(Socis. 2001. No. 6. P. 85? 95)
RYBAKOVSKY Leonid Leonidovich,doctor economic sciences, Professor. Institute for Socio-Political Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
The most terrible results of wars, of any scale, are human losses. Life - from the point of view of human morality - is priceless. But from the point of view of politicians who push people to kill each other, victims are only the inevitable result of wars, and war, Clausewitz noted, is a continuation of politics by other means. Not to mention early times, even in the 20th century, human losses in wars were and are not considered as lost lives, but as lost potential. Human memory has not preserved information about hundreds of thousands, millions of soldiers and civilians who died during ancient, medieval, modern wars, retaining the names of Macedon, Caesar, Barbarossa, Napoleon, and other commanders on whose conscience these victims are.
After any war, and sometimes during ongoing battles, the loss of life is counted. The Second World War is no exception. Both the winners and the vanquished already in the first post-war years knew at least, own human losses. The casualty figures published at the time have changed little to date. In 1946, Germany's losses in World War II were estimated at 6.5 million. This figure is being specified, but most of the amendments do not exceed 20 percent. Another thing is the human losses of the USSR. The loss figure published in the Soviet Union in 1946 had almost quadrupled by the beginning of the 1990s. It remains the subject of controversy, which is natural. Sometimes losses are underestimated, however, slightly - by 12 - 13%. At the same time, those who are not tired of humiliating their own Motherland continue to overestimate the human losses of the USSR often by 1.5 - 2 times. And without these overstatements, the losses are terrible in scale - almost 14% of the pre-war population of the country. Every fifth inhabitant died or was destroyed in the temporarily occupied territories. Soviet people fought together with the enemy, died together on the battlefields, in concentration camps, at the hands of punishers, etc. During the war and after it, neither victory nor total losses were shared. Before the collapse of the USSR, there was no need for estimates of human losses for individual republics or nationalities. Actually, they are still missing, at least for Russia. The need for them, meanwhile, is obvious. Not in order to show whose contribution to the overall victory is more significant, or who lost more people in the common struggle against the aggressor, but only in order to recreate the history of the population of Russia, to assess the damage to its demographic development.
Prerequisites for Estimating Human Losses
for certain parts of the country
Calculations of losses throughout the Soviet Union are fraught with difficulties, which increase many times over when estimates are made for individual parts of the state. Estimates of human losses in such cases are often associated with irreparable information gaps. When guns are roaring, statistics are the last thing to think about. And without this, the war leaves a lot of unknowns.
Regardless of which method of estimating human losses is used: the direct count method, the demographic balance method, the ethno-demographic method, not to mention the method of proportional distribution of losses, it must proceed from a single value of human losses common to the USSR. Otherwise, the sum of estimates of the human losses of the now independent states will become unthinkable. In subsequent judgments and calculations, we proceed from the total losses of 27 million people. The irretrievable losses of military personnel are taken at 8.7 million. The civilian population accounts for 18.3 million people. Taking a different, slightly lower figure for total losses, for example - 26.6 million, we come to an estimate of civilian casualties at 17.9 million people, which is only 0.4 million less (1.5%).
Regardless of the method of determining casualties, it was inevitably devalued by the incompleteness and inaccuracy of the original information. We are talking about official data on the population on the eve and after the end of the war, its natural movement during the war years, information about the dead civilian population, collected by the Emergency state commission(ChGK) in the liberated areas, etc. There are discrepancies even when different authors use the same source of information. Example ? estimates for Leningrad. It is still unknown how many civilians died in the besieged city. For Leningrad and the region A.A. Shevyakov cites the death toll at 1.4 million people. According to P. Polyana, a little over 700 thousand people died. Both authors use ChGK materials. According to D. Likhachev, at least 2 million people died in the city during the blockade: many residents of rural areas fled there from the advancing enemy. No one took them into account, although they were among the dead.
The number of dead military personnel is not absolutely reliable either. S.N. Mikhalev believes that the value of the irretrievable losses of military personnel is approximately 2.2 million more than that proposed by the military department. Without going into a dispute, we note that the total amount of human losses, calculated by the demographic balance method, does not change from an increase or decrease in these losses, although the ratio of losses of military personnel and civilians does change. In the first case, it is and ?, in the second case - 2/5 and 3/5. A third relation should also be given, which is obtained if we use the one made by S.N. Mikhalev estimated the total losses of the Soviet Union at 23.6 million people. With military losses of 10.9 million, the share of the civilian population remains 12.7 million. Then the ratio of the deaths of the civilian population and military personnel is almost 1 to 1 (54 and 46 percent).
The plausibility of the first of the relations is confirmed by this consideration. In Germany, Hungary and Romania hostilities lasted 4-6 months. There was no targeted extermination of the population, as was the case in Poland, Yugoslavia and the USSR. The ratio in the losses of military personnel and the civilian population in them is 1: 1. In addition, the main battles took place on Soviet territory, where, along with the soldiers, the Soviet, and not the German population, died. In our country, the occupation and destruction of the civilian population lasted 2.5 - 3 years. Many localities changed hands several times; some were destroyed along with the population during the fighting and punitive operations. As a result of military actions and punitive operations of fascist troops against partisans in the occupied territory, 1710 cities and more than 70 thousand rural settlements were completely or partially destroyed and burned. Let's add many months of sieges, blockades, bombing and shelling of cities. That's hundreds of thousands, millions of lives. Consequently, the ratio of dead servicemen and civilians in the USSR cannot be the same as in Germany and the countries allied with it.
Large distortions in the estimates of human losses for individual parts of a single state are made by internal migrations. Information about the number of people who migrated from the areas from which our troops retreated is extremely contradictory. They vary within 10 - 25 million. So, according to G. Kumanev, 500 thousand people left Karelia at the beginning of the war, while the number of inhabitants of this republic in 1939 was 470 thousand.
Information from the USSR State Statistics Committee on those evacuated during the war years includes 10 million of those who used the railroad, and 2 million - water transport. But many left the battlefields in cars and horse-drawn vehicles, on foot. As the occupied territories were liberated from the fascist troops, many returned back: some of them were drafted into the army, some died. No data are known about the movements of the population in the second half of the 1940s, when the scale of return migration increased. These factors are not measurable. And on their basis, population estimates are made up to the 1959 census. Let us add that for areas from where the population migrated during the war years, estimates of human losses, especially by the demographic balance method, are overestimated, and for areas that received migrants, they are underestimated.
Traditional Methods for Estimating Human Losses
1. The method of proportional distribution of losses. This method assumes that losses in all parts of the population are distributed equally intensively. But this condition is absent when calculating the human losses of the USSR: not all Union republics were completely or partially occupied. In addition, data on the death of the civilian population in the occupied territories and on those driven to work in Germany (“Ostarbeiters”) differ significantly depending on the time the territory was in the hands of the enemy, the severity of the fighting, the scope of resistance, and, consequently, the cruelty of punitive operations . The nature of the battles in different regions of the country differed significantly. The blockade of Leningrad, the defense of Stalingrad, the battle of Kursk differ from the defense of Brest or Sevastopol not in the fierceness and stamina of the soldiers, but in the scale, which the proportional distribution of losses cannot take into account. Therefore, it would be wrong to simply distribute the losses of the civilian population according to the proportion of the number of inhabitants of the territories subjected to occupation, and military personnel - according to the share of the Union republics in the country's population, it would be wrong.
According to the data of the ChGK, in the territories that were occupied for a long time (Group 1), the accounted (apparently greatly underestimated) proportion of persons exterminated by the Nazis amounted to 4% of the pre-war population. Approximately 8.4% of the population of these areas was deported to Germany. In territories that were briefly or partially occupied (Group 2), slightly less than one percent died. Together with those driven away for forced labor, this gives 1.5%, i.e. almost 8.3 times less than the first group of territories. There are also significant differences within the groups in the death of the civilian population and its removal for forced labor. In the first group - Leningrad (died and driven to Germany 28.3% of the population), Pskov (17.4%), Novgorod (15.7%), Bryansk (12.7%) and Smolensk (8.5%) regions . In the second - Oryol (7.7%) and Volgograd (5.8%) regions.
To apply the method of proportional distribution of the number of dead, in addition to the total losses (separately for military personnel and civilians), also data on the population in the pre-war and post-war years. This information makes it possible to calculate the rate of population change separately for groups of areas that have been under occupation for a long and a short time. The rate of population decline in such territories of Russia in the post-war years is higher than in the Soviet republics that were captured by the enemy (in total). Even by 1959, the population of these Russian territories did not reach the level of 1939. The rates of change in the number of population by groups of regions are significantly different. The areas of the 1st group suffered most significantly during the war. In 1959, the population here was 15% lower than before the war. Obviously, it is also wrong to distribute human losses in proportion to the share of the civilian population of the occupied territories.
To calculate, you can take the formula: RP \u003d (OP x TO x DR): TR. Where: RP ? losses of the civilian population of Russia, OP - total losses of the civilian population, TO - the rate of change in the population of all regions that were under occupation, DR - the share of Russia in the population of the occupied territories, TP - the rate of change in the population of the Russian regions that were under occupation. Two calculation options are possible: according to the dynamics of the population 1939 - 1951 and 1939 - 1959. In the first case, the loss of the civilian population in the territories of Russia will amount to 6.694 thousand people. In the second - 6.969 thousand. Although both calculation options are significantly affected by the results of the migration movement of the population (in 1939 - 1950 and in 1939 - 1958), they give close results - 6.7 - 7 million people without the death of servicemen.
2. Method of direct counting. Available information limits the use of this method, since its use in its pure form requires complete information about the dead civilian population and military personnel. In practice, one has to combine a direct account with a proportional distribution of a part of the country's total losses. In this way, the calculations of civilian casualties are made in two versions.
Option 1. Information about the death of the civilian population of the occupied areas, collected by the ChGK, was published by A.A. Shevyakov. On the territory of Russia, 5591 thousand people were exterminated (at P. Polyan - 656 thousand people). In total, for the USSR, this figure is 11,309 thousand people. Thus, Russia accounted for 49.4%, provided that the share of the population living in the occupied territories of Russia was less than 1/3; more than - 3 / 5 of all the population surveyed was in occupation for a short time. In addition to the death of the population during the fighting and occupation, part of it was driven away by the Nazis for forced labor. In total, 4129 thousand people were hijacked from the Soviet Union, of which 1269 thousand were from Russia - 30.7%. According to V.N. Zemskov, as of March 1946, 2,591 thousand Ostarbeiters were repatriated to the USSR. The dispute about the number of those who remained in the West is not fundamental for calculations. What is important is how many people were taken out and how many returned (about 63%). Obviously, the percentage of those who returned is not the same for different regions of the former USSR. The proportions of dead and non-returning Ostarbeiters are not the same. If Ostarbeiters from Russia behaved in captivity in the same way as people from other parts of the country, with a proportional distribution, Russia accounts for almost 0.5 million non-returning (mostly dead) Ostarbeiters. That is, the number of dead civilians in Russia is approximately 6.1 million people.
Option 2. To estimate all civilian casualties, it is necessary - in addition to the 5.6 million accounted for NSC - to proportionally distribute the unaccounted losses. Having agreed that all the losses of the civilian population of the USSR amount to 18.3 million people, and those recorded by the ChGK - 11.3 million, it turns out that among the unaccounted for (dead Ostarbeiters, displaced persons, etc.) there are 7 million civilians. The share of Russia in the number of the exterminated and dead population, according to the ChGK, is 49.4%. It accounts for unaccounted losses of the civilian population with a proportional distribution of approximately 3.458 million and the total losses of the civilian population of Russia are close to 9 million people.
3. Demographic balance method. This method was used to calculate the human losses of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War. Its use presupposes the availability of relatively reliable information about the population at the beginning and end of the war, about those born during the war years, natural mortality for the same period, and the balance of inter-republican migration. On the population at the beginning and end of the war, there are data from the statistical agencies of the USSR (Russia) and estimates by E.M. Andreeva, L.E. Darsky and T.L. Kharkov (below ADH). The difference between these data is that the second corrects the pre-war figures downward, while simultaneously increasing the post-war population, including even census data. The adjustment to the pre-war figures is based on the fact that the pre-war census overestimated the population. Figures for post-war years are increased for births and deaths based on corrections for incomplete registration. True, such an amendment for 1946-50. gives an increase in natural growth of only 0.2 million people. The remaining 0.8 million (the discrepancy for 1946 is one million people) apparently relate to adjustments for migration. Migration is the Achilles' heel of all amendments, as well as demographic forecasts.
ADH for 1946 - 50 years. give summary information about inter-republican migration, not complete and not accurate. We had to write that destination records and actual check-in points are not the same thing. Moving and registration do not coincide in time. Many circumstances affect the accuracy of accounting for population migration even at the present time, and we are talking about the first post-war years. In the mass of those who arrived in the urban settlements of Russia in 1946, the share of those who arrived "it is not known where" accounted for 74%. With such data on migration, is it possible to confidently judge the size of the population, and even with an accuracy of up to thousands of people? Population adjustments, unless the data is designed to calculate casualties, be it wars or reprisals, are harmless in and of themselves. But since the ADC underestimates the initial and overestimates the final population compared to the data of the statistical departments, this guarantees the lowest results of estimates of human losses. If, according to the statistical agencies, the population of Russia from 1941 to 1946 decreased by 14.9 million people, according to the ADC, by 13.5 million. For subsequent calculations, we will take as option 1 the difference obtained from the data of the statistical agencies, and as option 2 - ADC data.
The obtained values (14.9 and 13.5 million people) will be increased by the number of those born in 1941-1945. To do this, we use data on the birth rate in 1936-1940 and 1946-1950. and information about those who survived to the age of 42 - 28 years by 1979. The number of those born during the war years can be determined by the average proportion equal to their half-sum for two adjacent groups (1936 - 40 and 1946 - 50). The proportion of those who survived by 1979 up to 37 - 33 years will be 0.7. If we take as the initial data for calculating this coefficient the proportions of those who lived to 39–38 years old (born in 1939–40) and to 32–31 years old (years of birth 1946–47) by 1979, its value will be 673. Then the number born in 1941-45 will be in the first case 8.6 and in the second - 8.9 million people.
Those born in the pre-war and war years were partially exterminated during the occupation. Therefore, the shares of those born in 1946 - 50, 1951 - 55 and 1956 - 60. and those who reached the age of 42-38, 37-33 and 32-28 by the 1989 census are higher than those who reached this age by 1979. They are respectively 0.792, 0.862 and 0.934, If the shares of persons who survived to the same age in 1979 and 1989, divided one by the other, we get the ratios: for persons aged 42 - 38 years - 1.361, aged 37 - 33 years - 1.231 and aged 32 - 28 years - 1.140. It is difficult to admit that the mortality rate of those born during the war years is lower than that of children born on the eve of the war. Therefore, the ratios 1.231 - 1.281 are clearly underestimated, as are the initial coefficients 0.7 and 0.673. If we take the excess coefficients of 1.361, the proportion of those born during the war years and those who lived to 37–33 by 1979 will be 0.634, and the number of those born in 1941–45 will be 0.634. - 9.5 million people. If the difference between the population in 1941 and 1946. add the number of births (we take 9 million, the average number is between 8.6 and 9.5), we get the initial value for further calculations for variant 1 of 23.9 million and for variant 2 - 22.5 million people.
In these numbers ? three unknowns: natural mortality, migration growth (decrease) and actually human losses. Most often, when determining the natural decline in the population, the published indicators of natural increase in 1940 or 1939 are used. and in the postwar years. The most accessible indicators of natural population growth in 1940 and 1950. The natural increase in the population of Russia in 1940 was 12.4 per 1,000 population and in 1950 it was 16.8. For war years, average values are taken, in this case the figure is 14.6 per 1000 population, multiplied by 5 (war years). However, the use of indicators of natural increase in the periods adjacent to the war to assess the possible increase in war years is unreasonable, if only because the birth rate, and, consequently, infant mortality, cannot be taken according to peacetime indicators.
To determine natural mortality in 1941-45. data for adjacent periods are required. The painstaking work of E.M. Andreeva, L.E. Darsky and T.D. Kharkov made available statistical data on the dead in Russia in 30-50 years. XX century. In 1936 - 40 years. the number of deaths in Russia amounted to 10980 thousand people and in 1946-50. - 5733 thousand. The average of these figures gives 8.4 million people. But the population in the second half of the 40s is less than in the second half of the 30s. The average annual values here are 106.4 and 99.4 million people, i.e. the first is more than the second by 7%, by which the number of deaths in the war years should be increased. The resulting figure of 9 million includes an overestimation of infant mortality. Births during the war years are more than 2 times less than in the previous 5 years. Therefore, the total number of deaths during the war years, even with constant infant mortality rates, should be 1.5 - 2 million people less: approximately 7 - 7.5 million people.
Thus, the difference between the population in 1941 and 1946, increased by the number of those born during the war years, must be reduced by the natural mortality rate. Obviously, the higher the natural mortality, the lower the human losses and vice versa. Let's take 7.5 million people for further calculations. Then, according to the first option, an undistributed balance of 16.4 remains, and according to the second option - 15 million people. These figures include two components: the balance of inter-republican migration of the population in 1941-45. and Russia's losses in the Great Patriotic War.
Ethnodemographic method
This method was developed by us and used to estimate the number of Ostarbeiters in Russia. Methods for estimating the number of Ostarbeiters and human losses differ from each other in that in the first case, the number of Russian citizens who have survived to this day is determined from the totality of Ostarbeiters. In the second - the loss of the population of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War distributed among the former Soviet republics. The application of the ethno-demographic method involves the use of the total human losses for the country as the initial value. But separate assessments of the losses of the civilian population and military personnel are needed. The accepted figures are 18.3 and 8.7 million. The losses of the civilian population should be distributed among the Union republics, the territories of which were completely or partially occupied, and the losses of military personnel - among the post-Soviet states.
In general terms, the essence of the ethno-demographic method is that the human losses for individual parts are determined from the losses of state-forming nationalities. Transferring calculations to ethnic groups eliminates the main informational difficulty: they become unnecessary migration data. However, as with the use traditional methods, the application of the ethno-demographic method faces information gaps. The main one is that the national composition of the population of the territories that entered the USSR before the war has not been determined.
The ethno-demographic method makes it possible to estimate human losses for each of the main ethnic groups and distribute them in separate parts. former state. In this case, all calculations are carried out for Russia, although they can be performed for Ukraine, Belarus and other states of the new abroad. At the same time, the total losses of the civilian population of Russia are formed from the losses of persons of the main nationalities, which are the title ones for the largest union republics, the territory of which was completely or partially occupied.
For calculations, first of all, information is needed on the population and the main nationalities of the republics that were fully or partially under occupation, at the beginning and end of the war. Unfortunately, the first post-war census was carried out at the beginning of 1959. The situation with information about the composition of the pre-war population is even worse. The latter is available from the 1937 census and can be used without significant adjustment only for Russia. For other republics that were under occupation, it is either incomplete (Ukraine, Belarus) or absent (the Baltic states). It can be assumed that the population of the territories included in Ukraine and Belarus did not contain many representatives of the titular peoples of Russia, and the distribution of the remaining ethnic groups corresponded to the census (1937) structure of the same set of nationalities in the population of these republics. True, it is necessary to exclude a million Poles from the population that joined Ukraine - an interstate migration exchange carried out after the end of the war. Taking into account it, the increase in the population of Ukraine will not be 8.7, but 7.7 million people. Excluding Russians and Belarusians from the population, it turns out that the share of Ukrainians is almost 90%, the rest ? Poles, Jews, Czechs, Hungarians, Moldavians, Romanians, etc. Consequently, the number of Ukrainians at the end of 1939 can be increased by more than 7.8 million. In the same way, the number of Belarusians will increase by 3.1 million. neither in the Baltic States, in fact, there is any information that allows us to assess the national composition of the population. But for the human losses of Russia, this information is not needed: the share of the titular peoples of these republics is insignificant in the composition of its population.
Two calculation options are possible: the first is the total number of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians who lived in the USSR before the war, and the second is only their number in the republics that were under occupation. The number of Ukrainians, Belarusians and other peoples living in the occupied territories includes the population of the regions annexed on the eve of the war (20.1 million). As a result, at the beginning of 1937, the number of Ukrainians and Belarusians, respectively, increased by 6.1 and 2.8 million people.
Applying the formula described when using the method of proportional distribution of human losses, we obtain, regardless of the calculation options estimated values by major nationalities. Then this information is distributed in proportion to the share of Russia in the number of persons of this nationality in the USSR in 1937. The resulting figure of 7.4 million people is the loss of the civilian population. To them it is necessary to add the losses of military personnel attributable to Russia. Since the general for the USSR value of losses of servicemen, proposed by the military department, has been adopted, it remains to be accepted on faith and information that relates to the distribution of these losses among the republics and nationalities. Detailed information about both is given in the article by G.F. Krivosheeva. According to these data, Russia accounts for 7.9 million dead military personnel, or 66.3% of the total losses for the USSR. This figure is taken from the loss of 11.9 million people. If we assume that Russia's share in irretrievable losses (8668.4 million) is also 66.3%, their value will be 5.7 million people. With a proportional distribution of losses (Russia's share in the population of the USSR before the war - 56.4 - 56.8%), 4.9 million military personnel would have fallen to its share.
Irretrievable losses falling on the share of Russia can be calculated using the ethno-demographic method (Table 1).
TableI
Assessment of irretrievable losses of military personnel
(share of Russia)
|
Nationalities |
Dead Losses (thousand people) |
The share of persons in this nationality - residents |
Dead Losses (thousand people) |
Ukrainians |
|||
Belarusians |
|||
The irretrievable losses of military personnel related to Russia, obtained using the ethno-demographic method, turned out to be 0.1 million more than those obtained by recalculating the data on Russian losses cited by G.F. Krivosheev.
Assessment of Russia's human losses inGreat Patriotic War
The results of estimates of casualties during the war years, obtained using various methods, are presented in Table 2.
table 2
Assessment of humanlossesdifferent
methods (thousand. people)
Civilian casualties |
Losses of military personnel |
All human losses |
|
Proportional, two options |
|||
Straight, two options |
|||
Balanced, two options |
|||
Ethnodemographic |
Analysis of these data allows us to draw a number of conclusions. First, the approximate value of the human losses of Russia in the Great Patriotic War, in our opinion, is approximately 13 million people. It would be naïve to claim greater accuracy given the initial information that is currently available. Although the share of Russia in the human losses of the USSR is 48.5%, it is not as large as the proportion of the federation in the country's total population loss during the war years. The population of the Soviet Union from 1940 to 1951 decreased by 12.5 million people, including the share of Russia - 57.3% (7.2 million).
Secondly, taking this figure of human losses and estimates obtained by the demographic balance method, it is possible to determine the results of inter-republican migration during the war years. In 1941 - 1945 Russia's population increased due to forced migration by 1.9 to 3.3 million people. The second number is more real. Apparently, there were more migrants, but some of them returned as the places of exit were vacated, others migrated to the rear, to the Union republics, etc.
Thirdly, the share of the remaining 14 (excluding the Karelian-Finnish) union republics accounts for 3 million losses of military personnel; 6 republics, the territory of which was under occupation for a long time, lost 10.9 million civilians. Note that in the total decline in the population of the USSR (from 1940 to 1951), Ukraine accounted for 33%, Belarus - 10.1%, the Baltic states, Moldova - 2.6%. These figures differ sharply from the distribution of civilian casualties given by P. Polyak. It has a share of Russia - 10.8%, Ukraine - 52%, Belarus - 22.4%, etc. . According to him, Russia lost 1.3 million civilians. Then it turns out that the other republics - 17 million, provided that by the beginning of 1951 their population had decreased by only 5.3 million people?!
Fourthly, in the human losses of the Soviet Union, Russia accounts for 2/3 of the dead military personnel and 2/5 of the civilian population. The scale of Russia's losses, their distribution between the civilian population and military personnel (56% and 44%) does not correspond to that in the USSR (68% and 32%), especially in other republics (78% and 22%). if Russia's losses are attributed to the size of its population in 1940, it turns out that they amount to 11.9% with 13.9% for the country as a whole. However, the irretrievable losses of military personnel in the country are 4.5%, and in Russia - 5.2%. Such comparisons for the civilian population should come from the fact that not all of Russia was under occupation. In the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, civilian casualties amounted to 21%. On Russian - 24.3%. Every fourth is lost. There is nothing like it in any other European country!
The scale of human losses in Russia and their distribution between the civilian population and military personnel can be explained by several reasons. One of them is that on the western borders of the USSR from the Barents to the Black Sea, the first losses were suffered by border guards and military districts (on the first day of the war they were transformed into fronts), largely staffed by conscripts from Russia. During the 3rd and 4th quarters of 1941, the losses of the Red Army reached 3 million people - 99% of the average monthly personnel; 1942 was no easier. During the 1.5 years of the war, the Red Army lost 6 million people. Losses in subsequent years were not only less (about 4 million over 2.5 years), but also decreased: 30.9%, 21.6% and 10.0% in January-May 1945. Until 1943, the main losses carried by Russia. Its share in the irretrievable losses of the Red Army was: in 1941 - 65% of the all-Union, in 1942 - 77.1% and in 1943 - 69.5%. Later, when the battles mainly took place on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states and Moldova, then outside the USSR and conscriptions began in the liberated areas, Russia's share in irretrievable losses fell: 1944 - 51.8%, 1945 - 50.9%. Thus, the losses of Russian soldiers occur in the years when the country's armed forces suffered the most damage.
The second reason is related to the first. During the war years, the intensity of conscription of reinforcements from Russia was generally higher than from other republics. Military commissariats during the war called for 22.7% of Russian citizens, about 17%? citizens of the republics Central Asia and Transcaucasia, 12.5% - Ukraine and 12% - Belarus. There are several explanations here. Some republics in 1943-1944 were completely or partially under occupation, in others there was a different age composition of the population and the level of its socialization. There were other reasons as well.
According to G.F. Krivosheev, during the war years, 29.6 million people were mobilized in the Soviet Union, which, together with regular military personnel, amounted to 34.5 million. In Russia, according to him, one in five "put on an overcoat" and was called up for military service. Thus, the share of Russia among those called up in the country is 84.5%. At the same time, the loss of servicemen relative to the number of those mobilized in the other republics was 65.2%, and in Russia - 22.8%. These data make obvious the lies associated with the "international" policy of the CPSU: the share of soldiers of each nationality was proportional to the share in the population of the country. Data from the archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense on the national composition of 166 rifle divisions do not support this thesis. So, in January-June 1943, the share of Russians in these divisions was 63.8 - 65.6%. But before the war, the share of Russians in the country's population did not exceed 50%. The author of the book is right that as the country was liberated, the proportion of Ukrainians, Belarusians and some other nationalities increased, while Russians decreased. In particular, in the same rifle divisions from January 1 to December 31, 1943, the share of Russians fell by 6.3 points (64.6 and 58.3%), Ukrainians almost doubled (11.8 and 22.3 %), Belarusians? from 1.9 to 2.7%. This is understandable: mobilization came to the liberated territories. Together with the Russians in 1943, the Kazakhs, representatives of the Transcaucasian republics, and, perhaps, the Kyrgyz, actively replenished the armed forces. It is clear that the thesis about the proportional participation of nations in the war by the Soviet people pursued a noble goal. But lies? it's a lie, even with good intentions.
Among the reasons for the large deaths of the civilian population is that large-scale battles in Russian territories, in fact, took place four times: the Red Army retreated twice in 1941 to Moscow and in 1942 to Stalingrad, and the Nazi troops were first driven back from Moscow, and then defeated at Stalingrad and on the Kursk salient. For almost 2 years, bloody battles were going on in Russian territories. The Red Army suffered the greatest losses in the summer and autumn of 1941 and 1942. Settlements changed hands several times, many of them were destroyed as a result of bombing and shelling. Soldiers perished, and civilians who remained in the settlements also perished. A significant contribution to the loss of the civilian population was made by the blockade of Leningrad, which claimed at least 1.5 - 2 million human lives.
The scale of losses among the Russians is connected with the racial policy in the occupied areas. Russians are most represented among the military and prevailed in the civilian population of the occupied regions of Russia (96-98%). Of the total losses of military personnel, Russians accounted for 66.3%, Ukrainians - 15.9%, Belarusians - 2.9%, Tatars - 2.2%, Jews - 1.6%, etc. . According to P. Polyan, in 1941 the enemy captured 58.3% of all prisoners. Based on the structure of the losses of the first stage of the war, immigrants from Russia prevailed among them. Of the prisoners of 1941, 20% survived to victory, while the survival rate of prisoners of 1944 was 48%. Of course, the length of time spent in captivity affected, but the main thing is that the composition of the prisoners has changed. By the way, among the prisoners of war and "Ostarbeiters" there were 31,700 defectors among Russians, 144,900 among Ukrainians and 10,000 Belarusians. According to the "Ostarbeiters" is this for Russia? 1.7%, Belarus - 2.5%, for Ukraine - 6%. There were 0.5%, 0.6% and 2.2% of non-returnees regarding the losses of persons of the same nationalities. The ratio of defectors to the number of repatriated Soviet citizens is as follows: 2%, 1.9% and 8.8%. The percentage of Ukrainians is largely due to the fact that on the eve of the war it included western territories, the population of which did not have time to integrate into the new conditions.
The attitude of the invaders to the Russians was much worse than, for example, to the Ukrainians. Let us refer to P. Polyana, in this issue far from prejudice. In the book, which is fundamental according to the material collected in the German archives, he writes about the rate of the Nazis at the beginning of the war on the "superiority" of the Ukrainian over the Russian. Ukrainian prisoners of war were even released; there were other privileges that were abolished at the end of 1941. Not only Ukrainians, but also the peoples of the Baltic countries, the Germans and especially the Crimean Tatars were in a more sparing regime. Worse, perhaps, was only the Jews, who were subject to total extermination. This practice was due to the fact that the Nazis at the first stage of the war, counting on its lightning-fast nature, were not ready for such a number of prisoners. Therefore, in 1941, 318.8 thousand people were released from captivity, incl. - 277.8 thousand Ukrainians. Having soon abandoned such measures, they returned to them in 1943: they released those who joined security and other formations - until May 1944, more than 0.8 million prisoners of war.
Naturally, the peoples of the Soviet Union are not to blame for the fact that such a fate befell, first of all, the Russian people. It so happened that the main battles of the first stages of the war, when the losses were especially great, went on the territory of Russia. The peoples of the USSR are not to blame for the fact that the Nazis, in an effort to destroy the friendship of peoples, pursued a differentiated policy, while not considering Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians as full-fledged nations. We are not talking about the peculiar national policy of the leadership of the USSR and much more. This is our common history. It should not be distorted, no matter how painful it is.
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Leonid Leonidovich Rybakovsky is 80 years old
On April 21, Leonid Leonidovich Rybakovsky, Doctor of Economics, Professor, turned 80 years old.
Employees of the Institute of Demography and the editors of "Demoscope Weekly" heartily congratulate Leonid Leonidovich Rybakovsky on his anniversary, wish him good health, success and achievements for the benefit of demographic science.
Congratulations to colleagues
Leonid Leonidovich Rybakovsky is 80 years old. Although, knowing him, communicating, working with him, it's hard to believe. Perhaps only one thing testifies in favor of this date - his great professional and life wisdom.
Leonid Leonidovich Rybakovsky was born on April 21, 1931 in the city of Spassk, Primorsky Krai. In 1953 he graduated from the Kuibyshev Planning Institute. Since 1971 - doctor of economic sciences, and since 1977 - professor (specialty - demography). Since 1959, Leonid Leonidovich has been working at the Academy of Sciences, since 1974 to this day - at the Institute of Socio-Political Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Now he is the chief researcher of this Institute.
LL Rybakovsky was awarded the medal "For Valiant Labor", the medal of the Order "For Services to the Fatherland" II degree, the Order of Friendship.
He has published more than 300 scientific papers, including, 10 author's monographs and over 30 collective books, including textbooks and teaching aids on demography, population migration, sociology and labor economics. Articles have been published in many journals, encyclopedias, reference books, etc. Many works have been translated or published in Spanish, French, German, English and other languages. The most significant author's monographs: "Regional Analysis of Migration" (1973), "Methodological Issues of Population Forecasting" (1978), "Population of the Far East for 150 Years" (1990), "Population Migration: Forecasts, Factors, Policy" (1987). The last work was awarded the silver medal of VDNKh.
Recently, the monographs "Casual losses of the USSR and Russia in the Great Patriotic War" (2001), "Applied demography" (2003), "Population migration. Theory questions" (2003), as well as collective works under his editorship "Demographic Future" have been published. Russia" (2001), "Stabilization of the population of Russia (opportunities and directions of demographic policy)" (2001), "Demographic conceptual dictionary" (2003), "Demography" (2005), "Strategy for the demographic development of Russia" (2005), " Practical demography" (2005), "Transformation of migration processes in the post-Soviet space" (2007), "Demographic development of Russia in the 21st century" (2009), etc.
The main scientific ideas developed by Rybakovsky relate to the theory of population migration. He proposed a classification of the population depending on the genetic trait. This classification includes three basic concepts: "local natives", "old-timers" and "new settlers". Of great importance for the regional analysis of migration is the coefficient of intensity of interregional migration links (KIMS) proposed in the late 1960s. The value of this coefficient does not depend on the size of the population, both on the exit areas and on the places where migrants settle. The advantage of this indicator is that it allows one to determine the true value of interregional migration links.
Significant contribution in the theory of migration was the development of the concept of three stages of the migration process. The fundamental provisions of the concept are reduced to the separation of such concepts as readiness for migration (mobility) and resettlement (implementation of this readiness). These concepts are associated with the introduction of sociological knowledge into migration issues, in particular, ideas about projective and real behavior, potential migration and migration mobility.
For the theory of population migration, the author's views on the conditions (all components of the environment) - factors (only that part of the components of the environment that affect this phenomenon) - the causes of migration (interaction of objective and subjective) are important; development of a problematic approach to the analysis of migration processes, the essence of which is to assess migration not from the standpoint of its scale and intensity, but depending on the solution of which demographic problems it contributes to.
New for demographic science is the ethno-demographic method proposed by LL Rybakovsky for assessing human losses for individual parts of the state or the former common country. The essence of the ethno-demographic method is that human losses for the countries of the former USSR are determined from the losses of those ethnic groups that are state-forming. Transferring calculations to ethnic groups immediately eliminates the main informational difficulty: data on population migration become unnecessary. Estimating human losses using the ethno-demographic method involves making calculations for each of the main ethnic groups and distributing these losses among individual parts of the state, especially if it is former.
The calculations of the human losses of Russia in the Great Patriotic War, performed by the ethno-demographic method, showed that the share of the RSFSR accounted for approximately 13.2 million human lives lost in 1941-1945, including 5.8 million military personnel, civilian population - 7.4 million people. The same method was used to calculate the number of those who were repressed, including the number of those sentenced to capital punishment and the excess death rate of political prisoners in 1937-1938, falling to the lot of Russia.
Leonid Leonidovich Rybakovsky is a member of the Interdepartmental Working Group on the Priority National Project "Health" and Demographic Policy under the Council under the President of the Russian Federation, the Coordinating Council for Social Strategy under the Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Board of the Ministry of Health and social development RF, Scientific Council under the Federal Migration Service of Russia, etc.
He has trained over 100 Doctors and Candidates of Sciences working in Moscow, other regions of Russia, and in the countries of the new abroad.
It is difficult to overestimate what Leonid Leonidovich Rybakovsky did in demography. But, knowing his character, activity, seething energy, research streak, there is no doubt that his new research and publications are ahead of us.
Health to you, Leonid Leonidovich, happiness, interesting work and publications, well-being of all. And for many, many more years to serve as a living example of a real Scientist-Researcher-Citizen with a capital letter.
Colleagues from the Institute
socio-political research of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Happy anniversary, Leonid Leonidovich!
Before me is a small, miraculously preserved clipping from some Far Eastern newspaper - a photo and a small text (there is no mark either on the date or on the name of the newspaper). If I'm not mistaken, this is 1962 or 1963. Quite young L.L. Rybakovsky, V.I. Perevedentsev, G.V. Milner and also young, but still noticeably older than them, Mikhail Yakovlevich Sonin, talk on TV news about the Conference on Labor Resources of the Far East, which was organized in Khabarovsk by L.L. Rybakovsky. Leonid Leonidovich has only recently defended his Ph.D., but has already managed to hold a major scientific conference with the involvement of well-known scientists from Moscow. The conference was called a "meeting" in the newspaper, which betrays the atmosphere of those years: they got used to all sorts of meetings of the party state apparatus, and scientific conferences at Far East were new.
Leonid Leonidovich for the first time introduced demography into science in the Far East, creating a specialized laboratory, and at the same time raised research on labor resources to a much higher level. His energetic activity in this direction contributed to the consolidation of lone researchers scattered across the vast expanses of the region - from Magadan. Yakutsk, Ulan-Ude, Chita, etc. I don’t know about other areas of science, but in our area, thanks to L.L. Rybakovsky, the enthusiasm and revival of research that followed the creation of the Siberian Branch of the Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk reached the Far East. And now our science in the region is adequately represented by his student - Ekaterina Leonidovna Motrich.
Well-known to Leonid Leonidovich, my older friend Dina Mikhailovna Zakharina, who was sharp-tongued and easily gave nicknames to everyone, nicknamed L.L. Rybakovsky in a hurry, focusing on his motorism. But if I knew how to invent nicknames, I would emphasize his impatience as main feature character. L.L. Rybakovsky needs everything at once, everything now! He cannot stand a slow pace, delaying decisions, long reflections, and he himself always acts decisively and quickly, sometimes abruptly.
L.L. Rybakovsky is a great lover of life, but also a great workaholic, a lover of digging through archives and figures. Evidence of this is his numerous books.
I still call him by the name he was called in his youth and by which he then introduced himself - Oleg. Over the years, I've gotten used to it and it doesn't work any other way. It seems to me that by calling him that, I kind of emphasize our long-standing friendship, resurrect the memory of his cramped, but cozy and warm Khabarovsk house, where the charming and quick Lisa was the host. How long ago was that! Even before Olezhka, who himself is already a doctor of science.
Dear Oleg (excuse me for that!), It's nice to see you on the day of your honorable anniversary in great shape, as before, full of energy and desires. Health to you, cheerfulness and success in our common field!
I also congratulate your scientific team, which remained faithful to you throughout your Moscow life and wandered after you. Undoubtedly, for them it is also a holiday.
Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya
Lucky to work with Rybakovsky
I'm lucky. I have had the pleasure of communicating with Leonid Leonidovich Rybakovsky for many years. We met in November 1978 at the Domodedovo airport. Both flew to a conference in Dushanbe. However, that acquaintance, rather, can be called fleeting. After 2.5 years, in the spring of 1981, I began to participate in a seminar organized by Leonid Leonidovich. At that time, the department of demography created by him began to work actively. In a short period, on the basis of the sector of migration problems, which he led at the then Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Leonid Leonidovich created one of the most powerful research demographic centers in our country, in which I worked almost all of the 1980s. And I got into this department thanks to my short speech at that very seminar in the spring of 1981.
At that time, my teacher Vladimir Alexandrovich Borisov was already working in the department with Leonid Leonidovich, through whom Rybakovsky invited me to work in his department. I accepted this invitation with pleasure, and on October 1, 1981, I began working in the demography department of the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
Leonid Leonidovich Rybakovsky both then and now actively supported and continues to support young people starting their scientific career. At the same time, he contributes in every possible way both to the growth of knowledge among young colleagues, to improving their professional qualifications, and to their status growth. I would even say that it not only contributes, but makes one grow both in terms of knowledge and status.
There are two important implications from this.
Firstly, Leonid Leonidovich has countless students who love him both in various regions of Russia and in the CIS countries. Many of them themselves have long become high-class scientists who already have their own students. Thus, of course, we can talk about the scientific school of Rybakovsky.
Secondly, he constantly communicates, works with young people, and therefore he is very young himself. And in terms of his seething energy and scientific activity, in my opinion, very few young people can compare with him.
I also note that Leonid Leonidovich is very receptive to everything new in science and, in fact, continues to learn in the process of communication, joint work with students and colleagues.
Communicating with Leonid Leonidovich you involuntarily learn how to organize your scientific work, which is very important for a scientist, researcher.
But let me return to my work in Rybakovsky's department. I worked in a group with my favorite teacher, Vladimir Alexandrovich Borisov. In general, many interesting specialists and scientists came to work in the department. Both experienced and youth. There was a very creative atmosphere, many discussions and discussions. The latter were often very sharp, as people with different views worked in the department.
At the same time, one cannot fail to mention the importance of simple human communication in the department. I always remember the joint holidays with warmth. The famous "peace pipe" of Leonid Leonidovich, which he took out of the safe. I think that many of those who worked in the department then remember her well. Thus, we can say that it was interesting not only to work in the department, but also to live.
In the late 1980s, I left the department and our communication with Leonid Leonidovich was temporarily interrupted. Again, we began to work together already somewhere in 1999-2000. It was a joint work led by Rybakovsky on the Demographic Concept, which was then adopted in September 2001 as the Concept of the Demographic Development of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2015.
And here it is necessary to say about one more important feature of Leonid Leonidovich Rybakovsky as a scientist and as a citizen. As far as I know him, he has always sought not only to conduct scientific research, to write books and articles. He always tried to "get through" to the authorities, to "force" to think seriously about the demographic problems of the country, he worked and is working with them when such an opportunity is given.
Leonid Leonidovich! So that for many, many years you would like to create in science and in all areas of life that are of interest to you, and so that you can always realize everything you have planned.
Vladimir Arkhangelsky
The main publications of L.L. Rybakovsky
- Problems of formation of the population of the Far East. Khabarovsk, 1969.
- Population of the Far East for 100 years. M., 1969.
- Regional analysis of migrations. M., 1973.
- Methodological foundations population forecasting. M., 1978.
- Population migration: forecasts, factors, policy. M., 1987.
- population of the Far East. M., 1990.
- Human losses of the USSR and Russia in the Great Patriotic War. M., 2001.
- Migration of the population (Issue 5) Stages of the migration process. M., 2001.
- Applied demography. M., 2003.
- Population migration (questions of theory). M., 2003.
Collective monographs:
- Reproduction of labor resources of the Far East. M., 1969.
- Territorial features of the population of the RSFSR. M., 1976.
- Social factors and features of the migration of the population of the USSR. M., 1978.
- Demographic processes in a socialist society. M., 1981.
- The population of the USSR for 70 years. M., 1988.
- The demographic future of Russia. M., 2001.
- Stabilization of the population of Russia. M., 2001.
- Demographic development of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug: situation, forecast, policy. Khanty-Mansiysk, 2002.
- Demographic development of the Samara region: Problems and policy directions. M., 2003.
- Demographic conceptual dictionary. M., 2003 (second edition - M., 2007).
- Demographic situation in Moscow and tendencies of its development. M., 2005.
- Demography. M., 2005.
- Practical demography. M., 2005.
- Strategy of demographic development of Russia. M., 2005.
- Transformation of migration processes in the post-Soviet space. M., 2007.
- Demographic development of the Central Federal District. M., 2008.
- Demographic development of Russia in the XXI century. M., 2009.
- Demographic contours of Russian regions. M., 2009.
Demographic Future of Russia and Migration Processes
Early 1990s is marked by the onset in Russia of a period of long-term depopulation, which covered almost all of its subjects. This phenomenon is by no means new. Even at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, for example, France was in a period of protracted depopulation. In the XX century. Many countries are facing natural population decline. Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Sweden and a number of other states live in the depopulation regime. Russia simply turned out to be an outsider in the circle of European countries, and its society was not ready to perceive such a trend in demographic dynamics. From the data presented in Table 1, it can be seen that depopulation in Russia is determined by both components of population reproduction - fertility and mortality. In other words, it is happening under double pressure, which distinguishes Russia from Western European countries.
First of all, Russia has the lowest birth rates among European countries, and now their level is significantly lower than in previous decades (Table 2). During the last third of the 20th century In Russia, the regime of population reproduction has deteriorated sharply, and the total birth rate has decreased. In the 1970s each woman of reproductive age on average gave birth to 1.97 children, in the 1980s. even 2.04, which was close to a simple reproduction of the population. But in 1991 this figure fell to 1.73, and in 2000 to 1.21. In recent years, the birth rate has slightly increased, but still it is less than 60-65% of the level that provides a simple replacement of generations.
At present, in terms of birth rate, Russia is in the group of economically developed countries(such as Italy, Spain, Greece, Germany, Czech Republic), whose total fertility rate is consistently 1.2-1.3. European average in the second half of the 1990s. was 1.4, while in Russia it was 1.3. In Europe, only in Albania was an expanded reproduction of the population observed. Therefore, in the 1990s The prospects for population reproduction in Russia were even worse than in European countries.
In the 1990s in Russia, not only was the total fertility rate extremely low, but the number of births was much lower than in previous decades. In absolute figures for the period 1991-2000. 9.5 million fewer children were born than in 1981-1990, and 7.2 million fewer than in 1971-1980. Reducing the birth rate in the 1990s. was so significant that analogies with the Great Patriotic War are appropriate. Number of children born in 1941-1945 compared with the previous pre-war five-year period was 56%. Approximately the same thing happened in 1996-2000, when in relation to 1986-1990. the number of births dropped to 55%. one
Table 1
Demographic development of Russia in the 1990s.
|
T _ Jtj /^ ttq TL/LPGLGW |
Natural- |
Number ratio |
Total |
Expected pro |
||||
|
years |
TTTLT Yf*G |
T-I^Ll at IMCU |
naya loss, |
dead to the numbers |
coefficient |
duration |
||
|
growth |
born |
fertility (?) |
life (years) |
|||||
|
1991 |
1795 |
1691 |
104 |
0,942 |
1,732 |
69,01 |
||
|
1992 |
1588 |
1807 |
-219 |
,138 |
1,552 |
67,89 |
||
|
1993 |
1379 |
2129 |
-750 |
,544 |
,385 |
65,14 |
||
|
1994 |
1408 |
2301 |
-893 |
,634 |
,400 |
63,98 |
||
|
1995 |
1364 |
2204 |
-840 |
,616 |
,344 |
64,64 |
||
|
1996 |
1305 |
2082 |
-777 |
,595 |
,281 |
65,89 |
||
|
1997 |
1260 |
2016 |
-756 |
,600 |
,230 |
66,64 |
||
|
1998 |
1283 |
1989 |
-706 |
,550 |
,242 |
67,02 |
||
|
1999 |
1215 |
2144 |
-929 |
,765 |
1,171 |
65,93 |
||
|
2000 |
1267 |
2225 |
-958 |
,756 |
1,214 |
65,27 |
||
|
2001 |
1312 |
2255 |
-943 |
,719 |
1,249 |
65,3 |
||
|
2002 |
1397 |
2332 |
-935 |
,669 |
1,322 |
64,8 |
||
|
2003 |
1477 |
2366 |
-889 |
,602 | ||||
Table 2
Average annual number of births and total fertility rates in Russia
The fundamental reason for the decline in the birth rate in Russia is the completion of the demographic transition by the end of the 20th century. Unlike most countries, in Russia the transition from having many children to having few children took place in a relatively short time, full of extreme events - the First World War and the Civil War, collectivization and the rapid growth of industry and large cities, associated with an increase in women's employment; repressions of the late thirties; Great Patriotic War; and, finally, the reforms of the nineties. In addition to huge human losses (more than 13 million dead during the Great Patriotic War and more than 0.5 million exterminated in 1937-1938), Russia has undergone radical changes in the age, sex and family structures of the population, the reproductive behavior of post-war populations. knees.
Another reason is the measures to stimulate the birth rate in the 1980s, which contributed to the repayment of the demographic wave, the depression that formed during the war years, and, on the other hand, led to the emergence in peacetime5 new wave, the crest of which fell on 1983-1987. The births that took place were concentrated in a short period of time. As a result, women who fulfilled their reproductive plans in the 1990s. turned into a kind of "reproductive ballast". The resulting increase in children born in the 1980s. (approximately 2.0-2.5 million people), by the end of the 1990s was completely "eaten".
The third reason is the nature of the socio-economic transformation, the decline in the standard of living of the population, on the one hand, and the growth of demand, a higher standard of living, especially among young people, on the other. As a result, a significant part of young men and women are distracted from reproductive activities (shuttle traders, labor migrants, etc.), seeking to create material comfort for themselves or simply to survive in market conditions. In the first half of the 1990s. there were at least 10-15 million people, or almost 30% of the population aged 20 to 40 years. An attempt to earn "good" money stretches for many years, which does not contribute to the implementation of reproductive plans. This also includes the departure of young women to work abroad. In the 1990s in Western Europe alone, according to rough estimates, approximately 3-4% of Russian women aged 18 to 24 provided paid sexual services. Today, not only the "brain drain" from Russia persists, depleting the intellectual potential of the nation, but the "aesthetic" image of the people is also deteriorating. It is appropriate to recall the novel by A.S. Novikov-Priboy "Captain of the first rank". It explains how the breed of noble masters improved. Beauties from the poor willingly married any rich freak. "From such a married couple, the children will no longer be as ugly as their father. ... The children will grow up and, in turn, marry beauties. This is the manner in which a special, masterful breed is obtained." The departure of young and beautiful women from Russia abroad is accompanied not only by a decrease in the birth rate, but, if we follow the logic of the author of the novel, will lead to a deterioration in the aesthetic quality of the population.
The fourth reason, and it is gradually gaining strength, is the change in reproductive attitudes that is happening, to a significant extent under the influence of the media, the introduction of Western models of family, reproductive and sexual behavior into the minds of Russian youth. In the 1990s the proportion of unregistered, so-called civil marriages increased (in 1994 they were 6.6%, and in 2002 already 9%), the number of extramarital births increased, and the age at which sexual activity began to decrease. Thus, in 1990, the proportion of extramarital births was 14.6%, in 1995 - 21.1%, and in 2002 it reached 29.5%. At the same time, today's Russian youth takes the creation of "family nests" and the birth of children more seriously. First - the solution of material problems (purchasing housing, its improvement, buying a car, getting an education and a profession, and, therefore, a well-paid job), and only then expanding the family.
The most negative consequence of the systemic, primarily economic crisis in Russia was an increase in mortality. In the 1990s the number of deaths exceeded the level of the 1980s. by 4.9 million people, and compared with the seventies increased by 7.4 million. If we take the age-specific mortality rates in the 1980s. and the number of deaths at the same ages in the 1990s, then you can get a surplus of deaths in the last decade compared to the previous one. This surplus, or rather supermortality in 1991-2000. amounted to approximately 3-3.5 million people, and together with the losses attributable to the third year of the XXI century - about 4 million people. For comparison, we note that supermortality during the Great Patriotic War, including the death of the population in besieged Leningrad, amounted to approximately 4.2 million people. Among those who died in the peaceful 1990s, the proportion of deaths preventable under other socioeconomic conditions increased.
The dynamics of life expectancy of the population of Russia in the seventies and nineties is peculiar. In the sixties, according to this indicator, the country was at the level of European states. But already in 1971-1980. life expectancy decreased compared to the previous decade by 0.82 years. In the 1980s it increased in relation to the previous decade by 0.44 years, but nevertheless remained 0.38 years lower than it was in the most favorable sixties in this respect. In fact, for the past 35-^0 years, life expectancy has been in a stagnant state.
All this happened against the backdrop of a rapid increase in life expectancy in developed countries: Japan, the USA, Canada, Germany, France, Sweden, etc. The life expectancy of the population of both sexes in the early sixties was 65-67 years in Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and a number of other European countries, while in Russia it was almost 69 years. But already in the 1980s. life expectancy in these and other developed countries exceeded the level of Russia lagging behind by that time by 5-7 years. In the nineties, the average life expectancy for the entire period in Russia decreased by 2.65 years compared to the previous decade and at the beginning of the 21st century. was a little over 65 years, i.e. was less than in the main European countries by 12-14 years. This indicator lagged behind the average European level by 7 years. In 2001 life expectancy for both sexes in Russia was 13-14 years lower than in Great Britain, Germany, Italy, France, than in Canada and Sweden - by 15 years. According to the UN, today in Russia, compared with other European countries, including countries that emerged in the post-Soviet space, the lowest life expectancy.
Russia is not only a European country, but also an Asian one. In Asia, its place in the distribution of life expectancy is also far from the best. Among the 50 Asian countries, Russia is in the worst third. In terms of life expectancy, Russia's "neighbors" are Indonesia, Guatemala, Mongolia, Morocco, Egypt, all the states of Central Asia, and so on. In the group of eastern regions of Russia, only in Western Siberia life expectancy is close to its average level throughout foreign Asia, while in Eastern Siberia it is lower by 3-4 years, in the Far East - by 1-2 years. In 2001, this indicator in Russia was 17 years lower than in Japan.
The underlying cause of the increase in mortality was the consequences of the reforms of the 1990s. - the collapse of the health care system and sanitary supervision (forgotten cholera, tuberculosis, and other diseases appeared, almost completely eliminated in the Soviet years); the high cost of effective and the spread of counterfeit drugs; deterioration in the balance and diet (partial replacement of meat products, animal oil, fish with potatoes, cereals, flour products); inaccessibility for the majority of the population of good rest and leisure activities; disregard for health and safety regulations, especially in the private sector; "liberalization" of road traffic; lack of effective control over goods produced and imported into the country and saturation consumer market counterfeit food and alcohol; stressful situations, which resulted in an increase in suicides and mental disorders; deterioration of the crime situation, the spread of drug addiction, etc. The number of suicides was especially significant in 1994-1995, exceeding a total of 120,000. Having begun to decline from 1995, the number of suicides in 1999, after another loss of their savings by the population, increased again. In 2003, it was 24% higher than the number of murders, and both together with poisoning, death from accidents and injuries, including road injuries, exceeded 335 thousand cases, firmly taking the second place among the leading causes of death.
The integral influence of the increase in mortality and the decline in the birth rate has led to a significant natural decline in population. During the depopulation decade (1992-2001), 7.8 million fewer people were born in the country than died, while in the 1980s and 1970s. it was the opposite: the number of births exceeded the number of deaths by 7.6 and 7.8 million people, respectively. Therefore, if in 1971-1990. the population of the country increased during each decade due to natural increase by almost 8 million people, then over ten years of depopulation it decreased by the same 8 million people as a result of natural decline. Figuratively speaking, in the nineties, Russia lost the same part of the population as lived in seven million-plus cities - Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Volgograd, Yekaterinburg, Kazan, Krasnoyarsk and Novosibirsk.
In 1999-2000 The population of Russia decreased annually by 6.5 people per thousand inhabitants of the country, while in Belarus this figure was 4.9-4.1% o, Bulgaria - 4.7-5.1, Hungary - 4.8- 3.8, not to mention Italy, where the natural decline was 0.7-0.8 and Sweden - 0.7-0.3% c. In terms of population, a large natural decline was observed only in Ukraine (7.0-7.5%o). Thus, Russia is distinguished not only by the natural population decline (in the last 5 years, 900-950 thousand people a year), but also by the depth of depopulation, which is more significant than in all other countries, with the exception of Ukraine.
Table 3
Periods of reduction in the number of stable population with appropriate indicators of its reproduction 2|
Net reproduction rate |
total fertility rate |
Initial population decline rate |
|
|
Up to 75% |
Up to 50% |
||
|
0,7 0,6 0,5 |
1,480 1,270 1,060 |
In 20 years In 14 years In 11 years |
In 49 years In 34 years In 25 years |
At present, in terms of the birth rate, Russia is a European power, which is in the group of advanced developed countries. In terms of the total fertility rate, it ranks among the third of the countries with the lowest values of this indicator (Italy, Spain, Greece, Germany, the Czech Republic, in total 11 countries where the total fertility rate is consistently 1.2-1.3). At the same time, in terms of life expectancy, Russia firmly occupies a position among the underdeveloped countries (among Asian countries - 16th place out of 50). Only when compared with African states does it look more or less normal: if it were there, it could take a place in the top ten among 50 countries. In a word, in Russia at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries, in fact, a unique regime of population reproduction took shape: European fertility and Afro-Asian mortality.
Ascertaining the reasons for the deterioration demographic situation is just one of the questions. Another, logically following it, is an assessment of what such a demographic development can lead to if society does not realize the significance of the impending threat. The demographic future of Russia can be presented in two ways: as the dynamics of a hypothetical and real population. In the first case, it is important to establish what kind of population reduction can be at the actual level of reproduction, which does not provide a simple replacement of generations. In 1999, the total birth rate for the country as a whole was 1.215, and the net reproduction rate of the population was 0.551; in 2002, the total fertility rate rose to 1.322. Calculations of the rates of a possible decrease in the hypothetical population are given in Table 3. With the reproduction rates prevailing by the end of the 20th century, the country's population would have halved in one third of the century and by 2033-2034. would not exceed 97 million people. But this is a "virtual" representation of the country's future. Numerous forecasts of the demographic future of Russia, based on the existing indicators of fertility, mortality, and the age and sex structure of the population living in the country, speak of what can happen and is already happening in reality. The likely picture is rather bleak. Note that the aggregated forecasts performed Federal Service state statistics (FSGS), represent the estimated population, which takes into account changes in both natural and migratory movements. They adopted a positive migration balance, which naturally underestimates the rate of population decline (Table 4).
Table 4
Forecast estimates of the population of Russia 3
(initial base - 2000, million people)
|
2005 |
2010 |
2015 |
2025 |
2050 |
|
|
Goskomstat RF, 1996 Goskomstat RF, 1999 UN, 1994 UN, 1998 |
143,0 142,1 144,2 |
140,3 138,7 143,1 |
134,0 142,0 |
137,9 |
129,8 121,3 |
Table 5
Changing components of demographic dynamicsin Russia(thousand people)
|
years |
overall growth, |
Natural |
migratory |
CMIS* |
|
decline (-) |
increase, decrease (-) |
growth | ||
|
1992 |
-31 |
-207 |
176 |
698 |
|
1993 |
-308 |
-738 |
430** |
504 |
|
1994 |
-60 |
-870 |
810 |
290 |
|
1995 |
-330 |
-832 |
502** |
401 |
|
1996 |
-474 |
-818 |
344 |
451 |
|
1997 |
-398 |
-750 |
353 |
390 |
|
1998 |
-411 |
-697 |
285 |
415 |
|
1999 |
-768 |
-923 |
165** |
566 |
|
2000 |
-740 |
-959 |
214 |
406*** |
|
2001 |
-865 |
-937 |
72 |
626 4 |
|
2002 |
-855 |
-935 |
80** |
578 |
|
2003 |
-796 |
-889 |
93 |
728 |
According to forecasts made in 2000 by the UN Population Service, out of the countries where the number of inhabitants is 140 thousand people or more, by 2050 the population will decrease by 39. In this list, Russia ranks 6th in terms of population decline. It is ahead of Estonia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Georgia and Guyana. But in terms of the scale of losses, Russia is in first place. All 39 countries by the middle of the century, according to UN forecasts, will lose almost 152 million, of which Russia will account for 41.2 million people (27%), Ukraine - 19.6 million, Japan - 17.9 million, Italy, Germany and Spain combined - 34.4 million people. The point, of course, is not the accuracy of the numbers, but the direction and scale of the demographic dynamics. And it is such that by the middle of this century the population of Russia may be less than 100 million people.
Naturally, demographic dynamics is determined not only by the nature of reproduction processes, but also depends on external migration. In recent decades, depopulation processes in many European countries have been smoothed out to some extent with the help of external migration. Migration replaced the natural population decline in whole or in part. Russia also belongs to such countries (Table 5).
External migration growth 1992-2003 reached 3.5 million people, which compensated for approximately 45% of the natural loss. From the beginning of depopulation (1992) up to the present time, external migration, with a constant positive balance, has never fully compensated for the natural population decline. Moreover, if in the first half of the 1990s. migratory increase made up for 60-90% of the natural loss, then at the turn of the century the migration balance decreased sharply and began to compensate for only a tenth of the natural loss (8.3% in 2001, 9.4% in 2002, and 9.4% in 2003 10 ,5%). And the point here is not that the migration potential of the Russian-speaking population has decreased in the post-Soviet space, but in the migration policy that Russia pursued in the 1990s. She did not take advantage of the favorable market conditions. As a result of discrimination (laws on citizenship, state language, voting rights, etc.) in the states that emerged in the post-Soviet space, the Russian-speaking, predominantly Slavic, population was ready to return en masse to their historical homeland. The obstacles that it encountered quickly extinguished the migration impulses of the Russian-speaking diasporas, even in countries with a different ethnic culture.
But even with a reduction in the influx of the Russian-speaking population, primarily Russians, from the countries of the new abroad, migration still partially extinguished the decrease in the number of the state-forming ethnic group that occurred in the intercensal period (1989-2002). At the moment last census(October 2002), the number of Russians in Russia amounted to 116 million people against 120 million in 1989. During the intercensal period, due to migration growth, the number of Russians in Russia increased by 3.4 million people. Consequently, as a result of depopulation, the number of Russians in Russia decreased not by 4, but by 7.4 million. A similar thing happened with a number of other ethnic groups. But that's not all. Due to the change of their nationality only by Ukrainians, the number of Russians increased by 1.2 million people. At the same time, the number of Russians, as a result of the excess of the number of deaths over the number of births, decreased by almost 9 million people, i.e. by 7.5%, while the entire population of Russia during this time decreased by 1.1%.
The reduction in migration flows to Russia, together with the fall in the birth rate, affected not only the quantitative, but also the qualitative parameters of the population. A decrease in the population, which occurs not from external, but from internally immanent factors, is always accompanied by demographic aging to one degree or another. Specifics of Russia in the 1990s was that here the aging of the population occurred only as a result of the fall in the birth rate, while the increasing mortality of the adult population, especially in the middle of the decade, restrained this process, i.e. promoted rejuvenation. External migration also had an impact in the same direction, since among migrants there is always a higher proportion of people of young working age.
Reduction by the end of the 1990s the influx of migrants and the balance of migration brought to naught
the role of this factor in population growth and its rejuvenation. Naturally, the reduction
reduction of migration growth and increase in life expectancy
(if this process begins), will further accelerate demographic aging, due to
which will increase the demographic burden on the part of persons of the age
those older than able-bodied (Table 6).
Table 6
Distribution of the permanent population of Russia by main age groups(for the beginning of the year)
|
years |
Average age |
Younger working age |
in able-bodied |
Older working age |
|
(years) |
new age, in % |
age, in % |
age, in % |
|
|
1979 (census) |
34,0 |
23,3 |
60,4 |
16,3 |
|
1989 (census) |
34,7 |
24,5 |
56,9 |
18,5 |
|
1999 (est.) |
37,1 |
20,7 |
58,5 |
20,8 |
|
2009(forecast) |
15,0 |
63,5 |
21.5 h |
|
|
2016(forecast) |
15,3 |
59,9 |
24,8 |
.
If at the beginning of 1999 there were 356 old-age pensioners per 1,000 people of working age, by 2016 there will be 415. At present, even with a lower demographic burden on the part of old-age pensioners, their financial situation is deplorable, stronger. Moreover, over the years of reforms, their social status has deteriorated sharply, and the unbelievable for Russian traditions has happened: the younger generations have ceased to respect the older population. But the country has no future when the younger generations do not provide materially and spiritually the existence of those who gave them life.
The decrease in the population and its aging can be called anything you like: depopulation, reduction in the demographic potential, decrepitude of the nation, its extinction, degeneration, etc. The point is not in words, but in the fact that the current nature of demographic development in all cases is a warning to the peoples of Russia. In a predictable future, the majority of the peoples inhabiting the regions may disappear, from which, over the course of centuries, a multinational Russian state was formed around the geopolitical core - the Moscow Principality.
World history is full of examples when numerous for their time and seemingly invincible peoples disappeared without a trace. The most ancient powerful state of the Assyrians in Western Asia in the 7th century. BC e. was captured by other peoples, some of its inhabitants were exterminated, and the other, mixed with the conquerors, disappeared along with their state. In the steppe spaces between the Don and the Danube, back in the 10th century. Pechenegs lived, often attacking ancient Russia. At the end of the XI century. under the pressure of the Polovtsy, they were driven out to the lower reaches of the Danube, where they mixed with the Polovtsy and disappeared as such. Before the colonization of America, up to 50 million Indians are believed to have lived in its southern and northern parts. Mastering the expanses of North America, the colonists exterminated many tribes. Now there are several hundred thousand Indians left in this part of the mainland.
History shows that in the past, the disappearance of peoples was associated with their conquest and extermination, assimilation among the victors, or simply expulsion from their historical habitats. In the third millennium, Russia is creating a historical precedent when large nations in peacetime, without external influence, can disappear only because the reproduction of the population has "narrowed" to a level that does not guarantee its survival.
To prevent this from happening, Russia must mobilize all possible sources and factors for stabilizing the population. This goal is formulated in the Concept of Demographic Development of the Russian Federation approved by the Government of the country. It should be noted that in 2000-2002 the number of births began to increase - in 2002 they amounted to 1.4 million children born against 1.2 million in 1999. In 2003, the number of births increased by another 80 thousand. Some tend to associate this process exclusively with the stabilization of the economy, others rightly attribute it to shifts in the age structure, which is subject to the influence of the so-called "demographic waves". At the beginning of the XXI century. a generation of women, numerically larger than before, entered the reproductive age, which led to an increase in the number of births. In 1999, the proportion of women of reproductive age in the average annual population was 26.8%, and in 2003 it was already 27.7%. But the structural factor is not the only reason. Another is related to some increase in the number of children born to one woman of reproductive age. In a word, there has been an improvement in the situation with the birth rate, although a slight one. Of course, this was affected by the fact that the population began to feel the emerging stabilization in the country, associated with economic recovery. The phenomenon of belief in changes for the better needs to be studied, since this already happened in 1986-1987, when the Soviet people believed in changes for the better, promised by M. Gorbachev.
The slow growth in the birth rate, which has been going on for 4 years, while maintaining a high level of mortality, will not save Russia from the natural decline in the population. We need to reduce mortality. Reducing it to the parameters of the 1980s. could save the lives of at least 400-500 thousand people, which would have not only demographic, but also enormous humanitarian significance. Mobilizing reserves to reduce mortality through preventable causes does not require huge investments. Nevertheless, the growth of the birth rate that has begun, even if it is supplemented by a reduction in mortality, will not be able to influence a radical change in the population reproduction regime and ensure positive demographic dynamics. Therefore, in the first decade of the XXI century. the rate of population decline in the country will largely be determined by the scale of the influx of migrants from abroad.
Despite the decrease in the number of the peoples of Russia (Russians, Tatars, Komi, Kabardians, etc.) who remained in the new abroad, their numbers are still quite large at the present time. According to the 1989 census, 28 million people lived in the former Soviet republics, and now - from 20 to 22 million (the number has decreased due to natural decline, migration outflow to Russia and other countries of the new and old abroad, as well as changes nationality). The reduction in the scale of migration of Russians and other titular peoples of Russia from the states of the new abroad and the decrease in the migration growth of the population of Russia as a whole are caused, on the one hand, by the liberalization of attitudes towards the Russian-speaking population (language and other concessions) and its integration into the local ethno-cultural environment, especially that part of it , which is to some extent mixed with the indigenous people, and on the other hand, the fact that migrants in their historical homeland still do not meet with proper understanding and support due to the lack of a consistent migration policy regarding compatriots who remained abroad.
In its migration policy, Russia does not take into account not only its own, but also the experience of others. And the experience, for example, of post-war Germany, France, Japan and some other countries testifies to the huge political and economic gains of the states that returned their compatriots from the territories they left behind. France under General de Gaulle made the historically correct decision to withdraw from North Africa. Being in a difficult economic situation, she resettled 1.5-2 million Frenchmen to their homeland, although this laid a heavy burden on the budget of a country with a population of less than 45 million people. Defeated Germany with a ruined economy returned more than 10 million ethnic Germans to the original borders of the Third Reich. This increased the population of the country by 15-20%. Devastated Japan after the end of World War II returned from the areas of occupation (China, Korea, Southeast Asia and South Sakhalin) about 4.5 million people, which increased its population by 5-6%.
The influx of the Russian-speaking population from the new abroad in the current decade can, with the appropriate migration policy of Russia, amount to several million people. The actual scale of migration will depend on the policy pursued by the states of the new abroad in relation to the Russian-speaking population (the status of the Russian language, the replacement of leadership positions, education, etc.), and on the migration policy of Russia in relation to compatriots remaining in the post-Soviet space. But in any case, the influx of migrants from the new abroad will significantly slow down the decline in Russia's population. In subsequent years, the migration potential may be completely exhausted, because the population that has aged and passed into the category of pensioners and those that will be born and undergo socialization outside their historical homeland are unlikely to emigrate to Russia.
A more restrained migration policy should be carried out with respect to immigrants from the old abroad. Obviously, the Russian state without an influx of foreign labor will not be able to exploit its natural resources on a large scale. Russia is the largest country in the world in terms of territory, it owns 1/8 of the globe, vast agricultural land, including the best black soil in the world. This gives it the opportunity to be self-sufficient, to form a balance of food and agricultural raw materials through its own production. Russia - forest country, which fully provides its needs with commercial timber, raw materials for the production of pulp, cardboard, paper, etc. It has colossal world reserves of fresh water (only in Baikal the volume of fresh water is 23 thousand cubic kilometers, which is equal to about one fifth of the world reserves). It accounts for one fifth (21%) of the world's resources, which is more than the share of its territory (12.6%), not to mention the country's share in the world population (2.4%). Russia has 45% of the world's natural gas reserves, 13% of oil, 23% of coal, and so on. The predicted reserves of Russia's resources are estimated at 140 trillion. US dollars. With the value of Russia's gross domestic product in 2002, these resources will last for about 400 years, and with a doubling of GDP, for at least two centuries. The fact that Russia is one of richest countries the world is its plus. And the downside is that until the XXI century. most of the country's territory remained little developed and sparsely populated. At present, the population density of the eastern regions of Russia is approximately 30 times lower than the average population level of the entire Asian continent. But the old part of the country is not so densely populated. The level of its population is more than 2 times lower than in the rest of Europe.
Historical experience shows that a country cannot preserve its territories if they are sparsely populated and unprotected. Enough examples to confirm this thesis. Two events, one in the 19th and the other in the 20th centuries, are most prominent. The first historical lesson is the civilized loss of Alaska (over 1.5 million sq. km), sold to the United States in 1867. But there were not only buyers on Russian territory. She always beckoned invaders. Hitler, preparing an attack on the USSR, explained that the expansion of living space for the German people could only occur at the expense of Russia. According to this doctrine, after the capture of the USSR by the Nazis, it was envisaged to destroy 46-51 million Russians and other Slavic peoples within a few years. But Russian, like other Soviet territories at that time, turned out to be not only a tasty morsel for the invaders, but also one of the factors due to which the lightning victory of the Nazis turned into their crushing defeat. Russia should not forget the bitter experience even in the face of radical change international relations, good neighborly coexistence, strategic partnership and comprehensive globalization.
In our opinion, what has been said should be fully taken into account when considering long-term immigration programs and pursuing an appropriate migration policy. This is of particular importance for the sparsely populated eastern regions of the country. There are poorly developed Russian territories border with densely populated areas of China, whose population continues to grow rapidly. Already at present, from 100 to 10 million people live in the regions of China bordering the south of the Far East. The border regions, primarily Primorye and the Amur Region, will be able to avoid the fate of Alaska, Texas, Kosovo and a number of other regions of the world only if they consistently pursue such a policy that would meet both national interest Russia and the national interests of China. The foundation of this policy is the strength and large scale of economic relations between countries doomed to live in the neighborhood. A special block of this policy should be a long-term migration program. Its essence is the creation of such prerequisites that will allow immigration, primarily illegal, to be replaced by temporary labor migration. The purpose of attracting labor from China could be a joint mutually beneficial exploitation natural resources Siberia, the Far East, other regions of the country. With such a formulation, the question of who should populate the Far East - immigrants from neighboring countries or the titular peoples of Russia, and the question of which natural resources China can use to link its economic development prospects will be resolved.
Demographic expansion in the future is possible not only from the countries of the Pacific region. It is also likely in the region of the southern borders of Russia. Beyond their borders, a powerful community of Islamic states is being formed, into which, sooner or later, a part of the states - the former union republics of the USSR - will be drawn. In the countries of this community, the population is growing rapidly, the conditions for employment of which are limited due to the lack of land and the agrarian orientation of the economy. To beginning of XXI in. in Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, other Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, there were approximately 450 million people, mostly of the Islamic faith. According to UN forecasts, by 2050 their population will reach one billion, and in each of the last three countries the number of inhabitants will exceed Russia's.
A population explosion expected in a number of countries in the first half of this century (the population will double in Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Iraq and some others), the concentration of millions of unemployed armies in the context of the Islamization of the former Soviet republics and the strengthening of their ties with neighboring Muslim states can significantly change the geopolitical situation in the south Russia, to cause a powerful migration expansion. In this geopolitically important area, an active migration policy should also be pursued, not limited to the issuance of migration cards.
Most likely, without an annual migration influx (its value will depend on the size of the natural loss and the dynamics of labor resources), stabilization of the Russian population and maintenance of labor potential at a level sufficient for sustainable economic development cannot be achieved. The solution of these two interrelated tasks is reduced both to the reception of migrants - future citizens of Russia, primarily from the countries of the new abroad, and to attracting labor migrants with certain social parameters from the old abroad for a reasonable period of time.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Age composition of the population of the RSFSR. According to the All-Union Population Census of 1989.
Goskomstat of the RSFSR. M., 1990.
Demographic Yearbook of Russia. State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation. M., 2001.
Demographic Yearbook of Russia. State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation. M., 1996.
Demographic conceptual dictionary. Ed. L L. Rybakovsky. M., 2003.
The demographic future of Russia. Ed. L.L. Rybakovsky and G.N. Karelova. M.,
2001.
The population of the USSR for 70 years. Ed. LL. Rybakovsky. M., 1988. "- -"
Estimated population of the Russian Federation until 2016 (Stat.
bulletin). State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation. M., 2000.
Russian statistical yearbook. Official publication. M., 2003.
Rybakovskiy LL. Applied demography. M, 2003.
Ryazantsev S. The impact of migration on the socio-economic development of Europe: modern
new trends. Stavropol, 2001.
Stabilization of the population of Russia (possible directions of the demographic
politicians). Ed. Karelova G.N. and Rybakovsky LL. M., 2001.
Population of the Russian Federation by sex and age as of January 1, 1999.
State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation. M., 1999.
1 This work was supported by the Russian Humanitarian Foundation (project 02-03-18144-a).
2 Calculations were made by V.M. Arkhangelsky, they abstract from the peculiarities of the age structure of the population and assume that it has stabilized.
3 Medium options accepted.
4 KRMS - the coefficient of effectiveness of migration ties, the ratio of the number of departures to arrivals in per thousand, the indicator of return, used in pre-revolutionary resettlement activities.
n3.doc
RYBAKOVSKY L.L.Population migration.
Three stages of the migration process.
(Essays on the theory and research methods)
The monograph presents the concept of a three-stage migration process, including the formation of mobility, the actual resettlement and the survival rate of new settlers in places of settlement. Consideration of each stage is accompanied by a presentation of various methodological techniques, with the help of which one can get an adequate idea of the migration process.
For anyone interested in migration issues
AUTHOR'S FOREWORD
The proposed work is not a textbook or even tutorial. These are the theoretical and methodological developments of the author, united around a common theme - the concept of three stages of the migration process. The basis of the book was the material of two monographs written in the 70s and 80s (115, 118). These books are not only pretty outdated, but also become inaccessible. In addition, today appeared big number those who, with great energy, got involved in the study of modern migration problems, without having sufficient knowledge in the field of migration for this. Part of the material of earlier published books was omitted, because. it ceased to correspond to modern realities and our ideas about that time.
At the same time, the work includes material, mainly statistical, relating to Russian reality. The book contains not only and not so much author's developments, it contains a lot of what was the result of many years of work of scientists of the pre-revolutionary and Soviet times. Without the huge theoretical baggage created by our predecessors and left as a legacy, not only to us, but also to those who will come later, it is not possible to have our own ideas. Unfortunately, in the 1990s, very few new theoretical "frills" appeared. And this is understandable, during the period of "storm and onslaught", the formation market relations, the authors of migration papers are not fighting for theory, but for survival in the new system, for which the most attractive thing, as it sounds vulgar, is money.
Thus, the change in the socio-economic basis and political system in Russia, which led to the strongest transformation of migration processes, the emergence of a huge number of those who began to deal with the problems of population migration without having sufficient experience and knowledge in this field of science, and the author’s desire to draw a line under his more than forty years of studying this issue - these are the motives for the appearance of this book. Many questions remained outside its pages. In particular, the author bypassed such notions as "integration of immigrants", "migration potential", etc., which broke into our scientific life. All of them are waiting in the wings. There are no monographic generalizations of forced migrations yet, as is done in the field of immigration (E.S. Krasinets, T.M. Regent), external (international) migration (V.A. Iontsev, A.N. Kamensky, S.V. Ryazantsev ) etc. There is no development of a holistic concept of the migration policy of the state, there is no theory of migration management in market conditions. In short, there is still a lot of space for scientific research.
L.L. Rybakovsky
CHAPTER 1
MIGRATION AS A SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC
PROCESS
1.1 Migration movement of the population and its features
The existence of different points of view on certain scientific problems can quite often be explained to the point of triviality simply: they arise due to the fact that different terms are used for the same concepts, and the same terms are used for different concepts. Endless and sometimes fruitless discussions about various scientific definitions have often led scientists away, and sometimes even today, scientists away from the analysis of objective social phenomena. This phenomenon was noticed a long time ago by the outstanding Russian historian V.O. Klyuchevsky, who said that in scientific research they are sometimes carried away by the philological solution of issues, i.e. not phenomena, but words are investigated. As a result of such a "philological" method, it sometimes turns out that for the terms you love, there are no phenomena in life for which all the fuss was started. The latter usually happens when the principles of materialistic dialectics are neglected, and at the present time this is often done because of dislike for its creators.
According to the materialist understanding of social being, each concept, regardless of the terminology used, is only a form of adequate expression of the most essential aspects of a completely definite objectively existing phenomenon. Only by revealing the essence of this phenomenon, it is possible to formulate its theoretical surrogate and agree on what term to assign to it. Since ancient times, the saying has been known that they don’t argue about terms, they agree on them. True, it is not so easy to agree on this.
However, we will use the proposed approach. To do this, it is necessary first to establish the most significant features of the subject of our consideration - the migration process, revealing its difference from other types of population movement. This is also necessary because, when defining the subject of demography, there are still ongoing disputes over the boundaries of this system of scientific knowledge. Differences in approaches are related to the attribution to the subject of demography of various types of population movement, including migration. It should be noted that there was no unanimity in understanding the number and essence of different types of population movement among scientists, and there is no. Here are some examples. Back in the 70s of the last century, I.S. Matlin argued that the movement of population and labor resources is divided into such types as demographic, intersectoral, interprofessional and territorial (72). In addition to the fact that the natural movement is replaced in this case by a vague demographic movement, there are also no movements associated with a change in social class or stratification status, educational level, etc.
In the same years, Yu.N. Kozyrev attributed social, migration and personal mobility to the forms of population mobility, apparently understanding the latter as natural movement (22). G.I. Kasperovich distinguished between territorial, industrial and social movements. (43) B.D. Breev in his early works noted that from the point of view of the formation of the labor force, three forms of population mobility should be distinguished: territorial, sectoral, and professional (106). Speaking of labor resources, we should not forget that they also have elements natural movement- the transition from one age group to another and such an unpleasant, if not more so, phenomenon as mortality. O.V. Larmin singled out in the movement of the population the processes of natural, mechanical and structural changes, which are organically intertwined with each other (74). In addition to the fact that the social movement of the population is omitted here, the structural movement is singled out as an independent type. There has been a kind of mixing of process and structure, which is the moment of the process. V.A. Borisov, in his work dating back to the new millennium, distinguishes only two types of population movement: natural and mechanical (migration), while understanding movement as change (10). His typology lacks such a multifaceted movement as social.
In general, most sociologists and demographers distinguish three types of population movement: social, natural and migratory. Considering the social movement, it should be borne in mind that there is an idea of it in both the broad and narrow sense of the word. According to this paradigm, social relations in the broad sense of the word include all social relations, including demographic relations, while social relations in the narrow sense of the word mean only a specific area of relations (69). The narrow understanding of the social movement remains to this day a thing in itself. It is possible, however, by social to understand all types of population movement in social sphere with the exception of natural and migratory. In this case, the allocation of three types of population movement allows you to have a definite, unambiguous idea about each of them. In particular, the social movement is professional, educational, intersectoral, intersectoral, etc. population movement. It includes changes in areas of employment, occupation, qualifications, and more. Social movement can be represented in two ways: as social development and as a change in social status. In the first case, we mean, for example, an increase in the qualification and educational level, and in the second case, social displacement, i.e. intra- or intersectoral movement of personnel, change of profession, etc.
For isolating the migration movement from the totality of types of movement, the original three-term scheme is quite convenient, since, as already mentioned, it combines in the social everything that is not included in the migration and natural movement, which, according to many demographers, are the subject of demographic study. Let us agree to regard both types of population movement as the subject of demography. This will allow us to define this science as a system of knowledge about the general and special in the natural and migration movement of the population, their patterns, factors and consequences. According to the passport of specialties of the Higher Attestation Commission, the content of this area of research is “the patterns of reproduction and migration of the population, the features of their manifestation and evolution at different historical stages of social development, in various socio-economic and ethno-cultural conditions ...” (93.p.12). This citation is intended to once again confirm that demography is a science that studies both the natural and migration movements of the population, both reproductive and migration processes.
Everything in the world is interconnected and all types of population movement are inseparable, in organic unity, changing, if we are talking about human society, certain parameters of people's populations. This was known even to the philosophers of ancient times. Each person, like the population as a whole, has certain characteristics. Any person has three types of properties: those that are given to him from birth and either remain unchanged or change over time (sex, race, age, etc.), those that are acquired as socialization progresses (education, language, etc.). ), and, finally, those that can be changed fairly quickly (for example, profession, social status, etc.). There are characteristics that, from a formal point of view, can only improve, indicating the social development of the individual, but there are those that can change in any direction. The former include, for example, the level of education, the latter - the state of health. Therefore, social displacement and social development are not synonymous.
If a person has a lot of innate and acquired, changing and unchanging properties, then there are even more of them in the population as a whole. Just as the opinion is true that no two people are exactly alike, it is even more true that there are no population structures that are identical in terms of their parameters. And this is natural, since the individual, the collective (family) and the population are single, special and universal, distinguished by the specific properties and relationships. They can be expressed using various indicators: in some cases, by personal characteristics, in others, by average and structural indicators.
Any set of people, and even more so such as the population, is subject to both quantitative and qualitative changes. Quantitative changes occur as a result of both "internal" movement, i.e. reproductive process, and "external" - population migration. Moreover, both lead to qualitative changes, but the first only in one (age), and the second in many parameters. In turn, the social movement changes only the qualitative characteristics of the population. In this it is similar to the migratory movement. But unlike migration, it embraces social development not only of parts of the totality, but also of the totality as a whole. Migration, although it contributes to social development, but not of the totality, but only of its parts. The migration process is largely connected not only with social development, but also with natural movement. The social movement is also associated with it. Indeed, with an increase in the age of a person, for example, his experience multiplies, the level of qualification grows, and other changes occur.
As a result of reproduction, the population changes only due to birth and death rates, and the demographic structure - as a result of the transition from one age to another. In this sense, the reproductive function is inherent not only to the childbearing contingent, which has a reproductive property, but also to the entire population, since the reproductive process, along with fertility, also includes mortality and a change in the age structure. Taking into account these three components, the reproduction of the population is not only a change of generations based on fertility and mortality, i.e. "entry" into the totality of some people and "exit" of other people, but also their movement in the "demographic space", i.e. the transition of generations from one age group to another with a gradual decrease in their initial value.
Unlike natural movement, migration is a spatial movement of the population, a change in its territorial distribution, i.e. geography. In this sense, migration does not change the population of the territory within which it moves. The number and structure of the population is changing only in certain parts of a given territory (country).
The most complex and qualitatively diverse is the social movement, which changes the most important structures for social development: social-class, professional-qualification, etc. These structures study different social sciences, and this is understandable, since there has long been a differentiation of scientific knowledge about the life of the population. Obviously, the integration of scientific knowledge systems into a single science on the basis that the natural movement of the population is organically interconnected with its social development is hardly justified. In this sense, the words of D. Diderot are true that unity and uniformity are not the same thing. This should be attributed to the reproduction of the population, carried out as a result of fertility and mortality, and the reproduction of the social structure, which occurs as a result of social reproduction. These processes are far from unambiguous.
To some extent, there is a similarity between migration and population reproduction. With this in mind, M.V. Kurman wrote: "Natural reproduction and migration of the population are characterized by the interaction of two components: positive (birth, arrival) and negative (death, departure)" (132). Migration and the reproductive process are two components of demographic dynamics. The foregoing corresponds to the views expressed repeatedly in the past on the content of demographic processes. Thus, in the "Course of Demography", reprinted several times in the last thirty years of the twentieth century, demographic processes include the processes and phenomena of reproduction, migration, changes in the distribution and structure of the population (55). It should be noted that not only in domestic, but also in foreign demography, understanding the reproduction of the population as a change of generations based on fertility and mortality, nevertheless, along with natural, migration movement is also referred to as demographic processes. Thus, since the change in the size and age-sex structure of the population occurs only as a result of reproduction and migration, demographic processes can be limited to these two phenomena or types of movement.
Although the reproduction and migration of the population can be united by a single concept of "demographic processes", nevertheless, there are significant differences between them. First, the difference is that these are two different types of population movement. Reproductive processes take place in the same set of people and are for it an internal movement. Migration processes are another matter. They need at least two sets of people (132), for each of which migration is an external phenomenon.
Secondly, in the reproduction process, individual events (deaths, births) for each of their participants are of a one-time nature, while in migrations, individual events (emigrations, immigrations) for their participants can be repeated. Therefore, the number of events and the number of participants in migration processes are different, the first is always more than the second. So, in the 70s. in former USSR the total migration flow was about 14 million events per year, and the number of people involved in migration was just over 11 million (128).
Thirdly, reproductive, and to some extent other types of demographic behavior, are determined by needs that are directly related to the reproduction of the population. This is the need for children or some other needs that children can satisfy, the need for self-preservation, i.e. in life, the need to create a family. Otherwise in migrations. Here, movements are determined not by the needs for migration, but by changes in the socio-economic status that arise in part of the population. In the first case, the needs internal purpose demographic behavior, its initial element, while in the second migration is a means of satisfying other, usually material needs. That is why the level of well-being of a family is usually inversely related to the realization of the need for children and directly dependent on migratory movement.
Fourth, reproductive processes are associated with such demographic characteristics of the population that either remain unchanged throughout life (gender) or change deterministically over time (age). At the same time, migrations interact with variable social characteristics, some of which migration always changes (place of residence, scope of work), others sometimes (occupation, qualifications).
Fifth, in the reproductive process, every single event, whether it is a birth or death, is biological in nature. But these events, representing series taking place in a certain environment in space and time, already have a social character. Although rare, there are attempts to introduce a biological component into this social process. The matter does not change from the fact that socio-economic conditions are called the determinant of fertility or migration. It should be categorically emphasized that in migration processes, not only the totality of movements, but also each of them individually is social in nature. It is not caused by biological, but by social needs. And unlike natural movement, the biological factor is absent here even at the level of an individual event. We can say that the migration process is socially conditioned twice - first as a separate event, and then as a combination of them.
Sixth, migration differs from other social processes and, first of all, from the reproduction of the population by its much greater dependence on objective factors (136). Migration is more "rigidly" related to various parameters of socio-economic development - the distribution of productive forces, the intensity of urbanization, and so on.
Despite the differences, migration and population replacement, however, are only two of the only demographic components on the scale and interaction of which population dynamics depend. The Significance of These Components in Demographic Dynamics post-war Russia repeatedly changed (Table 1.1). In the 50-60s. of the last century, primarily as a result of the mass outflow of the population from central Russia to the virgin regions of northern Kazakhstan, the total increase decreased by almost 2 million people. In turn, migrants to the virgin lands, according to the most conservative estimates, increased the population of Kazakhstan in subsequent years by at least 300-400 thousand people.
Table 1.1.
General, natural and migration growth of the population of Russia
In 1951 - 2000 (thousand people)
| years | General gain | natural increase | Migration growth |
| 1951-1960 | 17820 | 18674 | -854 |
| 1961-1970 | 9965 | 11058 | -1093 |
| 1971-1980 | 8461 | 7917 | 544 |
| 1981-1990 | 9537 | 7583 | 1954 |
| 1991-2000 | 3400 | -6730 | 3330 |
In the 90s, there was a large-scale reduction in the population of Russia, but not due to migration, but as a result of depopulation that swept the country. The country's population decreased due to natural decline by more than 6.8 million people, of which migration compensated for over 3.3 million. These are, in many respects, former immigrants from Russia and their offspring.
1.2. Migration - the process of territorial movement of the population
The level of development of the conceptual apparatus that characterizes a particular social phenomenon largely depends on the duration, depth and scope of the research being carried out. If there is no practical need for such a scientific apparatus, then there is no conceptual apparatus either. Actually, this is what happened with the migration of the population. As soon as the study of population migration ceased in the early 1930s, the term "migration" became eroded. Migration in the true sense has fallen out of the reference literature. It did not appear in the second edition of the TSB, already carried out in 1954. Only in the third edition of the ITU (1959) and the Brief Geographical Encyclopedia (1961) was the term "migration" restored in the interpretation of V.V. Pokshishevsky (95).
With the renaissance in the study of population migration that began in the second half of the 1960s and continued until the mid-1970s, a large number of definitions of this phenomenon and attempts to classify it are associated. The intensification of the study of migration has led to the use of many different terms. Migration began to be called a territorial, geographical, spatial phenomenon, sometimes trying to identify semantic differences where there are none. Migration is defined as mobility (lat. mobilis) or in the Russian counterpart - mobility, it is also movement, displacement, resettlement, redistribution, etc. Terminological confusion required putting things in order in the scientific apparatus. B.S. Khorev, V.I. Staroverov and many other researchers of population migration (131,143). Among the latest attempts to give a detailed analysis of the definitions of migration and to classify them is the study by A.U. Homras (142). Unfortunately, his approach was not sustained consistently, the author mixed different points of view, failing to separate the broad and narrow interpretation of population migration (141). If we do not touch on various minor nuances, then all definitions of population migration can be divided into three groups, taking the essential moment as a classification feature.
The first group, quite widespread at the end of the 20th century, includes definitions that mix different types of population movement, in particular, migration and social. Here, migration includes sectoral, territorial, professional and social movement (140). A.U. Homra called this approach to the definition of migration broad. (142). However, the point is not how to call the approach, but that various forms of social movement are attributed to migration, although it is obvious that it is wrong to combine migration and social movement under one concept. Unfortunately, this happens quite often.
In a work published in the 60s, J. Szczepanski defines migration as any movement, regardless of the change in location in geographic space (151). In the early 70s, M.V. Kurman in a number of works tried to define migration as any form of social movement. They, for example, presented staff turnover as a type of migration (54). Later, he noted that territorial migration does not exhaust the whole variety of types of population migration. It includes intersectoral and intrasectoral migration, which can be called industrial migration. It is quite legitimate to talk about educational and professional migration. Further, he notes that "population migrations in the broad sense of the word should include all types of population movements that have social significance" (132.p.98). In 1976, he confirmed this point of view (53).
Actually, the point of view of M.V. Kurman is a repetition of what E.F. Baranov and B.D. Breev back in the second half of the 60s. In their opinion, migration can be considered from the point of view of three different aspects - as territorial, sectoral and professional migration. This approach was due to the fact that the authors replaced the term mobility with the term migration (lat. migratio, i.e. resettlement). As soon as they summed up the various types of movements under a single generic concept of "mobility", everything fell into place. In a work published in 1977 by B.D. Breev writes not about migration or migratory mobility, but about the fact that mobility includes territorial, sectoral and professional movement (11). In this and especially in a work published in 1982, he understands mobility as an expression of a person's ability to change his social status (154). In such an understanding of mobility and its types, this point of view cannot be attributed, as A.U. Homra, to this group of definitions, since B.D. Breeva is not talking about migration, but about a broader concept - the movement (he has mobility) of the population, and, by the way, he already considers it not as movement, but as the ability to do so.
Speaking about this point of view as a whole, it should be emphasized that the essence is that all definitions that equate migration with various types of movement essentially confuse territorial and social movement. Here, different phenomena are identified: the movement of people across the territory and the movement of people by educational groups, professions, industries, enterprises, etc. Indeed, these are all displacements, but displacements of a different nature and, moreover, the result.
The second group, the most common and now recognized by the majority, includes those definitions of migration that include only territorial movements of the population. The characterization of this group of definitions should not begin with the works of Yu.N. Kozyreva or B.S. Khorev, dating back to the 70s, as A.U. Homra, but from the works of the late 50s - early 60s, when for the first time in the post-war literature all possible definitions of migration related to territorial population movements were formulated. After more than 20 years, V.I. Perevedentsev reiterated that population migration can be considered in the broad sense of the word as a set of all movements of people in space and in a narrower, special sense of the word as a set of migrations of people associated with a change of their place of residence for a relatively long period (95).
Considering migrations only as territorial movements of the population, it should be noted that they are very different both in the distance between the place of exit and the place of entry, and in the status of those objects between which migrants move, and in terms of the periods for which people move, and in goals, which they are pursuing. Movements can occur both within a settlement and between settlements of different socioeconomic status, within and between territories of different taxonomic significance. At the same time, movements can be made voluntarily, forcibly and involuntarily. They may be based on economic, environmental, social, political, religious and other factors. Migrations can differ not only depending on the factors and methods of movement that determine them, but also on their directions, goals, etc. All this determines the diversity of definitions of population migration.
There are at least three possible approaches to including various types of territorial movement of the population in migration. First of all, migration refers to the whole variety of spatial movement of the population, regardless of its nature and goals. This includes moving from one settlement to another, daily trips to work or study outside populated areas, arrival in a particular area for temporary, including seasonal, work, business trips, vacations and other movements. Most researchers exclude from migration those spatial movements that occur within the same settlement. However, there is no unity of views in this regard. For example, Yu.N. Kozyrev refers to migration all movements that take place within settlements, even if they are associated with visiting trade enterprises (33.p.76)
Further, migration includes such spatial movements that occur between settlements, which lead to a permanent or temporary change of residence, and also represent a regular two-way movement between the place of residence and the sphere of work or study. Return episodic business and recreational trips from one settlement to another are not taken into account.
Finally, migration refers to such a process of spatial movement of the population, which ultimately leads to its territorial redistribution. In this case, the attribution of spatial movement to migration is determined by the actual resettlement from one locality to another and, in a number of countries, by formal registration in a new place of residence. At the same time, there is a connection between the place of residence and the sphere of application of labor, study or other activities in one settlement.
Depending on one of the three approaches or a combination of them, any set of types of territorial displacement of the population can be attributed to migration. It is no coincidence that the most opposing points of view can be found in the literature. So, I.S. Matlin refers to migrations as a change of residence and pendulum migration (72), while V.V. Pokshishevsky believes that pendulum migration should be excluded, since it is only a special form of settlement (132.p.14).
Most researchers proceed, however, from the second approach, according to which they include three types of territorial displacement of the population under migration. But if we proceed from the first approach to the definition of migration, then we can distinguish not three, but four main types of spatial movement of the population. These include episodic, pendulum, seasonal and permanent migration. Of course, it is most controversial to include in the territorial movement of the population such a form as occasional trips. First A.U. Homra included in migration only trips such as tourism (141), then L.L. Shamileva attributed recreational movements to migration (149), which K.Sh. Amiraslanov also considers the composition of temporary (seasonal) migrations (7).
In addition to the three main types, it is legitimate, especially for modern conditions, to consider episodic migrations as an independent type, and in them - recreational trips, which are fully consistent with the concept of "territorial population movement". Of course, we should not forget that all four types of migration are specific in nature, and the population participating in them pursues completely different goals.
Episodic migrations are business, recreational and other trips that are not only irregular in time, but also not necessarily in the same directions. If able-bodied contingents participate in business trips, then the rest of the population also participates in recreational trips. The composition of participants in episodic migration is very diverse. In terms of scale, this type of migration, apparently, surpasses all others. Unfortunately, it is studied very poorly. The only exception was, perhaps, only tourist trips, the volume of which constantly increased in the Soviet years. In the early 1980s, the number of people who made tourist trips more than doubled compared to 1970 and exceeded 60 million (1). Today, the scale of trips of Russian citizens for recreation and tourism purposes outside the country has increased many times over, but whether this has increased their total volume, including internal movements, is difficult to say. In any case, to present a figure of 30 million trips, and this is Russia's share, proportional to the size of its population in the former USSR, would be an excessive exaggeration. Another thing is the trip of "shuttles", which, with a certain degree of conventionality, can be attributed to episodic migrations. These probably include the pilgrimage and some other movements.
Circular migrations are daily or weekly trips of the population from places of residence to places of work (and vice versa) located in different settlements. In many countries, a significant part of the urban and rural population participates in pendulum migrations. On the most significant scale, it takes place in those agglomerations whose centers are large and largest cities. In the last 10-20 years, the importance of pendulum migrations in the territorial movements of the population has increased significantly. In a number of countries, the scale of daily pendulum migrations is close to the volume of annual irrevocable resettlements and even exceeds them. According to B.S. Khoreva and V.N. Čapek in last quarter In the 20th century in the USSR, the ratio between permanent and pendulum migration was 2:3 (143).
Circular migrants increase quantitatively and change qualitatively the labor resources of settlements - centers of gravity, where the number of jobs exceeds their own labor resources or does not correspond to the professional and qualification structure of the population. On the other hand, pendulum migration creates conditions for satisfying the diverse labor needs of residents, as a rule, of small settlements, in which the choice of jobs is qualitatively and sometimes quantitatively limited.
Seasonal migrations are movements, mainly of the able-bodied population, to places of temporary work and residence for a period, usually several months, with the possibility of returning to places of permanent residence. Seasonal migration not only raises the real standard of living, but also satisfies the needs of production that is experiencing a shortage of labor. Such migrations arise due to the fact that in the economy of a number of regions the dominant position belongs to industries in which the need for labor is uneven over time. As a result, during the peak seasons, these industries are experiencing an exceedingly large demand for labor. Since it cannot be satisfied at the expense of local labor resources, additional labor is attracted from other areas.
The sectors with a seasonal nature of production include, first of all, agriculture. In this industry, during the sowing and harvesting seasons, the need for labor is much greater than in the rest, especially in winter. Seasonal industries include the processing of agricultural raw materials. Integration of this industry with agriculture significantly reduces the need for seasonal migration. Branches with a seasonal character, or stages, of production are also logging (rafting), fishing (coastal fishing) and a number of others. At the same time, the seasonal nature of production is by no means necessarily accompanied by the seasonal nature of labor. Agro-industrial integration, intersectoral cooperation in the use of labor, the use of new technologies and production methods (for example, ocean fishing) essentially negates the need for seasonal migration.
An irrevocable species (or resettlement) can be called migration in the strict sense of the word, corresponding to it etymologically. This explains the fact that a number of researchers call irrevocable migration complete, complete, i.e. taking place forever. Irreversible migration simultaneously meets two conditions: firstly, the population moves from one settlement to another, and, secondly, the movements are accompanied by a change of permanent place of residence. The first condition excludes from migration all possible movements of the population within settlements, and the second excludes return or short-term trips to other settlements.
Types of migration differ not only in formal terms, but also in essence. Thus, irrevocable migration, unlike others, is the most important source of the formation of a permanent composition of the population in populated areas. Naturally, between irrevocable migration and its other types, as noted by M.V. Kurman, there is no insurmountable wall (53). One type of migration can turn into another or act as its starting point. In particular, episodic, circular and seasonal migrations are sometimes precursors of irreversible migration, as they create conditions (primarily informational) for choosing a possible permanent place of residence.
The third group includes definitions that do not share such different concepts as movement and mobility. So, T.M. Karakhanova believes that the definition of the essence of population migration should be based on two interpretations, one of which considers migration as a form of geographic mobility (42). A little later, L.L. Shamileva repeated this definition, calling migration a form of population mobility (149). . Actually, the dissertations of T.M. Karakhanova, L.L. Shamileva and other graduate students of the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University were carried out in line with the works of B.S. Khorev, who, having set the task of creating a "concept of migration mobility of the population in all its forms" (74), in many of his works under migration mobility accepts migration in the broad sense of the word, and in the narrow sense - only resettlement (86. p. 19 ) Resettlement, in turn, is the territorial mobility of the population, i.e. aggregate characteristics of inter-settlement movements of any kind.
A similar position is taken by O.V. Larmin, who considers migration as part of migratory mobility (56). V.N. Chapek and V.M. Moiseenko in the works of the last years of the past century also did not distinguish between mobility and resettlement (81,145). In the works of other researchers of migration, such as, for example, V.I. Perevedentsev, T.I. Zaslavskaya, including ours, also, until the end of the 70s, no distinction was made between mobility and resettlement. So, in 1970. T.I. Zaslavskaya defined migration as geographical mobility, i.e. moving from one locality to another, and in 1973 she wrote that population migration is a private form of mobility (78).
At the same time, the terms "mobility" (mobility) and "displacement" are by no means unambiguous. And it is no coincidence that there are at least four different interpretations of the term "migration mobility". Mobility is seen as general concept various types of movement. It is synonymous with relocation. Both approaches are characteristic of most studies. In the third case, mobility acts as a general concept of potential and real migration. Finally, mobility is the potential willingness of the population to change its territorial status (37). Back in 1973, perhaps the only researcher, M.V. Kurman noted that the word "mobility" denotes the potential ability or readiness of an individual for action rather than the action itself (132.p.99).
In 1978 we, together with T.I. Zaslavskaya, expressed the idea that mobility and migration are different concepts. The published article says that we consider the latter definition to be the most preferable. With this approach, on the one hand, the psychological readiness for displacement is clearly distinguished, and on the other hand, the actual displacement of the population (37). The definition of migration as territorial mobility seems to be inaccurate, and not only for terminological reasons, but also in essence. Under the migration of the population should be understood as territorial movement, and under the mobility (mobility) - the ability to migrate, i.e. potential migratory activity. We emphasize once again that the migration of the population is not mobility, but actual displacement. Mobility, in turn, is not movement, but readiness for it.
Having clarified the essence of territorial movement, establishing the difference between movement and mobility, it is possible to define the migration of the population. Migration, as already noted, in Latin means movement, resettlement. When applied to humanity, the term "migration" is usually used in conjunction with the population. Note that in scientific terms the term "population migration" is very lucky, because its etymological and modern semantic meanings largely coincide.
Once again, we note that displacement and resettlement are by no means synonymous. That is why it is possible to use different terms to refer to migration in the narrow and broad sense of the word. In a narrow sense, migration is a complete type of territorial movement, culminating in a change of permanent place of residence, i.e. literally means migration. The term resettlement, widely used in the literature of the 19th century, very accurately reflects the essence of such a phenomenon as migration. In other words, this is the case when the precision of the definition is not sacrificed for brevity.
Territorial displacement is a broader interpretation of migration. Many researchers refer to migrations in a broad sense, as already mentioned, along with irrevocable also other types of population migration. In a word, the territorial movement that takes place between different settlements of one or more administrative-territorial units, regardless of the duration, regularity and purpose, is migration in the broad sense of the word.
1.3. Essence and functions of population migration
Population migration is a social phenomenon. The population is not only a collection of people, but also a specific system of social ties and relations, thus acting as a subsystem of "society" (114). Population migration is as ancient a phenomenon as man. Before the appearance of man, his anthropoid predecessors moved geographically. But these movements implied a search for commodities given by nature, and not for the working conditions for their production. This is the fundamental difference between the migrations of any populations of the animal world and the migration of the population.
Migration as a spatial movement of the population is characteristic of all human societies. However, the intensity, direction and composition of migration flows, its social, economic and demographic consequences differ significantly not only in different historical eras, but also in countries with different levels of economic development, different natural and geographical conditions and population structures.
Migration of the population affects social development through the implementation of its functions. Functions are those specific roles that population migration plays in the life of society. Naturally, the functions of migration express its essence, the properties of this phenomenon. Therefore, it is difficult to agree with the opinion of V.I. Staroverov that migration in demography performs a demographic function, in ethnography it performs an ethnographic function, in economic geography- urbanization, in social hygiene - social hygiene, etc. (131)
The functions of population migration are not unambiguous. Some of them are independent of the type of socio-economic system and the characteristics of individual societies, the nature of others is determined by the socio-economic conditions of specific countries. The first are the general functions of migration, the second are the specific functions of a particular civilization or, if you like, a socio-economic formation.
T.I. Zaslavskaya, when analyzing population migration, distinguishes among its most general functions accelerating, selective and redistributive. In the works of the late 20th century, she reduced the essence of the first of them to ensuring one or another level of spatial mobility of the population (78). Territorial movements contribute to changing the socio-psychological characteristics of people, expanding their horizons, accumulating knowledge about various areas of life, exchanging work skills and industrial experience, developing the individual, his material, social and spiritual needs, and integrating national cultures. A more mobile population, as a rule, is also more socially active. Thus, migration in any case leads to the development of the population. "Without creating the mobility of the population, there can be no development" (58. p. 246).
The development of the population is very difficult to express with the help of indicators that characterize one or another property of a population of people. It would seem that such a characteristic as the educational level is the most appropriate, but, based on the data of the former Soviet Union, a comparison of migration mobility (the intensity of migration of the population of territorial units) with the level of education (the number of people with secondary general education per 1,000 employed) revealed a decrease in the intensity of migration with an increase in educational level, although theoretically one would expect the opposite.
The role of the educational level of the population is evidence of its social development, an organic element of which is the increase in its mobility. V.I. Lenin, to be objective, was not only a proletarian leader, the founder of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet state, but he was also an outstanding scientist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It is to him that the words belong that no school can give people that which gives them an independent acquaintance with the various conditions of life (58).
Another function of migration is the redistribution of the population associated with the placement of productive forces, the distribution production capacity and investments between separate territories of the country, including between natural areas, districts, different types of rural and urban settlements. The peculiarity of the redistributive function is due to its inter-territorial nature, since the interaction of the population of at least two regions is necessary for resettlement.
Performing a redistributive function, migration not only increases the population of certain territories, but also indirectly affects the dynamics of demographic processes, because migrants participate in the reproduction of the population. Therefore, the significance of migration in changing the population of a given area is always greater than the proportion of migrants in the population of this area. The role of migration in the reproduction of the population is most significant in areas with a relatively low intensity of natural movement. Thus, in the Soviet years in the Baltic States, which had the lowest birth rate, there was the highest proportion of descendants of migrants in the natural increase - 30 out of 100 people. On the contrary, in the republics of Central Asia, which were characterized by the highest birth rate, this figure was 4-5 people (113).
The third function of migration is selective. Its essence is that the uneven participation of various socio-demographic groups in migration leads to a change in the qualitative composition of the population of different territories. Experience shows that men and people of working age participate in migration more actively than disabled people and women. There are great differences in the migration mobility of people of different nationalities, as well as the indigenous inhabitants of a particular area and those who have recently settled there from other areas.
The general functions of migration have a certain independence and, at the same time, are closely interconnected. Territorial redistribution of the population and changes in its qualitative composition are carried out only with appropriate mobility. The quantitative redistribution of the population may or may not be combined with a change in its qualitative composition in areas of outflow or inflow of migrants. Similarly, intensive qualitative population selection can take place even when the quantitative result of redistribution is negligible (78). Thus, due to the manifestation of selective selection of migrants in areas with even a small balance of migration exchange, the structure of the population can change markedly. In turn, the outflow of the population from some areas and the influx of migrants there from others will significantly renew the composition of the population and change its migration activity. The functions of increasing mobility, redistributive and selective, manifest themselves ambiguously in different types of migration. In some cases, as, for example, in episodic migration, the function of developing mobility is of the greatest importance, in others, such as resettlement, all functions manifest themselves in full. Nevertheless, in all migratory movements, the essence of migration is revealed to the greatest extent through its functions.
From the formal, external side, the general functions of migration for all civilizations, all formations are similar. Everywhere, migration processes are characterized by redistributive and selective functions. They also contribute to the development of the population. However, the essence of migration is not only in these functions. Migration has at least two more functions: economic and social, functions that contribute to changing the living conditions of the population.
Regardless of the socio-economic mechanism through which territorial distribution material factors of production, the economic function of population migration in the general view is reduced to the connection with the means of production of the labor force and its carrier - the able-bodied population. The implementation of this task in full on the basis of the implementation of the general functions of migration: accelerating, redistributive and selective, should lead to the provision of quantitative and qualitative correspondence between the material and personal factors of production. Which mechanism - planning and distribution or market (overflow of capital and labor) is more effective time will tell.
The social function of population migration is entirely determined by the level of economic development of the country and its policy. Within this framework, migrants solve their life problems: through resettlement, they seek to improve their lives. Migration as a result of its implementation social function, is an iterative process of improving the living standards of the migrant population. This conclusion is based on the results of sociological surveys conducted in many parts of the country and showing that the bulk of migrants in new places provides themselves with a higher standard of living than in places of origin. This is understandable, otherwise migration would be pointless for those who want to improve their well-being. True, this applies only to voluntary migrations. Forced and involuntary migrations are subject to different laws.
1.4. The concept of three stages of the migration process
Unlike natural movement, which is an internal property of such a system as population, migration is an external movement in relation to it. Regardless of the existing definitions of the demographic system, each of them must include such a moment as spatial localization. Therefore, each demographic system is, first of all, a territorially defined set of people. Naturally, the presence of at least two such demographic systems is the first objective prerequisite for population migration.
In migration, each individual event, whether it be arrival, departure or resettlement, is its elementary cell. This position would not need comments if other opinions were not found in the literature. So, A.U. Homra believes that "the act of changing labor should be recognized as the primary cell in the process of population migration" (141). But if migration is understood as a change of place of residence (moving from one settlement to another), then for this it is not necessary to change the profession, occupation, branch of labor application. At the same time, the change of the latter can occur without changing the place of residence.
The migration process is a set of events that entail a change of residence. Some of these events are explicit, for example, resettlement, others are latent (the formation of mobility, etc.). In order for all these events to represent a process, they, i.e. arrivals, departures, etc., must constitute a statistically significant population. Migration is a quantitatively massive process.
For each territorial set of people participating in the migration exchange with other territorial sets of the population, the composition of outgoing migrants does not coincide with the composition of arrivals, and not so much quantitatively as qualitatively. This migration differs from other types of migration. So, in tourism, the composition of departing and arriving is almost the same. The same can be said about pendulum and seasonal migration. Only the structure of such a migration process as resettlement is characterized by great diversity.
Migration, like other processes, takes place in time, so it can be measured in a certain interval. The characteristic of the migration structure is taken as the average for this interval. A structure is a process in statics, and a process is essentially a structure in dynamics, i.e. continuous change of states of the structure. Moreover, not only the structure of the migration process is constantly changing, but also those aggregates of people who give and receive migrants. Migration is thus the most important factor changes in various sections of the structure of the population of exit areas and places of migrants' settlement.
So, migration events in their mass, spatially localized, i.e. considered with respect to certain territorial aggregates of people, taken over a sufficiently large time interval, represent an organically single series of facts of arrival, departure or resettlement. Each of these series of events can be represented as a migration process. Processes are relatively homogeneous series of phenomena connected by mutual causal dependencies, a single series of changes in social systems(151). According to V. Yadov, the process is a purposeful set of mass phenomena of the same order (155). Both of these definitions capture the essence of a simple migration process relatively accurately: the process of the departure of the population from one point (region), the arrival of the population to another point (region) or a certain flow of migrations. But if there are more than two territorial populations of people between whom the migration exchange takes place, then the processes of departure, arrival and resettlement are structurally and quantitatively different from each other.
At the same time, for each territorial population of people, the migration process acts as a twofold movement, i.e. as a stream of departures and as a stream of arrivals. The two-sidedness of the migration process is due not to the fact that in places of entry there are forces of attraction, but in the areas of exit - forces of expulsion (both are present in each area), but because the migration process is the interaction of two oppositely directed relatively homogeneous series of events.
However, if for territorial aggregates of people the migration process is presented as a series of arrivals, a series of departures and their interaction, the end result of which is the migration balance, then it looks completely different for the migration participants themselves. The latter is due to the fact that for a migrant, the event is not the beginning (departure) or end (arrival) of a migratory movement, but the resettlement itself, i.e. change of permanent residence. Therefore, when considering migration, firstly, from the side of territorially localized populations and, secondly, from the side of participants in resettlement, a different meaning is put into the concept of a migration event. The migration process can also be presented in different ways.
From the formal point of view, the migration process is a series of migration events fixed in space and time. This fixation is carried out at the time of registration of migrants at the new and old places of residence. In the past, this operation was called the discharge of the outgoing population and the registration of the incoming population. Each single resettlement is recorded twice: first as a fact of departure and then as a fact of arrival. Both events are separated both in time and geographically. But if we consider the migration process not from the formal side, but in essence, then it is a set of actual migrations. Formal milestones (fixation of departure and fixation of arrival) divide the migration process into three stages (phases): initial, main and final. Note that the concept of "stage" is broader than the concept of "phase". A stage is not only a certain moment in the course of development, but also a stage that has its own qualitative characteristics. Therefore, it is this term that is most appropriate for characterizing the three different components of the migration process.
The development of the concept of the three-stage migration process falls on the last third of the 20th century. It was published in a comparatively complete form at the end of the 1980s (115), although its main provisions saw the light in the late 1970s. (37). Since the end of the 1950s, studies have been carried out that have revealed the relationship between resettlement and the survival rate of migrants. Such connections were described in the migration literature of the 19th century. In the second half of the twentieth century, they were comprehended again, on the basis of contemporary empirical material for that time. Once again, the old truth was confirmed: the degree of novelty in science is determined by the measure of forgetfulness.
L.L. came closest to understanding the concept of the three-stage migration process. Shamilev, who noted that the migration process in its development goes through the stage of potential migration, the stage of the direct act of migration and the stage characterizing the consequences of migration processes (149). Adjusting for the fact that the consequences of migration processes (results of the territorial movement of the population) are much wider than the survival rate of new settlers, and potential migration is only one of the aspects of migration mobility, this scheme can be accepted as preceding the concept of a three-stage migration process.
The fundamental provisions of the concept of the three-stage migration process can be summarized as follows. Firstly, migration mobility (mobility) and migration movement (resettlement) are considered as two, although interrelated, but essentially different phenomena: the first as the ability (readiness) to migrate (attitude), the second - as an act of movement, the implementation of the attitude for migration. With the definition of differences between these two phenomena and concepts adequate to them, the introduction of sociological knowledge into migration issues, in particular, ideas about projective and real behavior, about intentions and their implementation, and the reality of the latter is made dependent on both personal characteristics and situational parameters.
Secondly, there was a rejection of a one-sided understanding of the process of human interaction with a new social environment and natural and geographical conditions. The deepening of knowledge about the survival rate of the population in the areas of settlement, the isolation of this process of adaptation as its organic component and giving it a subject orientation, allowed us to consider the migration of the population as a process that has a completed character.
Thirdly, singling out of the resettlement of its core part - the migration flow, made it possible to show the difference between the migration turnover and the number of participants in the process. The total flow appeared as a certain set of direct and reverse migration movements, structured according to personal and geographical features. Ultimately, migration flows tied together the entire set of areas of exit and settlement, which created the basis for the formation of regional indicators of migration links.
Thus, any completed migration process consists of three stages:
Initial, or preparatory stage, representing the process of formation of the territorial mobility of the population;
The main stage, or the actual resettlement of the population, migration flows;
The final, or final stage, acting as the survival rate of migrants in a new place.
The individual stages of the migration process are closely linked. A migrant is a future newcomer during the period of his territorial displacement, and a newcomer is a former migrant during the period of his settlement and adaptation in the area of settlement. The extreme stages of the process are also connected. So, new settlers, having increased migration activity, i.e. ability to relocate, to a large extent are also potential migrants.
Chapter 2 FORMATION OF MOBILITY - INITIAL
STAGE OF THE MIGRATION PROCESS
2.1. Migration mobility and potential
migration. Ethno-demographic differentiation
The first stage of the migration process is the formation of the territorial mobility of the population, i.e. his particular socio-psychological state. In Russia, a person in such a state is usually referred to as “easy-going”. However, having high migration mobility and being a potential migrant are far from the same thing. These concepts, although closely related, are by no means synonymous. Back in the late 60s of the last century, T.I. Zaslavskaya noted that in addition to the practical implementation of the propensity to migrate, there is also the process of forming a potential propensity to migrate (127). Two years later, she gave a complete definition of this concept. "A positive attitude towards mobility, combined with a decision made but not yet implemented to move in the world of work, constitutes the so-called potential mobility" (80.p.142). Based on her later understanding of this phenomenon, in the above quotation, mobility should be replaced by migration. In the field of rural-urban migration, this provision was interpreted by L.V. Korel, according to which "potential migration is a psychological state of a villager's readiness to leave a given village" (49. pp. 111-112).
The volume of potential migration can be determined using a questionnaire survey of the population. Those respondents who answer the corresponding question of the questionnaire that they intend to migrate are classified as potential migrants with varying degrees of probability of leaving, and the rest are stable (stationary) residents of the village (78,145).
Unlike potential migration, migration mobility is, as it were, an objectified state, the ability of an individual to migrate, formed as a result of accumulated migration experience. Such an experience L.V. Korel aptly calls it a migratory biography. The latter includes a set of movements preceding the moment of sociological survey (49). This is essentially one of the expressions of the level of mobility of the population. With the help of a certain system of indicators, it is possible to assess the migration mobility of the population, both of a particular territory as a whole, and of its individual groups, which differ in various parameters.
Mobility depends primarily on the number of resettlements made, the duration of residence in the exit area or place of resettlement, etc. It is largely related to the participation of the population in other types of migration, in particular, in tourism, commuting, etc. A combination of various circumstances can lead to the fact that persons with less migratory mobility, i.e. migratory background or experience will be among the potential migrants, while migrants with many movements behind them will be included in the permanent population. Nevertheless, under equal living conditions, persons with greater migratory mobility, as a rule, also have a greater psychological readiness for resettlement. A person with extensive migration experience is more likely to decide to relocate if he is not satisfied with the living conditions in the last place of residence than someone who was born in the area and lived there all his life.
Migration mobility is a property inherent not only to an individual person, an individual, but also to the entire population of people, the population as a whole. Increasing migration mobility is a historical, irreversible process, just like the development of mankind. It can be characterized in the most general form by an increase in the intensity of movements, primarily population migrations. In Russia, in pre-revolutionary times, according to approximate calculations by A.A. Kaufman, 0.14% of the total population of the country, or 10% of its annual natural increase, participated in the resettlements (44.p.4). In the postwar years, according to the calculations of M.Ya. Sonina participated in migrations 6 times more than before the revolution (124.p.161). For comparison with pre-revolutionary times, one can cite the following fact: in the seventies of the XX century. the volume of population migrations was 3-3.5 times higher than the number of those born in the country, and was 4.5-5 times higher than the natural population growth (128) More precisely, in the last third of the last century, 25-30 times more participated in migrations, than in the days of A.A. Kaufman.
An assessment of the migration mobility of the population is given in the monograph by V.M. Moiseenko. Her calculations show the dynamics of migration mobility in the postwar years. In 1940, one resident in the USSR made 12.1 per year various trips, while in 1981 - 21.5 (81). In the 1990s, under the conditions of reforming Russia, the volumes and, accordingly, the intensity of migration of the population decreased. This fact is noted by I.B. Orlova, Zh.A. Zaionchkovskaya and others. the total volume of migration was lower than in the past by 20-25%, and in 1963. it decreased by another 30% (75.p.6). I.B. Orlova writes that in 1992. the total migration turnover per 1000 inhabitants of Russia was less than in 1991. by 11% and 1/3 below the level of 1986-1990. (123.p.7). In 2000 the number of migrants registered as arrivals has decreased since 1993. by 1.2 million people, and those who left, respectively, by 1 million. in Russia compared to 1973. the scale of arrivals and departures in urban areas decreased by 3.3 times. In the past decade, the scale of population migration in Russia was only 1.3 times higher than the number of births. And this despite the fact that there was a sharp drop in the birth rate of the population (the annual number of births in the 90s was about half that of the previous decade.)
Of course, the growth of migration alone does not fully characterize the increase in the mobility of the population. It is also increasing significantly as a result of urbanization processes, the development of tourism, sanatorium and resort services for the population, etc. The population living in different regions of the country, in settlements of different social status, differs different levels migratory mobility. It depends both on the degree of socialization of individuals, separate groups and the population of a particular territorial unit as a whole, and on the features of its structure (Table 2.1.1)
Table 2.1.1
Distribution of subjects of the Russian Federation by level of migration
Mobility in 2000
| Indicators of the intensity of population migration, ppm | Number of subjects of the Russian Federation | Examples |
| Up to 10.0 | 4 | Moscow region, St. Petersburg, Ingushetia |
| From 10.1 to 15.0 | 16 | Krasnodar Territory, Mordovia, Ryazan Region |
| From 15.1 to 20.0 | 35 | Tomsk region, Dagestan, Kaliningrad region. |
| From 20.1 to 30.0 | 16 | Khabarovsk Territory, Buryatia, Murmansk Region. |
| 30.1 and above | 8 | Jewish Autonomous Region, Kalmykia, Magadan Region. |
| Total | 79 | Average -16.7 ppm |
The population migration intensity coefficients range from 4.2 (Moscow) to 75.2 per thousand (Chukotka). The very fact that the indicators are so different not only for Moscow and Chukotka, but also for the extreme groups (4-10 and 30-75) indicates their low suitability for characterizing migratory mobility. Rather, they characterize the degree of realization of potential migration.
The existing differences in the coefficients of migration intensity by regions of the country are to a certain extent associated with the migration mobility of men and women, as well as people of different ages (by the way, among the subjects of the Federation, Chukotka has the highest proportion of men and one of the highest proportion of people of working age).
All post-war population censuses, which determined the time of residence in the place of the census, confirmed that the migration mobility of men in our country is higher than that of women. For example, at the time of the 1970 census. the excess of men over women in the whole of the former USSR was approximately 40%. (128). In 1970 those migrants who settled in the area for the last two years and remained there at the time of the census were taken into account. In Russia as a whole, there were 8.2% of such men, while 7.1% of women, with a ratio in the population of the federation of 45.7 and 54.3%.
The general pattern, consisting in the excess of the proportion of men over women in the composition of migrants, has, however, a number of features. So, in the study of rural-urban migration, Korel L.V. found that as the level of urbanization of rural settlements increases, the proportion of men in the migration outflow decreases (49.p.103) . A number of studies have shown that women tend to have more one-time moves, while men have more multiple moves (20).
In the 1990s, judging by the coefficients of intensity of migration of men and women, there was a convergence of these indicators. In particular, in 2000. the intensity of male migration exceeded that of women by only three hundredths of a percentage point, and in urban areas it was 0.07 points, while in countryside indicators of intensity of migration for women were higher than for men (by 0.03 points).
The 1970 population census also revealed differences in the migratory mobility of people of different ages. Among the urban population of working age, on average in the USSR, it was more than 3 times higher than among those of pre-working age, and almost 4 times higher than among those who had gone beyond working age. Migration mobility among people aged 16-24 is 8-10 times higher than in the age group under 16 (128) Differences in the migration mobility of the population of working age, on the one hand, and those beyond the working age, on the other, were especially significant , in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia, to the least extent they are observed in the Baltic republics.
Data on the age characteristics of migrants in the 1979 census. have not been published. Actually, there is no information on the migration of the population in the seventies and subsequent years in open publications. This is due to the fact that in 1976. demographic statistics subjected to sequestration at the initiative of the defense department, supported by the USSR State Planning Committee. The main argument was that the migration involved in the majority of men and able-bodied persons, and this is the mobilization potential. The objections of the Central Statistical Bureau and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR against the closure of demographic information turned out to be little consolation for the participants in the interdepartmental commission.
The information received as a result of the 1989 census did not see the light - the Soviet Union collapsed. Therefore, the migration mobility of the Russian population in the nineties can be judged from the data of a sample survey in 1994. (Table 2.1.2)
Table 2.1.2
Intensity of migration of people of different age groups in 1994
(the ratio of the number of migrants to the population
this age group)
| Age contingents | All migrants | Including: |
|
| Migrants who lived at the survey site for up to 2 years | Migrants who lived at the survey site from 2 to 5 years |
||
| Up to able-bodied | 0.315 | 1.103 | 0.931 |
| able-bodied | 1.123 | 1.165 | 1.226 |
| Older than able-bodied | 1.437 | 0.432 | 0.461 |
Comparison of indicators of the intensity of migration of men and women, calculated by ten-year age groups for 2000, indicates that the highest level of these coefficients is observed in the group of 20-29 years old. The intensity of migration of men in this age group is twice as high as in people under the age of 20 and in the group of 30-39 years old, and 3 times as compared with the population over 50 years old. In women of the age group of 20-29 years, the indicators are 1.5 and 3-4 times higher, respectively.
Indirect characteristics of the migration mobility of the population, expressed in terms of the intensity of migration, of course, cannot fully reveal its dynamics and territorial differences in the mobility of various groups of the population. To a greater extent, the level of population mobility could be characterized by the number of movements that a person makes during all or part of his life. Since there was no such accounting in the former USSR, nor in modern Russia If not, we will use the data for Hungary. According to the materials of the last quarter of the 20th century, every inhabitant of Hungary made more than four migratory movements throughout his life (31. p. 207).
These indicators should differ between the working-age population and those who have already retired. Although, of course, the older a person is, the more movements he made during his life, but, on the other hand, the level of migration mobility of the population increases along with social development, i.e. in the 80s it was probably higher than, for example, in the 60s.
Migration mobility is not only different for people of different ages, but also for people of the same age living in different parts of the country. So, at one time, Ukrainian scientists N.N. Sachuk and V.A. Stakhovich revealed territorial differences in the migration mobility of centenarians. They showed that the number of moves for people aged 80 and over during their lifetime was 0.53 in Moldova, 0.82 in Abkhazia, 0.85 in Belarus, 0.88 in Ukraine and 1 in Lithuania. 25. Over a lifetime, on average in the surveyed areas, 47.1% of persons aged 80 years and older did not change their place of residence (20).
Large differences existed in the migration mobility of people of different nationalities living in the former USSR. 1970 population census data. allowed the titular nationalities of the Union republics to be divided into four groups depending on the level of migration mobility of the indigenous population living there. As indicators by which the distribution was made, the coefficients of the intensity of migration of urban residents and the proportion of people who lived in places of settlement for at least two years were taken.
The first group included Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians. They had the highest coefficient of migration intensity compared to other nationalities, and the proportion of people who lived in places of resettlement for less than two years (conditionally new settlers) among them was 5-7%.
The second group is Moldovans, Kazakhs, Estonians and Latvians. Representatives of these nationalities migrated with a lower intensity than representatives of the first group - the migration intensity coefficients were almost 1.5 times lower, and the proportion of new settlers ranged from 3.1% for Moldovans to 5.8% for Estonians.
The third group is Kyrgyz, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Turkmens and Georgians. This group was characterized by an even lower intensity of migration - 1.5-2 times lower compared to the first group, and the proportion of new settlers among these nationalities was 1.4-2.5%.
The fourth group is Uzbeks and Tajiks. The intensity of migration among them was 3 times lower than among the nationalities included in the first group, and the proportion of new settlers was 1.4-2.2%.
The lowest migration mobility was among the indigenous population of the republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, who lived in rural areas (4-7 times lower than in Russia). Such a low intensity of migration with high rates of natural increase inevitably led to an increase in the proportion of people of indigenous nationalities in the rural population of these republics. On the contrary, the highest migratory mobility was urban population areas of new development located in Siberia, the North and the Far East.
According to the 1989 population census, it is possible to establish which main nationalities living in Russia are characterized by the greatest migration mobility. At the same time, of course, one should not forget that the applied coefficients are just rough indicators for such comparisons (Table 2.1.3).
Table 2.1.3
The intensity of migration of the main nationalities in Russia
(1989 census, relative to the national average)
| Nationalities | Above average arrivals | Exceeding the average level in dropouts |
| Russians | 0.862 | 0.883 |
| Ukrainians, Belarusians | 1.284 | 1.13.4 |
| Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvashs | 1.239 | 1.264 |
| Mordovians, Maris, Udmurts | 0.928 | 0.985 |
| peoples of the North Caucasus | 1.036 | 0.794 |
| peoples of the North | 0.703 | 0.768 |
| Germans, Jews | 0.863 | 1.896 |
| the entire population of Russia | 1.000 | 1.000 |
The data in Table 2.1.3 is very difficult to comment on. The simplest is the migration of Germans and Jews. These ethnic groups leave the country most intensively (exceeding the average for the entire population by 1.9 times) and are not very active in internal migration. It is difficult to explain why Tatars, Bashkirs, Udmurts, Ukrainians and Belarusians have higher migration intensity coefficients than Russians, and the latter below the average. One cannot seriously think that during the years of reforms only Russians have lost their migration activity. It is easier to comment on the peoples of the Caucasus, where arrivals are above average and departures are lower.
Thus, demographic and ethnic differences in the population of different regions of the country determine its different migration mobility. But these characteristics are not decisive in differentiating the migration mobility of various groups of the population. To a decisive extent, migration mobility is influenced by the genetic (from genesis) structure of the population.
The genetic structure of the population and its study
In areas whose population has been growing for many years due to an intensive migration influx, a very peculiar set of people is formed, different in a number of ways from the population of those territories from which migrants arrive. The main difference lies in the level of stability of the composition of the population. In demography, the term "stable population" has a dual meaning. Traditionally, stabilization is understood as a process that gives the population all the properties of a stable age and sex structure. This is achieved while maintaining for a certain long period of time some regime of population reproduction given at the initial moment.
The term "stable population" has a different meaning when it comes to the process of population formation, usually areas of new development. Here, in the totality of people, some individuals are replaced by others, regardless of whether they have the same or different demographic characteristics. This replacement is carried out as a result of interdistrict migration processes.
The calculation of the level of stability (in this case, constancy) of the composition of the population is not only of theoretical importance. It is connected with the development of measures to attract stable labor resources. It is no coincidence, therefore, that in the second half of the 20th century the concept of "permanent population" (stable population) could be found in almost all demographic studies devoted to the eastern and northern regions of the country. In a number of works attempts have even been made to theoretically define this concept (98, 157).
Assessment of the level of stability of the population is impossible without the development of the concept of "permanent population". The comprehension of this demographic concept is organically connected with the idea of the classification of the composition of the population. Classification involves the logical division of the studied population into constituent parts. This division is based on one principle or another. Despite the fact that any classification is conditional, it is an important means of scientific knowledge.
The classification of the composition of the population necessitates the division of the studied population into parts depending on differences in the degree of their stability, which, in turn, is directly related to the genesis of various population groups, the time of their introduction. Depending on the genesis of the various parts of the studied population, it can be divided into indigenous and alien populations. The term "indigenous population" in the economic literature occurs in a double sense. S.A. Novoselsky refers to the indigenous population those born in a particular city, and to the alien - all those born outside it (88.p.205). The same point of view is shared by A.G. Rashin, distinguishing among the pre-revolutionary population of Moscow, indigenous and newcomers (111.p.301).
In 1926-1927. in Irkutsk, the registration of migrants going to the areas located east of Lake Baikal was carried out. The authors of the review, compiled according to this registration, among the migrants who passed through Irkutsk, singled out the indigenous people, who included those born in Siberia, and newcomers - natives of other regions of the country (99.p.36). Researchers of population migration and survival rate of new settlers in Siberia V.I. Perevedentsev and Zh.A. Zaionchkovskaya also refer the natives of this place to the indigenous population (36.p.73). The same approach is typical for the practice of statistical accounting of the population in the United States. Already from the middle of the nineteenth century. the entire population was divided into natives of the United States and natives of other countries, who were children and other descendants of migrants. By A. Lincoln's definition, the entire population of the United States are former migrants. And this is true, since almost the entire indigenous population that lived in the United States was exterminated.
In Russia, too, the population of the northern and eastern territories inhabited at different times, in particular Siberia, is mostly alien. Both in the European north, and in Siberia, and in the Far East, significant enclaves of the indigenous population (Komi, Nenets, Buryats, Yakuts, Nivkhs, etc.) have survived. It is natural, therefore, to contrast the offspring of migrants (their children born in Siberia) with another ( born in other areas) as a native alien is unlawful. We can only talk about different generations (children, fathers, grandfathers, etc.) of the same alien population.
Another meaning attached to the term "indigenous population" is to oppose the alien population to the aborigines. M.A. Sergeev in the mid-thirties of the twentieth century, analyzing the composition of the population of Kamchatka, wrote that in the group of permanent population one should single out indigenous people living in rural areas and being natives of the region (121.p.155). This is the opinion of G.A. Agranata, A.B. Kupriyanov and V.F. Puzanova, who classify the Aleuts, Eskimos, and Indians as the indigenous population of Alaska (2). The point of view of M.A. Sergeev and a number of other authors is legitimate not only etymologically, but also historically: aborigines are the indigenous inhabitants of the area, who have been living in it since ancient times. In the indigenous population, the most ancient inhabitants of this territory can be distinguished. Information about the genesis of this part of the population is associated with their habitation in this territory. In addition, the peoples of other localities, with which their original habitat was associated, could also move here. For example, the Yakuts and the Buryats who displaced them. These, as well as other peoples similar in genesis, have been inhabiting their present territory for a relatively long time. Their modern settlement is largely associated with the movement of stronger peoples in the area of the original habitat.
From the point of view of the formation of the population, only two groups are of interest: the nationalities that have lived since ancient times, and the nationalities that have moved here before the arrival of the Russian population. The modern settlement of the former is associated with their historical evolution, while the appearance of the latter is due to a number of external factors. The rest of the population is made up of descendants of people who arrived in the populated area from the old habitable areas. This idea is most definitely formulated by one of the authors of the book "Asian Russia" V.K. Kuznetsov. He writes: "All Russian population Asiatic Russia is alien, in this sense the so-called old-timers of Siberia are the same settlers as the inhabitants of resettlement villages and towns" (3. p. 188).
Of greatest interest from the point of view of the formation of labor resources in areas of new development is, of course, the study of the composition of the newcomer population, and not only because it is many times larger in number than the indigenous inhabitants, but also because the intensive growth of the population occurs, in essence, through increase in the immigrant population. If you look deep into Russian history, it turns out that Russians for the entire present-day territory of Russia are newcomers everywhere. This was quite convincingly stated by the outstanding Russian historian of the late 19th - early 20th century V.O. Klyuchevsky. At first, the Russians, who came to the present-day central regions of Russia, met here the Finno-Ugric peoples, with whom they peacefully coexisted, in any case, no significant clashes were noted in history. Then, more than 4 centuries ago, cohabitation with the Turkic-speaking peoples of the Volga region began. The 19th century is the time when the North Caucasus was annexed to Russia. Intensive assimilation processes were going on among the Russians and all these peoples. Only during the last three generations in the second half of the twentieth century. there was a mixture of about 1/3 of all Russians. Now, most likely, there are no Russians who are not mixed with anyone: Ukrainians, Tatars, Mordovians, Avars, etc. In addition, the roots of ethnic mixing go back to ancient times, when people from Kievan Rus, having moved to the regions of present-day central Russia, lived together there with indigenous peoples, mutually perceiving much of the material and spiritual culture of each other. In a word, now in the alien population there is enough blood of the indigenous people and vice versa.
