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• INTRODUCTION 2
• 1. The birth rate in Russia. 3
• 2. Fertility in urban and countryside 4
• 3. Changing the age pattern of fertility 5
• 4. Out-of-wedlock births 7
• 5. Intrafamilial birth control 10
• 5.1. Abortion 10
• 13
• 6. Reproduction of conditional and real generations 16
• 7. Prospects for changes in the birth rate 19
• Bibliography: 21

INTRODUCTION

The topic of the presented work is “Analysis of the dynamics of the birth rate in the Russian Federation”.

fertility- the ratio of the number of births to the number of inhabitants in this territory.

All changes in the Russian birth rate that have occurred over the past hundred years often lead to a decrease in its level. Indeed, Russia experienced grandiose changes - the fall in the final birth rate was 4.5 - 6.3 times, depending on the method of assessment: from 7.5 live births per one conditional average woman in her entire life at the end of the 19th century to 1.2 children - at the end of the 20th century; from 7.2 children per woman born in the late 1860s to 1.6 children per woman in real cohorts of the late 1960s. radical and rapid changes in the family, society and state, which took place during the life of only three or four demographic generations of Russians (the length of the demographic generation is about 30 years).

On the one hand, the decline in the birth rate was a historically inevitable response to the general and consistent modernization of society in all areas, on the other hand, the transition from high to low birth rates led to different rates of population change, to a fundamental transformation of the demographic balance between generations (the quantitative ratio between age groups children, parents and grandparents), which, in turn, initiates and accelerates the corresponding socio-economic and political changes. It is the decline in the birth rate to the current unprecedented low level that is the central moment of the current demographic challenge to socio-economic systems in developed countries.

1. The birth rate in Russia. In 1999, the birth rate in Russia continued to decline. The total number of births was 68.6 thousand less than in the previous year, and the final birth rate reached an all-time low - 1.17 births per woman. A barely noticeable increase in the indicator in 1998 did not justify hopes for a change in the trend. Since in 2000, according to preliminary data, a certain increase in the birth rate was again noted, the current situation can be characterized as stagnation with the possibility of further decline remaining. Age and final (total) birth rate. Russia, 1980,1990-1999

years	Birth rate (per 1000) in women aged	Total fertility (for 1 woman)

* Including those born to mothers under 15 years of age.
** Including those born to mothers over the age of 49.

The final (total) birth rate in Russia and some other countries with the lowest birth rate. 1970-1999

Country
Bulgaria
Germany
Western lands
Eastern lands
Slovenia

In 1999, the final birth rate in Russia became lower than in a number of countries, in which, quite recently, just a year ago, it was lower than in Russia (Table 2.7). In Europe, a lower figure in 1999 can be found only in Latvia (1.16), the Czech Republic (1.13), the eastern lands of Germany (1.11), possibly in Ukraine (in 1998 it was 1.19; 1999 data not yet published).

2. Fertility in urban and rural areas

Today, 27% of the total population of Russia and 25% of all women aged 18-35 live in rural areas. At the same time, the contribution rural population in the total number of births is significantly higher than its share in the entire population. The village gives 31% of all births, including 34% of all second and 50% of third births. At the same time, the proportion of firstborns born in the countryside almost exactly corresponds to the proportion of rural women of the main childbearing ages - the same 25%. This is explained very simply - the first children in Russia are born by almost all both urban and rural women, and repeated births occur more often in the village.

Despite the long-term general trend towards a decrease in the birth rate, which has manifested itself both in the city and in the countryside, the rural population still maintains a higher birth rate. In 1999, the indicator of the final (total) birth rate for the rural population exceeded that for the urban population by almost 40% (Table 2.9).

Differences in the birth rate of urban and rural population, Russia, 1958-1999, %

Over time, both absolute and relative rural and urban differences in fertility are shrinking. But this is happening against the backdrop of a general decline in the birth rate in the country, and the annual rates of change in the birth rate in urban and rural areas change synchronously and, as a rule, differ little. Therefore, the relative differences in the birth rate between urban and rural areas decrease slowly - by no more than 20 percentage points in 40 years.

3. Changing the age pattern of fertility

In 1999, a decrease in the intensity of births was noted in all age groups of mothers simultaneously in urban and rural areas and in all regions of Russia without exception. But before 1999, the dynamics of the birth rate was somewhat different - the birth rate decreased among the youngest mothers (under 25 years old) and - since 1995 - increased among older mothers (see Table 2.6). Based on this, we hypothesized that Russia is experiencing not only and not so much a total decline in the birth rate, but a transformation of its age model towards "aging" - by analogy with all other developed countries, not excluding countries with transition economy located in Eastern and Central Europe.

The Russian data for 1999 made us think about how consistently the modernization of the birth rate in Russia will proceed in the future. Has the transformation of the birth rate model really stopped, and is not its too “young” profile being conserved in addition to its falling level?

Partial response to last question gives table. 2.8, which shows the contribution of age groups to the final (total) birth rate. It turns out that the previous trend of a decrease in the contribution of young mothers and an increase in the role of more mature mothers in the formation of the Russian birth rate was not violated in 1999. The decrease in the intensity of births to mothers at a young age, following the general global trend, is proceeding at a fairly high rate in Russia. 1999 was no exception, when the decrease in the birth rate in the youngest ages was much more significant than in mothers over 25 years of age. The age profile of fertility continues to be modified, and at the same time, the increase in the average age of mothers, which began in 1995, continues. In 1994 it was 24.48 years, in 1999 - 25.57 years. Both the average age of the mother increases at the birth of all children, and at the birth of children of each order - the first, second, etc.

Average age of mother at the birth of a child of each priority *. Russia, 1979-1999

The contribution of age groups of mothers to the final (total) birth rate. Russia, 1980.1990-1999, %

	Mother's age
					35 and older	Total

*Including those born to mothers younger than 15 years of age.

It can be assumed that the younger generations tend to postpone their firstborns, and the probability of rebirth changes less significantly. This conclusion can be drawn on the basis of differences in the rate of change in age-specific fertility rates (the first children in Russia, as a rule, appear in women under the age of 25, and repeated births occur at a more mature age).

4. Out-of-wedlock births

In 1999, almost 28% of all those born alive in Russia (29.5% in rural areas and 27.3% in urban areas) were born out of a registered marriage.

The increase in the share of illegitimate births began in the second half of the 1980s. in urban and rural areas at the same time, and then proceeded at an increasing pace until 1999, when the process slowed down somewhat. Now, out-of-wedlock births are a very important component of the total birth rate, and the only category of births that has continued to increase in absolute terms since 1993 are births registered on the basis of a joint application by the mother and father of the child who do not have a certificate of marriage.

The more than two-fold increase in out-of-wedlock births in 10 years requires explanation. At the same time, despite the importance of this relatively new phenomenon, it has been studied extremely poorly so far. Neither official statistics nor sociological surveys yet allow us to fully understand its nature. There is not enough information about which social groups in Russia (in terms of income, education, profession, etc.) and for what reasons prefer to have a child without a marriage certificate.

The number of births in marriage and out of wedlock. Russia, 1988-1999

	Total, thousand	Including those born, thousand:	Share of births out of registered marriage, %	Extramarital births registered on the basis, thousand:	Share of those registered by joint application, %
		in a registered marriage	out of registered marriage		joint statement of mother and father	one mother's statements

Source: Calculated on the basis of official data of the Goskomstat of Russia (database of the Central Department of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences).

Here is what little is known about the process:

a) half of illegitimate births are recognized by their fathers, which implies that the relationship between parents is not accidental;

b) although the probability of giving birth to a child out of wedlock is related to age (it is very high for women under the age of 20 and above the average after 35), however, the bulk of extramarital births are not given by "stupid" teenagers and desperate women of "Balzac age", and people in the main reproductive ages (women aged 20-34 in 1999 provided 71% of all births outside of a registered marriage, in urban areas - 73, in rural areas - 66%);

c) an illegitimate child is far from always the first and only (the average order of birth of a child in marriage and out of wedlock differs slightly: in 1998 the average order of marriage births was 1.63, illegitimate - 1.55, including births registered according to statement of one mother, - 1.48);

d) there are separate peoples and ethnic groups in the country in which the prevalence of out-of-wedlock births is significantly higher than the national average: Komi-Permyaks, Tuvans, Buryats, Nenets, Evenks, Chukchi, Koryaks, Khakasses and some others (the share of births out of a registered marriage reaches half and above the total number of births).

It should also be emphasized that the rapid growth of out-of-wedlock births is by no means a specific Russian phenomenon. In a number of economically developed countries, Russia occupies a middle position both in terms of the level of out-of-wedlock birth rates and in the rate of their change.

5. Intrafamilial birth control

Almost the entire population of Russia in reproductive ages resorts to various methods of regulating the number of children born and the timing of their birth. At the same time, despite some positive developments, an unfavorable balance remains between the practice of abortion and the practice of preventing it, that is, family planning itself.

5.1. Abortion

Termination of pregnancy - induced abortion - continues to occupy an unreasonably large place in the structure of methods of birth control. The abortion rate remains one of the highest in the world. Even if we compare Russia only with countries with similar birth rates, the number of abortions per 100 births in Russia sometimes exceeds the corresponding figure in other countries by 5, 10, or even more times.

And yet in the 1990s. there was a constant decrease in the level of registered abortions in Russia. 1999 was no exception. Between 1990 and 1999, both the absolute number of abortions and the number of abortions per 1,000 women of reproductive age halved. The average annual rate of decline was 7% per year.

Since the annual number of births in the country has also been declining, the abortion/birth ratio has not changed so much: 206 abortions per 100 births in 1990 and 179 abortions per 100 births in 1999. Abortions still end in the majority of pregnancies - 64.2% or slightly less than Uz in 1999. According to the study of RZRZH, conducted in three regions of Russia in 1996 and 1999, the distribution of pregnancies by their outcomes changed little between the two stages of the survey: on average in three regions, 60.7% of all pregnancies in 1996 and 60 .4% in 1999 were interrupted by induced abortion.

The number of abortions performed in institutions of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation (Ministry of Health of Russia) in 1999 amounted to 2059.7 thousand, or 53 per 1000 women of reproductive age, which is also 2 times less than in 1990. According to official data, the proportion mini-abortions in the total number of abortions increased slightly in 1999, which can be regarded as a positive trend. It is possible that the actual increase was even greater, since mini-abortions are likely to be less well-reported in statistics than full surgical abortions.

The Fundamentals of the legislation of the Russian Federation on the protection of the health of citizens (Article 36) determines that artificial termination of pregnancy can be carried out at the request of a woman with a gestational age of up to 12 weeks, if there are social indications - for a period of up to 22 weeks and at any stage of pregnancy, if there are medical indications. In fact, according to the Russian Ministry of Health, more than 90% of induced abortions (excluding mini-abortions) are performed before 12 weeks of gestation. The proportion of late abortions in 1999 decreased compared to the previous year, while about 7% of abortions (excluding mini-abortions) were performed between 12 and 22 weeks of pregnancy and about 2% after 22 weeks.

Officially registered abortions. Russia, 1990-1999

									1999 in % to 1990
Total, thousand
No mini-abortions
Per 1000 women aged 15-49 - total
No mini-abortions
Per 100 live births - total
No mini-abortions
Share of mini-abortions in the total number of abortions, %
Share of abortions among pregnancies*, %
Abortions in primigravidas**, thous.
per 1000 women aged 15-49

* Pregnancies = abortions + live births.
** According to the Ministry of Health of Russia (without mini-abortions).

Source

The officially registered number of abortions by age group per 1000 women. Russia, 1990-1999

years	15-19 years old	20-34 years old	35 years and older	15-49 years old

Source: Russian Statistical Yearbook. M.: Goskomstat of Russia, 2000. S. 217.

The total number of abortions in the country is declining due to a decrease in the age intensity of artificial termination of pregnancy. at the fastest pace during the 1990s. The abortion rate at the age of 35 years and older decreased, the lowest - at the age of 20 to 34 years. After 1996, the abortion rate has declined fastest among young women under the age of 20, and the contribution of this age group to the total number of abortions has correspondingly decreased.

The age structure of the female population, starting from the mid-1990s, on the contrary, contributes to an increase in the total number of abortions. The number of women aged 20-30 (accounting for more than half of all abortions) is increasing, and if the age-specific abortion rates had not changed in recent years, the total number of abortions would increase slightly only due to a change in age structure women.

The total abortion rate is an indicator that does not depend on age composition women, decreased significantly after 199621: from an average of 2.34 abortions per woman of reproductive age in 1996 to 1.95 abortions in 1999 (Table 2.15). For the first time in Russia, this indicator fell below 2 (however, it covers only abortions performed in the system of the Russian Ministry of Health).

According to the Ministry of Health of Russia, the decrease in the abortion rate in 1999 occurred in all economic regions and in all subjects of the Federation (with the exception of three).

While the official abortion rates in Russia show a positive trend, a selective study of the RZRJ, which took place in two stages - in 1996 and 1999, did not reveal a clear improvement in the situation with abortions over 3 years, and in one region out of three (in the city of St. Perm), the study even recorded their growth.

Abortion in most cases is the result of an unplanned pregnancy. According to RZRZH, more than half of all pregnancies were not planned by the respondents, and the distribution of pregnancies according to their plannedness "worsened" over the observed period. The proportion of pregnancies that, according to the respondents, were unwanted (women did not want to have more children) increased. At the same time, women in 1999 were less inclined than in 1996 to terminate unwanted pregnancies by abortion (84-92% in 1999 versus 93-97% in 1996), their attitude towards abortion recorded during the survey became more negative .

5.2. Pregnancy Prevention

An alternative to abortion as a method of regulating childbearing is its prevention using various methods and means that prevent conception.

Unfortunately, there are no national data on the prevalence and structure of contraception used in Russia. The Ministry of Health of Russia publishes information on the number of women who have intrauterine devices (IUDs), use oral contraception (OC) and are under the supervision of a doctor. These data are likely to be incomplete, especially for hormonal drugs that are dispensed in pharmacies without a prescription. Even those women who, using one of the indicated methods of contraception, consult a doctor, but irregularly, are included in the statistics only in the year they visit the clinic. In addition, there is no information on the cessation and duration of the use of contraceptive methods.

Proportion of women using contraception, aged 15-49.*
Russia. 1990-1999, %

	Intrauterine devices	Hormonal contraception	Introduced IUD per 100 women

* Calculated based on data from the Russian Ministry of Health at the end of the year.

Source: Health of the population of Russia and the activities of health care institutions in 1999 (statistical materials). M.: Ministry of Health of Russia, 2000.

According to the Russian Ministry of Health at the end of 1999, 16.5% of all women of reproductive age used intrauterine contraceptives and 7.2% used hormonal contraceptives. These figures vary by region of the country.

The number of women using intrauterine devices since the mid-1990s decreased, and the number of those who resorted to oral contraception has steadily increased. In recent years, however, the rate of increase in the number of women using hormonal contraception has slowed down. In 1998-1999, according to the Ministry of Health of Russia, their share decreased in almost half of the regions of the Russian Federation, although this share increased throughout the country as a whole. A slowdown in the use of oral contraception is indicated by the results of a study in RZRW, during which no significant change in the rate of use of oral contraception was found between 1996 and 1999. According to RZRZH, in 1996, 5.2-10.0% of women with a permanent partner used oral contraception, and in 1999 - 5.3-9.5% of women.

Whether this is explained by the increase in the price of hormonal contraceptives after August 1998, or whether it is due to incomplete registration, or to some other factors, is still unclear. In a survey of family planning experts from 27 regions of Russia, almost half of them expressed their conviction that the situation in the country is leading to a reduction in the availability of family planning services, an increase in their payment and, in particular, an increase in the cost of contraception. At the same time, according to a sample survey, women's knowledge of modern methods of contraception has increased significantly in recent years (RZRZh-1999).

Regional population surveys dealing with family planning generally show a high prevalence of contraception, not much lower than in other developed countries. Thus, according to a sample survey of women (1745 people) living in the Krasnodar Territory, 87% of sexually active women are protected from pregnancy. According to RZRZH-1999, 73% of surveyed women aged 15 to 44 living with a regular partner use any contraceptive methods, including 53% use modern methods contraception (average for three regions of Russia). Even among women without children, the proportion using contraception is 48%.

The level of contraceptive use among women who have a permanent partner does not differ much by age groups, with the exception of the extreme ones, reaching a maximum (almost 80%) at the age of 30-34 years (RZRZH-1999). At the same time, the majority of married women who do not use contraceptive methods explain this by such reasons as lack of sexual life, impaired fertility, pregnancy or the desire to become pregnant, breastfeeding, etc. It is estimated (RZRZH-1999) that the level of unmet need for planning families (the proportion of women at risk of conception, not planning to become pregnant in the near future, but not using contraceptives) is 11-12%. For comparison: in the Netherlands, according to the Fertility and Family Survey, this indicator varies from 2 at the age of 25-29 years to 7% in the age groups of 18-19 and 35-39 years

Almost 1/3 of family planning experts, according to the survey mentioned above, are pessimistic about the future development of family planning services in Russia. In addition to limited resources, improvement of the situation, according to most experts, is hampered by the fragmentation of measures to protect reproductive health, the preservation of traditions of formalizing preventive activities, the inertia of the medical community, weak Information Support action to reduce abortion.

6. Reproduction of conditional and real generations

In 1999, the trend towards a reduction in the net reproduction rate of the Russian population, which did not manifest itself in 1998, again made itself felt. The current birth rate only replaces generations of current mothers by 55.1%. This indicator corresponds to an annual reduction in the population due to natural decline by more than 2% per year (the so-called coefficient natural increase stable population).

Components of the net reproduction rate of the female conditional generation in Russia for various years

	Expected average number of children per woman	including girls	Average age of mother	Expected probability for a girl to live to the average age of her mother
End of the 19th century

With all the advantages of the net coefficient, which says much more about the reproduction process than individual birth and death rates, we should not forget that usually we are talking about the indicator relating to the so-called "conditional" generation. It can be successfully used to assess or predict the evolution of the process of generation renewal in a stable or slowly changing situation, but when the situation changes frequently and abruptly, the effectiveness of using the indicator is significantly reduced. In the XX century. in Russia and in many other countries the situation was far from stable, and this, of course, limited the analytical and predictive capabilities of the net coefficient.

An analysis of the dynamics of the reproduction process using the usual net coefficient can be supplemented and deepened when considering the actual reproduction of the so-called "real", i.e. specific generations of mothers by year of birth: the average number of children actually born in a lifetime and the actual survival of girls to the average age of motherhood. These indicators are used much less often because their estimation can only be done retrospectively and requires information accumulated over many years. But when the appropriate estimates are made, it becomes possible to analyze reproduction for real generations, which show the true result of the demographic activity of generations in specific historical conditions.

It is these indicators that are presented in the table. They indicate that not a single female cohort born in the 20th century. in Russia, did not produce enough offspring to reproduce the number of parental generations (cohorts, starting from the generation born in 1900, had a net reproduction rate of less than one). This is precisely what explains the inevitable entry of Russia into a period of negative population growth, which is observed today.

Components of the net reproduction rate of female generations born in Russia, 1890-1969

Years of birth of maternal cohorts	Average number of children born by age 50	including girls	Survival of the girl to the middle age of the mother	Net reproduction rate

For cohorts born in the 1960s. (the last cohorts whose procreative activity is now close to completion), the level of underreproduction will be 20-25%, which is generally not worse than for most previous generations born after 1905. A similar reproductive result obtained for a long sequence of generations is explained by the fact that for more than half a century, the decline in fertility was largely offset by a decrease in mortality, despite the arrhythmia caused by a series of social disasters in the first half of the 20th century.

Further prospects for the reproduction of the population of Russia and other developed countries are not obvious. Since the reserves for reducing child mortality are close to exhaustion, and the birth rate has stabilized at an extremely low level, it is most likely to expect an increase in the level of underreproduction of generations and a further reduction in the population in Russia and in those countries where it is already underway, as well as the spread of depopulation trends to the vast majority of developed countries. countries of the world. Migration growth can only partially compensate for losses from natural loss. According to the latest version of the UN forecast (1999), the European population will decline.

7. Prospects for changes in the birth rate

The current birth rate in Russia is so low that a further fall in the birth rate is unlikely. It could be expected if voluntary childlessness, sexual abstinence and mass infertility of partners became widespread. At the same time, neither demographic data nor opinion polls record such phenomena, and there is no tendency to increase the rejection of motherhood.

Proportion of women who do not want to have more children, depending on the number of children they already have at the time of the survey

Survey Year	All women	Including having the specified number of children:
					3 or more
RZRZh, 1996**
RZRZh, 1999**

* Married women aged 20-49.
** Women aged 15-4 who are fertile and have a regular partner.

Sources: RLMS - Family Planning and the Problem of Abortion in the Russian Federation: Recent Trends. Russian monitoring economic situation and public health 1992-1996. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. March 1997. P. 10. Table 1; RZRZH: weighted averages for three regions: Ivanovo Oblast, the cities of Yekaterinburg and Perm (the total number of interviewed women in each region was taken as weights). Calculated from: 1996 study. Reproductive health of Russian women. Final report. May, 1998. VTsIOM/CDC/USAID. Tab. IV. fourteen; Reproductive health of Russian women - 1999. Preliminary report. February, 2000. VTsIOM/CDC/USAID.

Moreover, over the 3-year period between the two surveys within the framework of the study "Reproductive Health of Russian Women" (RHRW) (conducted in 1996 and 1999), among women who have not yet had a single child, the proportion of those who are not going to to have them in the future (from 16 to 11%). On the other hand, the results of surveys also do not inspire great optimism regarding the increase in the birth rate among women who already have children - the likelihood of having another child in the second half of the 1990s. either fluctuated at a low level, or even slightly decreased.

Summarizing the results of various surveys, we find that from 50 to 60% of women who have one child are going to give birth to a second child, and from among mothers of two children, no more than 8-10% can decide to have a third child. With such values ​​of the probability of increasing the family, the indicator of the final birth rate per woman of the real generation will be in the range of 1.4-1.5 children.

As a result, in the coming years, we can assume a slight increase in the birth rate due to the fact that, compared with previous years, a greater number of women will want to give birth to their first children. At the same time, this growth will be very limited and will be countered by a decrease in the likelihood of rebirths.

Bibliography:

Population of Russia 2002. Eighth annual demographic report. /Answer. ed. A.G. Vishnevsky. - M., 2001.

Zakharov S.V. Birth rate in Russia: the first and second demographic transition. //Demographic modernization, private life and identity in Russia. - M., 2001.

Kozlov I.V. Ethno-cultural factors of fertility // Demographic modernization, private life and identity in Russia. - M., 2001.

In December 2010, I published an article titledniem "Russian demography, the subject of all kinds of fantasies" .
In this article, I recalled how the political, economic, and institutional collapse that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to the start of an unprecedented health and demographic disaster. From 1991 to 1999 as a result of the collapse Russian economy public health has deteriorated significantly, and life expectancy has declined. Excessive consumption of alcohol, often adulterated, and associated poisoning, rising suicide rates, increased drug use, and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS, have led to an explosive increase in deaths. Living conditions in Russia in the 1990s led to a gradual decline in the birth rate. In front of face economic crisis abortion was often the only option for many women. All this led to an unprecedented demographic crisis. Consider the number of births, deaths and natural population growth by years (excluding migration). The birth rate is falling, the death rate is rising.

Year of Birth Death Growth

1991 1.794.626 1.690.657 +103.969
1992 1.587.644 1.807.441 -219.797
1993 1.378.983 2.129.339 -750.356
1994 1.408.159 2.301.366 -893.207
1995 1.363.806 2.203.811 -840.005
1996 1.304.638 2.082.249 -777.611
1997 1.259.943 2.015.779 -755.836
1998 1.283.292 1.988.744 -705.452
1999 1.214.689 2.144.316 -929.627

Between 2000 and 2005, the birth rate increased significantly, probably due to the improvement in the world economic situation, but the death rate also increased, resulting in an incredible reduction in the population by 5,363,668 people during these six years, that is, an average of 893,944 per year. In January 2006, Russia's population was only 142.2 million compared to 148.3 million in 1990.

Year of Birth Death Growth

2000 1.266.800 2.225.332 -958.532
2001 1.311.604 2.254.856 -943.252
2002 1.397.000 2.332.300 -935.300
2003 1.483.200 2.370.300 -887.100
2004 1.502.477 2.295.402 -792.925
2005 1.457.376 2.303.935 -846.559

In 2005, the Russian state began to implement a demographic "new course", entrusted to Dmitry Medvedev, who at that time was Deputy Prime Minister and was responsible for priority national projects. Designed to stimulate births and reduce deaths, this social plan had an additional impact on the continuing rise in living standards from 2005 to 2009. Restoration of the country's health care system and financial aid families have seen impressive results. Ultimately, over the 12 years from 1999 to 2011, the death rate dropped sharply and the annual number of births increased by more than 40%.

Year of Birth Death Growth

2005 1.457.376 2.303.935 -846.559
2006 1.479.637 2.166.703 -687.066
2007 1.610.100 2.080.400 -470.300
2008 1.717.500 2.081.000 -363.500
2009 1.764.000 2.010.500 -246.500
2010 1.789.600 2.031.000 -241.400
2011 1.793.828 1.925.036 -131.208

Taking into account the positive migration growth in 2009 - for the first time since 1991 - the population of Russia increased by almost 50,000 people. In 2010, it decreased slightly (by about 50,000 people), but in In 2011, the population grew by 160,000 people. In 2011, 1,793,828 babies were born, the highest since 1991, and for the first time since 1992, fewer than 2 million people died in the country. This 2011 is an interesting feature because the second half of the year (number of births versus deaths) is significantly better than the first half. Over the last 6 months of the year, the natural population growth (excluding immigration) was positive: there were 951.249 births and 943.617 deaths, that is, the positive increase was 7.632. August 2011 even turned out to be a record in terms of births (173.166), and the average for the other five months of the half year was more than 150,000.

If this trend continues in next year, the number of births in Russia may approach 1.8 million, and the number of deaths should continue to decline, falling below the level in 1.9 million. The negative natural increase in 2012 may well be less than 100,000. Migration growth, in turn, should also be positive, given the need for the Russian economy in the labor force, and Russian population Russia should grow again in 2012. For readers interested in the relationship between economics and demography: a more detailed study was published in France

Sergey Zakharov worked on the theme of the issue

What explains the increase in the birth rate in recent years

In 2000-2009, the number of births in Russia increased (with the exception of 2005). Compared with the minimum figure reached in 1999 - 1214.7 thousand - the number of live births in 2009 (excluding the Chechen Republic) increased more than impressively - by 510.5 thousand or 42%. In 2007, the annual increase in births was the most significant - 8.7%. In 2008 and 2009, the growth rate fell rapidly - respectively, 6.4% and 2.8%. Preliminary data for 2010 indicate that the increase in the number of births in Russia has apparently ended, and even with possible adjustments based on annual development data, the increase in the number of births will hardly be more than 1.5-1.6% (Fig. 1).

Figure 1. Increase in the annual number of births in Russia, 2000-2010 (data for 2010 are preliminary), %

The increase in the total number of births registered on the territory of the Russian Federation involves not only Russian, but also foreign citizens permanently residing in Russia. In 2007, the number of births to foreign citizens was 17.6 thousand (1.09% of the total number of births in Russia), in 2008 - 18.4 thousand (1.08%), in 2009 - 28.4 thousand ( 1.6%). In 2009, the annual increase in births of Russian citizens (according to their passports) on the territory of Russia (including those registered in Russian embassies abroad) was 2.5%, while the increase in the total number of births recorded by Rosstat was 2.8%. Apparently, the contribution of foreign citizens, as well as persons whose citizenship is unknown, to the total Russian number of births is increasing and is beginning to gain statistical weight.

The increase in the number of births over the past decade was facilitated by a favorable age structure of the population - the number of women of the main childbearing age (up to 35 years) was in the growth phase. However, as evidenced by the calculations given in Table. 1, the positive influence of the structure factor has exhausted itself. Starting from 2010-2011, the role of the age structure in changing the number of births will become negative. The positive impact of changes in the actual birth rate (age-related intensity of childbearing) was significant in 2002, but then fell rapidly, and only in 2007 it reasserted itself, exceeding the 2002 level twice. The ratio of the contribution of the structural factor and the intensity factor of childbearing to the increase in births in 2007 was 10% and 90%, in 2008 - 8% and 92%, in 2009 - 2% and 98%.

Table 1. Number of births in Russia and components of its change, 1995, 2000-2009, thousand

Year	Number of births 1	Change per year	including by changing 2 :
			Sex and age structure of the population	Age intensity of childbearing
1995	1363,8	-44,4	+12,3	-56,7
2000	1266,8	+52,1	+13,9	+38,2
2001	1311,6	+44,8	+17,2	+27,6
2002	1397,0	+85,4	+19,7	+65,7
2003	1449,5	+52,6	+20,3	+32,2
2004 (excluding Chechnya)	1474,0	+24,5	+18,4	+6,1
2004 (with Chechnya)	1502,5	-	-	-
2005	1457,4	-45,1	+17,0	-62,1
2006	1479,6	+22,2	+14,8	+7,4
2007	1610,1	+130,5	+12,8	+117,7
2008	1713,9	+103,8	+7,8	+96,0
2009	1761,7	+47,8	+0,8	+47,0

Notes:
1 1993-2003 no births in the Chechen Republic; 2005-2006 - including births in the Chechen Republic.
2 Index decomposition of annual growth.

An indicator that does not depend on the sex and age structure of the population, the total fertility rate (the total number of births per one woman of the conditional generation), also indicates that in Russia in 1999-2004 there was an increase in the intensity of childbearing, both in urban and urban areas. in rural areas (Fig. 2).

Figure 2. Final (total) birth rate, per woman, 1980-2009

Note. Calculated on the basis of one-year age coefficients. In 1993-2003 - without the Chechen Republic.

The dynamics of the birth rate in Russia has long been close to its dynamics in most industrialized countries. Russia ceased to stand out against their background after the Second World War (Fig. 3) and since then has been in the “corridor” common to all these countries, approaching either its lower (1970) or its upper border (mid-1980s). years).

Figure 3. Total fertility rate (number of births per 1 woman of conventional generation) in some developed countries, 1925-2008

The high, by European standards, birth rates of the mid-1980s did not last long in Russia, and already from the end of the 1980s there was a sharp drop, which again brought Russia into the group of countries with the lowest birth rate, the number of which had increased sharply by that time . If in 1980 Russia ranked 27th among 40 industrialized countries, and even 17th in 1990, by 2000 it had fallen to 38th position.

At the same time, Russia's position was not exceptional. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the total fertility rate fell to less than 1.4 per woman in many countries, Russia was close to such diverse countries of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe as Bulgaria, Latvia, Czech Republic, Spain, Slovenia, Greece (Fig. 4).

Figure 4. Minimum values ​​of the total fertility rate achieved in some countries in the 1990s-2000s

The slow growth in the birth rate that began in Russia at first barely noticeably raised its rating place among the developed countries. It increased more significantly as a result of the growth in the birth rate in 2007-2009, when Russia reached the middle positions among the 40 developed countries. At the same time, even in 2009, with a total fertility rate of 1.54, it was still far from being included in their leading group, especially since in recent years the birth rate in all developed countries has increased. Having passed the point of historical low fertility, all industrialized countries entered the band of its growth. This applies even to those of them that had the highest rates: the USA, New Zealand, Australia, France, Scandinavian countries. At the same time, as a rule, the lower the minimum value of the total fertility rate, the more significant was the subsequent increase.

It is difficult to give an unambiguous explanation for such a friendly change in trends. One of the most plausible hypotheses shared by many foreign experts boils down to the fact that in all developed countries - faster in some, slower in others - the potential for increasing the average age of motherhood is being exhausted. It is known that the transformation of the birth rate model towards aging has been leading in developed countries over the past three decades. It is also obvious that if each new generation becomes parents at a later age, then even if the average desired and expected number of children remains unchanged, the market characteristics of the intensity of childbearing for calendar years turn out to be artificially low. With a slowdown in the rate of aging of the age function of fertility, which is observed in many countries, there is an inevitable increase in the total fertility rate up to the level of the expected final fertility of real generations, and, accordingly, estimates of the intensity of births for conditional generations begin to more adequately reflect the true level of fertility.

One way or another, but Russia, having achieved an acceleration in the growth of the birth rate in 2007-2008 not without the help of the activation of demographic policy, does not stand out against the background of other countries that entered the growth phase without any special efforts on the part of the state in relation to strengthening family policy and / or giving it pronatalist orientation, neither by the size of the average annual increase in the total fertility rate, nor by the rate of its growth (Fig. 5 and 6).

Figure 5. Average annual increase in the total fertility rate in some countries for the period between the year of reaching the minimum value (indicated in brackets) and 2008, births per 1 woman

Figure 6. The average annual rate of increase in the total fertility rate in some countries between the year of the minimum value (indicated in brackets) and 2008

To compensate for the current level of childlessness, every second family needs to have 3 children

The low birth rate in Russia is associated with the mass distribution of one-child families and, accordingly, with a very high proportion of firstborns in the total number of births. Accordingly, for a deeper understanding of the positive changes in fertility observed in recent years, it is necessary to know at the expense of which children, in the order of their birth, the mother had these changes.

The distribution of births by order of the mother is the most important initial information for an in-depth study of the birth rate and the assessment of such an important characteristic as the probability of an increase in the family. Unfortunately, after 1998, Russian researchers were deprived of the opportunity to fully use this indicator. The Law on acts of civil status adopted in the late 1990s, in contrast to international and previous domestic practice, does not provide for a record of the serial number of birth of the mother in the source document for statistics - the act of birth, and all attempts by the scientific community to change the situation have not yet been were crowned with success. Nevertheless, many local statistical authorities continue (in fact, in violation of the current legislation) to collect relevant information on a voluntary basis and provide it to Rosstat. Coverage Russian territories This initiative remains quite large, they are located in all geographic zones (although the composition of these territories varies slightly from year to year) and in recent years have accounted for about 70% of all births in the country (66.6% in 2006, 71.1% in 2007, 72.6% in 2008, 69.9% in 2009), which allows, with certain reservations, to extend incomplete data to the whole of Russia.

In addition, since 2007 the Fund social insurance of the Russian Federation (FSS) develops information about those born in order of birth to the mother on the basis of coupons No. 2 of individual Birth certificates put into effect on January 1, 2006 as part of the National Health Project and issued to pregnant women who have entered the medical register.

The main advantage of this source of data is that the percentage of coverage of newborns distributed by mother's birth order in the FSS system is significantly higher compared to Rosstat data based on reports from an incomplete range of territorial statistical bodies - in 2009 93.1% according to the FSS against 69.9% according to Rosstat. A significant drawback of the FSS database is that it was put into effect quite recently. This does not allow using its information capabilities to analyze changes in the birth rate in retrospect and, in particular, to study the demographic effects caused by the 2007 family policy measures. In addition, the age grouping of mothers proposed in the available database does not correspond to the generally accepted demographic statistics. The meaningful linkage of this, in fact, a purely departmental database, designed to control specific financial flows, with the Rosstat database based on an independent system state accounting demographic events in the civil registry offices, is still an unsolvable task. But the parallel use of these two sources is possible, and it shows that, in general, they do not contradict each other (Fig. 7).

Figure 7. Structure of births by mother's birth order in the totality of territories covered by the corresponding form of statistical accounting (Rosstat system) and according to the data of the Social Insurance Fund of the Russian Federation, 2007-2009, %

In further analysis of the birth rate by age and birth order, we will rely on the information capabilities of the statistical reports of Rosstat, which, despite the obvious incompleteness, provide the necessary level of comparability in dynamics. It should be noted that, according to Rosstat, the distribution of births in 2007-2009 is slightly more biased towards higher birth orders than according to the FSS. Accordingly, our estimates of the average order of births and the probabilities of the next birth are probably, although hardly noticeable, but overestimated.

The final results of our calculations are presented in Table. 2. The increase in 2001-2005, though very small, of the contribution to the overall dynamics of the birth rate of second and third births, with a slow decrease in the contribution of first-borns, is noteworthy. However, the contribution of fourth and subsequent births also decreased.

Table 2. Contribution of each birth order to the final (total) birth rate, % and average birth order, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000-2007

Year	Children by birth order					Total	Average birth order 2
	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth and next
1980	51,8	34,5	7,9	2,5	3,3	100,0	1,74
1990	52,5	33,0	9,4	2,7	2,4	100,0	1,72
1995	60,0	28,9	7,3	2,2	1,6	100,0	1,58
2000 1	58,7	29,9	7,7	2,2	1,5	100,0	1,59
2001 1	58,9	30,1	7,4	2,2	1,4	100,0	1,59
2002 1	57,9	30,8	7,7	2,2	1,4	100,0	1,60
2003 1	57,5	31,2	7,8	2,1	1,4	100,0	1,60
2004 1	57,4	31,3	7,8	2,1	1,4	100,0	1,60
2005 1	57,3	31,5	7,8	2,1	1,3	100,0	1,60
2006 1	57,5	31,4	7,8	2,1	1,2	100,0	1,59
2007 1	53,7	33,6	8,9	2,4	1,4	100,0	1,66
2008 1	52,3	34,3	9,5	2,5	1,4	100,0	1,68
2009 1	52,1	34,5	9,5	2,5	1,4	100,0	1,68

Note. The average birth order is calculated as a weighted arithmetic mean, where the total birth rate for each order is taken as weights.
Source: Author's calculations using birth rates for one-year age groups. When calculating indicators for 1995-2003, the Chechen Republic was excluded.

In 2007-2009, the picture became significantly different. The total birth rate for first births has changed insignificantly compared to 2006, while for children of the second and subsequent stages it has increased markedly. The share of not only second and third births, but even fourth and fifth ones has increased. As a result, the contribution of repeated births to the total birth rate in the country has noticeably increased, and the structure of the birth rate by birth order has returned to the level of the first half of the 1990s. The decrease in the proportion of first and simultaneously fourth and subsequent births mutually compensated each other for a long time, so that the average order of birth in 1993-2006 fluctuated around the same level - 1.6. Structural changes in the birth rate in 2007-2009 led to its increase to 1.68.

For real generations of women, there can be no discrepancy between the average order of births and the final birth rate, this is essentially the same indicator - the average number of children born per woman by the end of the childbearing period. For conditional generations, in the case of smooth changes in the age pattern of fertility and a stable proportion of women who have never given birth, the discrepancies between the indicators are also minimal, as was the case, for example, in 1980 and 1990.

However, in the case of sharp changes in the pregnancy and birth calendar followed by the average woman, or, in other words, sharp changes in the average rate of formation of the final size of the offspring in real generations, discrepancies between these characteristics of the birth rate for conditional and real generations become inevitable, and they are all the more the more significantly the average rate of family formation changes. In the case of an acceleration in rates - children are born to parents at a younger age than before - the total fertility rate overestimates the actual level of fertility and, accordingly, exceeds the average order of births. An example of this is the situation in the mid-1980s, when family policy measures introduced in 1981 caused a disruption in the previous birth calendar of the average woman - a significant number of women born in the 1960s hurried to acquire offspring, primarily a second child, for several years before. The total fertility rate jumped from 1.89 in 1980 to 2.23 in 1987, or more than 0.3 children per woman. In reality, the demographic impact of these policies has been much less significant, as families have not so much changed their intentions about the final size of their offspring, but have revised the “schedule” of their birth, as indicated by the weak response of the indicator of average birth order (1 .74 in 1980 and 1.83 in 1987, a difference of only 0.09 children, very close in magnitude to the estimate of the positive impact of policy on the value of the final birth rate of real generations).

Since the mid-1990s, the opposite picture has been observed - the indicator of the average order of birth significantly exceeded the total fertility rate. Consequently, there has been a significant slowdown in the rate of family formation - generations of women born in the 1970s and 1980s have children at a later age than previous generations. Accordingly, the total fertility rate calculated for calendar years (for conditional generations) gave an underestimate of the final fertility, which should be expected from generations that are in active procreative ages and are currently experiencing the process of transformation of the age model of fertility towards aging.

Based on an estimate of the average birth order for the last ten years, it can be assumed that if there is no significant increase in the proportion of completely childless (never giving birth) women and the structure of mothers in terms of the number of births does not change, then the final birth rate of real female generations, which are now close to average age of motherhood (27 years), i.e. born in the first half of the 1980s will be at least 1.6 children per woman.

The most correct generalizing estimate of the probability with which in a given calendar year there was a birth of children of each order among mothers of all ages, gives an indicator called in demography likelihood of family growth, is the proportion of mothers who gave birth to another child in current year among those who have already given birth to one child less (for example, the probability of having a first child is the proportion of women who gave birth to their first child in billing year among women who have never given birth at the beginning of the year, and the probability of a third child is the proportion of women with two children who give birth to a third child in a given year). Our annual estimates of the probabilities of family growth over the past 30 years, with the proviso that since 1998 the calculations are based on incomplete data, are presented in Fig. eight .

Figure 8. The resulting probability of increasing the family by birth order for a woman by the age of 50, 1979-2009

Note. Estimate based on data on territories that submit data on births to Rosstat simultaneously by mother's age and birth order.

In the first half of the 1980s, the probability of a next birth increased for children of all orders, but then the movement went in the opposite direction. The births of not only second and subsequent children, but even first-borns were postponed (and, apparently, partially, never materialized). Only gradually did the situation begin to improve: since 1994, the probability of having third and fourth children has slowly crept up, since 2000, the probability of second births. The probabilities of the birth of the first and fifth children remained at the level of 1999.

The jump in the birth rate that occurred in 2007 is clearly visible. In 2008, the increase in the probabilities of having 2, 3, and 4 children continued, while the increase in the probability of having the fifth and subsequent children stopped. In 2009, the probability of second births continued to increase, but with a slowdown, the increase in the probability of third births stopped, and the probabilities of fourth and subsequent births began to decline. Once again, based on the most correct indicator that can be calculated on the basis of available official statistics, the conclusion is confirmed that the increase in the birth rate in Russia in 2007-2009 was significant and affected the birth of children of all orders, except for the first. The revival of the probability of the birth of first-born children occurred only in 2009, but the increase was extremely small.

The situation with the probability of the birth of first-born is alarming. If it does not increase, then the base for the further growth of the second and subsequent children narrows. As a result, the task of achieving a birth rate sufficient for simple reproduction of the population (indicated in the Concept of Demographic Policy in the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025) becomes more difficult - the average number of births per woman with children must be increased very significantly. Thus, according to the birth order tables for the period 1999-2009, the expected proportion of completely childless women (by the age of 50) averaged 17%. If this value is held constant, then in order to achieve an average final birth rate of 2.1 (the threshold value that guarantees a simple replacement of generations), it is necessary that there should be an average of 2.53 births per woman who has ever given birth. In practice, this means that every second family with children must have at least 3 children. Based on the realities of today, it is difficult to imagine such a situation, since, according to the birth table for 2009, there are 1.83 births per woman who has ever given birth, and the proportion of those who have given birth to three or more children among those who have ever given birth is 17% . However, if it were possible to reduce the number of women who never gave birth to at least 6-7% (which was sustainably maintained in the 1970s-1980s), then to achieve the desired TFR value of 2.1, it would be enough for one woman with children would have 2.2 births. As a result, the proportion of two-child families in the population will significantly dominate over those with many children. Such a situation is much easier to imagine, given that, according to numerous public opinion polls, it is the two-child family that seems to be the most desirable for the Russian population.

The dynamics of the expected distribution of women in terms of the number of children born by the age of 50 in accordance with the birth tables for the conditional generations of 1979-2009 is shown in fig. 9. If the probabilities of increasing the family, observed in 2009, remain, the proportion of childless women will be about 16%, the proportion of women who have given birth to 1 child during their life, among all women (who have given birth and not given birth) - 35%, who have given birth to two children - 34% , 3 or more - 15%.

Figure 9. Expected distribution of women by the number of children born by the age of 50, while maintaining the birth rate of the corresponding years, 1979-2009

Motherhood: the contribution of 30-year-olds is growing

Russia, like Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Bulgaria and Romania, is one of the European countries with a relatively “young” birth rate. Despite the large structural shifts that the Russian fertility model has experienced in the past 15 years, its “young” age profile is still far from the “old” profile of developed countries with similar fertility levels (Fig. 10), although one cannot help but see that Russia moving in the same direction as them.

Figure 10. Age-specific fertility rates in Russia (1994, 2009) and in some countries with similar fertility levels in 2005-2007, per 1,000 women (in parentheses - total fertility rate)

Until 2000, the change in the age profile of fertility in Russia took place against the background of a decrease in its overall level: the decline in fertility rates among young women under 25 years of age significantly outpaced the reduction in the intensity of childbearing among women over 25 years of age. Then the birth rate in the age groups of young mothers stabilized, and the birth rate in the age groups over 25 began to increase. The general increase in the birth rate in the country, since 2000, has occurred precisely due to an increase in the birth rate in middle and older maternal ages. Today, the birth rate of 30-year-old women has already exceeded the level that was observed 25 years ago (Table 3). In 2007-2009, there was an increase, unprecedented in Russian history, in the birth rates of 30-year-old mothers - by 40% in three years, and in total, compared with 1999, when the historical minimum of the Russian birth rate was reached, the birth rate of women 30 years and older more than doubled. As a result, over a ten-year period from 1999 to 2009, the birth rate of women of older childbearing ages peaked in the mid-1980s. The demographic policy measures adopted in 2006-2007 played an important but not decisive role in this.

Table 3. Age-specific fertility rates, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000-2008, per 1000 women of the corresponding age

Year	Age groups
	15-19 *	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49 **
1980	43,8	157,8	100,8	52,1	17,4	4,9	0,4
1990	55,0	156,5	93,1	48,2	19,4	4,2	0,2
1995	44,8	112,7	66,5	29,5	10,6	2,2	0,1
2000	27,4	93,6	67,3	35,2	11,8	2,4	0,1
2001	27,3	93,1	70,2	38,0	12,9	2,4	0,1
2002	27,4	95,8	75,1	41,8	14,7	2,6	0,1
2003	27,6	95,1	78,3	44,1	16,0	2,7	0,1
2004	28,2	93,4	80,2	45,9	17,6	2,9	0,1
2005	27,5	86,8	77,9	45,5	17,8	3,0	0,2
2006	28,6	85,8	78,2	46,8	18,7	3,1	0,2
2007	29,1	87,5	86,3	54,5	22,8	3,8	0,2
2008	30,5	89,8	91,0	60,4	25,9	4,6	0,2
2009	30,3	90,3	93,7	63,8	27,8	5,2	0,2
2009/1999	1,049	0,984	1,471	1,982	2,501	2,333	1,976
2009/2006	1,059	1,052	1,198	1,363	1,488	1,665	1,536

In 2008, a significant event for the demographic history of Russia took place - for the first time since the 1930s, the maximum intensity of births moved from the age group of 20-24 years to the group of 25-29-year-old women. If in 1999 the modal (most probable) age of motherhood was 21, then in 2005 it was 24, and in 2009 it was 25.

As a result of multidirectional changes in the contribution of different age groups of mothers to total fertility, the age model of Russian fertility has changed dramatically over the past three decades (Fig. 11).

Figure 11. Ratio of age-specific fertility rates in 1990, 1995, 2005 and 2009 to birth rates in 1979-1980

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the relative contribution of mothers under the age of 25 to the final (total) birth rate fluctuated at the level of 52-54%. By the mid-1990s, when the "rejuvenation" of the birth rate reached its peak, the contribution of mothers under 20 years of age to the final birth rate approached 18%, and in total, mothers under 25 years of age provided 61% of the total birth rate in the country. Over the next 10 years, the picture changed rapidly: in 2008, the contribution of the youngest mothers under 20 decreased to 9.7%, while that of all mothers under 25 fell to 39% (Table 4).

Table 4. Contribution of age groups of mothers to the final (total) birth rate, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000-2009, %

Year	Mother's age, years
	up to 20	20-24	25-29	30-34	35 and older	Total
1980	11,6	41,9	26,7	13,8	6,0	100,0
1990	14,6	41,6	24,7	12,8	6,3	100,0
1995	16,8	42,3	24,9	11,1	4,9	100,0
2000	11,5	39,3	28,3	14,8	6,1	100,0
2001	11,2	38,2	28,7	15,6	6,3	100,0
2002	10,7	37,2	29,2	16,2	6,7	100,0
2003	10,5	36,0	29,7	16,7	7,1	100,0
2004	10,5	34,8	29,9	17,1	7,7	100,0
2005	10,6	33,6	30,1	17,6	8,1	100,0
2006	10,9	32,8	30,0	17,9	8,4	100,0
2007	10,2	30,8	30,4	19,2	9,4	100,0
2008	10,1	29,7	30,1	20,0	10,1	100,0
2009	9,7	29,0	30,1	20,5	10,7	100,0

As a result, now it is no longer the youngest, as it was 10 and 25 years ago, but more socially mature women - over 25 years old - provide more than 60% of the existing birth rate.

In a generalized form, the trend of changing the age model of fertility in Russia can be clearly seen in the dynamics of the average age of the mother, including at the birth of children of each order (Table 5). The average age of motherhood in 2009, according to our estimates, was 27.4 years, including at the birth of the first child - 24.6, the second child - 29.5, the third child - 32.1 years. These figures are not only higher than the minimum recorded in the mid-1990s (on average by 2.7 years for all births), but also exceed the values ​​observed at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s. The age of mothers at the birth of the second and third child increased most of all - compared with the minimum values, by 2.9 and 2.4 years, respectively. The increase in the age of birth of the first child over the same period was 2.1 years. An increase in the age of the mother is also observed at the birth of the fourth child.

Table 5. Average age of mother at the birth of children of each order, 1980, 1990, 1995-2007, years

Year	All births	including in order
		First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth and next
1980	25,67	22,99	27,33	30,07	31,81	35,49
1990	25,24	22,65	26,86	29,95	31,64	34,38
1995	24,79	22,67	26,91	29,85	31,55	34,29
1996	25,04	22,88	27,10	30,11	31,78	34,35
1997	25,23	22,97	27,29	30,27	31,91	34,32
1998	25,41	23,12	27,53	30,47	32,13	34,44
1999 1	25,57	23,29	27,70	30,68	32,30	34,53
2000 1	25,76	23,54	27,88	30,88	32,48	34,57
2001 1	25,93	23,66	28,21	31,13	32,60	34,53
2002 1	26,12	23,75	28,41	31,26	32,75	34,74
2003 1	26,27	23,85	28,61	31,41	32,77	34,78
2004 1	26,41	23,97	28,79	31,52	32,99	34,85
2005 1	26,56	24,12	28,94	31,62	33,01	34,96
2006 1	26,64	24,21	29,08	31,71	33,13	34,99
2007 1	26,99	24,33	29,19	31,79	33,20	35,02
2008 1	27,19	24,40	29,34	31,98	33,37	35,17
2009 1	27,36	24,60	29,47	32,06	33,38	35,09

The growth in the share of births outside the official union has stopped

The share of out-of-wedlock births in the total number of births has been declining for the fourth year in a row at a rate of one percentage point per year. After reaching an all-time high in 2005 (30%), in 2009 the figure fell to 26%. The absolute number of births out of a registered marriage in 2009 also slightly decreased compared to the previous year (by 1070 births) and amounted to 459.3 thousand (Fig. 12).

Figure 12. Number of births out of a registered marriage, thousand (left axis) and their share in the total number of births, % (right axis), 1959-2009

AT post-war period Russia stood out among the developed countries with a relatively high level of illegitimate births - about 20% - and then this was explained by the forced post-war “fatherlessness”. However, since the late 1960s in Europe, the birth of children outside of a registered marriage has been growing rapidly, and European countries, one after another, began to overtake Russia in terms of the proportion of illegitimate births. In Russia, however, until approximately the mid-1980s, this trend was not observed, and the proportion of illegitimate births remained stable. However, then it began to grow rapidly here as well. Today, despite a fifteen-year intensive growth in the number of out-of-wedlock births in 1990-2005, Russia is not an exception against the general background of developed countries, but rather is in line with their common trends. Thus, in Estonia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and France, the proportion of extramarital births is half or more of all births, in most European countries, the USA and Canada, as well as in Russia, from 25 to 40%. At the same time, in Italy and Switzerland - 15%, in Greece - just over 5%, in Japan - 2%.

It should be noted that across countries there is a rather positive relationship between the total birth rate and the proportion of out-of-wedlock births. If among countries with a total fertility rate below the average for developed countries, one can also find countries with a high and low proportion of extramarital births, then for countries that are characterized by a relatively higher birth rate, a low proportion of extramarital births is not typical.

In the 1990s, out-of-wedlock births grew especially rapidly at ages with the highest probability of marriage. On the contrary, in women older than 30 years of age, the level of out-of-wedlock births has stabilized. Twenty years ago, the birth of an illegitimate child in Russia was typical for very young mothers (under 20 years old) and for mothers over 35 years old. It was these extreme age groups that ensured the increase in extramarital births in the 1980s. At the ages of maximum marriageability (20-29 years), the birth of a child out of wedlock was a fairly rare event. Today it can be argued that out-of-wedlock births are typical for all ages over 20 years, approximately equally- from 21 to 31% (Table 10, Fig. 13).

Table 6. Percentage of illegitimate births by mother's age, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000-2008

years	Out of 100 births in each age group, was born out of wedlock to mothers aged
	15-19 *	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49 **	Age not specified***
1980	18,7	7,9	9,4	13,5	21,5	23,8	23,1	75,2
1990	20,2	11,0	11,8	17,3	25,5	34,8	36,5	85,5
1995	27,0	17,6	18,9	22,9	30,2	36,5	35,8	93,8
2000	41,0	25,6	24,7	26,4	31,2	34,9	36,8	93,7
2001	43,1	26,7	25,1	26,7	30,5	34,9	34,0	95,8
2002	44,7	27,9	25,7	26,7	30,2	34,1	32,2	93,9
2003	46,4	28,3	25,8	26,5	30,2	34,2	33,1	94,5
2004	47,3	28,4	25,6	26,6	30,3	33,7	33,0	95,2
2005	48,4	28,9	25,5	26,9	30,5	34,0	33,2	96,5
2006	47,2	28,2	24,6	26,4	29,9	34,2	34,1	97,3
2007	47,5	27,7	23,2	25,3	28,7	32,3	30,1	97,4
2008	47,4	27,2	22,1	24,0	27,5	31.6	33,9	97,3
2009	47,7	26,9	21,2	23,5	27,0	31,2	30,7	97,7

*Including those born to mothers younger than 15 years of age.
** Including those born to mothers over 49 years of age.
*** In 2009 the total number of children born out of wedlock to mothers of unknown age was 987, of which 981 were born on the basis of the mother’s statement. These are, as a rule, “refuse children” left in maternity hospitals; because they are registered according to the representation public institutions and not individuals.

Figure 13. Percentage of illegitimate births by mother's age, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005 and 2009, %

A significant increase in the share of extramarital births among the youngest mothers - up to 20 years old - from 20.2% in 1990 to 48.4% in 2005 (47.7% in 2009) was not accompanied by an increase in the number of abortions. On the contrary, the intensity of induced abortions in this age group has more than halved. Indirectly, this indicates that the number of unplanned, premarital pregnancies from casual relationships has not significantly increased, although there are sociological data showing that sexual activity among adolescents has increased over the past decade. The more than two-fold increase in the proportion of extramarital births in the age group under 20 years of age, first of all, indicates a decrease in the prevalence of “follow-up” marriages, stimulated by unplanned pregnancies. However, unintended pregnancies continue to be a determining factor in childbearing among young women, resulting in a growing ranks of single mothers. Among 28.3 thousand births to mothers aged 15-17 in 2009, 46% of children (12.9 thousand) were registered based on the application of one mother. Sample studies show that a smaller proportion of these women subsequently marry the child's father. In socially mature age, the subsequent registration of relations with the father of the child is much more common. We also recall that among mothers who abandon children immediately after birth, underage mothers predominate. social problem out-of-wedlock births at a young age is mainly a consequence of the low effectiveness of pregnancy control during the period of the onset of “growing up” and the first experiences of sexual life.

Out-of-wedlock fertility covers not only all ages, but is also quite evenly represented in all birth orders, which further increases its significance for the reproduction of the population in modern society(Table 7, Fig. 14). The minimum share of illegitimate births is typical for the second births of children in order - 20%, followed by first births - 29%, third - 25%, fourth and subsequent - 33% (2009). Thus, an illegitimate child is far from always the only one. In addition, in Russia there are some social and ethno-demographic groups that, for some reason, are not inclined to register marriage at all, and they are characterized by not so low birth rates. This is evidenced by differences in the prevalence of illegitimate births across Russian regions. Thus, in 2009 in Buryatia, the share of extramarital births was 39% (in 2008 - 41%), in the Chukotka district - 41% (in 2008 - 44%), in the Komi-Permyatsky district - 59% (in 2008 at the same level ), in Tyva - 61% (in 2008 - 62%), in rural areas of the Magadan region - 64%, in the Koryak district - 66% (in 2008 - 64%), including in rural areas - 73% (the maximum level in Russia). For rural areas of all areas inhabited by the peoples of the North, the share of illegitimate births is 44%.

Table 7. Percentage of children born out of a registered marriage among all those born by mother's birth order. Territories covered by the corresponding registration, 2002-2009, %

	birth order					All queues*
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th or more
2002	32,6	22,8	28,5	31,6	29,8	29,8
2003	32,7	23,2	28,7	32,2	28,7	29,8
2004	32,6	23,5	29,5	33,0	31,1	29,8
2005	32,5	23,7	30,4	34,1	33,8	30,1
2006	31,7	23,6	30,9	36,7	36,6	29,3
2007	31,2	22,2	27,8	32,7	33,3	28,3
2008	29,6	20,9	25,6	31,7	34,0	26,4
2009	28,6	20,2	25,2	32,0	34,1	24,6

Note: The indicator for all births differs slightly from that given in Table. 3.9 due to the fact that not all territories of the Russian Federation develop the corresponding data.

Figure 14. Percentage of children born out of a registered marriage among all those born by mother's birth order. Territories covered by the corresponding registration, 2002, 2005 and 2009, %

In 2007-2009, there was a noticeable decrease in the proportion of out-of-wedlock births for all birth orders (Table 8). The number of marriage births over the years has increased by almost a quarter, while illegitimate births - by only 6%. It is possible that official marriage in 2006-2009 acquired some additional benefits when making a decision about the next birth. Indeed, calculations of the average order of birth for various registration categories of births show that this indicator has increased more visibly for births registered on the basis of the parents' marriage certificate.

Table 8. Born in and out of wedlock, including by type of registration, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000-2009

Year	Total, thousand	Including those born:		Share of births outside the register marriage, %	Extramarital births registered on the basis, thousand:		Share of registered registered at the request of one mother, %
		in the register broken marriage	out of register broken marriage		joint statement of mother and father	one mother's statements
1980	2202,8	1965,2	237,6	10,8	90,7	146,9	61,8
1990	1988,9	1698,3	290,6	14,6	124,2	166,4	57,2
1995	1363,8	1075,5	288,3	21,1	124,2	164,1	56,9
2000	1266,8	912,5	354,3	28,0	167,3	187,0	52,8
2001	1311,6	934,3	377,5	28,8	179,5	197,8	52,4
2002	1397,0	985,5	411,5	29,5	195,4	216,1	52,5
2003	1449,5	1018,9	430,7	29,7	208,4	222,3	51,6
2004	1502,5	1055,4	447,1	29,8	214,7	232,4	52,0
2005	1457,4	1020,3	437,1	30,0	200,4	236,6	54,1
2006	1479,6	1048,1	431,5	29,2	189,9	241,6	56,0
2007	1610,1	1159,3	450,8	28,0	195,9	254,9	56,5
2008	1713,9	1253,5	460,4	26,9	202,8	257,6	55,9
2009	1761,7	1302,3	459,3	26,1	200,6	258,8	56,3
2009 /2006	1,191	1,243	1,065	-	1,056	1,071	-

So, extramarital births over the past two decades has become a mass phenomenon, covering the widest social strata. The contribution of unmarried mothers to the overall birth rate in the country is very significant. However, official statistics provide few opportunities for its study, which contributes to the spread of incorrect judgments. Among the most common misconceptions is the identification of out-of-wedlock birth with single motherhood. It used to be so, especially in the first decades after the Second World War. However, today extramarital births are formed, to a large extent, not by single mothers, but by married couples in whom marriage for some reason is not registered.

This is partly evidenced by official birth registration data, which show that the share of births registered by one mother is quite stable and usually does not exceed half of all births (Table 8).

The detailed dynamics of the structure of out-of-wedlock births depending on the parental status of the parents at the time of the birth of the child, according to sample data from the survey of GMS&L, shows that the contribution of the first partnership unions remains stable - at the level of 40-50% - throughout the entire post-war period. But the contribution of repeated unregistered unions is steadily growing. Fifty years ago, repeated unions played a barely noticeable role in out-of-wedlock births, which is not surprising given their then low prevalence. At the moment, every third illegitimate child is born in such unions. It is important to note that during the post-war period, the contribution to extramarital births of women who never had a spouse in their household decreased by half, from more than 40% to 15-20%. Pregnancies that were realized in births before the start of cohabitation in the first partnership have practically lost their significance for the formation of out-of-wedlock fertility. Apparently, in the last decade, control over unplanned pregnancies during the period of gaining the first sexual experience has increased.

Is it possible to count on an increase in the birth rate of real generations?

It was shown above that market estimates of the final (total) birth rate for conditional generations in Russia increased in 2000-2009, with the exception of 2005, in which, although there was a general decrease, it did not affect all age groups (the increase in the birth rate over the age of 25 continued). The increase in the birth rate in 2007-2008 was especially significant and, what is especially important, covered mainly the middle and older age groups of mothers, who make the main contribution to the birth rate of second and subsequent children.

However, it is reliable to judge the long-term evolution of fertility and build long-term demographic projections can only be based on birth rate estimates for real generations.

By now, we have complete knowledge of the number of children actually born for generations of women born in the 1950s and earlier. Estimates of the expected final fertility for the generations born in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, who are completing their reproductive biography, are also quite reliable. But for generations that are in the active ages of childbearing, i.e. for women born in the second half of the 1970s and 1980s, we can only talk about preliminary estimates.

For cohorts that have not completed their reproductive life, the most common internationally accepted method for obtaining such estimates is to sum the number of children actually born at the time of observation for each generation of women and the number of children that can be expected if, at subsequent ages, the average woman from a given generations will have the same fertility as demonstrated in the year of observation by women who have reached these ages. With this approach, for the generation of women who turned 15 in the year of observation, the estimated total fertility is more than a conditional value, based entirely on the “expected” component, and numerically coinciding with the usual total fertility rate for conditional generations. But as we move on to the older generations, the value of the “expected” component decreases, and the already realized, actual birth rate plays an increasingly important role in assessing the final birth rate.

Due to the fact that age-specific fertility rates change from year to year, the assessment of both the “actual” and “expected” components of the final birth rate for the same generation, and, consequently, their total value, can also change annually. In conditions modern Russia When there is an increase in fertility in women over 25 and even over 35, and as long as this increase is observed, estimates of the total fertility can be revised upward annually not only for the youngest generations, but also for representatives of older cohorts.

Let's see what estimates of the final birth rate could be made for post-war generations (Table 9), based on retrospective data limited to 1999 (the year of the minimum level of the current birth rate), and compare them with estimates obtained for the same generations ten years later ( latest available data for 2009). In addition, in order to assess the particularly significant contribution of birth rate growth after 2006 (i.e., after new demographic policies were put in place), we reproduced in the table the estimates of the expected final birth rate that we performed earlier based on data for 2006 year.

Table 9. Actual and prospective birth rates of real generations in Russia, women born in 1950-1989

Years of birth of women	Total number of births		Estimate based on 2009 data			Difference between 1999 and 2009 estimates	Difference between 2006 and 2009 estimates
	Estimate based on 1999 data	Estimated based on 2006 data	Actually born by 2010, children per woman	Births are expected to add. to those already born	Total number of births
1955-1959	1,88	1,88	1,88	0,00	1,88	0,00	0,00
1960-1964	1,75	1,76	1,76	0,00	1,76	0,01	0,00
1965-1969	1,58	1,63	1,63	0,01	1,64	0,06	0,01
1970-1974	1,40	1,52	1,49	0,09	1,58	0,18	0,06
1975-1979	1,23	1,43	1,26	0,31	1,57	0,34	0,14
1980-1984	1,16	1,33	0,83	0,71	1,54	0,38	0,21
1985-1989	-	-	0,34	1,19	1,53	-	-

It is obvious that the final birth rate for female cohorts born in the second half of the 1950s (1.88 children per woman) has not changed - these generations were close to leaving the childbearing age eight years ago, and in 2009 they already left it. The indicators for the generations born in the first half of the 1960s changed slightly upwards - 1.76 versus 1.75, but for the cohorts of the second half of the 1960s, the growth in the birth rate of recent years has not passed without a trace - an assessment of their magnitude the final birth rate has firmly crossed the mark of 1.6 children (1.64 against 1.58). True, the increase in births in 2007-2009 was no longer significant for them - 0.01 per woman.

More significantly, the expected birth rates for generations born in the 1970s should be revised: compared with estimates based on data accumulated by 2000, later estimates give an increase of 0.2-0.3 children per woman. In 2007 alone, these generations brought 0.03-0.07 children to the final birth rate, and in total for three years - 0.06-0.14. It is easy to calculate that if the trend towards an increase in the birth rate over the age of 30 continues, then generations of women born after 1970 will eventually have an average of 1.5-1.6 children. Unfortunately, they will not be able to step over this threshold while maintaining the intensity of births at the level of 2009. Especially if the growth of the birth rate in women over 35 will stop. These generations are inexorably approaching their forties, and today they are realizing their last chance to increase the size of their families. However, if the bar at the level of 1.6 is reached, then it will be possible to say that the long-term decline in the final birth rate from generation to generation will slow down and, perhaps, its level will stabilize. With such characteristics, Russia will not differ much from the predicted birth rates for conditional and real generations on average for Europe.

So, based on the observed trends, the assumption of a further reduction in the birth rate of real generations in Russia still looks more reasonable than its growth. Stabilization of the final birth rate of the cohorts at the level of 1.5-1.6 is the most optimistic scenario that can be counted on if the development of current processes continues.

Consider how Russia's position looks against the background of other developed countries. Ranking countries according to the level of the final birth rate of real generations somewhat changes the idea of ​​which countries have a birth rate, and, consequently, the number of children in families is higher or lower. Thus, the current rating of Russia, when moving from estimates of the birth rate based on indicators for conditional generations to birth rates for real generations, noticeably decreases (Table 10). It ranks 33rd - 34th among 40 developed countries in terms of the final birth rate of the cohorts born in 1955-1959, 1960-1964 and 1965-1969 (taking into account South Korea not shown in the table). The female generations of the indicated years of birth have almost completed their reproductive activity, and the birth rates for them can be considered as final. Russia's immediate rating environment looks like in the following way: Greece, Belarus, Switzerland, Ukraine (the birth rate of the cohort born in 1965-1969 in these countries is higher by no more than 0.1 births per woman), Japan, Germany (Eastern and Western lands), Italy, Spain ( the birth rate of the same cohort is slightly lower than in Russia).

Table 10. Total birth rate of real generations in 39 developed countries of the world *, female cohorts 1955-1959, 1960-1964 and 1965-1969 years of birth

Country**	Years of birth of generations			Change (3)-(1)
	1955-1959	1960-1964	1965-1969
	1	2	3	4
Ireland	2,55	2,32	2,15	-0,40
New Zealand	2,34	2,30	2,24	-0,10
Macedonia	2,28	2,24	2,17	-0,11
Serbia and Montenegro	2,25	2,21	2,04	-0,21
Slovakia	2,20	2,13	1,98	-0,22
Poland	2,19	2,11	1,94	-0,25
Australia	2,21	2,10	2,00	-0,21
Moldova	2,42	2,18	1,96	-0,46
Norway	2,07	2,09	2,04	-0,03
Romania	2,23	2,06	1,74	-0,49
France	2,13	2,06	1,99	-0,14
USA	1,98	2,02	2,08	0,10
Sweden	2,04	2,01	1,92	-0,12
Hungary	1,99	2,01	1,92	-0,07
Czech	2,06	1,99	1,88	-0,18
Great Britain	2,01	1,94	1,86	-0,15
Croatia	1,95	1,94	1,84	-0,11
Estonia	2,01	1,94	1,81	-0,20
Finland	1,93	1,94	1,89	-0,04
Denmark	1,86	1,91	1,93	0,07
Bulgaria	2,02	1,89	1,75	-0,27
Latvia	1,88	1,87	1,74	-0,14
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,91	1,86	…	…
Portugal	1,99	1,86	1,77	-0,22
Greece	1,95	1,84	1,69	-0,26
Slovenia	1,94	1,83	1,72	-0,22
Netherlands	1,87	1,82	1,75	-0,12
Belgium	1,83	1,82	1,74	-0,09
Canada	1,84	1,78	1,71	-0,13
Lithuania	1,93	1,78	1,72	-0,21
Ukraine	1,89	1,78	1,61	-0,28
Belarus	1,91	1,77	1,63	-0,28
Russia	1,86	1,75	1,59	-0,27
Switzerland	1,75	1,73	1,62	-0,13
Japan	1,93	1,73	1,52	-0,41
Germany (Eastern Lands)	1,82	1,71	1,52	-0,30
Spain	1,86	1,69	1,53	-0,33
Austria	1,73	1,66	1,59	-0,14
Italy	1,75	1,60	1,46	-0,29
Germany (West Lands)	1,60	1,55	1,48	-0,12

* Germany is represented by two parts - Eastern and Western lands due to different levels of fertility and trends in its change in the period before unification within a single state.
** Countries are listed in descending order of total fertility for the generation born in 1960-1964.
Source: Calculated based on HSE IDEM database.

The decline in the birth rate of real generations during the transition from the cohorts of 1955-1959 to the cohorts of 1965-1969 is the leading trend for the entire set of developed countries. Only Denmark (+0.07 children per woman) and the USA (+0.1) showed a statistically significant increase in the birth rate. The birth rate in Norway and Finland remains virtually unchanged. Romania (-0.49), Moldova (-0.46), Japan (0.41), Ireland (-0.40), Spain (-0.33) demonstrate the fastest decline in fertility for these cohorts separated by a ten-year period ), Eastern lands of Germany (-0.30), Italy (-0.29), Belarus, Ukraine (-0.28), Bulgaria and Russia (-0.27), Greece (-0.26), Poland ( -0.25), Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia (-0.22). True, in Ireland and Moldova such rapid rates of decline, according to at least, are partly related to the completion of the demographic transition to low fertility, i.e. with a decrease from high levels - 2.5 children per woman for the 1955-1959 cohort.

So, when predicting the birth rate for Russia, it should be taken into account that against the background of developed countries, its level has long been below average, and the rate of decline in post-war cohorts is above average. The decrease in the birth rate from generation to generation in Russia, unfortunately, continues, the average number of children in families is decreasing, despite the increase in indicators for conditional generations in 2000-2009, and it will be extremely difficult to reverse this trend. On the other hand, the positive trend of the last decade inspires certain optimism, since a slowdown in the rate of decline in the birth rate of real generations in Russia is evident.

Summarizing brief analysis position of Russia among developed countries in terms of the birth rate and its change in the last decade, we state: a) the situation that has developed in Russia is far from unique for developed world. close to Russian level fertility have countries with different levels economic well-being, with a different structure of the economy, with a different level of development of social and family policies; b) the situation in Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus, in some countries of Central Europe, in the countries of Southern Europe: Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, as well as in Canada and Switzerland is developing in the most similar way to the Russian one.

Having considered long-term trends and their market changes in the context of real generations, it is possible to more reasonably approach the assessment of possible prospects for the dynamics of indicators for calendar years.

As an upper bar for 2030, we can take an estimate of the final birth rate of conditional generations (total fertility rate) at the level of 1.9 per woman. This is the birth rate of the early 1980s, but is unlikely to be reached. In addition, the possibility of a return to the initial level (1.3-1.4 births) cannot be ruled out after the euphoria typical of the first years of the new family policy measures subsides. All countries faced a compensatory decline, including Russia in 1988-1993, after in the first years of the introduction of family policy measures, there was a rapid increase in birth rates, provided by shifts in the birth calendar without a significant increase in the total number of children in families. It will be very difficult to avoid repeating the sad experience, at least world history no such examples yet. In accordance with the average, most likely scenario, we expect a moderate increase in the birth rate to 1.7 by 2030. The concept of demographic policy in the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025, adopted in 2007, assumes within ten years to reach a value close to 2 births per woman. In our opinion, there are no grounds for such optimism.

Birth rate in Russia is still far below the generational replacement level

When analyzing the birth rate, its assessment is of independent importance from the point of view of the ratio of the birth rate and the level of replacement of generations, the reproduction of the population. Such an assessment is given by an integral indicator that takes into account not only the birth rate, but also the death rate of women before they reach reproductive age - the net coefficient (net coefficient) of population reproduction - the number of girls born, on average, by one woman and surviving to middle age, in to which their mother gave birth. AT modern conditions The leading factor in the replacement of generations is the birth rate, since the mortality rate of women in childhood and young ages in Russia has long been quite low, and its further decline is not able to significantly affect the integral indicators of reproduction. This is evidenced by the data in Table. 11, which presents the main components of the calculation of the net reproduction rate of the population in Russia.

Table 11. Components of the net reproduction rate of the Russian population, 1958/1959-2009

years	Average number of children per woman	Including girls (gross reproduction ratio leadership)	Average age of mother, years	The probability of a girl surviving to the average age of her mother	Net- reproduction ratio leadership
1958-1959	2,62	1,28	27,8	0,93	1,19
1964-1965	2,14	1,05	27,6	0,93	0,97
1968-1969	1,97	1,00	27,2	0,96	0,96
1974-1975	1,99	0,97	26,4	0,96	0,93
1978-1979	1,90	0,92	25,9	0,96	0,88
1984-1985	2,06	1,00	25,8	0,97	0,96
1988-1989	2,07	1,01	25,7	0,97	0,98
1994-1995	1,37	0,66	24,7	0,97	0,64
1998-1999	1,20	0,58	25,5	0,97	0,56
2004-2005	1,31	0,64	26,6	0,97	0,62
2000	1,19	0,58	25,8	0,97	0,56
2001	1,22	0,59	25,9	0,97	0,58
2002	1,29	0,62	26,1	0,97	0,61
2003	1,32	0,64	26,3	0,97	0,62
2004	1,34	0,64	26,4	0,97	0,63
2005	1,29	0,63	26,6	0,97	0,61
2006	1,30	0,63	26,6	0,97	0,61
2007	1,41	0,68	27,0	0,98	0,67
2008	1,49	0,73	27,2	0,98	0,71
2009	1,54	0,75	27,4	0,98	0,73

The process of declining fertility in the 1970s. covered all industrialized countries, and in the 1980s, its level almost universally fell below the level of simple generational replacement. Fig. 15, which presents several large industrialized countries, which are now at different ends of the spectrum of values ​​for this indicator. Of all developed countries, only in the United States (including among the white population) the value of the indicator is at the level of simple reproduction of the population. France is approaching the border of simple reproduction as close as possible. At the same time, in the countries of Southern Europe, Japan, as well as in Russia, the reproduction regime is far from the border of simple generational replacement.

Figure 15. Net population replacement rate in selected countries, 1960-2008

AT early XXI century, the birth rate was insufficient for the simple reproduction of the population in all industrialized countries, with the exception of the United States, and in 15 European countries the net reproduction rate of the population was lower than in Russia.

The observed net reproduction rate of 0.73 in 2008 indicates that, taking into account mortality, the current birth rate only replaces generations of current mothers by 73%. In fact, this means that if the current (that is, observed in the years when the indicator was calculated) regimes of fertility and mortality do not change over two to three decades, then each subsequent daughter generation will be 27% less than the previous one. In such a stable (i.e., having a constant reproduction pattern) population, the annual rate of natural increase (the so-called "true" rate of natural increase) will be negative at the level of 12 per 1000 population, and the population of a country closed to migration will decrease by almost 1.2% per year.

In 2009, the actual rate of natural increase in Russia was negative (-1.8‰), seven times less in absolute terms than the true rate. The reason for the discrepancy is explained by the fact that the age structure of the Russian population in terms of the degree of aging does not yet correspond to today's levels of fertility and mortality. But if the current trends continue, the rate of natural increase will approach the true. A significant increase in the birth rate in 2007-2009 and in total for the entire period since 1999 - after reaching its historical minimum - could not but affect positive side on integral indicators of population reproduction. At the same time, the path that Russia must travel to get out of the restricted regime zone demographic reproduction, still long.

Although Russian indicators In general, mortality rates are far from the ideal that other developed countries serve for Russia; in childhood and maternal age, the gap is small, and therefore the available reserves are not large, in terms of population reproduction indicators. If in Russia 98% of girls survive to the average age of their mother, then the best indicators in the world are 99%. Even if we assume that no girl born in 2009 will die and be able (and want) to become a mother, then, at the current birth rate, this could only increase the net reproduction rate from the observed 0.73 to 0, 75. Very significant fluctuations in mortality in Russia, noted in the 1980s-1990s, had practically no effect on the discussed characteristics of reproduction (differences in the values ​​of the probability of surviving to the average age of the mother concerned the third decimal place). The ongoing decline in infant mortality even improved them somewhat. The role of infant mortality is indeed serious, since about 50% of all female deaths from birth to the average age of the mother occur at the age of up to one year, which is a historically constant value, practically independent of the country, era and general mortality rate. However, only an increase in the birth rate among the current generations and immigration can fundamentally change for the better the indicators of population reproduction, if the birth rate among migrants is higher than among those living today in Russia.

However, the impact of migration on the number of births is not limited to the higher intensity of childbearing in migrant families. Mostly young people migrate, which has a beneficial effect on the age structure of the population, and this, in turn, increases the number of marriages and births and, accordingly, slows down the transition to a sustainable negative natural increase in the developed countries of the West. At the same time, the possibility of a transition to a negative balance of births and deaths in the vast majority of developed countries should be considered as a very likely threat, which is warned by the value of the net reproduction rate less than one, and, accordingly, the value of the true rate of natural increase below zero, maintained in them from the middle 1970s.

Related links

Shabunova A., Kopeikina M., Vologdina E. Reproductive behavior of women in the Vologda region. Trends and prospects

In fact, Russian data became incomplete even earlier, in 1993-1994. no information was collected on Ingushetia, in 1993-2003. across Chechnya.

The phenomenon of out-of-wedlock births and differences in the birth rate depending on the type of marriage-partner union were considered in detail by us earlier: see: Population of Russia 2007. Fifteenth Annual Demographic Report. M. 2009, pp. 124-144.

For more details, see Population of Russia 2007. Fifteenth Annual Demographic Report. M. 2009, p. 134-136.

For more information on differences in birth rates between migrants and non-migrants in Russia, see Population of Russia 2008. Sixteenth Annual Demographic Report. M. 2010, p. 111-132.

(summary)

General demographic losses in Russia since 1991 to 2010 amounted to about 32 million people. Let's prove it.

Population decline under Yeltsin (excess of mortality over birth rate) = 5767922 human

Migration growth under Yeltsin 4266033 people (only official migrants). Bringing the magnitude of this increase is necessary here, so that it would be clear why the population of the Russian Federation has not greatly decreased.

The population decline after Yeltsin's departure and the consequences of the economic genocide unleashed by him, especially from the consequences of the default (the excess of deaths over births) amounted to 7372918 people (up to 2010 inclusive)

Migration growth under Putin-Medvedev 1623171 people (only official migrants)

Direct losses from the economic genocide of the 90s (until 2010) calculated from the level of zero population growth (as many are born as die).

5767922 + 7372918 = 13 140 840 human

But in the RSFSR until 1991. there was a constant increase in the population, so we must calculate it, because. because of the economic genocide, we lost it.

That is, over the previous 10 years before the accession of drunk Boris, the population growth of the RSFSR amounted to:

148.3 (population of the RSFSR in 1991) - 138.8 (population of the RSFSR in 1981) = 9,5 mil. people (in 20 years will be 9,5*2 )

Thus, the total demographic losses since 1991 to 2010 amounted to

13,1+9,5*2=32,1 million people.

Source: www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/rosst atsite/main/population/demography/#

Migration increase in the population of the Russian Federation (by years)

1990 456062
1991 227371
1992 386389
1993 375838
1994 877532
1995 603198
1996 443296
1997 391127
1998 321198
1999 184022
total: 4266033 migration growth under Yeltsin

Migration growth of the population of the Russian Federation under Putin Medvedev by years

2000 241755
2001 81781

2002 87149
2003 43884
2004 41275
2005 107432
2006 132319
2007 239943
2008 242106
2009 247449
2010 158078
total: 1623171 migration growth under Putin-Medvedev

http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/B09_16/IssWWW.exe/Stg/02-01.htm
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b11_00/IssWWW.exe/Stg/dk01/7-0.htm

"Year" "population growth in the Russian Federation" (excess of mortality over birth rate)

1960 1896263
1965 1031731
1970 772530
1975 796437
1980 677024
1981 712322
1982 823844
1983 914327
1984 758748
1985 749881
1986 987940
1987 968389
1988 779382 (first call - on the wave of populism, Yeltsin and future liberalism are rushing to power, Gorbachev chooses a murderous model of economic reforms)
1989 576816
1990 332865
1991 103969 (last year of inertial growth)

On June 12, 1991, Yeltsin came to power and Yegor Gaidar began a shock recovery of the Russian Federation (January 1992)

1992 - 219797 ("- "RF began to die out)
1993 -750356 (ECONOMIC GENOCIDE OF LIBERASTS)
1994 -893207 (WE ARE KILLED BY THE MILLIONS)
1995 -840005
1996 -777611 (Magnitsky organizes laundress companies in Kalmykia to evade multibillion-dollar taxes)
1997 -755836
1998 -705452

(August 1998 = default, Bank of Safra, founder of Hermitage Capital, helps the Yeltsin Family cut part of the IMF tranche)

1999 -929627 (tax burden on Yukos 3%, Hermitage Capital in Kalmykia pays 5.5% income tax instead of 35%)
2000 -!!! 958532 !!! (tax burden on Yukos 3%, Magnitsky steals billions in Kalmykia)
2001 -943252 (tax burden on Yukos 26%)
2002 -935305 (tax burden on Yukos 35%)
2003 -888525 (Khodorkovsky's arrest)
2004 -792925 (Magnitsky in the court of Kalmykia loses a lawsuit from the tax office against one of the laundress companies. Due to pressure on the disabled, he won the lawsuit against another laundress company)
2005 -846559

In May 2005, the court found Khodorkovsky guilty of fraud, misappropriation of other people's property, tax evasion and other crimes, Khodorkovsky was sentenced to 9 years with confiscation of property that went to the national project "Housing".

2006 -687066
2007 -470323
2008 -362007

2009 - 248800)

Draw conclusions gentlemen - comrades!

Send your good work in the knowledge base is simple. Use the form below

Students, graduate students, young scientists who use the knowledge base in their studies and work will be very grateful to you.

Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation

All-Russian Correspondence Institute of Finance and Economics

TEST

in the discipline "demography"

on the topic "Analysis of the birth rate in Russia for 1998-2007"

Executor:

Kosyreva Olga Vyacheslavovna

specialty G and MU

Record book number 06MGD12474

Head: Ioda Elena Vasilievna

Lipetsk 2009

• Introduction
• 1. Theoretical part
• General fertility rates
• 1.2 Total fertility rates Special and age-specific fertility rates
• 1.3 Total and cumulative fertility rates, average age of mothers at birth
• 2. Analytical part
• Conclusion
• Literature

Introduction

Fertility is the process of childbearing in a population. It can only be considered as a mass phenomenon, as a collection of single acts of childbirth. This refers only to live births. Stillbirths are not included in the birth rate. It is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of fertility and fertility (in the old literature one can still find a mixture of these two categories). Fertility refers to the biological ability to bear children, while fertility refers to actual childbearing, i.e. implementation of this ability.

If fertility is a set of childbirths, then they themselves are the results of reproductive behavior (this concept will be discussed below). At the level of the family, the individual, the result is the number of children born. It is important, by the way, to always clarify how many children in the family, the individual has in mind. This can be: the number of children born, the number of living children, the number of children living in the family, the number of children of a certain age, for example, under 18, etc. It is clear that these indicators differ in meaning and in size.

It is accepted, depending on the number of children, to distinguish between small children, average children and large families. A small number of children means the presence of 1-2 children, an average number of children - 3-4 children, and a large number of children - 5 children or more. It is necessary to pay attention to the difference that takes place here in comparison with the practice, for example, of social protection of the population. There to large families include those who have 3 or more children.

Birth rate, along with mortality, is the main demographic process. It is she who is currently in our country and other industrial countries has a decisive influence on the nature of the reproduction of the population. It mainly depends on how the process of replacement of generations is carried out in society. Suffice it to say that if the average number of children born to one woman, regardless of her marital status, does not exceed about 2.1, or the average number of children per fertile (i.e., fertile) couple does not exceed about 2.3-2.4, then no matter how low the mortality rate would be, there will be no replacement of generations in society, and the population will decrease from generation to generation (it should, however, be borne in mind that this reduction may be inhibited or delayed for some time under the influence of the prevailing favorable age structure of the population, but only for a while).

The following testifies to the ratio of the influence of fertility and mortality on the reproduction of the population. With the current level of mortality in Russia, in order to ensure simple reproduction of the population, i.e. in order for the population not to decrease from generation to generation, it is necessary that on average 2.11 children be born per woman. If it were possible to reduce the death rate by 1.5 times, then this figure would be reduced to only 2.09.

In this regard, the birth rate is given a special place in demographic policy. The prospects for demographic dynamics, changes in the size of the population and its composition, and the future of our country depend decisively on whether it will be possible to significantly change its level and trends.

In order to increase the birth rate, one must have a very good idea of ​​what its level depends on, the number of children in families, what determines one or another reproductive behavior. This, in turn, implies a comprehensive and deep Scan fertility and reproductive behavior using various indicators and sources of information.

1.1 Birth rates of the population

General fertility rates

Total fertility rates include the absolute number of births and the total fertility rate. Sometimes the birth rate is identified with the number of births. For example, they say or write that the birth rate has increased or that it is higher in one area than in another. In support of this, absolute numbers of births are given. In fact, this indicator is completely uninformative and in itself is not suitable for fertility analysis. It is clear that the larger the population, the greater, ceteris paribus, will be the number of certain events in this population. In a larger population, there will be more births, more absolute number of births.

The absolute number of births can only be used to calculate other birth rates or to determine the absolute value of natural increase (in this case, the number of deaths is subtracted from the number of births).

The total fertility rate is better than the absolute number of births. However, this indicator is also unsuitable for a serious analysis of fertility. The fact is that not the entire population actually takes part in the process of childbearing, but only women of reproductive (childbearing, fertile) age. Therefore, the higher the proportion of these women in the total population, the higher the overall coefficient will be, other things being equal. fertility. .

1.2 Special and age-specific fertility rates

The name of indicators	Methodology for calculating indicators and sources of information
Special birth rate	Represents the number of births per 1,000 women of reproductive age (15-49 years). It is calculated by dividing the absolute number of births by the average annual number of women aged 15-49 and multiplying the result by 1000, i.e. calculated in ‰.
Age-specific fertility rate	Represents the number of births to mothers of age x per 1000 women of this age, i.e. calculated in ‰. As a rule, calculated and published for five-year age groups of women (15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49). However, they can also be calculated for one-year age groups, i.e. for each age separately. It is calculated by dividing the number of births to mothers of a certain age group (for example, 20-24 years old) by the average annual number of women of this age and multiplying the result by 1000.

A more adequate characterization of the birth rate is given by the use of special and age-specific birth rates. The special birth rate is significantly better than the general birth rate. It more adequately characterizes the true level of fertility, to a lesser extent depends on the characteristics of the age composition of the population. However, it still depends. The fact is that even within the age group of 15-49 years, the intensity of childbearing naturally differs by age. Depending on the level of fertility and, especially, the age of marriage, the maximum fertility rates occur in women in the age groups of 20-24 years or 25-29 years. Further, with age, the intensity of childbearing in women decreases. In this regard, it is clear that the more among women of childbearing age there are those who are 20-29 years old, the higher, all other things being equal, will be the value of the special fertility rate.

Even more precisely, in comparison with the special fertility rate, age coefficients characterize the birth rate. As a matter of fact, special coefficient fertility can be considered as a special case of age. It's just that the age group here is very large. It is 35 years, while usually age-specific fertility rates are calculated for five-year or one-year age groups.

The use of age coefficients in dynamic or territorial comparisons of the birth rate makes it possible to eliminate the influence of the age composition of women of reproductive age, to assess differences or changes in the age pattern of fertility. In addition, on their basis, the total fertility rate and population reproduction indicators are calculated, which will be discussed later.

A larger increase in fertility rates at older ages continued after 1999, when the birth rate in Russia slightly increased. For 15-19 year old women in 2003 the birth rate was lower than in 1999 by 6.4%. In all other ages, the birth rate in 2003 was higher than in 1999: 20-24 years old - by 2.1%, 25-29 years old - by 20.1%, 30-34 years old - by 34.9% , 35-39 years old - by 41.6%, 40-44 years old - by 22.7%.

Thus, in 30-39-year-old women, the birth rate in 2003 increased by more than a third compared to 1999 and returned to the level of the early 1990s. The same was true in the 25-29 age group, while women under 25 have fertility rates that are now significantly lower than they were 10 years ago. Such a different dynamics of fertility rates in women of different ages has led to a significant change in the shape of the curve of age-specific fertility rates, a shift in a significant proportion of births to older ages. If in 1994 the birth rate in the age group of 25-29 years old was 55.9% of the value of this indicator in the age group of 20-24 years old, then in 2003 it was 82.3%.

The age model of fertility now differs significantly in the regions of Russia. In a number of regions (for example, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Tomsk region), fertility rates for 25-29-year-old women are higher than for women aged 20-24, while there are regions where the birth rate for women aged 25-29 is less than 70% of its value at the age of 20-24 years (for example, the Republic of Mordovia, Kursk and Tambov regions).

Let us dwell on the possibilities of using the index method for dynamic or territorial comparisons of the birth rate. This method, used in relation to total fertility rates, allows you to determine to what extent the change in total fertility rates in dynamics or the difference in the value of this indicator for one population from its value for another population is associated with a change or difference in the actual intensity of childbearing, and to what extent - with a change or difference in the sex and age structure of the population. The calculation is made according to the following formula:

n 1 f x 1 *w x 0 n 1

--- = ----------- * -----------

n 0 n 0 f x 1 *w x 0

where n 1 - total fertility rate current period(for dynamic indices) or the analyzed population (for territorial indices);

n 0 - total fertility rate of the base period (for dynamic indices) or the population used as a comparison base (for territorial indices);

f x 1 - age-specific fertility rates of the current period (for dynamic indices) or the analyzed population (for territorial indices) (in ‰);

w x 0 - the share of women of each age group in the total population of the base period (for dynamic indices) or the population used as a comparison base (for territorial indices) (in fractions of a unit).

Total fertility rates are available almost always and you need to make an additional calculation only according to the formula: f x 1 *w x 0. For such a calculation, the age-specific fertility rates of the current period or the analyzed population are required, and the sex-age structure of the population, on the contrary, of the base period or the population used for comparison.

Now about what these indexes show.

The first index (n 1 / n 0) shows the change in the total fertility rate (for dynamic indices) or the difference between the value of this indicator for the analyzed population and its value for the population used as a comparison base (for territorial indices).

The second index ((f x 1 *w x 0) / n 0) indicates the contribution of age-specific fertility rates to the difference in overall rates. It shows what would be the change in the total fertility rate (for dynamic indices) or its difference from the indicator for another population (for territorial indices), if only the actual intensity of childbearing changed or differed, and the sex and age structure of the population remained unchanged or was the same for both populations.

The third index (n 1 / (f x 1 *w x 0)) indicates the contribution of the sex and age structure to the difference in total fertility rates. It shows what would be the change in the total fertility rate (for dynamic indices) or its difference from the indicator for another population (for territorial indices), if only the sex and age structure of the population changed or differed, and the intensity of childbearing itself remained unchanged or was the same for both populations.

Using the index method, we determine the contribution of changes in age-specific fertility rates and the age and sex composition of the population to the increase in the total fertility rate in Russia. In 2003, compared with 1999, the total fertility rate increased by 22.9%. More than half of this increase is caused by the growth of age-specific fertility rates (Table 1).

Table 1

Indices of the dynamics of the total fertility rate in the Russian Federation in 1999-2003.

	Change in total fertility rate	Index of the contribution of changes in age-specific fertility rates to changes in the total fertility rate	Index of the contribution of changes in the sex and age structure to changes in the total fertility rate

1.3 Total and cumulative fertility rates,

average age of mothers at birth

The name of indicators	Methodology for calculating indicators
total fertility rate	It shows the number of children that would be born on average by one woman throughout her life, provided that the birth rate at all ages remains unchanged and exactly the same as it was at the time the coefficient was calculated. It is calculated as the sum of age-specific fertility rates multiplied by 5 (if the age-specific coefficients are for 5-year groups; if they are for one-year groups, then no multiplication is done) and divided by 1000, since age-specific fertility rates are calculated per 1000 women, and the total coefficient is for one.
Cumulative Fertility Rate	Shows the number of children that would be born on average by one woman by reaching a particular age, provided that the birth rate remains unchanged and exactly the same as it was at the time the coefficient was calculated. Unlike the total fertility rate, when calculating the cumulative coefficients, not all age-specific fertility rates are summed up, but only up to the age for which the cumulative coefficient is calculated. For example, when calculating the cumulative fertility rate for 30 years old, age-specific fertility rates from 15 to 29 years old are summed up, and when calculating the cumulative birth rate for 40 years old, from 15 to 39 years old inclusively. As in the calculation of the total fertility rate, the sum of age-specific fertility rates is multiplied by the length of the age interval (a) and by 0.001.
Average age of mother at birth	Calculated using the following formula: Хср = (fх * x) / fх, where fх - age-specific fertility rates; x - age. If one-year age-specific fertility rates are used, then the corresponding number of years will be used as the x value, and 0.5 is added to the resulting Xav result. The necessity of the latter becomes clear from the following. If women are taken at the age of, for example, 20 years old, then those who are from 20 to 21 years old and, therefore, their average age, strictly speaking, are not 20, but 20.5 years old. When using five-year age-specific fertility rates, the middle of the five-year age group is taken as the x value (for the group of 15-19 years, the middle will be 17.5; for 20-24 - 22.5; for 25-29 - 27.5; for 30- 34 - 32.5; for 35-39 - 37.5; for 40-44 - 42.5; for 45-49 - 47.5).

One of the most important indicators fertility is the total coefficient. Compared with the age coefficients that adequately characterize the level of fertility, the total fertility rate has at least three advantages.

First, unlike the age coefficients, which are 7 for five-year age groups or 35 for one-year age groups, the total coefficient characterizes the birth rate in one number.

Secondly, it is more understandable in meaning, since it does not show the often poorly realized number of births per 1000 women of a certain age, but the average number of children born to one woman.

Thirdly, this coefficient characterizes not only the birth rate, but also the reproduction of the population. It has already been noted above that the total fertility rate of approximately 2.1, in fact, separates the simple reproduction of the population (when the population size does not change from generation to generation) from the narrowed one (when each new generation is smaller in number than the previous one).

For general characteristics In the first place, it is expedient to use the total fertility rate. If there is a need to deepen the analysis of fertility, to identify the components of changes in the total fertility rate over time or its differences in different populations, one should turn to age-specific fertility rates.

2. Analytical part

We use site data for analysis http://www.gks.ru/ .

table 2

Number of births (excluding stillbirths), thousand people, Russian Federation, total population, annual value of the indicator.

	Number of births, thousand people

1. Calculate the average

2. Let's analyze the series of dynamics

a); thousand people

; thousand people

Let's put all the data in a table:

Table 3

Indicators
Number of births, thousand people
1. Absolute increase, thous. people, basic
2. Growth rate,%, basic
3. Growth rate,%, basic
4. Absolute value of 1% increase, basic

From the table we see that the birth rate is increasing, therefore, there is an acceleration of the process.

It follows from the calculated data that the average birth rate was 1467.534 thousand people. In 2007, compared with 1998, the increase in the birth rate of the population amounted to 326.83 thousand people. Every year, the birth rate of the population increases by 2.6% or by 36.31 thousand people.

3. We will identify the development trend using:

a) period consolidation

b) moving average

c) analytical alignment by the least squares method

Putting all the data in a table

Table 4

	Number of births, thousand people (y)	Amount by period (?y)	Period average ()	Sum by period by moving average	Period average

a=1399.98-177.84424

After analyzing the graph, we see that the birth rate tends to increase. Because equals, then we can conclude that the calculations are correct.

4. Let's extrapolate 3 years ahead

In 2010, predicting taking into account the identified trend, the birth rate will be

In 2011, predicting taking into account the identified trend, the birth rate will be

In 2012, predicting taking into account the identified trend, the birth rate will be

5. Let's do a correlation-regression analysis.

Let us take the number of marriages as a factor sign. We use site data for analysis http://www.gks.ru/.

Putting all the data in a table

Table 5

	Indicators
	Number of births, thousand people	Number of marriages

Let's define:

a) correlation coefficient

b) coefficient of determination

c) regression coefficient

d) coefficient of elasticity

Putting all the data in a table

Table 6

	Indicators
	Number of births, thousand people	Number of marriages

Conclusion: there is a direct close relationship between fertility and marriage.

Conclusion: in 78.97% of 100%, the birth rate of the population is affected by marriage, and the remaining 21.03% are due to other factors.

a=1016.58-1399.98*0.862799

a=1016.58-1207.8606

Conclusion: at the conclusion of 1 marriage, the birth rate increases by 0.8627699 thousand people.

Conclusion

The rate of depopulation of Russia's population has become menacing - the number of Russians is declining every year and, according to various forecasts, by 2050 may reach 100 million people (against today's 142 million). The low birth rate is only one of the reasons for the demographic crisis in Russia. In the Tver region, the most acute problem is the extremely high mortality of the population - both from natural causes and from unnatural ones (traffic accidents, alcohol poisoning, murders, etc.). To date, the concept of demographic policy has been prepared in the region, which contains a number of measures aimed at correcting the situation. Today, all regions of the Center of Russia have faced the problem of natural population decline, regardless of their level of economic development. Increasing the birth rate, increasing life expectancy, the quality and availability of health care and social protection services have become the main directions of state policy.

Some demographic indicators in the region require closer attention, more diverse, deep measures to correct them. Thousands of people of working age die in the prime of their lives from alcoholism, poor lifestyle, industrial accidents and traffic accidents. We are especially losing men under the age of sixty, whose mortality rate is almost fifty percent of the total number of male deaths.

In demography, forecasts are built by analogy with the experience of other countries. This experience unequivocally testifies: depopulation of the population is surmountable. According to preliminary estimates, the loss may be reduced by a few ppm in the foreseeable future. Demographic processes are inherently very inertial, and it is impossible to turn the flywheel of depopulation overnight.

However, all the above calculations were made by statisticians without taking into account the implementation of measures aimed at the demographic development of the Russian Federation and the implementation of a priority national project in the field of healthcare.

Generally statistics on the birth and death rates of the population, obtained last year and in January 2007, indicate the possibility of a positive change in demographic development trends.

Literature

1. Borisov V.A. Demography: Textbook. - 3rd ed., revised. and add. - M .: Nota Bene, 2003. - 344 p.

2. Breeva E.B. Demographic Basics: Tutorial. - M.: Publishing and Trade Corporation "Dashkov and Co", 2004. - 352 p.

3. Butov V.I. Demography: Textbook / Ed. V.G. Ignatov. - M.-Rostov on / D: March, 2003. - 592 p.

4. Demography and population statistics: Textbook / Ed. I.I. Eliseeva. - M.: FINANCE AND STATISTICS, 2006. - 688 p.

5. Demography: Textbook / Ed. ON THE. Volgin. - M.: RAGS, 2003. - 384 p.

6. Demography: Textbook / Ed. V.G. Glushkova. - M.: KNORUS, 2004. - 304 p.

7. Denisenko M.B., Kalmykova N.M. Demography: Proc. allowance. - M.: INFRA-M, 2007. - 424 p.

8. Medkov V.M. Demography: Textbook. - 2nd ed. - M.: INFRA-M, 2007. - 683 p.

9. Runova T.G. Demography: Textbook. - M.: MGIU, 2002. - 136 p.

10. Sagradov A.A. Economic demography: Textbook. - M.: INFRA-M, 2005. - 256 p.

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