Belgian border, reaching the flank of the Allied units.
4. Under these conditions, the enemy's counter-manoeuvre was inevitably delayed. Superior German forces would always go out to the flank of the Allied troops, threatening their rear and forcing them to break off the battle. The retreat of the allied armies would have taken place under conditions of strong flank pressure and, consequently, disorganized. The allied troops, trying to slip out from under the blow, would have been forced to retreat to the south, then to the southeast, which could not but lead to the mixing of troops and their hilling southeast of Paris.
5. The French capital, which is an important road junction, the political and spiritual center of France, was captured during the operation without a fight.
6. The result of the offensive march maneuver through Belgium and Northern France was to be a colossal battle that the Allies would have to fight with an "inverted" front southeast of Paris. This battle, launched by the Germans in an ideal psychological and strategic environment, could lead to the defeat of the Allied armies. The latter would have been driven back to the east or northeast and destroyed by the main body of the army in cooperation with the troops of the German left wing.
So: “Let the one on the far right touch the English Channel with his shoulder. Alignment to the right, to the left to feel the elbow.
Calculation of the operation in time: deployment - 12 days, march maneuver through Belgium and France - 30 days, decisive battle - 7 days, "combing" the territory and destroying the remnants of the Allied army - 14 days. Just 9 weeks. The transfer of forces to the East could begin between the 36th and 42nd days of the operation.
Schlieffen's plan was a masterpiece, but it required geometric precision and desperate courage from the performers. From the General Staff, he also demanded a thorough study of the details.
The first problem was the general lack of forces for the intended maneuver. Schlieffen solved it in a simple and revolutionary way: he made up reserve corps from reservists of older draft ages and included them in the battle line.
Difficulties were presented by the key fortifications of Liege and Namur, which had to be taken not quickly, but very quickly, since Liege was part of the zone of operational deployment of the 1st German Army. This task was promptly solved by the creation (from peacetime formations) of a virtual "Liege army", which was intended to solve a single task - the assault on Liege - and disbanded immediately after its completion. Technically, the mobility of the "Army of Liege" was de-energized by giving it a fleet of super-heavy artillery pieces (done already under Moltke).
In Schlieffen's plan, the execution geometry played a fundamental role. The leading force of the offensive was to be the right-flank army (in 1914 - the 1st Army of von Kluck). In moving west, southwest, south-southwest and south, it had to outstrip the other armies of the Right Wing (in 1914, the 2nd Army of von Bülow and the Third Hausen), just as they were supposed to overtake the armies of the Center . Practically at the first stage of the operation, all the armies moved along arcs of concentric circles, and the center of these circles lay somewhere in the southern Ardennes. At the same time, the path that the 1st Army had to go through was twice the path of the 3rd Army and four times the length of the route of the 5th Army. This implied either the "braking" of the central armies, or the huge (over 40 km per day) pace of movement of the 1st Army. Otherwise, the 1st Army began to lag behind, turning from a shock group into a flank cover (against a non-existent enemy), the center bulged forward, and the entire offensive score fell apart.
Schlieffen needed to gain time at all costs. It was necessary to slow down the advance of the central armies and speed up the pace of the operation on the right flank.
The first task was easy.
Schlieffen weakened the troops to the limit not only in Alsace-Lorraine, but also in the Ardennes. He assumed that the enemy would launch two offensive operations: an invasion of Alsace for psychological reasons and an offensive in the Ardennes for strategic reasons. Schlieffen was aware that his grandiose detour plan would become known in general terms to the enemy. The French had two possible answers:
1. Rejecting any idea of an offensive, adopt a purely defensive plan. To invest large amounts of money in the modernization of the fortress of Lille and deploy the armies of the northern front on the Verdun-Lille-coast line.
Such a scheme, proposed by General Michel, was reasonable, although with the operational reinforcement that Schlieffen planned, it might not be enough. In any case, its adoption was unlikely for political reasons (national paranoia with Alsace).
2. Check in practice the chess principle: a flank attack is reflected by a counterattack in the center. With the onset of large forces through the Ardennes, reach the communications of the armies of the German right wing and neutralize them; under favorable conditions, carry out the encirclement operation ourselves, pressing the enemy troops to the Dutch border.
It was this strategic idea that formed the basis of the French deployment plan (Plan No. 17).
Although the Allied offensive in the Ardennes looked very dangerous for the Germans, Schlieffen welcomed him in every possible way. This blow stopped the armies of the center and even forced them to retreat, which corrected the German operational geometry. Meanwhile, the “short cut” on the impassable Ardennes required more time for the armies of the beginning of the century than the “long trip” on the Belgian roads. According to Schlieffen, the Allies would have to lose the pace in Belgium faster than win it in the Ardennes.
(Except natural conditions the fortress of Metz, which occupies a flank position relative to the Ardennes maneuver of the allied forces, should have played its role in this slowdown.)
But the delay of the center is only one (but essentially negative, in the sense that it does not lead directly to the achievement of the goal) link in the maneuver. Schlieffen needed to ensure maximum mobility of the right wing. At the tactical level, this task was solved by the inclusion of heavy howitzer artillery in the composition of the field troops (as an offensive weapon!) It seems to me that this is the technical basis of the Schlieffen plan. The regular inclusion of heavy artillery in the corps gave the Germans a decisive tactical advantage in battle.
So, the right-flank armies were able to easily suppress the resistance of the enemy rear guards and move in free space. However, the problem of continuous heavy marches remained.
If we can talk about the miscalculations of Count Schlieffen, then it is precisely in solving this problem. The idea of partial mechanization - the use of vehicles - to speed up the movement of the armies of the right wing - suggested itself ... Passing by this opportunity, Schlieffen made a mistake, generally insignificant, which unexpectedly became decisive in the conditions of August 1914.
Psychological features of the Schlieffen plan.
Alfred von Schlieffen belonged to that rare psychological type, which is characterized by an accurate and deep understanding of time (in war - the pace of the operation, rhythm), a penchant for creating algorithms, describing and implementing a sequence of actions aimed at resolving a certain system of contradictions in time (in war - strategic and operational planning).
He had systemic, deep, precise thinking, more strategic than tactical (he sees the general, not the particular).
Such people are usually bold and reckless.
These qualities were hidden in Schlieffen under the mask of cold isolation and aristocracy, but they broke through in discussions, games, in the nature of strategic planning.
Schlieffen is ready to take a terrible risk, because he clearly sees that with "more correct" and "less risky" actions there is no gain.
(Another well-known for his military merits, a man of a similar psychological and mental warehouse, Admiral of the Japanese Navy Ishiroko Yamamoto, in response to the phrase: “Your whole plan is a game of chance”, without looking up from the game of Go, remarked: “Uh-huh. And I will win ".
These words are important for evaluating the Schlieffen plan. There are many good things to say about him, but objectively he was a gamble. They say that the Schlieffen plan could only be carried out if the German troops were commanded by "gods" and the French by "idiots". This, of course, is not true. It would be more accurate to say: if the Germans made "correct" decisions during the implementation of the plan, and the French - "natural". At the same time, the Germans initially had the advantage that the “correct” moves were known to them: Schlieffen found them, calculated and carefully verified them. "At the board" the Germans had to carefully reproduce the "home analysis", while the French would have been forced to improvise.
Schlieffen was, of course, familiar with the basic paradox of planning, which is that the enemy usually does not behave in the way that is required in his best interests. Therefore, he tried to create an ideal plan, almost completely independent of the actions of the enemy. He succeeded, but psychologically at a high price. In fact, Schlieffen suspended the war for thirty-five to forty days, leaving both her own and others in a state of uncertainty, psychologically very difficult for a person, especially for a military man.
The situation was further complicated by the fact that the supreme command of the German armies belonged to Kaiser Wilhelm II, a man whose psychological stability left much to be desired. Modern researchers like to point out that the Kaiser commanded purely nominally, while the real power was wielded by the Chief of the General Staff. This is both true and false at the same time. German charters, despite their notorious accuracy and thoroughness, did not clearly define the relationship between the commander and the chief of staff of a large formation. Sometimes the commander played the first violin, and the chief of staff was reduced to the role of a registrar of orders (1st German Army of 1914 - von Kluck and Kühl), sometimes all real power was concentrated in the hands of the chief of staff (Hindenburg and Ludendorff in all posts), sometimes management was divided in a more complex way. But in any case, they work together and the mood of one cannot but be reflected in the mood of the other. In any case, the Kaiser, who was self-confident and during the operation, was much more useful for the headquarters and the army than the doubting and confused Kaiser.
And Schlieffen, organizing the annual maneuvers of the German army, all the time gives the Kaiser the opportunity to enjoy the victory. Only the side for which the Kaiser "plays" wins. Later, after Schlieffen's retirement, his successor, Helmut Moltke, stops this entertainment: "The maneuvers lose their meaning, the officers lose interest in them." Schlieffen might remark:
“Interest is not important. They are required to learn - at the level of the subcortex - algorithms of actions in standard situations. They are not asked to win, they are asked to follow simple instructions without being distracted and without gagging. As for the Kaiser, I need his self-confidence.”
If you bring up a naturally cowardly dog, you - for starters - slip a obviously weak opponent into it for a fight. Schlieffen raised his Kaiser.
Schlieffen completely subordinated his activities as Chief of the General Staff to a single goal - the preparation of a "geometric-dynamic" war with France, the first plan for a pan-European war. More can be said - the entire German army was created and trained only to carry out an asymmetric encirclement operation. An operation in which Germany's opponents win all the battles, except for one - the last and decisive one.
3. Lord Fisher and the English plan of war at sea.
War plans always bear the imprint of the creator's personality. The English plan of warfare is associated with the name of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir John Fisher.
John Fisher began service on Nelson's former flagship, the Victory, and perhaps this event, incidental in itself, influenced the entire history of the 20th century.
Nelson is not only the glory of England, not only a heroic death in the midst of a victorious battle and an example for future generations of sailors. Nelson is largely a symbol of Great Britain itself.
It's not even that the magnificent Battle of Trafalgar put an end to all attempts by Napoleon to create adequate naval forces and organize their landing on the British Isles. More important was England's awareness of its sea power, its role in the protection of maritime trade, its leading place in world politics.
Fisher came into contact with the history of British naval glory at the age of thirteen. Personality traits conditioned Fischer's strong emotional sense of history and his place in it. This feeling was reinforced by the fact of service on the Victory, a ship owned by History.
Thus Fischer found his destiny - to do for his England what Nelson did for his England.
An ironic and cynical logician, Fisher, of course, was not going to repeat life path Nelson (and his heroic death). He knew the French proverb all too well: "When two people do the same thing, it's not the same thing."
And Fisher defined his task as a complete reorganization of the British fleet.
The operational situation by the end of the 19th century seemed simply magnificent: the British fleet - commercial and military - did not know rivals on the seas and oceans, the industry was on the rise, the international position of the country - the arbiter of the world - did not inspire any fears.
Now we know for sure that such a situation is fraught with catastrophe. (All the more amusing to watch today's America, which seems to have set itself the task of making all the mistakes characteristic of the "hegemonic country" and in no case miss a single one.) Fischer did not have the necessary historical experience, so he had a working model presumably built by himself.
Operational situation on late XIX- the beginning of the 20th century, according to John Fisher:
1. The "brilliant isolation" of Great Britain automatically makes it an adversary of a power claiming European or world domination.
2. Deviation from this policy, expressed in the preparation of an agreement with France (concluded in April 1904), is a grave mistake. This agreement, without giving the UK any additional features(the confrontation between France and Germany over Alsace-Lorraine made it possible even without him to direct French policy in the direction pleasing to Great Britain), demonstrates the country's loss of self-confidence.
(Great Britain - the mistress of the seas and the leader of the civilized world - was supposed to strive for an alliance of the "Delosian type" with frankly weak states that did not infringe on the prerogatives of a great power. From this point of view, the Anglo-Japanese maritime alliance was then quite acceptable for Fisher - in contrast from the Entente.)
3. The development of the political situation will inevitably lead Britain to war with Germany.
4. This war will begin with the defeat of France and the occupation of its Territory.
(Here, as is easy to see, Fischer agrees with Schlieffen. Moreover, even their interests coincide. Schlieffen needs the defeat of France in order to get chances in the further struggle against the whole world. Fischer is satisfied with the defeat of France from the point of view of the long-term interests of the British Empire. In addition, Fischer's logic countered Schlieffen's land strategy with the original English answer - the blockade naval strategy.But in this case, Fischer was obliged in his planning to proceed from the fact that the strongest land power would crush his enemy in one fleeting campaign.
Before us is a situation that chess players will call "opening clash". Both sides deploy their forces independently and, for the time being, pay no attention to the actions of the opponent.)
5. The latter circumstance is to a certain extent favorable for Great Britain, since it eliminates the negative aspects of the Anglo-French alliance and makes it possible to return to the former policy of the world leader.
6. To do this, it is necessary to defeat Germany and restore France exclusively or almost exclusively by the British Empire and its dependent countries.
7. Thus, we are talking about the consistent use of dominance at sea for the complete defeat of the enemy, who is indisputably dominant on the continent.
8. The destruction of Germany's economic and military power must be carried out in such a way as to indirectly harm the United States of America and force it to accept the role of a junior partner (on the level of Japan).
One may get the impression that such an analysis is of a retrospective nature and could not be carried out at that time in principle. But it was at the turn of the century that the classical strategy was created. In chess (which, in my opinion, is a more accurate model of war or, more precisely, of the decision-making mechanism in war than is commonly believed), this was done by Steinitz and Tarrasch. “... Tarrasch was a staunch supporter of an active strategy, methodically constraining the enemy, using space for a convenient regrouping of forces and preparing a decisive offensive. With inexorable consistency, carrying out his plans, he won dozens of instructive games in this way - whole from beginning to end. Tarrasch's ability to create distant plans, providing for a radical regrouping of forces, was noted by Lasker ... ".
The theory of war on land was created by the elder Moltke and Schlieffen. The task of developing a strategy for the use of sea power fell to Fischer.
As we can see, Fischer's plan was designed for Germany to apply a formally continental strategy (in the development of Bismarck's ideas). However, the intellect of Alfred Tirpitz and the ambitions of Wilhelm II dramatically complicated the "game". In preparation for the war for European dominance, Germany began to build a fleet.
Here, we note, Schlieffen made a serious mistake. His plan at the first and most important stage did not provide for interaction with this fleet. As a result, in 1914 the army did one thing and the navy did another (or rather, nothing - at least not useful).
One had to be Fisher in order to lead the English fleet and feel the danger from a power that forty years ago had no naval forces at all. Which was completely devoid of naval traditions.
Perhaps Fischer had only one indisputable and very disturbing fact at his disposal: we have already noted that at the turn of the century the Blue Ribbon of the Atlantic passed from English liners to German ones. In this isolated fact, the admiral saw the moral obsolescence of the mighty armored fleet of the “mistress of the seas”.
To this day, Fischer is reproached for the fact that, having started the “dreadnought revolution” in 1904-1907, he devalued the absolute superiority of his country as a maritime power and gave Tirpitz and Germany a chance. These critics do not want to understand that even without the Russo-Japanese War and the reassessment caused by Tsushima, the creation of a turbine armored ship with single-caliber artillery was inevitable. Only, according to the logic of historical development, this idea should have been realized in the young fleets - German, Italian and American. Great Britain was doomed to the end to cling to its superiority in the old battleships and be the last in the "dreadnought race". Fischer did not like this turn of events.
From the moment the Dreadnought was launched, strategic calculations at sea gave way to operational planning: a tempo game began.
It was obvious that if Great Britain got an advantage in time, then it was insignificant: the developed shipbuilding capabilities of Germany would allow it to quickly master the construction of dreadnoughts. Since all the ironclads of the previous types were instantly obsolete and turned into auxiliary ships, a ratio of forces was predicted from 1: 1 in unfavorable conditions for Great Britain to 2: 1 in favor of the English fleet under circumstances especially favorable for Britain. Thus, the issue of a technical absolute blockade was removed from the agenda.
Tirpitz accepted the challenge, naming Germany's hastily built battle fleet the "High Seas Fleet".
So, by being the first to put the dreadnought into operation, Fisher only avoided a quick and complete defeat, but the question of the possibility of victory remained open. The battle fleet provided the defense of Great Britain (including in the event of the complete defeat of its continental allies). But, as Fischer clearly realized, he was not an offensive weapon. A ship was needed to drive the enemy out of the maritime theaters, a ship that would force him to support any of his operations outside the territorial waters with the entire battle fleet.
And in parallel with the Dreadnought, Great Britain creates the Invincible, the world's first battlecruiser.
If the creation of the Dreadnought was an almost inevitable result of the evolution of the class of squadron battleships, then I am inclined to consider the Invincible an almost pure Fisher innovation.
Hymn to battlecruisers.
To paraphrase R. Sheckley's statement about the Distorted World, we can say: we call them battlecruisers, although they are not battlecruisers at all and are not cruisers. This whole class of ships appeared as a result of the grandiose plan of John Fisher, who designed the scheme of his future Trafalgar in 1906.
The ironic name battlecruiser, almost a hoax... The cruising qualities of these ships, primarily their range, were initially sacrificed for speed and artillery armament.
These ships at once devalued all the efforts of Tirpitz to prepare for a cruising war. The Scharnhorsts did not look good against the Invincibles, which was demonstrated in 1914 near the Falkland Islands: “Quod erat demonstrandum,” Dr. Tarrasch, who was very fond of Latin sayings, concluded the visual lesson. Further, one battlecruiser patrol locked up all German surface ships in Heligoland Bight, turning the "High Seas Fleet" into the "Closed Bay Fleet". Indeed, the light, versatile, armored German cruisers, like the pre-dreadnought battleships, had no chance against this patrol. And this, too, was brilliantly demonstrated in 1914. Now the Germans were obliged to support any operation of the surface forces with battleships, which created the possibility of a decisive squadron battle. And in this battle, it was the battlecruisers that were supposed to provide the Tsushima "crossing", covering the enemy's head with the consistent placement of his ships in the focus of squadron fire.
In other words, if the task of ensuring the stability of the battle line was entrusted to the battle fleet - both on an operational and strategic scale, then the fleet of battle cruisers was created in order to ensure its mobility and variability. And, therefore, winning the battle.
Fisher is constantly reproached for insufficient booking of his "battlecruisers." However, this criticism is based on a misunderstanding of the operational plans for which these ships were created.
The task of displacing enemy ships from the theater of operations clearly required placement on ships maximum number main guns. The need to impose a battle on the enemy, the task of covering the head of his squadron, and finally, the task of fighting high-speed light cruisers - all this required maximum speed and, accordingly, the power supply of the ship. But with a fixed - primarily for economic reasons - displacement, these tasks could be jointly solved only by booking.
This, of course, raised the question of the cost of victory. The main blow in the naval battle was to be taken by weakly protected ships. Very expensive ships. The most beautiful ships of their time.
Fischer put so much inventiveness and cunning into the creation of Invincible that Tirpitz never managed to fully understand the depth of his plan. In any case, Germany's reflex response was unsuccessful.
Of course, the British intelligence joke with the Blucher also played its role. And here lies the first mystery of Fisher's strategic plan. The intelligent and informed Conan Doyle directly linked the gravest mistake of the German Admiralty with the work of his favorite hero. Well, Holmes or not Holmes, but someone gave the Germans a frank "misinformation" about the weapons of the Invincible. This is despite the fact that there was no such word: "misinformation" then.
It seems to me that if Fischer did not himself organize this reconnaissance operation, then, in any case, he knew about it. And from that moment on, the organization of naval intelligence and counterintelligence becomes his constant headache.
As for the Germans, they believed the information that the Invincible would be a smaller copy of the Dreadnought - with 203-mm or 234-mm guns - primarily because such a step seemed quite logical to them - being, by definition, a cruiser, the new the ship was to be a natural result of the development of an extensive family of English armored cruisers. A carefully thinking Tirpitz could not have imagined that Fischer would decide to create an extremely unbalanced strike ship.
The Blucher turned out to be the most unfortunate ship in the Kaiser fleet. Enormous funds were spent on the creation of a beautiful armored cruiser, which, due to the existence of the Invincible enemy, could not find any use for itself and, as a result, died uselessly.
So, Invincible instantly devalued both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and the not yet ready Blucher, forcing the German Admiralty to take some measures, to oppose their English battlecruisers. And here the Germans made a decisive mistake.
Tirpitz rightly judged that it was unprofitable for Germany to build direct imitations of the English LKR. Lagging behind in the line fleet, the Germans were not interested in high-speed ships that could draw the enemy into battle under any conditions. That is, they were forced to give priority to the stability of the battle line over its mobility. As a result, the German battlecruisers lagged behind the British in terms of power-to-weight ratio, and over time this gap only increased. (From time to time, pop-up data about the excellent speed qualities of the German LCRs: 28 knots for the Moltke, more than 28 for the Derflinger - have little to do with reality. In combat conditions, the German LCRs always lagged behind the English ones of the same generation. in a long pursuit, this lag increased due to overwork of the stokers.) As a result, the Hipper connection practically could not act in isolation from the main forces of the Hochseeflitte. But in this case, the operational purpose of the German LCR became somewhat vague. In essence, the Germans should not have created their technical centaurs at all (attack ships, in which, however, the defensive function prevailed over the offensive one). Instead, the focus should have been on building fast battleships.
There was, however, a much stronger solution. I think Fischer, who had deeply worked out the concept of the battlecruiser and how to use it, knew about it and throughout the period from 1908 to 1914 prayed to God that the Germans would not go down this path.
The correct answer to a strike battlecruiser like the Invincible could be an ocean-going battlecruiser that sacrificed defense not for speed but for autonomy. Just as two Invincibles devalued the entire German cruiser fleet, two such autonomous raiders would devalue the entire British communications defense fleet and force the British Admiralty to use their battlecruisers for defensive functions (for which, we note, they were of little use).
After Germany passed by this strongest opportunity, victory became a matter of technique for Fischer.
Between 1908 and 1912, both sides gambled up the stakes, quickly curving up the "main sequence" specifications of their dreadnoughts and battlecruisers. Having gained an advantage, Fischer attacks under the threat of losing this advantage. The "dreadnought revolution" is followed by the "superdreadnought" - the rejection of the 12-inch caliber in favor of the 13.5-inch caliber. As a result, the Germans were forced to leave their favorite 280 mm gun and switch to the 305 mm caliber. (Few people noticed that the Orions essentially threw into the dustbin of history the first generation of "dreadnoughts", doomed to become auxiliary ships after the battleships.)
As the international situation worsens, nervousness intensifies. Fischer's already nasty character deteriorates even more. The success of his own reconnaissance operation against the Germans forced Fischer to look for traces of a similar German action in any, the most innocent events. Trying to organize a fight against the very possibility of such actions, Fischer is making efforts to create an atmosphere of mutual control in the fleet, in other words, denunciation. That is, now he - and, moreover, from scratch - makes a decisive mistake.
During this period, Fisher and Churchill persuaded each other to go on a frank adventure - to order the construction of ships with 15-inch guns - guns that at that moment were not yet available not only in metal, but also on drafting tables.
The success of this dubious undertaking makes me once again recall the magnificent comments of D. Bronstein: “Sometimes, willy-nilly, you have to give up a pawn or even an exchange, a piece - there is a reason for this, if you see that the normal course of the struggle will lead you to a difficult position.”
Defending the interests of the decrepit British Empire, old Fisher invested in the preparations for war the energy, will and adventurism of his youth.
4. The deployment of forces and the struggle for the allies: 1905-1914.
A superficial analysis of the “clash of openings” between Schlieffen and Fischer suggests that the English admiral “counted” his opponent for one move. Indeed, Fischer's plan begins its destructive work the moment Schlieffen reaches its goal. The only thing Fischer needs is to prove the priority of the "sea" strategy over the "land" strategy, forcing Germany to fight against the economic possibilities of the rest of mankind. (Which, we note, fully corresponds to the logic of resolving the intercivilizational conflict.)
In reality, things were not so simple.
Both plans were based on the implicit assumption that a country would go to war in a favorable political environment.
It was absolutely essential for England to enlist the support of Russia. Otherwise, the blockade of Germany would not have been hermetic. The Grand Fleet, of course, outnumbered the High Seas Fleet, and this superiority was enough to close the North Sea. It should have been enough for the blockade of continental Europe. But not all of Eurasia! At the very least, Fischer's plans did not include instigating war into a "secular conflict".
The subtlety was, however, that the interests of Russia and Germany did not clash anywhere. (Seriously defend the concept that Russian empire entered the world war due to a trade conflict with Germany over grain duties, even the most orthodox Marxist would not have taken it now.) The theme of the suffering of the “Slav brothers” was quite popular in Russian society, but to consider the real cause of the war a showdown between Austria-Hungary and the South Slavic peoples is hardly appropriate. Of course, Russia could do anything for the sake of mastering the zone of the Straits, but the paradox of history was that it was Great Britain that was her main opponent on the way to Constantinople.
Moreover, the frank help that England provided to Japan during the war of 1904-1905 did not help to strengthen friendly relations between future partners in the Entente.
For some reason, no one, analyzing the history of the First World War, paid attention to the fact that, by entering into alliances with France and England, Russia, in essence, went against its own national aspirations. British diplomacy outplayed not only Russian, but also German politics, creating the prerequisites for using the "Russian steamroller" in their own interests.
The second political task of Great Britain was to create a favorable image of the country in the eyes of neutral states (primarily the United States). The problem here was that the Fischer blockade severely restricted neutral trade. Here Fischer could safely rely on two people - Schlieffen, who predetermined the entry of German troops into the territory of Belgium and Luxembourg, and Kaiser Wilhelm, whose pre-war eloquence contributed a lot to turning Germany into the "empire of the Huns."
Here it should be noted that the formation of Schlieffen as a military theorist took place in the era of Prince Bismarck. The great chancellor, long before Churchill, learned the famous formula: "War is too serious a matter to be entrusted to the military." Dealing with such high-class professionals as Roon and Moltke Sr., he nevertheless strived to ensure that the military only had to complete the work he had begun. B. Liddell Hart in his "Strategy of Indirect Actions" notes that throughout military history it is difficult to find examples of greater helplessness of one of the parties than the helplessness of Austria in 1866 and France in 1870. Note that in all three Bismarckian wars, Prussia was, in fact, the aggressor. However, in the first case, Bismarck created Prussia's image of a country defending the inviolability of international obligations, and in the other two, he provoked an enemy attack on "poor little peace-loving compliant" Prussia.
Alas, Bismarck was not only the first but also the last great German politician. His successors lacked above all flexibility. As a result, Germany quickly lost allied relations with Russia, quarreled with the British, and by the beginning of the World Crisis found itself at the tail end of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy: in fact, it was decided in Vienna whether Berlin should enter the war.
In order to ensure the implementation of the Schlieffen plan, genuine skill was required from German diplomacy. Perhaps Bismarck himself would not have been able to correctly solve the problem of "laundering the black dog." But in any case, Schlieffen had the right to expect at least some meaningful assistance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
If the favorable position of the neutral powers was the "sine qua non" of the implementation of the Fischer plan, then for Schlieffen's plans the positive attitude of the neutrals was not so important. However, there was one country whose entry into the war on the side of Germany was absolutely necessary for him. To the same extent that Russia's participation was necessary for the Entente. It's about Italy.
Italy is not only an additional 25 divisions (of dubious quality, however), not only the release of significant forces of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, not only a second front for France. Italy is a fleet. If Italy remains neutral or fights on the side of the Entente, her fleet and the Austro-Hungarian fleet balance each other out. Then the French fleet, reinforced by the English squadron, receives undeniable dominance in the Mediterranean.
But if Italy fulfills its obligations under the Triple Alliance, the situation looks different: by the end of 1914, the German fleet has 8 dreadnoughts in the Mediterranean against 4 French (the worst class). If, as a result of the defeat of France, French ships are sunk (for example, in Toulon), the German advantage in the Mediterranean becomes overwhelming, and they begin to seriously threaten the most important nodal points of the British Empire - Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria.
On this reasoning, the second stage of the Schlieffen plan was based: the English blockade breaks through in the Mediterranean Sea. The British are forced to either give up this region and lose the empire, or transfer at least a third of the available forces of the Grand Fleet there. At the same time, the remaining forces for a complete blockade of not only the North Sea, but also the French coast might not be enough.
This is where the "Schlieffen Amendment" to Fischer's ideas comes into play: to question the blockade with a peripheral (Mediterranean) strategy. The chances of success of this operation (of course, subject to the defeat of France and Italy's entry into the war) can be estimated as "50 to 50". Much would have depended on the balance of losses at sea in the 1914 campaign.
Now Schlieffen's intention is clear. The key to defeating France lies in southwestern Belgium. The key to defeating England lies in the Mediterranean, and the Italians hold it.
It was on this front that Triple Alliance diplomacy suffered its worst setback. Italy, which has territorial claims exclusively against its ally - Austria-Hungary, citing the formally defensive nature of the Triple Alliance, refused to enter the war and thereby predetermined the success of Great Britain.
So, the pre-war struggle for the allies was won by the Entente by a huge margin. Apart from Turkey, which was doomed to oppose Russia (as France - against Germany), Germany managed to secure (and then rather accidentally) the assistance of only one power - Bulgaria, while Great Britain won over the rest of the world to its side.
"Don't we have any friends left?" the Germans asked each other in 1914.
S. Pereslegin
Global financial crises accompany the entire history of human society. At first, they manifested themselves as crises of underproduction of agricultural products, from the middle of the 19th century. - as a violation of the financial balance between industrial production and effective demand.
In the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries The world has experienced several international financial crises. If before the XX century. economic crises limited to one, two or three countries, then with the beginning of the XX century. they began to acquire a regional and then an international character.
In Eurasia and America, for almost two centuries, economic crises have occurred about 20 times.
Before World War II, the following major financial crises broke out: 1825, 1836-1838, 1847, 1857, 1866, 1873, 1890-1893, 1907-1908, 1914, 1920-1921 and 1929-1933. AT post-war period at Bretton Woods monetary system there have been several currency crises associated with the commitment of countries to a fixed exchange rate of the national currency. There were significantly fewer banking crises and they did not have a wide economic impact.
Financial crisis of 1825 often regarded as the first international financial crisis in history, as it affected all the countries involved in international trade at the time.
The economic situation in England in the early 20's. 19th century was characterized by an upsurge in business activity, especially in the engineering and metallurgical industries, which was facilitated by active bank lending at affordable rates (5-6%). Moreover, loans were provided not only to national, but also foreign companies and foreign governments. The causes of the crisis were the following sequence of events.
The root cause of the crisis was an increase in the inflow of goods and capital into countries Latin America from Great Britain in order to finance the development of gold and silver mines and the public debt of the new Latin American republics, which from 1820 began to actively fight for their independence. These events contributed to a boom in exports and high-tech companies and an increase in the money supply, which led to an increase in speculative transactions on the London Stock Exchange. In the summer of 1825, the Bank of England, due to the growing trade imbalance and the depletion of gold reserves, was forced to increase the discount rate. Then came the crash in October 1825 stock market, and in early December 1825 a banking panic began, which soon spread to many European countries.
The Bank of England, most concerned about its own gold reserves, took no action to stop the panic, resulting in massive bankruptcies in the financial sector, and then in other sectors of the economy and the subsequent economic recession.
The crisis of 1825, which began in England, then spread to Latin America, as foreign loans were not rolled over, and the reduction in investment and exports reduced national budget revenues and caused defaults on public debts throughout the region. It took Latin American countries more than three decades to restructure their debts and resume foreign capital inflows.
Financial crisis 1836–1838 was initiated by England and the USA. In 1836, the Bank of England began to raise the discount rate in response to the decline in international gold reserves caused by a failed corn harvest and the subsequent flight of capital from Britain to the US, where there was a boom in the cotton plantation market. The subsequent stock market crash in December 1836 spread to France.
The consequences of this crisis for the United States were very severe: the decrease in credit to the cotton business in New Orleans resulted in a banking panic, which spread to New York through correspondent relations. Widespread panic led to the failure of the national payment and settlement system, which lasted for almost a year. This crisis spread through the channels of the capital market and the payment mechanism.
Financial crisis of 1857 struck national economy and public life simultaneously the USA, Germany, England and France. It began in the United States, triggered by the massive bankruptcies of railroad companies and the collapse of the stock market, which, in turn, provoked a crisis in the American economy. banking system.
In the same year, the crisis spread first to England, and then to stock markets Germany, France and all of Europe, a wave of stock market unrest swept even across Latin America.
During the crisis, iron production in the United States fell by 20%, cotton consumption - by 27%. In the UK, shipbuilding was hit the hardest, with output falling 26%. In Germany, the consumption of pig iron was reduced by 25%; in France - by 13% iron smelting and cotton consumption by the same amount; in Russia, iron smelting fell by 17%, the production of cotton fabrics - by 14%.
World financial crisis of 1873 started in Austria and Germany. The prerequisite for the crisis was a credit boom in Latin America, fueled by England, and a speculative boom in the real estate markets in Germany and Austria. The Austro-German boom ended with the collapse of the stock market in Vienna in May 1873, and the stock markets in Zurich and Amsterdam also collapsed.
In the United States, the banking crisis was triggered by a sharp fall in stocks on the New York Stock Exchange and the bankruptcy of the chief financier and president of the United Pacific railway Jay Cook. The crisis spread from Germany to America due to the refusal of German banks to roll over loans. As the American and European economies fell into a recession phase (a decline in production), Latin American exports fell sharply, which led to a drop in income state budgets. It was the longest crisis in the history of capitalism - it ended in 1878.
Financial crises 1890–1893 in the US and Australia were associated with the crisis of the Baring Bank and a decrease in business activity in the global commodity markets.
The cause of the crisis in the United States in 1893 is associated with the adoption of the Sherman Silver Pact, which allowed free pricing on the silver market. Investors, expecting that after the adoption of this pact, the United States would move away from the gold standard, began to withdraw capital from the country, which reduced the money supply and provoked a stock market crash and a banking crisis.
The Australian crisis was preceded by a boom in the real estate market, which was financed mainly by domestic loans. The immediate cause of the crisis was the fall in export prices and the closure of three major Australian banks. The crisis was also exacerbated by the withdrawal of British deposits.
Financial crisis of 1907–1908 in terms of international scope and consequences, it is one of the strongest in the entire era of the gold standard. This crisis affected nine countries and was provoked by the Bank of England, which in 1906 raised the discount rate from 3.5% to 6% to replenish its gold reserves, which caused an outflow of capital from the United States.
The stock market crash in New York occurred in early 1907, when business activity, and in October the liquidity crisis of trust companies spread to commercial banks. The sharp decline in the money supply led to the undermining of the national payment and settlement system and a protracted economic recession. From the USA and England, the crisis spread to France, Italy and a number of other states.
AT 1914 happened international financial crisis caused by the outbreak of the First World War. The cause of the crisis was the total sale of securities of foreign issuers by the governments of the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany to finance military operations.
This crisis, unlike others, did not spread from the center to the periphery, but began almost simultaneously in several countries, after the warring parties began to liquidate foreign assets, which led to the collapse of both commodity and money markets. The banking panic in the US, UK and some other countries was alleviated by the timely intervention of central banks.
Next world economic crisis, associated with post-war deflation (an increase in the purchasing power of the national currency) and a recession (a decline in production), occurred 1920–1922. The phenomenon has been associated with banking and currency crises in Denmark, Italy, Finland, Holland, Norway, the US and the UK.
Financial crisis 1929–1933(the time of the Great Depression) began on October 24, 1929 (Black Thursday), when there was a sharp decline in stocks on the New York Stock Exchange, the value of which fell by 60–70%, business activity fell sharply.
Shares of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the General Electric Company and the General Engine Company lost up to 200 points during the week. By the end of the month, the shareholders of these companies had lost more than $15 billion. By the end of 1929, stock prices had fallen to a fantastic sum of $40 billion, factories were closing, banks were failing, millions of unemployed people were wandering in search of work. The crisis raged until 1933, and its consequences were felt until the end of the 1930s, in 1933 the gold standard was abolished in the United States and the dollar exchange rate was introduced freely.
In the USA, Germany, France and the UK, there was a significant decline in industrial production and the share price of industrial companies (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1
Decline in industrial production and share prices as a result of the crisis of 1929–1933
Unemployment reached colossal proportions - according to official data, in 1933 at 32 developed countries There were 30 million unemployed, including 14 million in the United States.
The first post-war world economic crisis began at the end of 1957 and continued until the middle of 1958. It engulfed the USA, Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands and some other capitalist countries. Industrial production in the developed capitalist countries fell by 4%. The army of unemployed reached almost 10 million people.
Economic crisis, which began in the United States at the end of 1973, far exceeded the global economic crisis of 1957-1958 in terms of the breadth of coverage of countries, duration, depth and destructive force. and in a number of characteristics approached the crisis of 1929–1933. In all developed countries, there was a significant decline in industrial production and share prices (Table 2.2).
Table 2.2
Decline in industrial production and share prices as a result of the 1973 crisis
* Decrease in share price for the year - from December 1973 to December 1974.
The number of bankruptcies in 1974, compared with 1973, increased in the USA by 6%, Japan - by 42, Germany - by 40, Great Britain - by 47, France - by 27%. By mid-1975, the number of completely unemployed in the developed capitalist countries reached 15 million people. In addition, more than 10 million were transferred to part-time work or temporarily laid off from enterprises. The real incomes of working people have fallen everywhere.
1987 financial crisis in the United States began on October 19, 1987, this day is called Black Monday, when the American stock index Dow Jones Industrial fell 22.6%. Following the American stock market, the markets of Australia, Canada, and Hong Kong collapsed.
Possible causes of the 1987 crisis are called by experts:
- 1) market overvaluation and market psychology;
- 2) the outflow of investors from the market after a significant decrease in the capitalization of several large companies;
- 3) software trading, which uses computers to automatically execute arbitrage and hedging trades;
- 4) the inconsistency of the monetary policy of the countries of the Big Seven (G-7) (the United States, seeking to support the dollar and limit inflation, made too rapid changes in monetary policy without coordinating them with European countries).
AT 1992–1993 currency crises experienced some countries of the European Union (Great Britain, Italy, Sweden, Norway and Finland).
AT 1994–1995 the severe crisis that began in Mexico spread to other Latin American countries. In the late 1980s The Mexican government pursued a policy of attracting investment to the country, a stock exchange was opened, on which the shares of most Mexican state companies began to circulate, and in 1989-1994. Mexico was flooded with foreign capital. Fearing an economic crisis, foreign investors began to withdraw their capital from the country, in 1995, 10 billion US dollars were taken out of Mexico, and then the crisis of the banking system began.
Asian financial crisis erupted in 1997, resulting in the largest drop in the Asian stock market since the Second World War. The crisis began with the withdrawal of capital by foreign investors from the countries of Southeast Asia due to devaluation national currencies and high balance of payments deficits in the countries of the region. Economists estimate that the Asian crisis has reduced the world's gross domestic product (GDP) by $2 trillion.
AT 1997–1998 global financial crisis began in the countries of Southeast Asia (Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines), then spread to Eastern Europe (Russia and some countries former USSR) and Latin America (Brazil).
Russian financial crisis of 1998 is one of the most severe economic crises in the history of Russia. The external cause of this crisis was the negative impact on the Russian economy of the global financial crisis, which led to a decrease in demand for raw materials, which are the basis of Russian exports, a drop in oil prices by more than 35% (from $18.4 per barrel in 1997 to to $11.9 per barrel in 1998) and the outflow of capital from the Russian financial market.
Among the internal reasons, two main ones can be distinguished.
The first is to cover the deficit. federal budget, amounting to 6.5% of GDP at the beginning of 1998, due to borrowings for financial market at a high cost, leading to a steady increase in the cost of servicing and repaying the public debt. As a result, with the growth of the budget deficit and the absence of sources of repayment of obligations under government short-term bonds (GKOs), the Government of the Russian Federation was unable to pay them on time and declared a technical default.
The second reason is related to the excess of interest rates in the loan capital market over the rate of return in the production sector, which contributed to the outflow of capital from the real sector to the financial sector and the formation of an acute shortage of working capital in the industrial sector and an increase in the costs of their reproduction. As a result, there was an increase in accounts receivable and accounts payable, a decrease in the flow of payments and an increase in bankruptcies of enterprises.
From the history
Dynamics of the public debt of the Russian Federation for 1996–1998
Expenditures of the federal budget of Russia for servicing the public debt for 1995–1998.
The consequences of the 1998 financial crisis in Russia were both negative and positive changes. To negative consequences crisis can include:
- 1) a sharp drop in the exchange rate of the ruble against the dollar (more than three times);
- 2) a decrease in the value of banking sector assets due to the depreciation of bank investments in government securities and losses on open forward contracts for delivery foreign exchange which caused the bankruptcy of many banks and a deep crisis in the banking system;
- 3) a decrease in gold and foreign exchange reserves, which for the period from July 26 to October 11, 1998 decreased from 19.5 billion to 13.3 billion US dollars;
- 4) an increase in the share of overdue receivables and payables and, as a result, an increase in bankruptcies of enterprises and organizations;
- 5) a sharp drop in the level of income and living standards of the population;
- 6) an increase in the federal budget deficit, which, according to the results of 1998, amounted to 4.9% of GDP;
- 7) an increase in the state internal debt of the Russian Federation from 501 billion rubles. (21.4% of GDP) at the beginning of the year to 751 billion rubles. (28.6% of GDP) by the end of 1998;
- 8) the growth of the state external debt RF from USD 130.8 billion (33.5% of GDP) at the beginning of the year to USD 150 billion (117.8% of GDP) by the end of 1998;
- 9) undermining the confidence of the population in the banking system of the country;
- 10) a decrease in the total social capital, the size of national wealth, a decline in production and GDP.
The positive consequences of the 1998 crisis for Russia were:
- 1) an increase in export opportunities for domestic producers due to a decrease in prices for Russian goods abroad due to the devaluation of the ruble, which gave a chance to develop new markets;
- 2) stimulation of the production of import-substituting goods;
- 3) bankruptcy of inefficient owners and the possibility of developing efficient businesses;
- 4) recovery public policy and a change in its orientation, awareness of the need to move away from the raw-material economic model and the development of sectors of the economy that were replaced by imports before the financial crisis.
After 1999, the food, light industry, service sector began to develop, consumer demand began to grow
Over the course of almost two centuries of the formation and development of the world industrial society, crises occurred in the economies of many countries, during which there was a growing decline in production, accumulation of unsold goods on the market, falling prices, the collapse of the system of mutual settlements, the collapse of banking systems, the ruin of industrial and trading firms, a sharp rise in unemployment.
In the literature, the economic crisis is characterized as an imbalance between supply and demand for goods and services.
Crises accompany the entire history of human society. At first, they manifested themselves as crises of underproduction of agricultural products, from the middle of the 19th century - as an imbalance between industrial production and effective demand.
Until the 20th century, economic crises were limited to one, two or three countries, then they began to acquire an international character. Despite the fact that in recent decades the world community has created mechanisms to prevent global crises (strengthening state regulation business processes, the creation of international financial organizations, monitoring, etc.), as the history of world economic cataclysms testifies, it is impossible to accurately predict, much less avoid them. In Eurasia and America, for almost two centuries, economic crises have occurred about 20 times.
First world economic crisis, which dealt a blow to the national economy and public life at the same time the United States, Germany, England and France occurred in 1857. The crisis began in the USA. The reason was the massive bankruptcies of railway companies and the collapse of the stock market. The collapse in the stock market provoked a crisis in the American banking system. In the same year, the crisis spread to England, and then to the whole of Europe. A wave of stock market unrest swept even across Latin America. During the crisis, iron production in the United States fell by 20%, cotton consumption by 27%. In the UK, shipbuilding was hit the hardest, with output falling 26%. In Germany, the consumption of pig iron was reduced by 25%; in France - by 13% iron smelting and cotton consumption by the same amount; in Russia iron smelting fell by 17%, the output of cotton fabrics - by 14%.
Another global economic crisis began in 1873 from Austria and Germany. The crisis of 1873 is seen as a major international financial crisis. The prerequisite for the crisis was a credit boom in Latin America, fueled by England, and a speculative boom in the real estate market in Germany and Austria. The Austro-German boom ended with a stock market crash in Vienna in May. Stock markets in Zurich and Amsterdam also collapsed. In the US, the banking panic began after a sharp fall in stocks on the New York Stock Exchange and the bankruptcy of the chief financier and president of the United Pacific Railroad, Jay Cooke. The crisis spread from Germany to America due to the refusal of German banks to roll over loans. Since the American and European economies fell into a recession phase (a decline in production), Latin American exports fell sharply, which led to a drop in government budget revenues. It was the longest crisis in the history of capitalism: it ended in 1878.
In 1914 There was an international financial crisis caused by the outbreak of the First World War. The reason is the total sale of securities of foreign issuers by the governments of the USA, Great Britain, France and Germany to finance military operations. This crisis, unlike others, did not spread from the center to the periphery, but began almost simultaneously in several countries after the warring parties began to liquidate foreign assets. This led to a collapse in all markets, both commodity and money. The banking panic in the US, UK and some other countries was mitigated by the timely intervention of central banks.
The next world economic crisis associated with post-war deflation (an increase in the purchasing power of the national currency) and a recession (a decline in production) occurred in 1920-1922. The phenomenon was associated with banking and currency crises in Denmark, Italy, Finland, Holland, Norway, the USA and Great Britain.
1929-1933 - during the Great Depression
On October 24, 1929 (Black Thursday), the New York Stock Exchange experienced a sharp decline in stocks, marking the beginning of the largest economic crisis in the history of the world. The value of securities fell by 60-70%, business activity dropped sharply, and the gold standard for major world currencies was abolished. After the First World War, the US economy developed dynamically, millions of shareholders increased their capital, consumer demand grew rapidly. And all at once collapsed. The most solid stocks of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the General Electric Company and the General Engine Company lost up to two hundred points during the week. By the end of the month, shareholders had lost over $15 billion. By the end of 1929, the fall in stock prices reached a fantastic amount of 40 billion dollars. Firms and factories closed, banks burst, millions of unemployed wandered in search of work. The crisis raged until 1933, and its effects were felt until the end of the 1930s.
Industrial production during this crisis decreased in the US by 46%, in the UK by 24%, in Germany by 41%, in France by 32%. Stock prices of industrial companies fell in the US by 87%, in the UK by 48%, in Germany by 64%, in France by 60%. Unemployment reached colossal proportions. According to official data, in 1933 there were 30 million unemployed in 32 developed countries, including 14 million in the USA.
The first post-war world economic crisis began in late 1957 and continued until mid-1958. It covered the USA, Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands and some other capitalist countries. Industrial production in the developed capitalist countries fell by 4%. The army of unemployed has reached almost 10 million people.
The economic crisis that began in the United States in late 1973 in terms of breadth of coverage of countries, duration, depth and destructive power, it significantly surpassed the global economic crisis of 1957-1958 and, in a number of characteristics, approached the crisis of 1929-1933. During the crisis in the United States, industrial production fell by 13%, in Japan by 20%, in Germany by 22%, in Great Britain by 10%, in France by 13%, in Italy by 14%. Share prices in just one year - from December 1973 to December 1974 - fell in the USA by 33%, in Japan by 17%, in the FRG by 10%, in Great Britain by 56%, in France by 33%, in Italy by 28%. The number of bankruptcies in 1974 compared with 1973 increased by 6% in the USA, by 42% in Japan, by 40% in the FRG, by 47% in Great Britain, and by 27% in France. By mid-1975, the number of completely unemployed in the developed capitalist countries had reached 15 million. In addition, more than 10 million were placed on part-time work or temporarily laid off from enterprises. The real incomes of working people have fallen everywhere.
In 1973, there was also the first energy crisis, which began with the filing of the OPEC member countries, which reduced the volume of oil production. Thus, black gold miners tried to raise the cost of oil on the world market. On October 16, 1973, the price of a barrel of oil rose by 67% - from $3 to $5. In 1974, the cost of oil reached $12.
Black Monday 1987. On October 19, 1987, the US stock index Dow Jones Industrial collapsed by 22.6%. After American market the markets of Australia, Canada, Hong Kong collapsed. Possible cause of the crisis: the outflow of investors from the markets after a strong decline in the capitalization of several large companies.
The Mexican Crisis occurred in 1994-1995
In the late 1980s, the Mexican government pursued a policy of attracting investment to the country. In particular, officials opened stock exchange, brought to the site most of the Mexican state-owned companies. In 1989-1994, foreign capital poured into Mexico. The first manifestation of the crisis was the flight of capital from Mexico: foreigners began to fear an economic crisis in the country. In 1995, $10 billion was withdrawn from the country. A crisis in the banking system began.
In 1997 - Asian crisis
The biggest drop in the Asian stock market since World War II. The crisis is a consequence of the departure of foreign investors from the countries of Southeast Asia. The reason is the devaluation of the national currencies of the region and the high level of deficit in the balance of payments of the countries of Southeast Asia. According to economists, the Asian crisis reduced world GDP for $2 trillion.
In 1998 - Russian crisis
One of the most severe economic crises in the history of Russia. Reasons for the default: a huge public debt of Russia, low world prices for raw materials (Russia is a major supplier of oil and gas to the world market) and a pyramid of government short-term bonds, which the Russian government could not pay on time. The exchange rate of the ruble against the dollar in August 1998 - January 1999 fell 3 times - from 6 rubles. per dollar up to 21 rubles. per dollar.
Experts predicted the beginning of another powerful economic crisis by 2007-2008. In America, the collapse of the oil markets was predicted; in Eurasia, the complete defeat of the dollar.
The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources
