The historical experience inherited by Russian society from the era of the USSR and the period of the formation of post-Soviet Russia will influence the direction and logic of the development of our country for a long time to come. Some consequences of events experienced by society, such as, for example, the Great Patriotic War are constantly discussed and analyzed. However, there are also hidden consequences, the impact of which at first glance does not seem important. But they can play a decisive role in the strategic perspective.
survival trap
One of these often ignored problems of Russian society is the unwillingness or inability to think, to “look ahead” for long periods at once. According to regular public polls, about 46% of Russians do not know what will happen to them in the coming months, another 36% plan their lives for a maximum of one or two years in advance. Dominated by life strategies with a small planning horizon - to survive this week, month, year, and then we'll see.
The "collapse" of the planning horizon is a consequence of a series of shocks in the lives of the last two Soviet-Russian generations. First, the idea of planning for long term discredited by the endless process of building communism in the USSR. Despite assurances that the Soviet man would definitely live under communism in the future, this homo soveticus, not feeling any significant changes in life since the mid-1960s, was disappointed in the future. The subsequent unexpected collapse of the USSR, the formation of borders overnight where there were none, the need to adjust life strategies on the go left a significant scar in the collective memory, constantly reminding of the danger of building any long-term plans. This was followed by the default of 1998, when many people felt cheated and made the conviction that it makes no sense to link the future with their savings: after all, savings evaporated not for the first time in just a few years. The crisis of 2008, albeit relatively easily experienced by society (but not ended in the economy), the devaluation of the ruble at the end of 2014, a serious decline in income, the return of the Cold War rhetoric, and the sanctions policy in general, did not add confidence to the Russians. The two periods of aspirations for the future - the mid-1990s and 2000s - were too short for people to form the habit of working for distant goals. At the same time, shock events in the economy undermine confidence in savings, which means that it is impossible to create the necessary amount of resources for investment.
Such constant “breaks” and “distortions” over the past 30 years have formed two sustainable life strategies for the majority of the population. The first is to take everything from life now, since investments in the future still do not work, the second is to deal only with your problems and the problems of your family: here you can change something.
Search for a great goal
The situation could be corrected by the consistent implementation of long-term decisions by the authorities. But it does not work out with the implementation of state strategies either: the successful Strategy-2010 (known as the “Gref program”) was implemented by an average of 36%, the concept of long-term development of Russia until 2020 was already outdated at the time of its adoption. Priority national projects are an example of effective but manual management, rather than high-quality structural reforms. Even under the May 2012 Presidential Decrees, the targets were far from being fully met, and part of them was achieved through changes in the calculation methodology.
So in modern Russia do not like to form full-fledged, realistic strategies for the future. But they like to dream about the future. According to studies, the socio-cultural characteristics of Russian society, measured using the Hofstede method, classify Russia as both a fragmented collectivist country (divided into close-knit but poorly trusting social groups) and “feminine” - focused on long-term strategies, but avoiding uncertainty as much as possible. Simply put, such a set of life attitudes gives rise to the need for constant running towards a great goal and causes an equally constant “not running” to it. We are always in search of something big and unifying that we would like to strive for - a special "Russian way", communism or a national idea - but we are not ready to either find or develop an image of the future acceptable to everyone, or build a road to it, let alone step by step along this road. The shocks described above only reinforce these sociocultural characteristics in us.
But this does not mean that Russia is doomed to wander forever in the dark. The totality of such characteristics must be treated as initial conditions - taken into account when implementing any kind of policy. On the other hand, it is necessary to focus on what is happening with Russian society and elites today.
The ZIRCON research group recently conducted a large-scale expert survey (involving both pro-government and opposition experts). The most curious result of the survey is not so much in the forecasts that the respondents came up with, but in the dispersion and inconsistency of their estimates, showing that there is no consensus forecast of the future even among those who have all the tools of forecasting.
The authorities also do not have a clear vision - the information agenda is focused on the successes of the past and the news of the present, but does not answer questions about Russia in the future of 10-20 years; The latest economic outlook is changing rapidly and is likely to be overly optimistic. The transition in 2015 from a three-year budget to an annual one further shortened the planning horizon of departments, and a return to a three-year plan still looks formal. The financial behavior of Russians is characterized either by a forced decision to spend everything at once, leaving nothing for the future, which indicates the exhaustion of domestic budgets, or by short-term savings in banks. Both this and that speak of a further collapse of the planning horizon - people save because of uncertainty, putting it off for a close rainy day, not believing in a stable income "tomorrow". And we need public trust in savings strategies for a long period - this trust is almost directly converted into economic growth.
Window of opportunity
But in such total uncertainty there is also an essential positive property. When a large number active social and elite groups in equally there is no clear image of the future, and the key contradiction that separates them is also erased. The effect of homogeneity is formed, which can generate high responsiveness and readiness for compromise.
Since October 2016, the Center for Strategic Research within the framework of the project "Russia of the Future: A Positive Agenda" has held a series of working sessions "Looking into the Future: Russia in 10 Years" in the Russian regions and continues interviews and discussions about the future. There are several key intersections in the thoughts and ideas of respondents: understanding the need and inevitability of change, the demand for setting goals and describing the image of the future, which answers questions about the development and role of man in Russia and Russia in the world in 10-15 years, demonstrating a clear program of action upon its achievement. Everyone is tired of uncertainty - and our society began to strive to avoid it, which also fits into our socio-cultural specifics.
This means that the chances of overcoming the fragmentation of Russian society and the consequences of previous historical periods described above are high. The demand for a positive image of the future, understandable goals that will lengthen the horizons of planning and decision-making, and connect the development of the country with the well-being of every person is huge.
There are only two questions here: will it be possible to take advantage of the opened window of opportunity, and who exactly will do it. There is a positive scenario - the implementation of structural reforms will make it possible to double GDP by 2035 (by 2025 - GDP grows by 37%), to increase real wages, increase the share of exports of non-commodity non-energy goods from 34% (2016) to 50% in 2029 and 61% by 2035 - and that means being among the leading countries.
The main driver of development in this scenario, the source of Russia's growth, is the realization of the potential of each individual in making a structural turn towards a technological, innovative economy. But in order for us to make such a turnaround, we need to put together the three components of success, taking into account our national characteristics: to determine the vectors of change acceptable to the main social groups; to find a shared image of the future, for which our "collectivist worldview" will want to run; to create a realistic plan for moving towards this future - one that will give strength for a new breakthrough. To remain among the world leaders, the next ten years will have to run, and run faster than the rest of the world.
To connect the demand for change and ambitious goals through clear implementation mechanisms, to propose changes that the country is ready for, to create an action plan that will be feasible - these are the main tasks of the Russia Development Strategy 2018-2024.
The Center for Strategic Research, headed by ex-Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, for the first time made detailed proposals regarding Russia's development strategy in the coming years.
Alexey Kudrin (Photo: Vladislav Shatilo / RBC)
In the article “Budget maneuver and structural restructuring of the Russian economy”, published in the September issue of the journal “Voprosy ekonomiki” (Vedomosti drew attention to the publication), Kudrin for the first time reveals the details of Russia’s development strategy until 2024, which he is developing for the Russian authorities under his leadership Center for Strategic Research. The article was written in co-authorship with the head of the laboratory of the Institute of Applied economic research RANEPA Ilya Sokolov.
In the article, the authors identify three tasks that the budget policy should solve: restoring the budget balance and protection from risks, ensuring long-term fiscal sustainability and creating favorable conditions for economic growth. budget policy needs to be reformed, experts say: while maintaining the current policy of public spending, by 2035 spending budget system reached 41.5% of GDP (now - 35.9%). Growth will be associated mainly with an increase in social spending, spending on healthcare and servicing the public debt. Without structural reforms, Russia will face industrial stagnation and GDP growth of only 50% compared to 2035. But structural reforms, according to Kudrin and Sokolov, will make it possible to double the economy by 2035.
The authors of the article admit that Russia has a “specific structure” budget spending, within which little is spent on the development of human capital, while spending on defense and security, on the contrary, is increased.
Experts propose to reduce spending in unproductive sectors (defense spending, law enforcement, partly on public administration, social spending). They note that in the law enforcement system and the military department, one can note a "high number of employees." The number of law enforcement officers, according to the CSR, can be reduced by a quarter, and defense spending can be reduced from the current 4.4% of GDP to 2.8%. You can also save money within the framework of the social support system - according to the CSR, about three-quarters social payments receive citizens who are not among the needy. Experts suggest switching to the targeted principle of providing social support. In addition, the authors are in favor of increasing retirement age(previously CSR by this issue not expressed).
At the same time, it is necessary to increase spending on healthcare and education, the authors of the article point out (compared to the current level, they should be increased by 0.8 percentage points of GDP and 1 percentage point of GDP, respectively).
Why they can hardly be implemented, said Dmitry Travin, scientific director of the Center for Modernization Studies at the European University in St. Petersburg. Forbes publishes selected excerpts from his lecture at the GAIDPARK Winter Discussion School 2016, organized by the Yegor Gaidar Foundation and KGI University*.
source: anekdot.ru
Looking for the bottom
Already since the beginning of the 2000s. in Russia, there were no qualitative changes in institutional design (the only exception is the tax reform). Now we're facing the consequences of this - we've gone into a deep economic crisis. At the end of 2015, Russian GDP collapsed by almost 4%. Now we live much poorer than a year or two ago.
The authorities are presenting the economic crisis as a temporary phenomenon, which is about to end. Even at a spring press conference in 2015, Vladimir Putin refused to call the current situation a crisis. By the summer, it became impossible not to notice the obvious, and Putin himself, as well as the minister economic development Alexey Ulyukaev had to admit that the crisis in the economy still exists. At the same time, Ulyukaev said that we had already reached the ultimate point of decline, the notorious "bottom", and then only growth should have awaited us.
These words were heard when the price of a barrel of oil fluctuated around $50. Today, oil is worth about $30 with the risk of falling to $15. According to the latest forecasts of the ministry, the fall of the economy in 2016 will be another 0.8%. We may have reached the bottom, but now it is sinking with us.
Deviation of the "fat" zero
If we draw up a graph reflecting the development of the Russian economy since 2000, we can trace two clear trends. From 1999 to 2007 the economy grew by an average of 6.2% per year. This is less than China's growth rate (where growth has sometimes been measured in double digits), but more than Western Europe or the United States (2-4%), which suggests catch-up development. During the period beginning in 2008, the average annual economic growth was less than 1%. This is stagnation.
If you look at economic dynamics on an even larger scale, given the decline in the economy in last years existence of the USSR, Russian GDP has been declining for a quarter of a century, and only in 1999-2007. there was an economic boom. For a whole generation of Russians, this deviant, deviant behavior of the economy has become a trend, a pattern.
We were in a difficult situation throughout the 1990s, we are in it now, and it looks like many more difficult years await us.
What do we owe to the bright streak of the "fat" zero? The most obvious reason for economic growth is the rapid increase in energy prices and other Natural resources that Russia exports. The income received during this period was invested in the economy and increased the well-being of the people. But along with the fall in the price of oil (at its peak it reached $140 per barrel), the growth potential dried up.
It turns out, no Putin economic miracle was not: the coming to power of a new president simply coincided with changing conditions in the world economy, which led to a temporary deviation of the Russian economy from its persistently bad course last quarter century.
The world economy is not having the best, but definitely not the worst period: both in the US and even in the EU, economic growth is observed, in China it is almost 7%. This is below China's previous growth rate, but higher than our growth in the 2000s. Now there are very few countries in the world that are going through such difficult years as Russia. There may be several ways for Russia to get out of this situation - to restart economic growth. I would name these strategies after our most famous proponents of the respective approaches: Dmitry Medvedev, Alexei Kudrin and Sergei Glazyev.
Medvedev's strategy Import substitution 2.0
The current government is pursuing a course whose logic fits into the newfangled word "import substitution". With the economy falling, the Kremlin is trying to create new enterprises that can replace imported products that have disappeared on the market. Once, after the 1998 crisis, our country has already successfully carried out import substitution. Then, after the 5-fold devaluation of the ruble, Russian consumers were not able to buy imported goods that had already become familiar - food, clothing, and equipment. In early 1999, domestic food began to appear on the shelves. Compared with the goods of the Soviet era, it turned out to be of good quality; in next years this quality has improved. It turned out that having become poor in the 1990s, we learned to work well, and that the place vacated in the market can be successfully occupied by our enterprises - without additional customs barriers.
Import substitution was facilitated by several important factors: rising energy prices, increased investment in real sector, availability of free production capacities. It was enough to update them, and you can start a new production.
However, the policy of import substitution, which has been carried out for two years now, is failing. Growth is only certain categories goods - cheese, medicines, some industries Agriculture. And this is despite artificially created barriers in the form of counter-sanctions to support domestic enterprises. There is a fundamental difference from 1998: the devaluation of the ruble turned out to be “only twofold” (compared to fivefold in 1998), which is not enough to completely remove imports from the market (especially given the availability of workarounds - for example, through Belarus) . At the same time, the Russian authorities are afraid of further devaluation of the ruble, fearing that the standard of living of people will fall too sharply. And there is simply no free production capacity that could replace imports in the economy. The reserves of extensive development have been exhausted.
Opportunities for a real transformation of the Russian economy will appear only after the departure of the current generation of politicians
Of course, production capacity can be created from scratch. But the Russian paradox lies in the fact that for this you first need to import new equipment from the West. And it has risen in price compared to 2013 by 2-2.5 times (if you count in rubles). Of course, you can take a loan. But access to foreign loans covered by sanctions Russian budget there is no money for these purposes, and the Central Bank at the time of the devaluation sharply raised the refinancing rate, raising the cost of commercial loans.
It is very important for the import substitution business to have clear guarantees that counter-sanctions will be maintained for several more years, during which investments can be recouped. If restrictions are lifted, say, on the import of Polish apples or Finnish dairy products, our new cheeses will not withstand increased competition and will be forced out of the shelves. But the state cannot give manufacturers even such guarantees. The Kremlin's position: if the US and the EU lift sanctions, we will lift them too. For all these reasons, with the current constellation of factors, the policy of import substitution, unlike in 1999, will not give much effect.
Kudrin's strategy. Investment climate or straitjacket
In order for a country to have good cheese, it is not necessary to produce it yourself. Cheese can be bought in exchange for profits earned from the export of other goods. But goods need to be created, for which investments are needed. The state cannot afford these investments now, and most importantly, the state is a bad owner. AT market economy the entrepreneur is free to choose the country for investment. Countries compete for investment, they need to win the love of investors, create a good investment climate: ensure property security, low inflation, political stability, etc. This is the essence of Kudrin's strategy: to create good conditions for investment and not interfere with private business.
Capital can quickly respond to changes in the investment climate in different countries, in one click transferring funds from one country to another. Well-known economic journalist Thomas Friedman calls this effect a “golden straitjacket”: capitalists put it on political regimes that, for one reason or another, significantly increase business risks and worsen their investment climate. Capital is leaving the country, production is curtailed, a straitjacket begins to operate.
This outfit was especially pronounced in our case after the country's leadership decided that it could no longer live without Crimea. Russia was under sanctions, which finished off our already not the best investment climate. And considering that today we are actively creating in the public field the illusion of a “besieged fortress”, around which there are only enemies; rattling nuclear weapons, business reacts to this too: it continues to divert capital. The straitjacket becomes more and more narrow.
Kudrin's strategy is the most promising.
In a normal situation, it undoubtedly could help our country return to the era of high growth rates. But in order to implement it, it is not enough to have the economic powers of the Minister of Finance or the Economy. It is necessary to change the very approach to politics, a principle that has been operating in Russia for the past two years. If we decide to develop as an "independent", "free" country that is adding new territories to itself, we will be pulled together by a golden "straitjacket". If we want to live without it, we must return to the global rules of politics and business.
Glaziev's strategy. Printing press and interest groups
To explain this strategy, you need to know a little economic theory, namely Keynesianism. The shortest explanation of Keynes' theory came from the Polish economist Michal Kalecki. Imagine the extreme point of the inhabited part of America in the Wild West. One rich man comes to a bar in a provincial town, located on the border of the civilized world, and gives the bartender to keep all the savings he has during his absence in this town, so that he returns them back to him upon his return. The owner of the bar is not a stupid person: after the departure of our traveler, he put this money into circulation, for the benefit of his bar. Repaired the roof, painted the walls, increased the range of alcohol. These investments gave jobs to carpenters, painters, farmers; they also invested the money they earned in the economy, increasing consumer demand. When the traveler returned, he did not recognize the city - it flourished so much. The bartender greeted the traveler like a hero and returned the money to him. However, the traveler, in front of the astonished public, burned all this bundle of banknotes and announced that the money given to him for safekeeping was counterfeit, and, of course, he took the real ones with him.
To simplify a lot, that's the gist of it. economic theory Keynes: it doesn't matter where the money comes from in the economy; it is important that they are actively used in it.
Sergey Glazyev, presidential adviser on economics, proposes to do the same in Russia, calling for an increase in money supply. The Central Bank, according to its logic, should turn on the printing press, issue cheap loans commercial banks, and those - to issue cheap loans to businesses. Equipped with money, the mechanism of the Russian economy will restart. Sometimes such a policy worked, but it is unlikely to happen in modern Russia.
The scheme invented by Kalecki is, of course, a strong simplification. None of the inhabitants of the town during the absence of travel checked the money left for authenticity. The system worked thanks to people's trust in money: they wanted to earn it and were not afraid to keep it.
The Russians showed how much they "trust" the ruble back in December 2014 - they massively attacked store shelves with the sole purpose of exchanging depreciated rubles, if not for currency, then at least for consumer goods. In addition, the bulk of the rubles today is in the country with a very narrow stratum of people who need to launch economic policy Glazyev will not add to the already extremely weak faith in Russian currency. They understand for sure that the printing press will accelerate inflation, and the best thing is to transfer money into dollars or euros.
Businesses are also unlikely to use cheaper loans for their intended purpose. In a situation of currency instability, it is much more profitable to invest money not in the real sector of the economy - profits will be eaten away by inflation - but in currency speculation. The collective mind of business will always find a huge number of loopholes that will allow targeted loans not what Glazyev and the Central Bank originally planned. In order to stop the use of loans for the purchase of foreign currency, it will be necessary to introduce strict currency restrictions, fix exchange rate, to stop any legal possibility of withdrawing capital abroad - for example, to return to the Criminal Code the article that existed in the USSR for currency speculation.
But the problem economic reforms in that they never work out the way their authors originally intended.
As soon as radical reforms begin, interest groups are discovered that will try to adapt these reforms to their goals. At the time of the introduction of hard currency regulation his close friends will come to the president, who, of course, will not be against Glazyev's policy " printing press”, but will be urged to postpone the establishment of a currency corridor or assign them a special, more favorable exchange rate. Even such a reform, with all its frank disadvantages, will not be implemented in a comprehensive manner, but will only accelerate inflation and finally lead business into the shadow sector.
The situation in the Russian economy is not just bad, it is disgusting. But none of the three options we have considered will work in the current situation, although Kudrin's option could well work in a different political situation. What remains - to find the economic bottom and sit firmly on it? Probably, yes, at least until there are opportunities for transformation. Usually this happens no later than the moment of change of the current generation of rulers to the next. This has happened more than once in Russian history: when a new generation comes, carriers of fresh ideas and new views, and begins to solve old problems old system through its transformation.
* Text prepared by Mikhail Komin
The head of the CSR has completed work on a document that defines the main priorities and projects of the country for six years. The strategy will be presented to the president and only then made public
Alexey Kudrin. Photo: Grigory Sobchenko / website
Alexei Kudrin's team has completed work on the country's development strategy for the next six years after the 2018 presidential election. Kudrin spoke about this in an interview with TASS.
The main provisions will be presented personally to the president. There are no specifics yet, Kudrin asked to wait until the end of May. Nevertheless, he explained where to get the money from, whether the Russian economy would be competitive, and suggested what the ruble exchange rate would be like.
The strategy consists of priorities and projects. Top priorities: people, technology and public administration. The goal that was set by the president is to achieve growth rates above the world average, that is, 3.5% or higher. This is a very difficult task, but it is solvable. This should be a period of investment in a person.
“This is really a different, more attentive attitude to a person, starting from his birth, school, preschool age, in terms of developing his abilities, in terms of learning new skills to work in a changing world. This has never happened before in Russian history. It will be necessary not only to saturate people with knowledge, but to create in them the skills with which they will be more successful, efficient and effective all their lives. Discovering talents or abilities is the most important task, but much more money will need to be spent on this, ”said the head of the Center for Strategic Research.
In the next six years, several times more programmers will be required for the digitalization processes of all industries. Russia is not yet ready for this.
Kudrin kept his forecast: the price of oil will move in the range of 40-60 dollars per barrel in the next four to five years. “It will be a period of establishing a new balance. Even if the price goes below $40, we can safely meet the spending level calculated at $45. At the current oil price, the ruble will weaken a bit, maybe a little more than 60 rubles to the dollar. I think that at the current price of about $56 per barrel, the ruble could be a little weaker. If this level of oil prices persists, then the rate will weaken a little, ”Kudrin predicts.
According to the head of the CSR, the strategy should become a document that unites different segments of the population. “It must be in demand by the country… The strategy is a political document, the president must fully share it, so he may add something or exclude something,” Kudrin said.
Earlier, speaking at a forum in Krasnoyarsk, Kudrin called Russian economy.
The alternative is hopelessly lagging behind developed world
CSR Chairman Alexei Kudrin is ready to offer a recipe for solving health and education problems
Education and healthcare will become new drivers of Russia's economic growth, promises "Kudrin's strategy". Their development will require co-financing from citizens. Otherwise, Russia faces a hopeless lag behind the developed world, Vedomosti writes with reference to the materials of the 2035 strategy, which is being prepared for President Vladimir Putin by the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) under the leadership of Alexei Kudrin.
According to the strategy, the prospects for the economy in the 21st century depend on human capital: education, which forms this capital, and healthcare, which prevents its loss, will become one of the main drivers of Russian economic growth by 2024. The ways of development of these industries are described in the programs “Education of the 21st century” and “Health of citizens” proposed by the strategy.
Health care in the world is rapidly replacing the military as the main platform for technological progress, turning into the largest industry of developed economies: to miss this shift means to doom the country to the loss of the position of a great power, the CSR materials say. A country's place in the world economy will be determined by its ability to generate and master innovations: education, like healthcare, needs not improvement, but a qualitative breakthrough.
The choice is either to ensure a technological shift in human capital sectors through the joint efforts of the state, employers and citizens, or to put up with a deep long-term lag, the strategy suggests. For example, in per capita health financing, Russia lags behind developed countries 3.2 times.
The proposed CSR budget maneuver of 2% of GDP in favor of education and health care is equally divided between them: public funding medicine by 2024 should increase from 3.3% to 4.3% of GDP, education - from 3.6% to 4.6% of GDP. The share of private funds in education will grow by 2.3 times (up to 1.7% of GDP) due, among other things, to the provision of mass university education on an actually paid basis and the transfer of expenses for additional education of children to families. In the system of mandatory health insurance(OMS), the OMS-2 option appears with advanced programs for additional payment, drug benefits will be restructured.
Technologically advanced education and health care will also strengthen the international role of Russia: the share of educational services in exports will increase tenfold from 0.1% to 1%; medical services- from 0.07 billion (0.0001% of all exports) to 3.6 billion dollars by 2024.
There are no specific proposals on how to co-finance citizens in these programs of the strategy. For the purpose of budgetary maneuver, the government discussed, among other things, raising personal income tax to 15%, but there were no decisions. In total, the strategy assumes 14 programs, united in three blocks: technologies, human capital and the modern state.
This is the March version of the documents, it is not the only one and not the final one, the documents change almost on a daily basis, the representative of the CSR assures, official documents have not yet been sent to state departments. The strategy is due to be presented to the president in May.
