How to apply the method of the two-circuit monetary system of the USSR. Double-loop economy according to nine

On the monetary system of the Stalinist economy They can be called credit, banking, monetary, financial subsystems. All subsystems were organically interconnected. In fact, they formed single system, within which money was created, was regulated

Have you ever wondered, dear reader, how much money can circulate in a market economy? Surely not. Meanwhile, the amount of money in circulation is well known to science and is described by the so-called elementary identity of the quantitative theory of money: MV = PQ. (There are more complex formulas, but let's take the simplest one). Translated into human language, this formula means: the mass of money, multiplied by the velocity of circulation, must equal the mass of realized (sold) goods, expressed in prices. In other words, how much goods are sold in the economy, exactly how much money should circulate in it.

Let's say, if a billion worth of goods are sold in the economy, exactly one billion worth of money should circulate in it. And if a hundred billion worth of goods have been sold, then exactly one hundred billion worth of money should circulate. If more is drawn - this is already inflation. If less, then (to balance both parts of the identity) either a decline in production occurs, or prices fall, or the money supply increases.

Let's pay attention to one circumstance. With the exception of industries financed from the budget, the entire production sector in a market economy is paid for from the proceeds from the sale of consumer goods and redistributed upwards vertically. Let's say, if a farmer buys a tractor, then, ultimately, the cost of this tractor is paid by the consumer of bread products. And if a company produces machine tools, then the production of these machines is ultimately paid not by the one who bought them, but by the one who purchased the products made on these machines.

Everything is invested in the price of the final consumer product: the cost of energy resources, and transportation costs, and payment for raw materials, and deductions to the budget, and much more. Bank lending calculated on the reimbursement of loans and interest on them from future income received, again, from the sale of consumer goods, i.e. and loans are built into the price of final consumer products. In a market economy, the consumer sector is dominant, and the entire economy is based on it. Any market economy is based on personal consumption, which is directly related to personal income citizens. Yes, all over the world. So it was in the USSR. But at what level? The well-known researcher Yuri Emelyanov writes: “By the end of 1924, the country's industry produced extremely little and only the most primitive products. Metallurgy could provide each peasant economy Russia only 64 grams of nails annually. If the level of development of industry would continue to remain at this level, then the peasant, having bought a plow and a harrow, could expect to acquire these items for himself again only in 2045. The country was faced with the task in full growth: either to reverse the economic situation, or to perish.

Revolution in the economy

It is clear that in the economy of such an underdeveloped country, an extremely small amount of money turned around. The death of the state seemed inevitable. The breakthrough in the economy began in 1929. During the first Soviet five-year plan, from 1929 to 1933, about 1500 large industrial enterprises and entire industries that did not exist before were created: machine-tool building, aviation, chemical, ferroalloy production, tractor building, automotive industry and others. A second industrial center was created beyond the Urals (the first in the European part of the country), a circumstance that ultimately decided the outcome of the Great Patriotic War. Large-scale transformations required huge investments. But there was no money for investments.

In the first year of the five-year plan industrial development was funded by only 36%. In the second year - by 18%. And by the end of the five-year period, funding fell to zero. By 1937 the total industrial production increased in comparison with 1928 by almost 4 times. It turned out a paradoxical thing: investments were reduced to zero, and production increased several times. This was achieved using a method that has not yet been used in the history of the economy: the money supply was divided into cash and non-cash parts.

In fact, money is not cash and non-cash. Cash or non-cash is a form of payment or a form of savings. The splitting of money in the Soviet economy into mutually non-convertible parts meant the actual destruction of money as a universal equivalent. Non-cash money in such a system serves mainly as a means of accounting. In essence, this is not money, but counting units, with the help of which material resources are distributed. This has been pointed out by many for a long time. Cash in the Soviet economic system, as well as non-cash, had nothing to do with real money backed by the mass of commodities and served as a means of distributing material wealth, regardless of real labor productivity.

As a result of the transformation of the monetary system Soviet economy ceased to be dependent on the consumer sector. In a market economy, all savings and, accordingly, investments are created from profits from the sale of consumer goods and vertical redistribution, and the scale of the economy expands as the consumer sector expands. In the Soviet-type economy, on the contrary, it is the consumer sector that is in a subordinate position; beginning in 1929, the Soviet economy began to develop in a way that was directly opposite to the market. First of all, the task was to create a defense complex, then mechanical engineering, mechanization of agriculture, creation housing, electrification, etc. And only in the second place is the production of consumer goods.

ingenious solution

Since then, it has been that way. In 1940, 39% of all industrial output in the USSR was consumer goods. In 1980, its share was 26.2%. In 1986 it was 24.7%. The consumer sector in the USSR occupied not only an extremely insignificant place, but was also underdeveloped purely physically. This means an elementary lack of appropriate production capacity: only about 13% of the total production capacity of the Soviet Union was occupied by the production of consumer products.

We know that, in general, the mass of money in an economy is equal to the mass of all goods sold, expressed in prices. In other words, everything depends on the scale of development of the consumer sector. all costs are built into the price of the final consumer product. After 1929, the backward Soviet economy made a breakthrough, and an unrelated mass of industries and infrastructure hung over the consumer sector, the simple financial maintenance of which required a money supply many times greater than that corresponding to the existing mass of commodities.

The decision to divide the money supply into two independent spheres - cash and non-cash - was, no doubt, brilliant. It allowed the country in the shortest possible time to go through a path that, with the normal development of processes, would have taken several centuries (at best). Such a solution of theoretically absolutely insoluble problems was the only possible one in those specific historical conditions, with those production resources that were available, and at that level of technical development.

This solution was not found immediately, but empirically, empirically. The financial system created in the USSR had no analogues in history. It came into such striking contrast with all the experience accumulated by economic science by that time that it took a whole ideological, and not scientific justification for its implementation. As a result, the principles of the Soviet financial system were so camouflaged with ideological constructs that they have not really been comprehended to this day. A breakthrough in the economy led to a complete change in its structure and the creation of an appropriate financial system. He set such a direction of development, in which the economy does not develop in accordance with the growth of personal consumption, but, on the contrary, consumption grows following the increase in the possibilities of the economy.

"Inverted" economy

In an economy structured "in the Soviet way", the consumer sector is not economically significant at all. Changes in personal consumption here affect the economy to a limited extent. The desperate struggle for the creation of a defense complex in the 30s, the Second World War, the need to overcome the post-war devastation and the arms race consolidated the situation. The need to forcefully raise the standard of living of the population in the 1950s and 1970s led to the same results. This is our main feature: we have an economy capable of producing the volume of consumer products equivalent to one money supply, and at the same time the amount of production, infrastructure and social security systems, the financial maintenance of which requires another, larger money supply. Moreover, the second is many times greater than the first.

In addition, the consumer sector and the rest of our economy, as a rule, are almost unrelated. The flow of finance is generally excluded here, even if more than enough money is poured into the economy. Under the Soviet system, this problem was solved by strictly separating the two sectors of the financial system and distributing cash (cash and non-cash) flows in a planned manner. And the need for this was not dictated by Marxist theory, there is nothing of the kind in it. It is predetermined by the very structural characteristics of the economic system created in the USSR after 1929.

The Soviet financial system looks paradoxical from the point of view of Western economists. They simply could not understand it (and the "reformers" too). But in reality, it worked very well. Historically, we have formed an economy structured directly opposite to the Western one, “inverted” in comparison with it. In this "inverted" economy, we are trying to introduce the Western financial system. This is absurd. It is impossible to have one structure of the economy and a financial system designed for a completely different, directly opposite structure of the economy. It is impossible to have an economic structure “like ours” and a financial system “like theirs”. Recall that the economies of all the republics of the USSR were built in exactly this "Soviet" way - jerkily and disproportionately. Therefore, they all have similar structural characteristics. Accordingly, their financial systems also have similar characteristics. Financial and economic problems in general are about the same for them. In other words, both the financial and economic policies of the CIS countries should be carried out by approximately the same methods.

As we have indicated, starting from 1929 (from the beginning of industrialization), the Soviet economy began to develop in a way that was directly opposite to the market one. The market economy is based on the personal consumption of citizens, and in the USSR the consumer sector was not the main one, but a subordinate one. In addition, the Soviet economy, of necessity, was built in such a way that no competition could arise in it: exactly as many enterprises were built as needed for the needs of the economy. Such an economy precludes all competition by its very structure. Thus, the two main defining features of the economy former USSR the following:

1) relative underdevelopment of the consumer sector;

2) the almost complete absence of duplication production activities(competition) in the structure of the economy.

An economy structured in this way requires a specific financial system to ensure its normal functioning. Its essence is as follows. Money is divided into cash and non-cash spheres. Cash Serves purchasing power population. Non-cash "money" is essentially not money, but counting units, with the help of which the distribution of material resources is carried out in a planned manner.

Our advantages

During the “perestroika” period, such an economic structure became the object of heavy criticism from the “reformers”. However, the "reformers" did not present a serious analysis. As arguments, they used mostly emotions, and they presented the fact of criticality as truth. They could not offer something real either then or later. Moreover, some of them - such as, for example, Academician Petrakov, have now moved to directly opposite positions.

The physicist, Academician Yuri Kagan recalls with a caustic mockery of the “ideologists of reforms”: “In Soviet times, at the Kurchatov Institute, I led a seminar where all the leading economists spoke, who did not have a wide platform at that time - Shatalin, Aganbegyan, Zaslavskaya, Petrakov, Shmelev, Abalkin . They argued that the Soviet economy was leading to an abyss. I asked them: do you have an idea how to move from what is not needed to what is needed? They answered: we are not in demand, that's when we are in demand, we will write the necessary program in a month. So what came of it?"

In fact, the economic system built in the USSR, in addition to the well-known shortcomings, had very significant advantages over the Western (market) economy. These advantages are as follows:

1) The transition to a bifurcated financial system made it possible to free this economy from the limiting influence of the effective demand of the population, and it got the opportunity to develop independently of it. In the Western (market) economy, this is impossible. Everything there depends on effective demand: if it grows, the economy goes up; when it contracts, the economy is in recession;

2) Operation based non-cash money(more precisely, counting units) ruled out a situation in which development could be hampered due to a lack of financial resources. Here everything is determined by purely technical possibilities. And such a thing as non-payments or mutual debt simply cannot arise here; accordingly, economic paralysis cannot arise for this reason;

3) Organizational structure economy, excluding competition, allowed it, on the one hand, to reach the industrial level of development, on the other hand, to avoid the monstrous energy, resource and labor intensity of the Western (market) economy. Otherwise industrial country The USSR would never have: it simply would not have been able to overcome the barrier of energy and resource intensity;

4) Centralized system economic management made it possible to concentrate all efforts, resources and funds on selected areas, and to do this promptly, without waiting for this to happen as a result of an overflow of funds due to changes in market conditions, demand, etc.

In essence, the USSR developed a method for creating an economy more developed than the effective demand of the population allows. This valuable experience opens up new prospects for the economies of not only the CIS, but also other countries, and is still waiting to be studied and comprehended.

Objective assessment

In fact, a new type of economic system was created in the USSR, requiring special methods of management and special methods of reform. The fact that this is a fundamentally new, unprecedented in history and at the same time a very promising economic system was not comprehended in time either by the leaders of the state, let alone by the "reformers". Our "reformers", criticizing the Soviet economic system, they just repeated and still stupidly repeat the theses thrown to them from abroad. But after all, how much time has passed, it would be time to understand what was happening. As part of the Cold War, of course, psychological warfare was also waged. It included an attack on the thinking of intellectuals, writers, publicists, scientists, not least economists. It was suggested something like this: "Your economy is good for nothing, destroy it, do as we do." And they destroyed it. Now they are sitting on the ruins of the country and still cannot understand anything. In reality, however, serious Western researchers, free from ideological prejudices, have always highly appreciated the achievements of the Soviet economic system.

Thus, the English magazine The Economist writes: “Contrary to widespread statements, the historical development of the Soviet economy is one of the greatest successes achieved in the twentieth century. The USSR turned out to be one of two countries in the world that rapidly broke through into the group of industrially developed countries: the second country is Japan. Among largest countries In the world, only Japan exceeded the income level of GDP per capita of the USSR. This allowed the Soviet Union to eliminate extreme poverty, ensure the creation of services social insurance, create one of the most comprehensive social security systems in the world, achieve one of the high levels education and healthcare, to create a powerful military potential comparable to that of the United States. In addition to the defense industry, Soviet technology has proven its ability to prove itself at the highest international level. And all this - despite the blockade in the technological field by Western countries, from which Japan, by the way, did not suffer. Under these conditions, the development of the USSR is one of the largest economic achievements in world history.

Let us pay attention, however, to the following striking fact: the USSR achieved outstanding economic success, in all respects inferior to the West. The West (it should be considered as a single economic entity) consumes two-thirds of the resources extracted in the world. The USSR could always rely only on its own resources. Hundreds of millions of working hands are working in the West and hundreds of millions of working hands are working for it all over the world. There were only a few tens of millions of workers in the USSR. And the total industrial potential of the West exceeded the Soviet one not by hundreds, but by thousands of times. Nevertheless, the USSR managed to achieve phenomenal economic success and become the world's second superpower, although theoretically it had neither the strength nor the opportunity to do so. How did he do it? Thanks to that paradoxical (from the point of view of Western economists) structure of the economy and the corresponding paradoxical financial system. We have pointed out the advantages of the latter above.

Practice is the criterion of truth

From all that has been said, it does not at all follow that the Soviet economy was the pinnacle of perfection. Of course, it should have been reformed. But how? This question is difficult and complex. We will not consider it in its entirety. We will only touch upon the question of the financial system. The “reformers”, embarking on their destructive activities, considered it necessary to remove the barrier between the spheres of action of cash and non-cash money. It was a mistake. What should happen if such a barrier is removed in an economy structured in the “Soviet way”? In this case, the following should happen.

The bifurcated cash-non-cash financial system is liquidated, and the economy begins to work on the basis of real money backed by a mass of commodities. Since the economy, structured in the "Soviet way", creates a relatively small amount of consumer goods, the money supply immediately begins to shrink rapidly. As a result, the money supply is reduced to a level at which the normal functioning of the economy is impossible. Due to the general lack of money, financing of everything that is possible and impossible is stopped. A rapid decline in production begins, the situation immediately acquires a tendency to worsen. The effective demand of the population is constantly decreasing, which aggravates the already difficult situation. An increase in the money supply leads to an increase in prices. Strict regulation of the money supply in circulation exacerbates the general shortage of money. The budget is falling apart. The life support systems of the state are falling apart. Literally everything falls apart. "Reforms" come to a standstill.

In a word, during the years of "reforms" everything that should have happened happened. Everything was quite predictable. Conclusion: the problem of lack of money in our economy cannot be overcome - it is built into the very structure of the economic system at our disposal. Why were the economists silent? And they were not silent. Simply economically illiterate "reformers" were unable to understand them.

So, the famous economist V.M. Yakushev wrote back in 1989: “Rubles in relations between enterprises play the role not of money, but of accounting units (“money of account”), with the help of which the exchange of activities is mediated and labor costs are recorded. We have two types of money: "labor" and "accounting" and this is our reality. They cannot be mixed, and even more so, translated “countable” into “labor”. Planned and financial authorities unwittingly take into account this difference and insist that money from other items of expenditure should not be transferred to incentive funds. But this difference is not recognized by commodity-oriented economists, and instead of understanding why practitioners do this, they accuse them of thoughtlessness and ignorance, forgetting that practice is the criterion of truth. Now “accountable” money began to be abundantly transferred to the material incentive funds. And the result is that the financial system is practically disorganized.”

He was right. At that time, many wrote about it. Unfortunately, the management of economic processes fell into the hands of pseudo-economists, whose qualifications, to put it mildly, left much to be desired. They still have not understood and learned nothing. And what should have been done to stop the destruction of the economy? Bring the financial system back into line with the economic structure, that is, restore the barrier. The same Yakushev rightly wrote: “Organize financial relations it is possible only by blocking the transfer of “accounting” money into “labor” money. But this is not consistent with self-financing, which encourages such a spillover, based on the notion that we are dealing with ordinary commodity money. Recall that we are talking about the economy of the USSR as a general example. Everything that has been said about the economy of the former Soviet Union is also true for its constituent parts, since the entire Soviet economy was built according to a single scheme. It is from this that one must proceed.

So, until 1929, the USSR was an economically backward country, about 85% of whose population lived in countryside. In 1929, the country began an economic breakthrough - industrialization. Strictly speaking, it was from this moment that the Soviet economy began to be created. Since there was no money to finance industrialization in the country, the country's leadership found a paradoxical but effective solution: money was strictly divided into two areas of use - cash and non-cash. The scope of cash in such a system serves the immediate needs of the population. Non-cash here, in fact, are not money, but serve as counting units, with the help of which material resources are distributed. When the barrier between these two spheres is removed, the money supply in circulation is compressed to such an extent that the functioning of the economic system becomes impossible. She begins to fall apart physically. This is exactly what happened during the “reforms”.

Marxist ideology confused everyone

The "strangeness" of the new economic and corresponding financial system baffled the founders of the Soviet state and economists of the 1920s and 1930s. They understood that they were building some kind of economic system unprecedented in history, the like of which had not yet been. They put a lot of effort into understanding it. The problem was that Marxism was adopted as the official ideology in the USSR. But after all, Marx himself, in the economic part of his teaching, proceeded from the realities of Western economics, moreover, of the 19th century. Marx considered such an economy the only possible one that should be created throughout the world. He saw the transformation of the world in the way of changing property relations, but precisely within the framework of a Western-type economy.

Thus, building an economy that had nothing in common with the Western one, the communists came into irresolvable contradiction with Marx himself! This, of course, could not be allowed. Therefore, throughout the entire period of the existence of the USSR, Soviet economists tried to link Soviet practice with Marxism. It turned out bad. Or rather, it didn't work at all. How difficult it was to do this can already be judged by the fact that the first political economy textbook was prepared after thirty years of discussions, only in 1954, after the death of Stalin! Academician K. Ostrovityanov wrote in 1958: "It is difficult to name another economic problem that would cause so many disagreements and different points of view as the problem of commodity production and the operation of the laws of value under socialism." At the same time, I. V. Stalin himself understood that the Soviet economic system was moving further and further away from Marxism. He told his followers: “If you look for answers to all questions from Marx, you will be lost. You have to work with your head."

The well-known researcher Sergei Kara-Murza writes: “Stalin, apparently, intuitively felt the inadequacy of the labor theory of value to what really happened in the economy of the USSR. He resisted the rigid imposition of this theory on reality, but he resisted implicitly and indecisively, without having a final answer for himself. The problem is that the task of building new economy was decided as the sum of momentary answers to current questions. The solution found had no theoretical justification either then or later. The rationale was predominantly ideological. Ideological pressure confused everyone, including economists. As a result, the Soviet economics catastrophically lagged behind the Soviet reality. Now we have to reap the fruits of this lag. Nevertheless, although the theoretical views in the USSR were outdated, the practice still gave quite real results. And that's what we need to keep in mind in the first place.

Lieberman reform

For readers far from economic problems, such a statement may even seem strange. However, in fact, there is nothing unusual in it: in the circles of specialists, these issues have been discussed for many decades. The fact is that the Soviet economic system existed for too short a time and in too difficult historical conditions. As a result, theoretically, it was not really comprehended even in Soviet period. And the "reformers" did not try to understand anything in it, they acted on the principle of "break - do not build." As a result, now we are dealing with an economy, in the principles of which we ourselves do not really understand anything. Our economic science has lagged behind our own reality. This abnormal situation should be corrected long ago.

However, there are serious developments in the field of studying the financial system of the Soviet type. They need to be carefully analyzed. For the first time, the principles of the operation of our financial system began to be widely discussed in the mid-60s, during the discussion economic reform 1965, the so-called "Kosygin reform". The discussion began in 1962 with an article in Pravda by Kharkov professor Yevsey Lieberman. Economists are sharply divided into supporters and opponents of the reform. On the pages of the economic press there was a real war. The discussion has stalled. In the end, Alexei Kosygin, using his power as the pre-council of ministers, simply introduced it by will. With all due respect to Alexei Nikolaevich, we must admit that this decision was erroneous.

What did the “Kosygin reform” offer (in the West it is called the “Lieberman reform”)? Prominent Russian economist V. M. Yakushev characterizes it as follows: “It was assumed that if enterprises could transfer part of their profits to their incentive funds, this would solve the problem of stimulating labor, ensure a reduction in production costs and interest teams in intense plans. But something else happened." But what happened "other"? In short, the reform of 1965 began to undermine the country's financial system, and then the entire economy. The barrier between cash and non-cash (counting units) money, which was previously strictly preserved, began to weaken, i.e. what served exclusively for the purposes of accounting began to turn into a medium of exchange! The negative consequences were not long in coming. Unsecured money supply began to accumulate in the hands of the population and on the accounts of enterprises. Economic units turned out to be interested not in increasing output, but in increasing profits, and disorganization began to grow. economic mechanism etc. As a result, by the beginning of the 1980s, the country approached an economic crisis.

Rising tariffs is not an option

It was the “Kosygin reform” that plunged the USSR into what was later called “stagnation”. “Many scholars were already warning about negative consequences such a decision. But their warnings were ignored” (Yakushev). When “perestroika” began, the “reformers”, instead of restoring the normal for this economic structure the financial system, on the contrary, removed the last barriers between cash and non-cash money supply. This led to disaster. That is why the "reforms" of the 90s were immediately dubbed by serious researchers as "a worsened version of the reform of the 65th year." The strategic mistake in economic policy was made as early as 1965. In the 1990s, the "reformers" only worsened the situation. If the economy has not yet completely collapsed, it is only because some fragments of the former financial system have survived - public sector, individual government programs and other. In addition, some sectors of the economy capable of operating on a self-sustaining basis began to operate, self-employment increased, shuttle trade appeared, and so on. But this situation cannot persist for long. If not change economic policy- the collapse of the system cannot be stopped.

What follows from all this? The economy of the former USSR simply cannot operate on the basis of a Western-style financial system. There, in the general case, the amount of money in the economic turnover must correspond to the mass of goods sold (quantitative theory of money). Simply put, the economy there is financed from the consumer sector. Due to structural features, the Soviet-type economy cannot create the required amount of commodity mass. Therefore, it is necessary to bring the country's financial system in line with the structural characteristics of our economic system. In other words, two financial sectors. One serves the needs of the population, the other - the economic system as a whole. The scope of these sectors should not overlap. Exactly the same conclusions have now been reached by economists throughout the CIS. Thus, the well-known Russian researcher Sergei Kara-Murza writes: “In the USSR there was a financial system of two “circuits”. There was non-cash money in production. On the consumer market- "normal" money. Their mass was regulated in accordance with the mass of goods. This made it possible to support low prices and prevent inflation. Such a system could operate only if the transfer of non-cash money into cash was prohibited. The need to reorganize the financial system is now clear to any serious researcher.

How will this work in practice? A simple example. Now everyone knows that our energy sector is in critical condition and threatens to collapse in the next two years. The authorities are trying to save the day by inflating tariffs endlessly. But the money raised is still not enough. In fact, our population will never be able to finance domestic energy - they have too little money. Therefore, tariffs should not be increased, but reduced. And the financing of the energy industry should be undertaken by the state through special financial channels, strictly isolated and intended only for specific purposes. The funds of the population should be withdrawn exclusively for the remuneration of workers in the industry.

The same applies to heat, water, gas supply, infrastructure and much more. And to shoulder all the costs on the shoulders of the population is meaningless and useless - it still will not pull them. In this case, we will not save the economy, and we will ruin the population. Of course, in reality, everything is much more complicated than it can be stated in a newspaper publication. But we hope that we have managed, at least in general terms, to give readers an idea of ​​the principles on which our financial system should function.

There is little information on the topic of dual-circuit monetary systems. Below is a selection of theses by Andrey Devyatov on the Asian mode of production from this speech of his at the School common sense February 17, 2017:

Economic development is not necessarily guaranteed by a credit economy (Western model). This model is based on the Newtonian understanding of time as a duration or a linear sequence of events (progress). In this model, future demand is monetized, and credit is the main development tool.

The Chinese model of economic development is based on a cyclic understanding of time as a sequence of events, and the key concept is timeliness (which is not in the Newtonian model, where all periods of time are equivalent). This model is built on the law of change, which in the economic part is based not on credit, but on dividing the monetary system into two circuits.

The Asian mode of production is the two-circuit monetary system. It was invented in China in the 12th century during the Song Dynasty, but this system was used in the Yuan Dynasty during the unified state of Genghis Khan. It was thanks to this model that a single state (Yi Guo) from sea to sea could exist. The collapse of the model occurred after the introduction of Western elements into it.

The essence of the model is the division of monetary circulation into natural and non-cash money. The consumption of an individual is provided with natural money (gold, silver), which can be used to buy food or a cow there.

Long-term infrastructure projects (dams, canals, roads) are financed from another circuit, which operates on debt securities issued by the state. In China, paper money was invented specifically for this.

Two circuits - cash and non-cash - are separated, the borders between them are protected by the state through money changers, where you can exchange coins for paper and vice versa.

The fundamental difference from the European way of financing is the understanding of time as a cycle. Therefore, infrastructure projects are not financed by credit, i.е. under the future demand, but under the return of time in a new cycle. Because in the next cycle of life, investments will not pay off with a profit (Western model), but will be used by the next generation of people for a new cycle of life.

In the USSR, a two-circuit system was introduced by Stalin (golden ruble for the population and cashless payments for infrastructure projects). Therefore, after the war, the main priority for Stalin was the nuclear and missile projects as guarantors of the survival of future generations. The main non-cash resources from the second monetary circuit were thrown at them.

Capitalization in the understanding of Stalin - in happiness. The subject of capitalization is the happiness and dream of the people, and not the interest on the loan. It is a dream that can provide colossal economic breakthrough, which was demonstrated by the USSR.

The collapse of the double-circuit monetary system in the USSR occurred as a result of the Kosygin reform, when planning in pieces was abandoned and they switched to monetary statistical equivalents.

With a planning system in kind, innovation is the main indicator. After the Kosygin reform, the introduction of innovations turns out to be unprofitable, because it is possible to ensure the growth of "monetary" statistical indicators in more "efficient" ways: by accelerating costs, increasing costs, etc.